infra/stacks/webhook_handler/main.tf

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variable "tls_secret_name" {
type = string
sensitive = true
}
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "secrets" {
mount = "secret"
name = "webhook-handler"
}
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "webhook-handler" {
metadata {
name = "webhook-handler"
labels = {
tier = local.tiers.aux
"keel.sh/enrolled" = "true"
}
}
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip] ## Context Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with `metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode. Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey 2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace is affected. This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits show why each suppression exists. ## This change 107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` resource gets: ```hcl lifecycle { # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]] } ``` Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`): match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions `goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe. Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines). ## What is NOT in this change - `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out (paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran. - `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder comment). - `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) — gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited. - `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real apply to that stack. ## Verification Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern before and after: ``` $ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan Before: Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy. # kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place (goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null) # module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place (Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d) After: No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration. ``` Injection count check: ``` $ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' 108 ``` ## Reproduce locally 1. `git pull` 2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan` 3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label. Closes: code-dwx Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
module "tls_secret" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "deployment_updater" {
metadata {
name = "deployment-updater"
}
rule {
verbs = ["create", "update", "get", "patch", "list"]
api_groups = ["extensions", "apps", ""]
resources = ["deployments", "namespaces", "pods", "services"]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role_binding" "update_deployment_binding" {
metadata {
name = "update-deployment-binding"
}
subject {
kind = "ServiceAccount"
name = "default"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
}
role_ref {
api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
kind = "ClusterRole"
name = "deployment-updater"
}
}
resource "kubernetes_secret" "ssh-key" {
metadata {
name = "ssh-key"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
annotations = {
"reloader.stakater.com/match" = "true"
}
}
data = {
"id_rsa" = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.secrets.data["ssh_key"]
}
type = "generic"
}
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "webhook_handler" {
metadata {
name = "webhook-handler"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "webhook-handler"
tier = local.tiers.aux
}
annotations = {
"reloader.stakater.com/auto" = "true"
}
}
spec {
replicas = 1
selector {
match_labels = {
app = "webhook-handler"
}
}
template {
metadata {
labels = {
app = "webhook-handler"
}
}
spec {
container {
# security_context {
# run_as_user = 1000
# }
# lifecycle {
# post_start {
# exec {
# # Must be kept in sycn with webhook_handler dockerfile
# command = ["echo", "\"$SSH_KEY\"", ">", "/opt/id_rsa", "&&", "chown", "appuser", "/opt/id_rsa", "&&", "chmod", "600", "/opt/id_rsa"]
# }
# }
# }
image = "viktorbarzin/webhook-handler:latest"
name = "webhook-handler"
resources {
limits = {
memory = "64Mi"
}
requests = {
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cpu = "10m"
memory = "64Mi"
}
}
port {
container_port = 80
}
volume_mount {
name = "id-rsa"
mount_path = "/opt/id_rsa"
sub_path = "id_rsa"
}
env {
name = "WEBHOOKSECRET"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "secret"
}
}
}
env {
name = "FB_APP_SECRET"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "fb_app_secret"
}
}
}
env {
name = "FB_VERIFY_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "fb_verify_token"
}
}
}
env {
name = "FB_PAGE_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "fb_page_token"
}
}
}
env {
name = "CONFIG"
value = "./chatbot/config/viktorwebservices.yaml"
}
env {
name = "GIT_USER"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "git_user"
}
}
}
env {
name = "GIT_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "git_token"
}
}
}
env {
name = "SSH_KEY"
value = "/opt/id_rsa"
}
env {
name = "WOODPECKER_API_URL"
value = "https://ci.viktorbarzin.me"
}
env {
name = "WOODPECKER_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "woodpecker_token"
}
}
}
env {
name = "WOODPECKER_INFRA_REPO_ID"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "woodpecker_infra_repo_id"
}
}
}
env {
name = "AUTHENTIK_WEBHOOK_SECRET"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
key = "authentik_webhook_secret"
}
}
}
}
volume {
name = "id-rsa"
secret {
secret_name = "ssh-key"
}
}
}
}
}
lifecycle {
ignore_changes = [
spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config, # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1
metadata[0].annotations["keel.sh/policy"],
metadata[0].annotations["keel.sh/trigger"],
metadata[0].annotations["keel.sh/pollSchedule"], # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V2
]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_service" "webhook_handler" {
metadata {
name = "webhook-handler"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
labels = {
"app" = "webhook-handler"
}
}
spec {
selector = {
app = "webhook-handler"
}
port {
port = "80"
target_port = "3000"
}
}
}
module "ingress" {
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
# Webhook receiver — third parties (Forgejo, GitHub, etc.) POST events without
# browser sessions. Forward-auth would block all webhook deliveries.
infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent. Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately: - navidrome (Subsonic user/password) - ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens) - nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords) - vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth) - headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes) - paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens) Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public, webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt), claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api, fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster (meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2 (HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT), owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc), rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge (API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker (forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports). real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a prior edit — not touched here. No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
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# auth = "none": Webhook receiver — third parties (Forgejo, GitHub, etc.) POST events without browser sessions; forward-auth blocks deliveries.
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
auth = "none"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler.metadata[0].name
name = "webhook-handler"
host = "webhook"
[infra] Auto-create Cloudflare DNS records from ingress_factory ## Context Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars — a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten, leaving services unreachable externally. ## This change: - Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory` modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP). - Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard `*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing. - Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key). - Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses, special cases). - Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook. ``` BEFORE AFTER config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf | module "ingress" { v dns_type = "proxied" stacks/cloudflared/ } for_each = list | cloudflare_record auto-creates tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation ``` ## What is NOT in this change: - Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars) - 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases) - Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dns_type = "non-proxied"
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
extra_annotations = {
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "Webhook Handler"
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Webhook relay"
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "webhook.png"
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Automation"
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
}
}
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "external_secret" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
kind = "ExternalSecret"
metadata = {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
namespace = "webhook-handler"
}
spec = {
refreshInterval = "15m"
secretStoreRef = {
name = "vault-kv"
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
}
target = {
name = "webhook-handler-secrets"
}
dataFrom = [{
extract = {
key = "webhook-handler"
}
}]
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.webhook-handler]
}