[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
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data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "secrets" {
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mount = "secret"
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name = "claude-agent-service"
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}
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data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "viktor_secrets" {
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mount = "secret"
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name = "viktor"
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}
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locals {
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namespace = "claude-agent"
|
[forgejo] Phases 3+4+5: cutover, decommission, docs sweep
End of forgejo-registry-consolidation. After Phase 0/1 already landed
(Forgejo ready, dual-push CI, integrity probe, retention CronJob,
images migrated via forgejo-migrate-orphan-images.sh), this commit
flips everything off registry.viktorbarzin.me onto Forgejo and
removes the legacy infrastructure.
Phase 3 — image= flips:
* infra/stacks/{payslip-ingest,job-hunter,claude-agent-service,
fire-planner,freedify/factory,chrome-service,beads-server}/main.tf
— image= now points to forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/<name>.
* infra/stacks/claude-memory/main.tf — also moved off DockerHub
(viktorbarzin/claude-memory-mcp:17 → forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/...).
* infra/.woodpecker/{default,drift-detection}.yml — infra-ci pulled
from Forgejo. build-ci-image.yml dual-pushes still until next
build cycle confirms Forgejo as canonical.
* /home/wizard/code/CLAUDE.md — claude-memory-mcp install URL updated.
Phase 4 — decommission registry-private:
* registry-credentials Secret: dropped registry.viktorbarzin.me /
registry.viktorbarzin.me:5050 / 10.0.20.10:5050 auths entries.
Forgejo entry is the only one left.
* infra/stacks/infra/main.tf cloud-init: dropped containerd
hosts.toml entries for registry.viktorbarzin.me +
10.0.20.10:5050. (Existing nodes already had the file removed
manually by `setup-forgejo-containerd-mirror.sh` rollout — the
cloud-init template only fires on new VM provision.)
* infra/modules/docker-registry/docker-compose.yml: registry-private
service block removed; nginx 5050 port mapping dropped. Pull-
through caches for upstream registries (5000/5010/5020/5030/5040)
stay on the VM permanently.
* infra/modules/docker-registry/nginx_registry.conf: upstream
`private` block + port 5050 server block removed.
* infra/stacks/monitoring/modules/monitoring/main.tf: registry_
integrity_probe + registry_probe_credentials resources stripped.
forgejo_integrity_probe is the only manifest probe now.
Phase 5 — final docs sweep:
* infra/docs/runbooks/registry-vm.md — VM scope reduced to pull-
through caches; forgejo-registry-breakglass.md cross-ref added.
* infra/docs/architecture/ci-cd.md — registry component table +
diagram now reflect Forgejo. Pre-migration root-cause sentence
preserved as historical context with a pointer to the design doc.
* infra/docs/architecture/monitoring.md — Registry Integrity Probe
row updated to point at the Forgejo probe.
* infra/.claude/CLAUDE.md — Private registry section rewritten end-
to-end (auth, retention, integrity, where the bake came from).
* prometheus_chart_values.tpl — RegistryManifestIntegrityFailure
alert annotation simplified now that only one registry is in
scope.
Operational follow-up (cannot be done from a TF apply):
1. ssh root@10.0.20.10 — edit /opt/registry/docker-compose.yml to
match the new template AND `docker compose up -d --remove-orphans`
to actually stop the registry-private container. Memory id=1078
confirms cloud-init won't redeploy on TF apply alone.
2. After 1 week of no incidents, `rm -rf /opt/registry/data/private/`
on the VM (~2.6GB freed).
3. Open the dual-push step in build-ci-image.yml and drop
registry.viktorbarzin.me:5050 from the `repo:` list — at that
point the post-push integrity check at line 33-107 also needs
to be repointed at Forgejo or removed (the per-build verify is
redundant with the every-15min Forgejo probe).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 18:30:02 +00:00
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# Phase 3 cutover 2026-05-07 — see infra/docs/plans/2026-05-07-forgejo-registry-consolidation-plan.md.
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image = "forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/claude-agent-service"
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2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
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image_tag = "latest"
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[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
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labels = {
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app = "claude-agent-service"
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}
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}
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# --- Namespace ---
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resource "kubernetes_namespace" "claude_agent" {
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metadata {
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name = local.namespace
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labels = {
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tier = local.tiers.aux
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"resource-governance/custom-limitrange" = "true"
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"resource-governance/custom-quota" = "true"
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}
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}
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[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno
ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with
`metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This
is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks
should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how
Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode.
Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label
as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey
2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the
label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace
is affected.
This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same
`# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for
the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any
Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records
which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits
show why each suppression exists.
## This change
107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"`
resource gets:
```hcl
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
```
Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`):
match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the
outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing
brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions
`goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe.
Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces
one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines).
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out
(paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran.
- `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally
minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file
has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder
comment).
- `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) —
gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in
authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted
to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will
need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real
apply to that stack.
## Verification
Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern
before and after:
```
$ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan
Before:
Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy.
# kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place
(goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null)
# module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place
(Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d)
After:
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.
```
Injection count check:
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
108
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan`
3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label.
Closes: code-dwx
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
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lifecycle {
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# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
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ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
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}
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
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|
}
|
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# --- Secrets ---
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resource "kubernetes_manifest" "external_secret" {
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manifest = {
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apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
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kind = "ExternalSecret"
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metadata = {
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name = "claude-agent-secrets"
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namespace = local.namespace
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}
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spec = {
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refreshInterval = "15m"
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secretStoreRef = {
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name = "vault-kv"
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kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
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}
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target = {
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name = "claude-agent-secrets"
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}
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data = [
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{
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secretKey = "GITHUB_TOKEN"
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remoteRef = {
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key = "viktor"
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property = "github_pat"
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}
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},
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
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{
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# Forgejo push token for opening PRs on forgejo.viktorbarzin.me
|
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# (exec agent uses the Forgejo API via curl + $FORGEJO_TOKEN, and
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# git push over HTTPS via the url.insteadOf rewrite in git-init).
|
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# SECURITY: this is the viktor-scoped admin PAT (write:package +
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# repo) shared by Woodpecker — see secret/ci/global/forgejo_push_token.
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# The shared claude-agent pod (all agents on it) can now push to
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# and open PRs against any repo this token can reach.
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secretKey = "FORGEJO_TOKEN"
|
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|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "ci/global"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "forgejo_push_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
secretKey = "API_BEARER_TOKEN"
|
|
|
|
|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "claude-agent-service"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "api_bearer_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
# Long-lived OAuth token (1-year) from `claude setup-token`.
|
|
|
|
|
# Preferred over the short-lived .credentials.json — CLI picks this up and
|
|
|
|
|
# skips the refresh flow entirely. Rotate yearly; alert 30d before expiry.
|
|
|
|
|
secretKey = "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"
|
|
|
|
|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "claude-agent-service"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "claude_oauth_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
2026-04-19 13:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
# Consumed by service-upgrade agent to poll ci.viktorbarzin.me
|
|
|
|
|
# per-workflow status. Pod has no Vault CLI auth, so the old
|
|
|
|
|
# `vault kv get` path is dead — see bd code-3o3.
|
|
|
|
|
secretKey = "WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN"
|
|
|
|
|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "ci/global"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "woodpecker_api_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
# Consumed by service-upgrade agent for Start/Success/Failure
|
|
|
|
|
# notifications. Same shared webhook as alertmanager.
|
|
|
|
|
secretKey = "SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
|
|
|
|
|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "viktor"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "alertmanager_slack_api_url"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
