2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
variable "tls_secret_name" {}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "tier" { type = string }
|
|
|
|
|
variable "xray_reality_clients" { type = list(map(string)) }
|
|
|
|
|
variable "xray_reality_private_key" {
|
|
|
|
|
type = string
|
|
|
|
|
sensitive = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
variable "xray_reality_short_ids" { type = list(string) }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Github repo - https://github.com/teddysun/across/blob/master/docker/xray/README.md
|
|
|
|
|
# Clients:
|
|
|
|
|
# iOS - OneXRay - https://github.com/OneXray/OneXray
|
|
|
|
|
# MacOS - V2BOX
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "tls_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "xray" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
keel: enroll 15 critical-path namespaces for digest-only auto-update
Per user decision today: monitoring, mailserver, vault, descheduler,
metrics-server, traefik, technitium, crowdsec, redis, reverse-proxy,
reloader, headscale, wireguard, xray, cloudflared now participate in
the same `force + match-tag` regime as the rest of the cluster — Keel
watches the deployment's CURRENT tag for digest changes only and rolls
on push, never rewriting tag strings.
Two-part change:
stacks/kyverno/modules/kyverno/keel-annotations.tf
Trim the policy-level namespace exclude list from 31 → 16. The 16
remaining exclusions are the irreducible cluster-operator + state-
coupled set: keel itself, calico-system + tigera-operator (operator
loop), authentik (2026-05-17 pgbouncer incident bite), cnpg-system +
dbaas (state-coupled), kyverno, metallb-system, external-secrets,
proxmox-csi + nfs-csi + nvidia (just stabilized today, chart-pinned),
kube-system, vpa, sealed-secrets, infra-maintenance.
stacks/<each-of-15>/.../main.tf
Add `"keel.sh/enrolled" = "true"` label to the `kubernetes_namespace`
resource so the Kyverno mutate policy can target the workloads via
its namespaceSelector matchLabels.
Note on the apply path: the live ClusterPolicy was patched via
`kubectl patch` because the hashicorp/kubernetes provider v3.1.0 panics
during state refresh on Kyverno ClusterPolicy schemas with deeply
nested optional `context.celPreconditions` / `imageRegistry` fields
(see crash dump). The TF source above has the desired state, so any
clean future apply on a fixed provider version will be a no-op against
the live cluster.
Floating-tag workloads in the newly-enrolled set (will roll on every
upstream digest update — acceptable risk per user):
- wireguard: sclevine/wg:latest (image fixed today via iptables-nft
postStart shim)
- xray: teddysun/xray
- crowdsec-web: viktorbarzin/crowdsec_web
- monitoring: prompve/prometheus-pve-exporter:latest, prom/snmp-exporter
- traefik: nginx:1-alpine, openresty/openresty:alpine,
ghcr.io/tarampampam/error-pages:3
- redis: haproxy:3.1-alpine, redis:8-alpine
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 12:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
tier = var.tier
|
|
|
|
|
"keel.sh/enrolled" = "true"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno
ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with
`metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This
is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks
should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how
Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode.
Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label
as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey
2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the
label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace
is affected.
This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same
`# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for
the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any
Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records
which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits
show why each suppression exists.
## This change
107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"`
resource gets:
```hcl
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
```
Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`):
match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the
outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing
brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions
`goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe.
Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces
one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines).
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out
(paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran.
- `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally
minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file
has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder
comment).
- `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) —
gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in
authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted
to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will
need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real
apply to that stack.
## Verification
Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern
before and after:
```
$ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan
Before:
Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy.
# kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place
(goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null)
# module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place
(Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d)
After:
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.
```
Injection count check:
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
108
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan`
3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label.
