infra/cli/cmd_vault.go

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package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"syscall"
)
// vault verbs give each unix user no-HITL access to THEIR OWN Vaultwarden vault.
// Identity is the kernel UID; per-user creds live in that user's isolated Vault
// path (secret/workstation/claude-users/<user>) read via their scoped token, and
// decryption is done by the official `bw` CLI. See
// docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-24-homelab-vault-design.md.
func vaultCommands() []Command {
return []Command{
{Path: []string{"vault", "setup"}, Tier: TierWrite,
Summary: "one-time: store your Vaultwarden master password + API key in your Vault path", Run: vaultSetup},
{Path: []string{"vault", "status"}, Tier: TierRead,
Summary: "show whether your vault is configured/reachable (no secrets)", Run: vaultStatus},
{Path: []string{"vault", "list"}, Tier: TierRead,
Summary: "list your item names: vault list [--search Q]", Run: vaultList},
{Path: []string{"vault", "get"}, Tier: TierRead,
Summary: "fetch one item: vault get <name> [--field password|username|uri|notes] [--json]", Run: vaultGet},
{Path: []string{"vault", "search"}, Tier: TierRead,
Summary: "search your item names: vault search <query>", Run: vaultSearch},
{Path: []string{"vault", "code"}, Tier: TierRead,
Summary: "current TOTP code for an item: vault code <name>", Run: vaultCode},
{Path: []string{"vault", "lock"}, Tier: TierWrite,
Summary: "lock/log out the local bw session", Run: vaultLock},
}
}
const vwUserPathPrefix = "secret/workstation/claude-users/"
// vwCreds is one user's Vaultwarden auth material, read from their Vault path.
type vwCreds struct {
Email string
MasterPassword string
ClientID string
ClientSecret string
}
// cmdRunner shells out to an external command with an explicit environment and
// returns trimmed stdout. Secrets are passed via envv, NEVER argv. Tests inject
// a fake; realRunner is the production implementation.
type cmdRunner func(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error)
func realRunner(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
cmd := exec.Command(name, argv...)
if envv != nil {
cmd.Env = envv
}
out, err := cmd.Output()
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err
}
func vwCredsPath(user string) string { return vwUserPathPrefix + user }
func bwAppDataDir(uid string) string { return "/run/user/" + uid + "/homelab-bw" }
// readVaultField returns one field from a KV-v2 path, "" if absent/error.
func readVaultField(run cmdRunner, field, path string) string {
out, err := run("vault", []string{"kv", "get", "-field=" + field, path}, nil)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return out
}
// loadCreds reads the four vaultwarden_* keys from the user's isolated path.
// A missing master password means the user hasn't onboarded.
func loadCreds(run cmdRunner, user string) (vwCreds, error) {
p := vwCredsPath(user)
c := vwCreds{
Email: readVaultField(run, "vaultwarden_email", p),
MasterPassword: readVaultField(run, "vaultwarden_master_password", p),
ClientID: readVaultField(run, "vaultwarden_client_id", p),
ClientSecret: readVaultField(run, "vaultwarden_client_secret", p),
}
if c.MasterPassword == "" {
return vwCreds{}, fmt.Errorf("vault not configured for this user — run `homelab vault setup`")
}
return c, nil
}
// vaultCurrentUser/vaultCurrentUID are seams for tests (avoid conflict with repo.go's currentUser func).
var vaultCurrentUser = func() string { return os.Getenv("USER") }
var vaultCurrentUID = func() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid()) }
// bwBaseEnv is the minimal non-secret environment bw/node need. We deliberately
// do NOT inherit the full parent env (keeps stray secrets out of the child).
func bwBaseEnv(appdata string) []string {
path := os.Getenv("PATH")
if path == "" {
path = "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"
}
return []string{
"PATH=" + path,
"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"),
"BITWARDENCLI_APPDATA_DIR=" + appdata,
"BW_NOINTERACTION=true",
}
}
// bwSecretEnv adds the secret-bearing vars. session may be "" (pre-unlock).
func bwSecretEnv(appdata string, c vwCreds, session string) []string {
env := bwBaseEnv(appdata)
env = append(env,
"BW_CLIENTID="+c.ClientID,
"BW_CLIENTSECRET="+c.ClientSecret,
"BW_PASSWORD="+c.MasterPassword,
)
if session != "" {
env = append(env, "BW_SESSION="+session)
}
return env
}
func bwLoginArgs() []string { return []string{"login", "--apikey"} }
func bwUnlockArgs() []string { return []string{"unlock", "--passwordenv", "BW_PASSWORD", "--raw"} }
func bwGetArgs(field, name string) []string { return []string{"get", field, name} }
func bwStatusArgs() []string { return []string{"status"} }
func bwListArgs(search string) []string {
a := []string{"list", "items"}
if search != "" {
a = append(a, "--search", search)
}
return a
}
// bwUnlock runs `bw unlock` and returns the raw session key.
