29 lines
1.4 KiB
Terraform
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Terraform
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# Vault OIDC authorization fence (ADR-0020). The "Vault" Authentik application had
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# NO authorization binding (audit 2026-06-15: any authenticated identity could
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# complete Vault OIDC login and receive Vault's built-in `default`-policy token —
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# token self-management/cubbyhole, no secret access, but still more than an
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# outside user should hold). Bind it to "Allow Login Users" so only established
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# homelab users can log in: they inherit that base group via its children
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# (Home Server Admins / Headscale Users / Wrongmove Users — verified live that
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# `User.all_groups()` includes the parent), while publicly self-enrolled
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# "TripIt External" users (deliberately PARENTLESS, so NOT in Allow Login Users)
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# are denied at the Vault consent step. Closes the one OIDC app the forward-auth
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# fence cannot reach; the other sensitive OIDC apps already bind a trusted group.
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#
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# The Vault application itself stays UI-managed (like the other OIDC apps); this
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# adds ONLY the authorization binding. policy_engine_mode on the app is "any", so
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# one group binding == membership in that group is required to authorize.
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data "authentik_application" "vault" {
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slug = "vault"
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}
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data "authentik_group" "allow_login_users" {
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name = "Allow Login Users"
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}
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resource "authentik_policy_binding" "vault_allow_login_users" {
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target = data.authentik_application.vault.uuid
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group = data.authentik_group.allow_login_users.id
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order = 0
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}
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