# Home Assistant MCP endpoint (community ha-mcp add-on on ha-sofia).
|
|
|
|
|
# The URL embeds a secret path-token, so it ships as a secret, not a
|
|
|
|
|
# literal. Referenced as ${HA_MCP_URL} by the project-scoped .mcp.json
|
|
|
|
|
# in the infra repo root. Same Vault key OpenClaw uses
|
|
|
|
|
# (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
|
|
|
|
|
secretKey = "HA_MCP_URL"
|
|
|
|
|
remoteRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "openclaw"
|
|
|
|
|
property = "ha_sofia_mcp_url"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# SOPS age key for terraform state decryption
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_secret" "sops_age_key" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "sops-age-key"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
"keys.txt" = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.viktor_secrets.data["sops_age_key_devvm"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
type = "Opaque"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Claude OAuth credentials (for claude -p)
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_secret" "claude_credentials" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-credentials"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
".credentials.json" = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.secrets.data["claude_credentials_json"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
type = "Opaque"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# git-crypt key for repo decryption
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "git_crypt_key" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "git-crypt-key"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
binary_data = {
|
|
|
|
|
"key" = filebase64("${path.root}/../../.git/git-crypt/keys/default")
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- RBAC ---
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service_account" "claude_agent" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "claude_agent" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["", "apps", "batch"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["pods", "pods/log", "nodes", "events", "deployments", "services", "namespaces", "jobs", "cronjobs", "configmaps", "replicasets", "statefulsets", "daemonsets"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["patch", "update"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["apps"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["deployments"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["create"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = [""]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["pods/exec"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role_binding" "claude_agent" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subject {
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ServiceAccount"
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
role_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ClusterRole"
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_cluster_role.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
# claude-agent-exec — broad cluster WRITE for the executor agent
|
|
|
|
|
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
# Added 2026-06-04 for the nextcloud-todos-exec executor elevation. The
|
|
|
|
|
# existing `claude-agent` ClusterRole above stays as-is (read + patch
|
|
|
|
|
# deployments + pods/exec) — this is purely ADDITIVE.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# SECURITY — VERY BROAD, FLAG FOR REVIEW:
|
|
|
|
|
# - This grants the SHARED claude-agent pod cluster-wide
|
|
|
|
|
# get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete across the common API groups
|
|
|
|
|
# below. EVERY agent that runs on this pod inherits it.
|
|
|
|
|
# - It explicitly includes core `secrets` (read+write, cluster-wide) and
|
|
|
|
|
# rbac roles/rolebindings (create/update/delete) — i.e. the agent can
|
|
|
|
|
# read any Secret in any namespace and grant itself further RBAC. That is
|
|
|
|
|
# close to cluster-admin in blast radius, minus a few group wildcards.
|
|
|
|
|
# - It intentionally does NOT bind the built-in `cluster-admin` ClusterRole,
|
|
|
|
|
# so it lacks: arbitrary CRDs/apiextensions, clusterroles/clusterrolebindings
|
|
|
|
|
# bind/escalate beyond what's listed, raw `*` on `*`. Viktor can widen to
|
|
|
|
|
# `cluster-admin` by swapping the role_ref below if he decides the scoped
|
|
|
|
|
# list is too restrictive.
|
|
|
|
|
# Terraform-managed cluster resources must still be changed via `scripts/tg
|
|
|
|
|
# apply` (CLAUDE.md Terraform-only rule) — this RBAC is for ad-hoc kubectl
|
|
|
|
|
# writes the exec agent needs, not a license to drift Terraform state.
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "claude_agent_exec" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-exec"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = [""]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["pods", "pods/log", "pods/exec", "services", "configmaps", "secrets", "persistentvolumeclaims", "serviceaccounts", "namespaces", "events", "endpoints"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["apps"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["deployments", "statefulsets", "daemonsets", "replicasets"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["batch"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["jobs", "cronjobs"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["networking.k8s.io"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["ingresses", "networkpolicies"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rule {
|
|
|
|
|
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
|
|
|
|
|
api_groups = ["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"]
|
|
|
|
|
resources = ["roles", "rolebindings"]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role_binding" "claude_agent_exec" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-exec"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subject {
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ServiceAccount"
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
role_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ClusterRole"
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_cluster_role.claude_agent_exec.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# --- Storage ---
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# The `workspace` volume in the deployment is intentionally emptyDir — agent
|
|
|
|
|
# jobs do fresh git clones each run, so a per-pod scratch dir on node disk
|
|
|
|
|
# is faster and isolated. The 10Gi `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC
|
|
|
|
|
# that previously sat next to this comment was created but never wired
|
|
|
|
|
# into the deployment (sat idle from 2026-04-15 to 2026-05-11).
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# For cases where the agent DOES need to persist state across pod restarts
