2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
variable "tls_secret_name" {}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "tier" { type = string }
|
|
|
|
|
variable "headscale_config" {}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "headscale_acl" {}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "nfs_server" { type = string }
|
|
|
|
|
variable "homepage_token" {
|
|
|
|
|
type = string
|
|
|
|
|
default = ""
|
|
|
|
|
sensitive = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
variable "ui_cookie_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
type = string
|
|
|
|
|
sensitive = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "ui_api_key" {
|
|
|
|
|
type = string
|
|
|
|
|
sensitive = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 15:44:13 +02:00
|
|
|
variable "headscale_derp_map" {
|
|
|
|
|
type = string
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "headscale" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
tier = var.tier
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno
ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with
`metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This
is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks
should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how
Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode.
Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label
as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey
2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the
label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace
is affected.
This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same
`# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for
the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any
Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records
which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits
show why each suppression exists.
## This change
107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"`
resource gets:
```hcl
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
```
Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`):
match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the
outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing
brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions
`goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe.
Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces
one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines).
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out
(paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran.
- `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally
minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file
has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder
comment).
- `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) —
gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in
authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted
to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will
need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real
apply to that stack.
## Verification
Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern
before and after:
```
$ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan
Before:
Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy.
# kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place
(goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null)
# module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place
(Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d)
After:
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.
```
Injection count check:
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
108
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan`
3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label.
Closes: code-dwx
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "tls_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
truenas deprecation: migrate all non-immich storage to proxmox NFS
- Migrate 7 backup CronJobs to Proxmox host NFS (192.168.1.127)
(etcd, mysql, postgresql, nextcloud, redis, vaultwarden, plotting-book)
- Migrate headscale backup, ebook2audiobook, osm_routing to Proxmox NFS
- Migrate servarr (lidarr, readarr, soulseek) NFS refs to Proxmox
- Remove 79 orphaned TrueNAS NFS module declarations from 49 stacks
- Delete stacks/platform/modules/ (27 dead module copies, 65MB)
- Update nfs-truenas StorageClass to point to Proxmox (192.168.1.127)
- Remove iscsi DNS record from config.tfvars
- Fix woodpecker persistence config and alertmanager PV
Only Immich (8 PVCs, ~1.4TB) remains on TrueNAS.
2026-04-12 14:35:39 +01:00
|
|
|
module "nfs_data_host" {
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/nfs_volume"
|
truenas deprecation: migrate all non-immich storage to proxmox NFS
- Migrate 7 backup CronJobs to Proxmox host NFS (192.168.1.127)
(etcd, mysql, postgresql, nextcloud, redis, vaultwarden, plotting-book)
- Migrate headscale backup, ebook2audiobook, osm_routing to Proxmox NFS
- Migrate servarr (lidarr, readarr, soulseek) NFS refs to Proxmox
- Remove 79 orphaned TrueNAS NFS module declarations from 49 stacks
- Delete stacks/platform/modules/ (27 dead module copies, 65MB)
- Update nfs-truenas StorageClass to point to Proxmox (192.168.1.127)
- Remove iscsi DNS record from config.tfvars
- Fix woodpecker persistence config and alertmanager PV
Only Immich (8 PVCs, ~1.4TB) remains on TrueNAS.
2026-04-12 14:35:39 +01:00
|
|
|
name = "headscale-data-host"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
truenas deprecation: migrate all non-immich storage to proxmox NFS
- Migrate 7 backup CronJobs to Proxmox host NFS (192.168.1.127)
(etcd, mysql, postgresql, nextcloud, redis, vaultwarden, plotting-book)
- Migrate headscale backup, ebook2audiobook, osm_routing to Proxmox NFS
- Migrate servarr (lidarr, readarr, soulseek) NFS refs to Proxmox
- Remove 79 orphaned TrueNAS NFS module declarations from 49 stacks
- Delete stacks/platform/modules/ (27 dead module copies, 65MB)
- Update nfs-truenas StorageClass to point to Proxmox (192.168.1.127)
- Remove iscsi DNS record from config.tfvars
- Fix woodpecker persistence config and alertmanager PV
Only Immich (8 PVCs, ~1.4TB) remains on TrueNAS.
