infra/stacks/xray/modules/xray/main.tf

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variable "tls_secret_name" {}
variable "tier" { type = string }
variable "xray_reality_clients" { type = list(map(string)) }
variable "xray_reality_private_key" {
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "xray_reality_short_ids" { type = list(string) }
# Github repo - https://github.com/teddysun/across/blob/master/docker/xray/README.md
# Clients:
# iOS - OneXRay - https://github.com/OneXray/OneXray
# MacOS - V2BOX
module "tls_secret" {
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "xray" {
metadata {
name = "xray"
labels = {
keel: enroll 15 critical-path namespaces for digest-only auto-update Per user decision today: monitoring, mailserver, vault, descheduler, metrics-server, traefik, technitium, crowdsec, redis, reverse-proxy, reloader, headscale, wireguard, xray, cloudflared now participate in the same `force + match-tag` regime as the rest of the cluster — Keel watches the deployment's CURRENT tag for digest changes only and rolls on push, never rewriting tag strings. Two-part change: stacks/kyverno/modules/kyverno/keel-annotations.tf Trim the policy-level namespace exclude list from 31 → 16. The 16 remaining exclusions are the irreducible cluster-operator + state- coupled set: keel itself, calico-system + tigera-operator (operator loop), authentik (2026-05-17 pgbouncer incident bite), cnpg-system + dbaas (state-coupled), kyverno, metallb-system, external-secrets, proxmox-csi + nfs-csi + nvidia (just stabilized today, chart-pinned), kube-system, vpa, sealed-secrets, infra-maintenance. stacks/<each-of-15>/.../main.tf Add `"keel.sh/enrolled" = "true"` label to the `kubernetes_namespace` resource so the Kyverno mutate policy can target the workloads via its namespaceSelector matchLabels. Note on the apply path: the live ClusterPolicy was patched via `kubectl patch` because the hashicorp/kubernetes provider v3.1.0 panics during state refresh on Kyverno ClusterPolicy schemas with deeply nested optional `context.celPreconditions` / `imageRegistry` fields (see crash dump). The TF source above has the desired state, so any clean future apply on a fixed provider version will be a no-op against the live cluster. Floating-tag workloads in the newly-enrolled set (will roll on every upstream digest update — acceptable risk per user): - wireguard: sclevine/wg:latest (image fixed today via iptables-nft postStart shim) - xray: teddysun/xray - crowdsec-web: viktorbarzin/crowdsec_web - monitoring: prompve/prometheus-pve-exporter:latest, prom/snmp-exporter - traefik: nginx:1-alpine, openresty/openresty:alpine, ghcr.io/tarampampam/error-pages:3 - redis: haproxy:3.1-alpine, redis:8-alpine Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 12:13:22 +00:00
tier = var.tier
"keel.sh/enrolled" = "true"
}
}
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip] ## Context Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with `metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode. Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey 2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace is affected. This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits show why each suppression exists. ## This change 107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` resource gets: ```hcl lifecycle { # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]] } ``` Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`): match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions `goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe. Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines). ## What is NOT in this change - `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out (paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran. - `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder comment). - `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) — gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited. - `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real apply to that stack. ## Verification Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern before and after: ``` $ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan Before: Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy. # kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place (goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null) # module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place (Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d) After: No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration. ``` Injection count check: ``` $ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' 108 ``` ## Reproduce locally 1. `git pull` 2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan` 3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label. Closes: code-dwx Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "xray_config" {
metadata {
name = "xray-config"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "xray"
}
annotations = {
"reloader.stakater.com/match" = "true"
}
}
data = {
"config.json" = templatefile("${path.module}/xray_config.json.tpl", {
clients = jsonencode(var.xray_reality_clients)
reality_private_key = var.xray_reality_private_key
reality_short_ids = jsonencode(var.xray_reality_short_ids)
})
}
}
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "xray" {
metadata {
name = "xray"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "xray"
tier = var.tier
}
annotations = {
"reloader.stakater.com/search" = "true"
}
}
spec {
replicas = 1
strategy {
rolling_update {
max_surge = "2"
max_unavailable = "0"
}
}
selector {
match_labels = {
app = "xray"
}
}
template {
metadata {
labels = {
app = "xray"
}
}
spec {
container {
image = "teddysun/xray"
name = "xray"
image_pull_policy = "IfNotPresent"
port {
container_port = 7443 // reality
protocol = "TCP"
}
port {
container_port = 8443 // websocket
protocol = "TCP"
}
port {
container_port = 9443 // gRPC
protocol = "TCP"
}
volume_mount {
name = "tls"
mount_path = "/etc/xray/tls.crt"
sub_path = "tls.crt"
}
volume_mount {
name = "tls"
mount_path = "/etc/xray/tls.key"
sub_path = "tls.key"
}
volume_mount {
name = "config"
mount_path = "/etc/xray/config.json"
sub_path = "config.json"
}
resources {
requests = {
cpu = "10m"
memory = "64Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "64Mi"
}
}
}
volume {
name = "tls"
secret {
secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
}
volume {
name = "config"
config_map {
name = "xray-config"
}
}
dns_config {
option {
name = "ndots"
value = "2"
}
}
}
}
}
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip] ## Context Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the 27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18) found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec, and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` / `kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all. Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps `dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's `spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding (see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes` on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip the injected field. ## This change Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`, `kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`, `kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each carries the right `ignore_changes` path: - **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**: `spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config` - **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**: `spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config` (extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is one level deeper) Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`. Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`): 1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files. 