|
|
|
|
|
# (caches, ad-hoc outputs, anything that should survive a pod reschedule),
|
|
|
|
|
# `module.persistent` below provides a 5Gi NFS-backed RWX volume mounted
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
# at /persistent for state that should survive a pod reschedule. Since the
|
|
|
|
|
# service now runs jobs concurrently (bounded semaphore, no single-flight
|
|
|
|
|
# lock), agents sharing /persistent must use per-job paths to avoid races —
|
|
|
|
|
# per-job *workspaces* are isolated (own clone under /workspace/jobs/<id>),
|
|
|
|
|
# but /persistent is shared.
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
module "persistent" {
|
|
|
|
|
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/nfs_volume"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
nfs_server = "192.168.1.127"
|
|
|
|
|
nfs_path = "/srv/nfs/claude-agent-persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
storage = "5Gi"
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- Deployment ---
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "claude_agent" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-service"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = local.labels
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
replicas = 1
|
|
|
|
|
strategy {
|
|
|
|
|
type = "Recreate"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
selector {
|
|
|
|
|
match_labels = local.labels
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
labels = local.labels
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
service_account_name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
image_pull_secrets {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "registry-credentials"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
security_context {
|
|
|
|
|
run_as_user = 1000
|
|
|
|
|
run_as_group = 1000
|
|
|
|
|
fs_group = 1000
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
# Fix workspace ownership. Kubelet creates the Dockerfile WORKDIR
|
|
|
|
|
# (/workspace/infra) inside the emptyDir as root:gid=fsGroup with
|
|
|
|
|
# the setgid bit — uid 1000 can't write into it without explicit
|
|
|
|
|
# chown + chmod. Pre-create so the path is guaranteed, then chown
|
|
|
|
|
# recursively and chmod the infra subdir for safety.
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
init_container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "fix-perms"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "busybox:1.37"
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
command = ["sh", "-c", "mkdir -p /workspace/infra /persistent && chown -R 1000:1000 /workspace /persistent && chmod 0775 /workspace/infra /persistent"]
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
security_context {
|
|
|
|
|
run_as_user = 0
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "32Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "64Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Copy Claude credentials to writable volume (CLI needs to refresh OAuth tokens)
|
|
|
|
|
init_container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "copy-claude-creds"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "busybox:1.37"
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["sh", "-c", "cp /secrets/claude/.credentials.json /home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json && chown 1000:1000 /home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json"]
|
|
|
|
|
security_context {
|
|
|
|
|
run_as_user = 0
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-credentials-secret"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/secrets/claude"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-home"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "32Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "64Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Init: clone repo + unlock git-crypt on first run
|
|
|
|
|
init_container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "git-init"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["sh", "-c", <<-EOF
|
|
|
|
|
set -e
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Configure git with HTTPS + PAT
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global user.name "Claude Agent Service"
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global user.email "claude-agent@viktorbarzin.me"
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global --add safe.directory /workspace/infra
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global url."https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/".insteadOf "git@github.com:"
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global url."https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# Authenticate git pushes/clones to Forgejo so the exec agent can
|
|
|
|
|
# branch + push to open PRs on forgejo.viktorbarzin.me. The PR
|
|
|
|
|
# itself is created via the Forgejo API (curl + $FORGEJO_TOKEN);
|
|
|
|
|
# this rewrite only handles the git transport.
|
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" ]; then
|
|
|
|
|
git config --global url."https://$${FORGEJO_TOKEN}@forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/".insteadOf "https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/"
|
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# Clone or update repo
|
|
|
|
|
if [ ! -d /workspace/infra/.git ]; then
|
|
|
|
|
git clone https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/ViktorBarzin/infra.git /workspace/infra
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
cd /workspace/infra
|
|
|
|
|
git fetch origin
|
|
|
|
|
git reset --hard origin/master
|
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Unlock git-crypt
|
|
|
|
|
cd /workspace/infra
|
|
|
|
|
git-crypt unlock /secrets/git-crypt/key || true
|
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
env_from {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "git-crypt-key"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/secrets/git-crypt"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
cpu = "100m"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "256Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "512Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
[infra/claude-agent-service] Seed beads metadata + scratch dir at runtime
## Context
Review of the BeadBoard Dispatch wiring found that the claude-agent-service
Dockerfile's `COPY beads/metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json` and
`COPY agents/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/...` both land
on paths that are volume-mounted at runtime:
- `/workspace` → `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC (main.tf:394-398)
- `/home/agent/.claude` → `claude-home` emptyDir (main.tf:424-427)
Kubernetes mounts hide image-layer content at those paths, so the COPYs are
dead. The companion commit in `claude-agent-service` restages both files to
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` (an image-layer path that is never mounted).
Additionally, the beads-task-runner agent rails expect
`/workspace/scratch/<job_id>/` to exist, but nothing was creating it.