2026-04-12 14:35:39 +01:00
|
|
|
nfs_server = "192.168.1.127"
|
|
|
|
|
nfs_path = "/srv/nfs/headscale"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(storage): migrate all sensitive services to proxmox-lvm-encrypted
Reconcile Terraform with cluster state after manual encrypted PVC migrations
and complete the remaining unfinished migrations. All services storing
sensitive data now use LUKS2-encrypted block storage via the Proxmox CSI
plugin.
## Context
Only Technitium DNS was using encrypted storage in Terraform. Many services
had been manually migrated to encrypted PVCs in the cluster, but Terraform
was never updated — creating dangerous state drift where a `tg apply` could
recreate unencrypted PVCs.
## This change
Phase 0 — Infrastructure:
- Add `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` StorageClass to Helm values (extraParameters)
- Add ExternalSecret for LUKS encryption passphrase to Terraform
- Fix CSI node plugin memory: `node.plugin.resources` (not `node.resources`)
with 1280Mi limit for LUKS2 Argon2id key derivation
Phase 1 — TF state reconciliation (zero downtime):
- Health, Matrix, N8N, Forgejo, Vaultwarden, Mailserver: state rm + import
- Redis, DBAAS MySQL, DBAAS PostgreSQL: Helm/CNPG value updates
Phase 2 — Data migration (encrypted PVCs existed but unused):
- Headscale, Frigate, MeshCentral: rsync + switchover
- Nextcloud (20Gi): rsync + chart_values update
Phase 3 — New encrypted PVCs:
- Roundcube HTML, HackMD, Affine, DBAAS pgadmin: create + rsync + switchover
Phase 4 — Cleanup:
- Deleted 5 orphaned unencrypted PVCs
## Services migrated (18 PVCs across 14 namespaces)
```
vaultwarden → vaultwarden-data-encrypted
dbaas → datadir-mysql-cluster-0, pg-cluster-{1,2}, dbaas-pgadmin-encrypted
mailserver → mailserver-data-encrypted, roundcubemail-{enigma,html}-encrypted
nextcloud → nextcloud-data-encrypted
forgejo → forgejo-data-encrypted
matrix → matrix-data-encrypted
n8n → n8n-data-encrypted
affine → affine-data-encrypted
health → health-uploads-encrypted
hackmd → hackmd-data-encrypted
redis → redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}
headscale → headscale-data-encrypted
frigate → frigate-config-encrypted
meshcentral → meshcentral-{data,files}-encrypted
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:15:30 +00:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim" "data_encrypted" {
|
feat(storage): migrate 12 SQLite NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 1)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
SQLite-backed services. Deployments updated to use new block storage
PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for 1-week rollback.
Services: ntfy, freshrss, insta2spotify, actualbudget (x3),
wealthfolio, navidrome (DB only), audiobookshelf config,
headscale, forgejo, uptime-kuma.
Also: set Recreate strategy on ntfy, forgejo, insta2spotify,
wealthfolio (required for RWO volumes).
2026-04-04 16:26:59 +03:00
|
|
|
wait_until_bound = false
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
feat(storage): migrate all sensitive services to proxmox-lvm-encrypted
Reconcile Terraform with cluster state after manual encrypted PVC migrations
and complete the remaining unfinished migrations. All services storing
sensitive data now use LUKS2-encrypted block storage via the Proxmox CSI
plugin.
## Context
Only Technitium DNS was using encrypted storage in Terraform. Many services
had been manually migrated to encrypted PVCs in the cluster, but Terraform
was never updated — creating dangerous state drift where a `tg apply` could
recreate unencrypted PVCs.
