49 lines
3.1 KiB
Terraform
49 lines
3.1 KiB
Terraform
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# this is appended and merged to the main postfix.cf
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# see defaults - https://github.com/docker-mailserver/docker-mailserver/blob/master/target/postfix/main.cf
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variable "postfix_cf" {
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default = <<EOT
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relayhost = [smtp-relay.brevo.com]:587
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smtp_sasl_auth_enable = yes
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smtp_sasl_password_maps = hash:/etc/postfix/sasl/passwd
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smtp_sasl_security_options = noanonymous
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smtp_sasl_tls_security_options = noanonymous
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smtp_tls_security_level = encrypt
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# TLS cert/key come from docker-mailserver's SSL_TYPE=manual flow, which writes
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# the authoritative `smtpd_tls_chain_files` into main.cf at boot. Setting the
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# legacy smtpd_tls_cert_file/smtpd_tls_key_file here too makes postfix warn
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# ("Both smtpd_tls_chain_files and one or more of the legacy ...") and ignore
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# them. Dropped to silence the warning — functionally a no-op (chain_files wins).
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smtpd_use_tls=yes
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# Require STARTTLS before any AUTH command on the SMTPD listener.
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# Without this, a misconfigured client that skips STARTTLS would send
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# PLAIN/LOGIN creds in the clear. docker-mailserver's default does NOT
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# enforce this at the main.cf level for submission (587).
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# Note: smtpd_sasl_auth_only (sometimes cited) is NOT a real Postfix
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# parameter — only smtpd_tls_auth_only is. Addresses code-vnw.
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smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes
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header_size_limit = 4096000
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# Debug mail tls
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smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1
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#smtpd_tls_ciphers = TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:!aNULL:!SEED:!CAMELLIA:!RSA+AES:!SHA1
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#tls_medium_cipherlist = ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:!aNULL:!SEED:!CAMELLIA:!RSA+AES:!SHA1
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# Rate limiting (brute-force protection)
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smtpd_client_connection_rate_limit = 10
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smtpd_client_message_rate_limit = 30
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anvil_rate_time_unit = 60s
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# Disable the postscreen decision cache. The default (btree) driver
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# requires an exclusive file lock for every access, and with postscreen
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# re-spawning per connection (master.cf: maxproc=1) that produces thousands
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# of 'unable to get exclusive lock' fatals per day — stalling SMTP
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# acceptance and starving inbound delivery. lmdb would avoid the lock but
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# isn't compiled into docker-mailserver 15.0.0's Postfix build
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# (postconf -m → no lmdb). Proxy:btree is unsafe because postscreen does
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# its own locking. An empty value disables the cache entirely — legitimate
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# clients pay the greet/bare-newline re-check on every new TCP session,
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# which is trivial at our volume (~100 deliveries/day).
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postscreen_cache_map =
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EOT
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}
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