## Layout before / after
```
Before (dead COPYs):
image layer runtime (mounted volumes hide the files)
----------- -----------------------------------
/workspace/ <- hidden by PVC mount
.beads/
metadata.json <- UNREACHABLE
/home/agent/.claude/ <- hidden by emptyDir mount
agents/
beads-task-runner.md <- UNREACHABLE
After (init container seeds volumes at pod start):
image layer runtime
----------- ------------------------------------
/usr/share/agent-seed/
beads-metadata.json --+
beads-task-runner.md --+-> copied by seed-beads-agent init
container into the mounted volumes
on every pod start:
/workspace/.beads/metadata.json
/workspace/scratch/
/home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
```
## What
### New init container: `seed-beads-agent`
- Positioned AFTER `git-init`, BEFORE the main container.
- Uses the same service image (`${local.image}:${local.image_tag}`) — the
seed files are baked in at `/usr/share/agent-seed/`.
- Runs as default uid 1000 (the PVCs are already chowned by `fix-perms`).
- Shell body:
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
- Mounts: `workspace` at `/workspace`, `claude-home` at `/home/agent/.claude`.
- Resources: 32Mi requests / 64Mi limits (matches `fix-perms`/`copy-claude-creds`).
### Formatting
- `terraform fmt -recursive` also normalised whitespace in the token-expiry
locals block and the CronJob container definition. No semantic change.
## What is NOT in this change
- No image tag bump. The Dockerfile refactor that produces the
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` path lands in the claude-agent-service repo
and will roll in on the next CI build. Until that build ships and the
tag is bumped in this file, the new init container will `cp` from a
path that doesn't exist yet — so do NOT apply this commit until the
corresponding image tag bump is ready. The commit is declarative prep.
- No changes to storage class, RBAC, Service, or any other init.
- The main container mounts remain unchanged — only the init containers
prepare volume contents.
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ terraform fmt -check -recursive stacks/claude-agent-service/
(no output — clean)
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ init -backend=false
Terraform has been successfully initialized!
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ validate
Warning: Deprecated Resource (pre-existing; use kubernetes_namespace_v1)
Success! The configuration is valid, but there were some validation warnings
as shown above.
```
### Manual Verification (after image bump + apply)
1. Bump `local.image_tag` in main.tf to the SHA of a build that has
`/usr/share/agent-seed/*` (verify with `docker inspect $IMAGE | jq ...`
or `kubectl run tmp --image ... -- ls /usr/share/agent-seed`).
2. `scripts/tg apply stacks/claude-agent-service`
3. `kubectl -n claude-agent get pods -w` — all init containers complete.
4. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- ls -la /workspace/.beads/metadata.json /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md /workspace/scratch`
Expected: all three paths exist; first two are regular files with the
expected content, `scratch` is a directory.
5. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- jq -r .dolt_server_host /workspace/.beads/metadata.json`
Expected: `dolt.beads-server.svc.cluster.local`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
# Seed beads metadata + beads-task-runner agent into runtime volumes.
|
|
|
|
|
# The Dockerfile stages these files at /usr/share/agent-seed/ (image
|
|
|
|
|
# layer, never mounted). Both /workspace (PVC) and /home/agent/.claude
|
|
|
|
|
# (emptyDir) are volume mounts that hide any image-layer content, so
|
|
|
|
|
# the files have to be copied in at pod start. Also creates the
|
|
|
|
|
# scratch directory the beads-task-runner rails expect.
|
|
|
|
|
init_container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "seed-beads-agent"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["sh", "-c", <<-EOT
|
|
|
|
|
set -e
|
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
|
|
|
|
|
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
|
|
|
|
|
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
|
2026-05-16 11:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/recruiter-triage.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/recruiter-triage.md
|
2026-06-04 03:45:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/nextcloud-todos-planner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/nextcloud-todos-planner.md
|
|
|
|
|
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/nextcloud-todos-exec.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/nextcloud-todos-exec.md
|
[infra/claude-agent-service] Seed beads metadata + scratch dir at runtime
## Context
Review of the BeadBoard Dispatch wiring found that the claude-agent-service
Dockerfile's `COPY beads/metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json` and
`COPY agents/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/...` both land
on paths that are volume-mounted at runtime:
- `/workspace` → `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC (main.tf:394-398)
- `/home/agent/.claude` → `claude-home` emptyDir (main.tf:424-427)
Kubernetes mounts hide image-layer content at those paths, so the COPYs are
dead. The companion commit in `claude-agent-service` restages both files to
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` (an image-layer path that is never mounted).
Additionally, the beads-task-runner agent rails expect
`/workspace/scratch/<job_id>/` to exist, but nothing was creating it.