## This change
Phase 0 — Infrastructure:
- Add `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` StorageClass to Helm values (extraParameters)
- Add ExternalSecret for LUKS encryption passphrase to Terraform
- Fix CSI node plugin memory: `node.plugin.resources` (not `node.resources`)
with 1280Mi limit for LUKS2 Argon2id key derivation
Phase 1 — TF state reconciliation (zero downtime):
- Health, Matrix, N8N, Forgejo, Vaultwarden, Mailserver: state rm + import
- Redis, DBAAS MySQL, DBAAS PostgreSQL: Helm/CNPG value updates
Phase 2 — Data migration (encrypted PVCs existed but unused):
- Headscale, Frigate, MeshCentral: rsync + switchover
- Nextcloud (20Gi): rsync + chart_values update
Phase 3 — New encrypted PVCs:
- Roundcube HTML, HackMD, Affine, DBAAS pgadmin: create + rsync + switchover
Phase 4 — Cleanup:
- Deleted 5 orphaned unencrypted PVCs
## Services migrated (18 PVCs across 14 namespaces)
```
vaultwarden → vaultwarden-data-encrypted
dbaas → datadir-mysql-cluster-0, pg-cluster-{1,2}, dbaas-pgadmin-encrypted
mailserver → mailserver-data-encrypted, roundcubemail-{enigma,html}-encrypted
nextcloud → nextcloud-data-encrypted
forgejo → forgejo-data-encrypted
matrix → matrix-data-encrypted
n8n → n8n-data-encrypted
affine → affine-data-encrypted
health → health-uploads-encrypted
hackmd → hackmd-data-encrypted
redis → redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}
headscale → headscale-data-encrypted
frigate → frigate-config-encrypted
meshcentral → meshcentral-{data,files}-encrypted
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:15:30 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "headscale-data-encrypted"
|
feat(storage): migrate 12 SQLite NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 1)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
SQLite-backed services. Deployments updated to use new block storage
PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for 1-week rollback.
Services: ntfy, freshrss, insta2spotify, actualbudget (x3),
wealthfolio, navidrome (DB only), audiobookshelf config,
headscale, forgejo, uptime-kuma.
Also: set Recreate strategy on ntfy, forgejo, insta2spotify,
wealthfolio (required for RWO volumes).
2026-04-04 16:26:59 +03:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
2026-05-10 19:56:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/threshold" = "10%"
|
feat(storage): migrate 12 SQLite NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 1)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
SQLite-backed services. Deployments updated to use new block storage
PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for 1-week rollback.
Services: ntfy, freshrss, insta2spotify, actualbudget (x3),
wealthfolio, navidrome (DB only), audiobookshelf config,
headscale, forgejo, uptime-kuma.
Also: set Recreate strategy on ntfy, forgejo, insta2spotify,
wealthfolio (required for RWO volumes).
2026-04-04 16:26:59 +03:00
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/increase" = "100%"
|
|
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/storage_limit" = "5Gi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
access_modes = ["ReadWriteOnce"]
|
feat(storage): migrate all sensitive services to proxmox-lvm-encrypted
Reconcile Terraform with cluster state after manual encrypted PVC migrations
and complete the remaining unfinished migrations. All services storing
sensitive data now use LUKS2-encrypted block storage via the Proxmox CSI
plugin.
## Context
Only Technitium DNS was using encrypted storage in Terraform. Many services
had been manually migrated to encrypted PVCs in the cluster, but Terraform
was never updated — creating dangerous state drift where a `tg apply` could
recreate unencrypted PVCs.