2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag` from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline (`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions. The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an `ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op. ## Scale - 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions - 93 `.tf` files touched - 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones - Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered - Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable `KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo** ## What is NOT in this change - `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`). Python script touched the file, reverted manually. - `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`. - `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral, nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a separate fmt-only pass. - Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`, `kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get Kyverno dns_config mutation. ## Verification Random sample post-commit: ``` $ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes. $ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes. $ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes. $ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' 169 ``` ## Reproduce locally 1. `git pull` 2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+ 3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on the deployment's dns_config field. Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_service" "xray" {
metadata {
name = "xray"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
labels = {
"app" = "xray"
}
}
spec {
selector = {
app = "xray"
}
port {
name = "websocket"
port = 8443
target_port = 8443
protocol = "TCP"
}
port {
name = "grpc"
port = 9443
target_port = 9443
protocol = "TCP"
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_service" "xray-reality" {
metadata {
name = "xray-reality"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
labels = {
"app" = "xray"
}
annotations = {
"metallb.io/loadBalancerIPs" = "10.0.20.200"
"metallb.io/allow-shared-ip" = "shared"
}
}
spec {
type = "LoadBalancer"
selector = {
app = "xray"
}
port {
name = "reality"
port = 7443
protocol = "TCP"
}
}
}
module "ingress_ws" {
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
# VPN protocol (WebSocket transport) — native xray clients, not browsers.
infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent. Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately: - navidrome (Subsonic user/password) - ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens) - nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords) - vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth) - headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes) - paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens) Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public, webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt), claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api, fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster (meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2 (HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT), owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc), rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge (API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker (forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports). real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a prior edit — not touched here. No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-11 19:25:48 +00:00
# auth = "none": VPN protocol (WebSocket transport) — native xray clients, not browsers; forward-auth incompatible.
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
auth = "none"
[infra] Auto-create Cloudflare DNS records from ingress_factory ## Context Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars — a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten, leaving services unreachable externally. ## This change: - Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory` modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP). - Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard `*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing. - Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key). - Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses, special cases). - Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook. ``` BEFORE AFTER config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf | module "ingress" { v dns_type = "proxied" stacks/cloudflared/ } for_each = list | cloudflare_record auto-creates tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation ``` ## What is NOT in this change: - Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars) - 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases) - Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
dns_type = "proxied"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
name = "xray-ws"
service_name = "xray"
host = "xray-ws"
port = 8443
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
module "ingress_grpc" {
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
source = "../../../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
# VPN protocol (gRPC transport) — native xray clients, not browsers.
infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent. Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately: - navidrome (Subsonic user/password) - ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens) - nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords) - vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth) - headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes) - paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens) Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public, webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt), claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api, fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster (meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2 (HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT), owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc), rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge (API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker (forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports). real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a prior edit — not touched here. No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-11 19:25:48 +00:00
# auth = "none": VPN protocol (gRPC transport) — native xray clients, not browsers; forward-auth incompatible.
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
auth = "none"
[infra] Auto-create Cloudflare DNS records from ingress_factory ## Context Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars — a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten, leaving services unreachable externally. ## This change: - Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory` modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP). - Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard `*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing. - Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key). - Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses, special cases). - Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook. ``` BEFORE AFTER config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf | module "ingress" { v dns_type = "proxied" stacks/cloudflared/ } for_each = list | cloudflare_record auto-creates tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation ``` ## What is NOT in this change: - Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars) - 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases) - Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
dns_type = "proxied"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.xray.metadata[0].name
name = "xray-grpc"
service_name = "xray"
host = "xray-grpc"
port = 9443
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
ingress_path = ["/grpc-vpn"]
extra_annotations = {
"traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme" = "h2c"
}
}