## Layout before / after
```
Before (dead COPYs):
image layer runtime (mounted volumes hide the files)
----------- -----------------------------------
/workspace/ <- hidden by PVC mount
.beads/
metadata.json <- UNREACHABLE
/home/agent/.claude/ <- hidden by emptyDir mount
agents/
beads-task-runner.md <- UNREACHABLE
After (init container seeds volumes at pod start):
image layer runtime
----------- ------------------------------------
/usr/share/agent-seed/
beads-metadata.json --+
beads-task-runner.md --+-> copied by seed-beads-agent init
container into the mounted volumes
on every pod start:
/workspace/.beads/metadata.json
/workspace/scratch/
/home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
```
## What
### New init container: `seed-beads-agent`
- Positioned AFTER `git-init`, BEFORE the main container.
- Uses the same service image (`${local.image}:${local.image_tag}`) — the
seed files are baked in at `/usr/share/agent-seed/`.
- Runs as default uid 1000 (the PVCs are already chowned by `fix-perms`).
- Shell body:
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
- Mounts: `workspace` at `/workspace`, `claude-home` at `/home/agent/.claude`.
- Resources: 32Mi requests / 64Mi limits (matches `fix-perms`/`copy-claude-creds`).
### Formatting
- `terraform fmt -recursive` also normalised whitespace in the token-expiry
locals block and the CronJob container definition. No semantic change.
## What is NOT in this change
- No image tag bump. The Dockerfile refactor that produces the
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` path lands in the claude-agent-service repo
and will roll in on the next CI build. Until that build ships and the
tag is bumped in this file, the new init container will `cp` from a
path that doesn't exist yet — so do NOT apply this commit until the
corresponding image tag bump is ready. The commit is declarative prep.
- No changes to storage class, RBAC, Service, or any other init.
- The main container mounts remain unchanged — only the init containers
prepare volume contents.
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ terraform fmt -check -recursive stacks/claude-agent-service/
(no output — clean)
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ init -backend=false
Terraform has been successfully initialized!
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ validate
Warning: Deprecated Resource (pre-existing; use kubernetes_namespace_v1)
Success! The configuration is valid, but there were some validation warnings
as shown above.
```
### Manual Verification (after image bump + apply)
1. Bump `local.image_tag` in main.tf to the SHA of a build that has
`/usr/share/agent-seed/*` (verify with `docker inspect $IMAGE | jq ...`
or `kubectl run tmp --image ... -- ls /usr/share/agent-seed`).
2. `scripts/tg apply stacks/claude-agent-service`
3. `kubectl -n claude-agent get pods -w` — all init containers complete.
4. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- ls -la /workspace/.beads/metadata.json /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md /workspace/scratch`
Expected: all three paths exist; first two are regular files with the
expected content, `scratch` is a directory.
5. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- jq -r .dolt_server_host /workspace/.beads/metadata.json`
Expected: `dolt.beads-server.svc.cluster.local`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
EOT
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-home"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "32Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "64Mi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-service"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# Wrap the image CMD so a Vault token is in place before any agent
|
|
|
|
|
# runs `scripts/tg apply`. The `vault-token-refresher` sidecar
|
|
|
|
|
# k8s-auth-logs-in (role=terraform-state) and writes the token to the
|
|
|
|
|
# shared `vault-token` emptyDir at /vault/token; we symlink
|
|
|
|
|
# $HOME/.vault-token → that file so `vault` / `scripts/tg` (which fall
|
|
|
|
|
# through to ~/.vault-token when $VAULT_TOKEN is unset) pick it up.
|
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: this duplicates the image's CMD (uvicorn line below) — if the
|
|
|
|
|
# Dockerfile CMD changes, update this too. FLAG for review.
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOF
|
|
|
|
|
ln -sfn /vault/token "$HOME/.vault-token"
|
|
|
|
|
exec python3 -m uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --app-dir /srv
|
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
container_port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
env_from {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "WORKSPACE_DIR"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "/workspace/infra"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