## This change
Phase 0 — Infrastructure:
- Add `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` StorageClass to Helm values (extraParameters)
- Add ExternalSecret for LUKS encryption passphrase to Terraform
- Fix CSI node plugin memory: `node.plugin.resources` (not `node.resources`)
with 1280Mi limit for LUKS2 Argon2id key derivation
Phase 1 — TF state reconciliation (zero downtime):
- Health, Matrix, N8N, Forgejo, Vaultwarden, Mailserver: state rm + import
- Redis, DBAAS MySQL, DBAAS PostgreSQL: Helm/CNPG value updates
Phase 2 — Data migration (encrypted PVCs existed but unused):
- Headscale, Frigate, MeshCentral: rsync + switchover
- Nextcloud (20Gi): rsync + chart_values update
Phase 3 — New encrypted PVCs:
- Roundcube HTML, HackMD, Affine, DBAAS pgadmin: create + rsync + switchover
Phase 4 — Cleanup:
- Deleted 5 orphaned unencrypted PVCs
## Services migrated (18 PVCs across 14 namespaces)
```
vaultwarden → vaultwarden-data-encrypted
dbaas → datadir-mysql-cluster-0, pg-cluster-{1,2}, dbaas-pgadmin-encrypted
mailserver → mailserver-data-encrypted, roundcubemail-{enigma,html}-encrypted
nextcloud → nextcloud-data-encrypted
forgejo → forgejo-data-encrypted
matrix → matrix-data-encrypted
n8n → n8n-data-encrypted
affine → affine-data-encrypted
health → health-uploads-encrypted
hackmd → hackmd-data-encrypted
redis → redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}
headscale → headscale-data-encrypted
frigate → frigate-config-encrypted
meshcentral → meshcentral-{data,files}-encrypted
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:15:30 +00:00
|
|
|
storage_class_name = "proxmox-lvm-encrypted"
|
feat(storage): migrate 12 SQLite NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 1)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
SQLite-backed services. Deployments updated to use new block storage
PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for 1-week rollback.
Services: ntfy, freshrss, insta2spotify, actualbudget (x3),
wealthfolio, navidrome (DB only), audiobookshelf config,
headscale, forgejo, uptime-kuma.
Also: set Recreate strategy on ntfy, forgejo, insta2spotify,
wealthfolio (required for RWO volumes).
2026-04-04 16:26:59 +03:00
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
storage = "1Gi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "headscale" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
tier = var.tier
|
|
|
|
|
# scare to try but probably non-http will fail
|
|
|
|
|
# "istio-injection" : "enabled"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"reloader.stakater.com/search" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
replicas = 1
|
|
|
|
|
strategy {
|
|
|
|
|
type = "Recreate"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
selector {
|
|
|
|
|
match_labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
# "diun.enable" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
"diun.enable" = "false"
|
|
|
|
|
"diun.include_tags" = "^\\d+(?:\\.\\d+)?(?:\\.\\d+)?$"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
2026-03-24 14:51:09 +02:00
|
|
|
image = "headscale/headscale:0.28.0"
|
|
|
|
|
# image = "headscale/headscale:0.28.0-debug" # -debug is for debug images
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["headscale", "serve"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
cpu = "50m"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "128Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "128Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 9090
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 41641
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-24 14:51:09 +02:00
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 3479
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "UDP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
liveness_probe {
|
|
|
|
|
http_get {
|
|
|
|
|
path = "/health"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
initial_delay_seconds = 15
|
|
|
|
|
period_seconds = 30
|
|
|
|
|
timeout_seconds = 5
|
|
|
|
|
failure_threshold = 5
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
readiness_probe {
|
|
|
|
|
http_get {
|
|
|
|
|
path = "/health"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
initial_delay_seconds = 5
|
|
|
|
|
period_seconds = 30
|
|
|
|
|
timeout_seconds = 5
|
|
|
|
|
failure_threshold = 3
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "config-volume"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/etc/headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/mnt"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "nfs-config"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "config-volume"
|
|
|
|
|
config_map {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-config"
|
|
|
|
|
items {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "config.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
path = "config.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
items {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "acl.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
path = "acl.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 15:44:13 +02:00
|
|
|
items {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "derp.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
path = "derp.yaml"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "nfs-config"
|
|
|
|
|
persistent_volume_claim {
|
feat(storage): migrate all sensitive services to proxmox-lvm-encrypted
Reconcile Terraform with cluster state after manual encrypted PVC migrations
and complete the remaining unfinished migrations. All services storing
sensitive data now use LUKS2-encrypted block storage via the Proxmox CSI
plugin.