Closes: code-dwx
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "xray_config" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray-config"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"reloader.stakater.com/match" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
"config.json" = templatefile("${path.module}/xray_config.json.tpl", {
|
|
|
|
|
clients = jsonencode(var.xray_reality_clients)
|
|
|
|
|
reality_private_key = var.xray_reality_private_key
|
|
|
|
|
reality_short_ids = jsonencode(var.xray_reality_short_ids)
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "xray" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
tier = var.tier
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"reloader.stakater.com/search" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
replicas = 1
|
|
|
|
|
strategy {
|
|
|
|
|
rolling_update {
|
|
|
|
|
max_surge = "2"
|
|
|
|
|
max_unavailable = "0"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
selector {
|
|
|
|
|
match_labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
|
|
|
|
image = "teddysun/xray"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
image_pull_policy = "IfNotPresent"
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 7443 // reality
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 8443 // websocket
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 9443 // gRPC
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "tls"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/etc/xray/tls.crt"
|
|
|
|
|
sub_path = "tls.crt"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "tls"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/etc/xray/tls.key"
|
|
|
|
|
sub_path = "tls.key"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "config"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/etc/xray/config.json"
|
|
|
|
|
sub_path = "config.json"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
cpu = "10m"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "64Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "64Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "tls"
|
|
|
|
|
secret {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "config"
|
|
|
|
|
config_map {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray-config"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
dns_config {
|
|
|
|
|
option {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "ndots"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "2"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "xray" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"app" = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
selector = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
2026-05-24 01:13:54 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "websocket"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8443
|
|
|
|
|
target_port = 8443
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
2026-05-24 01:13:54 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "grpc"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 9443
|
|
|
|
|
target_port = 9443
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "xray-reality" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray-reality"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"app" = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
consolidate MetalLB IPs: 5 → 1 (10.0.20.200)
Migrate all 11 LoadBalancer services to share 10.0.20.200:
- Update annotations: metallb.universe.tf → metallb.io
- Pin all services to 10.0.20.200 with allow-shared-ip: shared
- Standardize externalTrafficPolicy to Cluster (required for IP sharing)
- Remove redundant port 80 (roundcube) from mailserver LB
- Update CoreDNS forward: 10.0.20.204 → 10.0.20.200
- Update cloudflared tunnel target: 10.0.20.202 → 10.0.20.200
Services consolidated: coturn, headscale, kms, qbittorrent, shadowsocks,
torrserver, wireguard, mailserver, traefik, xray, technitium
2026-03-24 18:35:43 +02:00
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"metallb.io/loadBalancerIPs" = "10.0.20.200"
|
|
|
|
|
"metallb.io/allow-shared-ip" = "shared"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
type = "LoadBalancer"
|
|
|
|
|
selector = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "reality"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 7443
|
|
|
|
|
protocol = "TCP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "ingress_ws" {
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
|
|
|
|
|
# VPN protocol (WebSocket transport) — native xray clients, not browsers.
|
infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress
Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier
and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why
they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the
call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future
readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their
own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately:
- navidrome (Subsonic user/password)
- ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens)
- nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords)
- vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth)
- headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes)
- paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens)
Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public,
webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or
Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt),
claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api,
fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA
integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster
(meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2
(HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT),
owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc),
rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge
(API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker
(forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports).
real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a
prior edit — not touched here.
No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware
chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit
is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-11 19:25:48 +00:00
|
|
|
# auth = "none": VPN protocol (WebSocket transport) — native xray clients, not browsers; forward-auth incompatible.
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
auth = "none"
|
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
|
|
|
dns_type = "proxied"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray-ws"
|
|
|
|
|
service_name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
host = "xray-ws"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8443
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "ingress_grpc" {
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
|
|
|
|
|
# VPN protocol (gRPC transport) — native xray clients, not browsers.
|
infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress
Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier
and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why
they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the
call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future
readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their
own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately:
- navidrome (Subsonic user/password)
- ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens)
- nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords)
- vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth)
- headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes)
- paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens)
Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public,
webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or
Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt),
claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api,
fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA
integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster
(meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2
(HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT),
owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc),
rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge
(API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker
(forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports).
real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a
prior edit — not touched here.
No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware
chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit
is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-11 19:25:48 +00:00
|
|
|
# auth = "none": VPN protocol (gRPC transport) — native xray clients, not browsers; forward-auth incompatible.
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
auth = "none"
|
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
|
|
|
dns_type = "proxied"
|
2026-03-17 21:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xray-grpc"
|
|
|
|
|
service_name = "xray"
|
|
|
|
|
host = "xray-grpc"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 9443
|
|
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
|
|
|
ingress_path = ["/grpc-vpn"]
|
|
|
|
|
extra_annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme" = "h2c"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|