# Soft-unbounded concurrency: this caps simultaneous agent runs;
|
|
|
|
|
# excess calls queue FIFO rather than 409/503. Each run peaks ~0.5-1.5Gi
|
|
|
|
|
# (claude + terraform), so this and the memory limit are sized together.
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "MAX_CONCURRENCY"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "10"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# Vault — so `scripts/tg apply` can fetch the Tier-1 PG backend
|
|
|
|
|
# password + the broadened app-secret reads. The CLI + scripts/tg
|
|
|
|
|
# fall through to $HOME/.vault-token (symlinked above) when
|
|
|
|
|
# $VAULT_TOKEN is unset; VAULT_K8S_ROLE tells the refresher which
|
|
|
|
|
# role to log in as.
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "VAULT_ADDR"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "http://vault-active.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "VAULT_K8S_ROLE"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "terraform-state"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# NOTE on MCP: the HA MCP URL (secret — its path segment is the auth
|
|
|
|
|
# token) arrives as env `HA_MCP_URL` via the claude-agent-secrets
|
|
|
|
|
# ExternalSecret (env_from above), sourced from Vault
|
|
|
|
|
# secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url. The project-scoped .mcp.json
|
|
|
|
|
# in the infra repo root references it as ${HA_MCP_URL}. Paperless
|
|
|
|
|
# MCP needs no token in-cluster (bearer is enforced only at the
|
|
|
|
|
# Traefik ingress), so its in-cluster Service URL is a plain literal
|
|
|
|
|
# in .mcp.json.
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
liveness_probe {
|
|
|
|
|
http_get {
|
|
|
|
|
path = "/health"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
initial_delay_seconds = 10
|
|
|
|
|
period_seconds = 30
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
readiness_probe {
|
|
|
|
|
http_get {
|
|
|
|
|
path = "/health"
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
initial_delay_seconds = 5
|
|
|
|
|
period_seconds = 10
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/persistent"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "sops-age-key"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/home/agent/.config/sops/age"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-home"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
# git-crypt key — each job re-unlocks its own clone, so the runtime
|
|
|
|
|
# container (not just the git-init init container) needs the key.
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "git-crypt-key"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/secrets/git-crypt"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# Shared Vault token written by the vault-token-refresher sidecar.
|
|
|
|
|
# Symlinked to $HOME/.vault-token by the container command above.
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-token"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/vault"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
# Burstable (tier-aux). Sized for ~10 concurrent agent runs at
|
|
|
|
|
# ~0.5-1.5Gi each (see MAX_CONCURRENCY). No CPU limit per cluster
|
|
|
|
|
# policy (CFS throttling); request only.
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cpu = "1"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "2Gi"
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
2026-06-02 21:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
memory = "12Gi"
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
# Sidecar: keep a fresh Vault token on disk for `scripts/tg apply`.
|
|
|
|
|
# k8s-auth login (role=terraform-state) every 30 min — well inside the
|
|
|
|
|
# 6-day token TTL — and write it to the shared `vault-token` emptyDir.
|
|
|
|
|
# The main container symlinks $HOME/.vault-token at it. Mirrors the
|
|
|
|
|
# estate k8s-auth-login pattern (infra/.woodpecker/default.yml "Vault
|
|
|
|
|
# auth" step, woodpecker vault-sync sidecar).
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-token-refresher"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "docker.io/curlimages/curl:8.11.0"
|
|
|
|
|
# No `set -e`: a transient Vault blip must NOT kill the refresh loop
|
|
|
|
|
# (the stale token keeps working until its 6d TTL). curlimages/curl
|
|
|
|
|
# is Alpine/busybox — has `sed`, no `jq`, so parse client_token with
|
|
|
|
|
# sed. umask 077 so the token file is 0600.
|
|
|
|
|
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOF
|
|
|
|
|
umask 077
|
|
|
|
|
while true; do
|
|
|
|
|
SA_TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
|
|
|
|
|
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$VAULT_ADDR/v1/auth/kubernetes/login" \
|
|
|
|
|
-d "{\"role\":\"$VAULT_K8S_ROLE\",\"jwt\":\"$SA_TOKEN\"}" \
|
|
|
|
|
| sed -n 's/.*"client_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
|
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
|
|
|
|
|
printf '%s' "$TOKEN" > /vault/token
|
|
|
|
|
echo "$(date -u +%FT%TZ) refreshed vault token (role=$VAULT_K8S_ROLE)"
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
echo "$(date -u +%FT%TZ) ERROR: vault k8s login failed (role=$VAULT_K8S_ROLE)" >&2
|
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
sleep 1800
|
|
|
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "VAULT_ADDR"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "http://vault-active.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "VAULT_K8S_ROLE"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "terraform-state"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-token"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/vault"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = { cpu = "5m", memory = "16Mi" }
|
|
|
|
|
limits = { memory = "32Mi" }
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "workspace"