## Context
Only Technitium DNS was using encrypted storage in Terraform. Many services
had been manually migrated to encrypted PVCs in the cluster, but Terraform
was never updated — creating dangerous state drift where a `tg apply` could
recreate unencrypted PVCs.
## This change
Phase 0 — Infrastructure:
- Add `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` StorageClass to Helm values (extraParameters)
- Add ExternalSecret for LUKS encryption passphrase to Terraform
- Fix CSI node plugin memory: `node.plugin.resources` (not `node.resources`)
with 1280Mi limit for LUKS2 Argon2id key derivation
Phase 1 — TF state reconciliation (zero downtime):
- Health, Matrix, N8N, Forgejo, Vaultwarden, Mailserver: state rm + import
- Redis, DBAAS MySQL, DBAAS PostgreSQL: Helm/CNPG value updates
Phase 2 — Data migration (encrypted PVCs existed but unused):
- Headscale, Frigate, MeshCentral: rsync + switchover
- Nextcloud (20Gi): rsync + chart_values update
Phase 3 — New encrypted PVCs:
- Roundcube HTML, HackMD, Affine, DBAAS pgadmin: create + rsync + switchover
Phase 4 — Cleanup:
- Deleted 5 orphaned unencrypted PVCs
## Services migrated (18 PVCs across 14 namespaces)
```
vaultwarden → vaultwarden-data-encrypted
dbaas → datadir-mysql-cluster-0, pg-cluster-{1,2}, dbaas-pgadmin-encrypted
mailserver → mailserver-data-encrypted, roundcubemail-{enigma,html}-encrypted
nextcloud → nextcloud-data-encrypted
forgejo → forgejo-data-encrypted
matrix → matrix-data-encrypted
n8n → n8n-data-encrypted
affine → affine-data-encrypted
health → health-uploads-encrypted
hackmd → hackmd-data-encrypted
redis → redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}
headscale → headscale-data-encrypted
frigate → frigate-config-encrypted
meshcentral → meshcentral-{data,files}-encrypted
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:15:30 +00:00
|
|
|
claim_name = kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.data_encrypted.metadata[0].name
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
# container {
|
|
|
|
|
# image = "simcu/headscale-ui:0.1.4"
|
|
|
|
|
# name = "headscale-ui"
|
|
|
|
|
# port {
|
|
|
|
|
# container_port = 80
|
|
|
|
|
# }
|
|
|
|
|
# }
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
fix: add Headscale monitoring, alerts, and pin UI image
- Add 4 Prometheus alerts: HeadscaleDown (critical), NoOnlineNodes,
HighHTTPLatency, HighErrorRate
- Add Grafana dashboard with node count, map responses, HTTP latency,
nodestore operations, and memory panels
- Pin headscale-ui to digest sha256:015f5ba0... (was :latest)
- Set disable_check_updates: true to skip GitHub check on startup
- Uptime Kuma monitor already existed (id=19, 300s interval)
2026-03-28 16:07:04 +02:00
|
|
|
image = "ghcr.io/gurucomputing/headscale-ui@sha256:015f5ba04bcbd5ee03178540a1dbbfc97b6896d7411032e3bf33c2f3e08f8b6f"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
# image = "ghcr.io/tale/headplane:0.3.2"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-ui"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
cpu = "25m"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "128Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "128Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 8081
|
|
|
|
|
# container_port = 3000
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "HTTP_PORT"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "8081"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
# env {
|
|
|
|
|
# name = "HTTPS_PORT"
|
|
|
|
|
# value = "8082"
|
|
|
|
|
# }
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "HEADSCALE_URL"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "http://localhost:8080"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "COOKIE_SECRET"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
value = var.ui_cookie_secret
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "ROOT_API_KEY"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
value = var.ui_api_key
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
dns_config {
|
|
|
|
|
option {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "ndots"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "2"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "headscale" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"app" = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"prometheus.io/scrape" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
"prometheus.io/port" = "9090"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
# annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
# "metallb.universe.tf/allow-shared-ip" : "shared"
|
|
|
|
|
# }
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
# type = "LoadBalancer"
|
|
|
|
|
# external_traffic_policy = "Cluster"
|
|
|
|
|
selector = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
port = "8080"
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-ui"
|
|
|
|
|
port = "80"
|
|
|
|
|
target_port = 8081
|
|
|
|
|
# target_port = 3000
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "metrics"
|
|
|
|
|
port = "9090"