func bwUnlock(run cmdRunner, env []string) (string, error) {
out, err := run("bw", bwUnlockArgs(), env)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("bw unlock failed (wrong master password? run `homelab vault setup`): %w", err)
}
return out, nil
}
// bwGet fetches one field of one item; session must be present in env.
func bwGet(run cmdRunner, env []string, field, name string) (string, error) {
return run("bw", bwGetArgs(field, name), env)
}
func returnMode(isTTY bool) string {
if isTTY {
return "clipboard"
}
return "stdout"
}
// stdoutIsTTY reports whether stdout is a character device (a terminal).
func stdoutIsTTY() bool {
fi, err := os.Stdout.Stat()
if err != nil {
return false
}
return fi.Mode()&os.ModeCharDevice != 0
}
// osc52 returns the OSC 52 escape that makes the local terminal copy payload to
// the system clipboard (works over SSH; no X11). osc52clear copies empty.
func osc52(payload string) string {
return "\x1b]52;c;" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload)) + "\a"
}
func osc52clear() string { return "\x1b]52;c;\a" }
// terminalAllowed gates OSC 52: only terminals known to honor clipboard writes,
// else we'd dump the secret's base64 into scrollback on unsupported terminals.
func terminalAllowed(term, termProgram string) bool {
t := strings.ToLower(term)
p := strings.ToLower(termProgram)
for _, ok := range []string{"kitty", "alacritty", "foot", "wezterm", "ghostty", "tmux", "screen"} {
if strings.Contains(t, ok) || strings.Contains(p, ok) {
return true
}
}
// xterm proper supports it only when the program is a known-good emulator.
return false
}
// opRecord is one CLI operation. ItemName is accepted for the caller's
// convenience but is INTENTIONALLY never rendered into the log line — auditing
// which of your own logins you opened is itself sensitive, and per-item reads
// are invisible server-side anyway (spec §9a).
type opRecord struct {
User string
Verb string
PID int
PPID int
ParentComm string
ItemName string // never logged
}
func opLogLine(r opRecord) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("user=%s verb=%s pid=%d ppid=%d parent=%s",
r.User, r.Verb, r.PID, r.PPID, r.ParentComm)
}
// parentComm reads /proc/<ppid>/comm (best-effort; "" on failure).
func parentComm(ppid int) string {
b, err := os.ReadFile(fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/comm", ppid))
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
}
// writeOpLog appends one privacy-aware line to the user's op-log (best-effort;
// never blocks or fails the command). Goes to syslog so it ships to Loki.
func writeOpLog(r opRecord) {
exec.Command("logger", "-t", "homelab-vault", opLogLine(r)).Run() // best-effort
}
func vaultLockPath(uid string) string { return "/run/user/" + uid + "/homelab-vault.lock" }
// hardenProcess disables core dumps so a bw/homelab crash can't spill the master
// password to a core file. Best-effort.
func hardenProcess() {
_ = syscall.Setrlimit(syscall.RLIMIT_CORE, &syscall.Rlimit{Cur: 0, Max: 0})
}
// withUserLock serializes bw mutations for this user (concurrent Claude sessions
// as the same user otherwise race bw's appdata). Returns an unlock func.
func withUserLock(uid string) (func(), error) {
f, err := os.OpenFile(vaultLockPath(uid), os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, 0600)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_EX); err != nil {
f.Close()
return nil, err
}
return func() { syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_UN); f.Close() }, nil
}
// session is one usable bw context: the env (with BW_SESSION) ready for `bw get`.
type session struct {
env []string
}
// openSession resolves creds, ensures login, unlocks, and returns a ready env.
// Caller must hold the user lock. appdata is created on tmpfs (0700).
func openSession(run cmdRunner, user, uid string) (session, error) {
creds, err := loadCreds(run, user)
if err != nil {
return session{}, err
}
appdata := bwAppDataDir(uid)
if err := os.MkdirAll(appdata, 0700); err != nil {
return session{}, fmt.Errorf("create bw appdata %s: %w", appdata, err)
}
loginEnv := bwSecretEnv(appdata, creds, "")
// Ensure server is set and we're logged in (idempotent; ignore "already").
_, _ = run("bw", []string{"config", "server", "https://vaultwarden.viktorbarzin.me"}, loginEnv)
if st, _ := run("bw", bwStatusArgs(), loginEnv); !strings.Contains(st, "\"status\"") || strings.Contains(st, "unauthenticated") {
if _, err := run("bw", bwLoginArgs(), loginEnv); err != nil {
return session{}, fmt.Errorf("bw login --apikey failed (API key valid? run `homelab vault setup`): %w", err)
}
}
sess, err := bwUnlock(run, loginEnv)
if err != nil {
return session{}, err
}
return session{env: bwSecretEnv(appdata, creds, sess)}, nil
}
func vaultSetup(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultStatus(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultList(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultGet(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultSearch(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultCode(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }
func vaultLock(args []string) error { return fmt.Errorf("not implemented") }