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "ingress" {
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
|
|
|
|
|
# Headscale is the Tailscale control plane — native Tailscale clients
|
|
|
|
|
# register, exchange keys, and pull DERP maps from headscale.viktorbarzin.me.
|
|
|
|
|
# Forward-auth would break every Tailscale client. Headscale has its own
|
|
|
|
|
# OIDC + preauth-key auth at the app layer; the web admin UI lives on a
|
|
|
|
|
# separate /web ingress that remains auth=required.
|
|
|
|
|
auth = "none"
|
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
|
|
|
dns_type = "non-proxied"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
extra_annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "Headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "VPN mesh network"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "headscale.png"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Identity & Security"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-28 14:26:51 +02:00
|
|
|
# Dedicated IngressRoute for DERP — bypasses CrowdSec, rate limiting, anti-AI,
|
|
|
|
|
# and error pages middlewares that interfere with the Upgrade: DERP protocol.
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "derp_ingress_route" {
|
|
|
|
|
manifest = {
|
|
|
|
|
apiVersion = "traefik.io/v1alpha1"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "IngressRoute"
|
|
|
|
|
metadata = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-derp"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec = {
|
|
|
|
|
entryPoints = ["websecure"]
|
|
|
|
|
routes = [{
|
|
|
|
|
match = "Host(`headscale.viktorbarzin.me`) && PathPrefix(`/derp`)"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "Rule"
|
|
|
|
|
services = [{
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_service.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}]
|
2026-04-05 20:01:06 +03:00
|
|
|
# Minimal middleware — retry + rate-limit. No CrowdSec/anti-AI (DERP is a relay protocol)
|
|
|
|
|
middlewares = [
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
name = "retry"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = "traefik"
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
name = "rate-limit"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = "traefik"
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
2026-03-28 14:26:51 +02:00
|
|
|
}]
|
|
|
|
|
tls = {
|
|
|
|
|
secretName = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
module "ingress-ui" {
|
|
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
auth = "required"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-ui"
|
|
|
|
|
host = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
service_name = "headscale"
|
2026-04-06 11:58:00 +03:00
|
|
|
port = 80
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ingress_path = ["/web"]
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "headscale-server" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-server"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"app" = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
consolidate MetalLB IPs: 5 → 1 (10.0.20.200)
Migrate all 11 LoadBalancer services to share 10.0.20.200:
- Update annotations: metallb.universe.tf → metallb.io
- Pin all services to 10.0.20.200 with allow-shared-ip: shared
- Standardize externalTrafficPolicy to Cluster (required for IP sharing)
- Remove redundant port 80 (roundcube) from mailserver LB
- Update CoreDNS forward: 10.0.20.204 → 10.0.20.200
- Update cloudflared tunnel target: 10.0.20.202 → 10.0.20.200
Services consolidated: coturn, headscale, kms, qbittorrent, shadowsocks,
torrserver, wireguard, mailserver, traefik, xray, technitium
2026-03-24 18:35:43 +02:00
|
|
|
"metallb.io/loadBalancerIPs" = "10.0.20.200"
|
|
|
|
|
"metallb.io/allow-shared-ip" = "shared"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
type = "LoadBalancer"
|
|
|
|
|
external_traffic_policy = "Cluster"
|
|
|
|
|
selector = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
# port {
|
|
|
|
|
# name = "headscale-tcp"
|
|
|
|
|
# port = "41641"
|
|
|
|
|
# protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
# }
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-udp"
|
|
|
|
|
port = "41641"
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "UDP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-24 14:51:09 +02:00
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "stun"
|
|
|
|
|
port = "3479"
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "UDP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "headscale-config" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-config"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"reloader.stakater.com/match" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
"config.yaml" = var.headscale_config
|
|
|
|
|
"acl.yaml" = var.headscale_acl
|
2026-03-28 15:44:13 +02:00
|
|
|
"derp.yaml" = var.headscale_derp_map
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
# Backup CronJob — sqlite3 .backup from proxmox-lvm to NFS for cloud sync pickup
|
|
|
|
|
# Uses pod_affinity to co-locate with headscale pod (required for RWO PVC access)
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cron_job_v1" "headscale_backup" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "headscale-backup"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.headscale.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
concurrency_policy = "Replace"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
schedule = "0 */6 * * *"
|
|
|
|
|
successful_jobs_history_limit = 1
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
failed_jobs_history_limit = 3
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
job_template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
backoff_limit = 3
|
|
|
|
|
ttl_seconds_after_finished = 10
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
affinity {
|
|
|
|
|
pod_affinity {
|
|
|
|
|
required_during_scheduling_ignored_during_execution {
|
|
|
|
|
label_selector {
|
|
|
|
|
match_labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "headscale"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
topology_key = "kubernetes.io/hostname"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
container {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
name = "backup"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "docker.io/library/alpine"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOT
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
set -euxo pipefail
|
|
|
|
|
apk add --no-cache sqlite
|
|
|
|
|
now=$(date +"%Y_%m_%d_%H_%M")
|
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p /backup
|
|
|
|
|
sqlite3 /data/db.sqlite ".backup /backup/db.sqlite.bak"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
echo "Backup completed at $(date)"
|
|
|
|
|
EOT
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
name = "data"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/data"
|
|
|
|
|
read_only = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "backup"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/backup"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
name = "data"
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
persistent_volume_claim {
|
feat(storage): migrate all sensitive services to proxmox-lvm-encrypted
Reconcile Terraform with cluster state after manual encrypted PVC migrations
and complete the remaining unfinished migrations. All services storing
sensitive data now use LUKS2-encrypted block storage via the Proxmox CSI
plugin.
## Context
Only Technitium DNS was using encrypted storage in Terraform. Many services
had been manually migrated to encrypted PVCs in the cluster, but Terraform
was never updated — creating dangerous state drift where a `tg apply` could
recreate unencrypted PVCs.
## This change
Phase 0 — Infrastructure:
- Add `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` StorageClass to Helm values (extraParameters)
- Add ExternalSecret for LUKS encryption passphrase to Terraform
- Fix CSI node plugin memory: `node.plugin.resources` (not `node.resources`)
with 1280Mi limit for LUKS2 Argon2id key derivation
Phase 1 — TF state reconciliation (zero downtime):
- Health, Matrix, N8N, Forgejo, Vaultwarden, Mailserver: state rm + import
- Redis, DBAAS MySQL, DBAAS PostgreSQL: Helm/CNPG value updates
Phase 2 — Data migration (encrypted PVCs existed but unused):
- Headscale, Frigate, MeshCentral: rsync + switchover
- Nextcloud (20Gi): rsync + chart_values update
Phase 3 — New encrypted PVCs:
- Roundcube HTML, HackMD, Affine, DBAAS pgadmin: create + rsync + switchover
Phase 4 — Cleanup:
- Deleted 5 orphaned unencrypted PVCs
## Services migrated (18 PVCs across 14 namespaces)
```
vaultwarden → vaultwarden-data-encrypted
dbaas → datadir-mysql-cluster-0, pg-cluster-{1,2}, dbaas-pgadmin-encrypted
mailserver → mailserver-data-encrypted, roundcubemail-{enigma,html}-encrypted
nextcloud → nextcloud-data-encrypted
forgejo → forgejo-data-encrypted
matrix → matrix-data-encrypted
n8n → n8n-data-encrypted
affine → affine-data-encrypted
health → health-uploads-encrypted
hackmd → hackmd-data-encrypted
redis → redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}
headscale → headscale-data-encrypted
frigate → frigate-config-encrypted
meshcentral → meshcentral-{data,files}-encrypted
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 20:15:30 +00:00
|
|
|
claim_name = kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.data_encrypted.metadata[0].name
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "backup"
|
|
|
|
|
persistent_volume_claim {
|
truenas deprecation: migrate all non-immich storage to proxmox NFS
- Migrate 7 backup CronJobs to Proxmox host NFS (192.168.1.127)
(etcd, mysql, postgresql, nextcloud, redis, vaultwarden, plotting-book)
- Migrate headscale backup, ebook2audiobook, osm_routing to Proxmox NFS
- Migrate servarr (lidarr, readarr, soulseek) NFS refs to Proxmox
- Remove 79 orphaned TrueNAS NFS module declarations from 49 stacks
- Delete stacks/platform/modules/ (27 dead module copies, 65MB)
- Update nfs-truenas StorageClass to point to Proxmox (192.168.1.127)
- Remove iscsi DNS record from config.tfvars
- Fix woodpecker persistence config and alertmanager PV
Only Immich (8 PVCs, ~1.4TB) remains on TrueNAS.
2026-04-12 14:35:39 +01:00
|
|
|
claim_name = module.nfs_data_host.claim_name
|
2026-04-08 08:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
restart_policy = "OnFailure"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-28 14:38:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
fix: add Headscale monitoring, alerts, and pin UI image
- Add 4 Prometheus alerts: HeadscaleDown (critical), NoOnlineNodes,
HighHTTPLatency, HighErrorRate
- Add Grafana dashboard with node count, map responses, HTTP latency,
nodestore operations, and memory panels
- Pin headscale-ui to digest sha256:015f5ba0... (was :latest)
- Set disable_check_updates: true to skip GitHub check on startup
- Uptime Kuma monitor already existed (id=19, 300s interval)
2026-03-28 16:07:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Grafana dashboard
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "grafana_headscale_dashboard" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "grafana-headscale-dashboard"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = "monitoring"
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
grafana_dashboard = "1"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat: organize Grafana dashboards into folders
Enable sidecar folderAnnotation + foldersFromFilesStructure to group
26 dashboards into 5 managed folders:
- Cluster (6): k8s health, API server, nodes, pods, kube-state-metrics
- Networking (6): CoreDNS, Technitium, Headscale, ingress, network traffic
- Hardware (5): node-exporter, proxmox, iDRAC, UPS, NVIDIA GPU
- Operations (4): backup health, registry, audit logs, Loki
- Applications (2): realestate-crawler, qBittorrent
Dashboard-to-folder mapping defined in grafana.tf locals block.
External stacks (headscale, technitium) annotated individually.
2026-03-28 16:23:49 +02:00
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
grafana_folder = "Networking"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
fix: add Headscale monitoring, alerts, and pin UI image
- Add 4 Prometheus alerts: HeadscaleDown (critical), NoOnlineNodes,
HighHTTPLatency, HighErrorRate
- Add Grafana dashboard with node count, map responses, HTTP latency,
nodestore operations, and memory panels
- Pin headscale-ui to digest sha256:015f5ba0... (was :latest)
- Set disable_check_updates: true to skip GitHub check on startup
- Uptime Kuma monitor already existed (id=19, 300s interval)
2026-03-28 16:07:04 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
"headscale.json" = file("${path.module}/dashboards/headscale.json")
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|