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
# Per-pod ephemeral scratch — agent does fresh git clones each
|
|
|
|
|
# job, so node-disk emptyDir is faster than a network-backed PVC
|
|
|
|
|
# and avoids RWO contention across the 3 replicas.
|
|
|
|
|
empty_dir {}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "persistent"
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
persistent_volume_claim {
|
2026-05-11 20:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
claim_name = module.persistent.claim_name
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "sops-age-key"
|
|
|
|
|
secret {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_name = kubernetes_secret.sops_age_key.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
default_mode = "0600"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "git-crypt-key"
|
|
|
|
|
config_map {
|
|
|
|
|
name = kubernetes_config_map.git_crypt_key.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-credentials-secret"
|
|
|
|
|
secret {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_name = kubernetes_secret.claude_credentials.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
default_mode = "0600"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-home"
|
|
|
|
|
empty_dir {}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.
Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.
claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).
Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Holds the Vault token the refresher sidecar mints; main container
|
|
|
|
|
# symlinks $HOME/.vault-token at /vault/token. emptyDir (memory-backed
|
|
|
|
|
# not required) — token is re-minted every 30 min and on pod restart.
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-token"
|
|
|
|
|
empty_dir {}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
[infra] Establish KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1 drift-suppression convention [ci skip]
## Context
Phase 1 of the state-drift consolidation audit (plan Wave 3) identified that
the entire repo leans on a repeated `lifecycle { ignore_changes = [...dns_config] }`
snippet to suppress Kyverno's admission-webhook dns_config mutation (the ndots=2
override that prevents NxDomain search-domain flooding). 27 occurrences across
19 stacks. Without this suppression, every pod-owning resource shows perpetual
TF plan drift.
The original plan proposed a shared `modules/kubernetes/kyverno_lifecycle/`
module emitting the ignore-paths list as an output that stacks would consume in
their `ignore_changes` blocks. That approach is architecturally impossible:
Terraform's `ignore_changes` meta-argument accepts only static attribute paths
— it rejects module outputs, locals, variables, and any expression (the HCL
spec evaluates `lifecycle` before the regular expression graph). So a DRY
module cannot exist. The canonical pattern IS the repeated snippet.
What the snippet was missing was a *discoverability tag* so that (a) new
resources can be validated for compliance, (b) the existing 27 sites can be
grep'd in a single command, and (c) future maintainers understand the
convention rather than each reinventing it.
## This change
- Introduces `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` as the canonical marker comment.
Attached inline on every `spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config` line
(or `spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0]...` for CronJobs) across all 27
existing suppression sites.
- Documents the convention with rationale and copy-paste snippets in
`AGENTS.md` → new "Kyverno Drift Suppression" section.
- Expands the existing `.claude/CLAUDE.md` Kyverno ndots note to reference
the marker and explain why the module approach is blocked.
- Updates `_template/main.tf.example` so every new stack starts compliant.
## What is NOT in this change
- The `kubernetes_manifest` Kyverno annotation drift (beads `code-seq`)
— that is Phase B with a sibling `# KYVERNO_MANIFEST_V1` marker.
- Behavioral changes — every `ignore_changes` list is byte-identical
save for the inline comment.
- The fallback module the original plan anticipated — skipped because
Terraform rejects expressions in `ignore_changes`.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup on adjacent unrelated blocks in three files
(claude-agent-service, freedify/factory, hermes-agent). Reverted to
keep this commit scoped to the convention rollout.
## Before / after
Before (cannot distinguish accidental-forgotten from intentional-convention):
```hcl
lifecycle {
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
}
```
After (greppable, self-documenting, discoverable by tooling):
```hcl
lifecycle {
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config] # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1
}
```
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
27
$ git diff --stat | grep -E '\.(tf|tf\.example|md)$' | wc -l
21
# All code-file diffs are 1 insertion + 1 deletion per marker site,
# except beads-server (3), ebooks (4), immich (3), uptime-kuma (2).
$ git diff --stat stacks/ | tail -1
20 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
```
### Manual Verification
No apply required — HCL comments only. Zero effect on any stack's plan output.
Future audits: `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` must grow as new
pod-owning resources are added.
## Reproduce locally
1. `cd infra && git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/` → expect 27 hits in 19 files
3. Grep any new `kubernetes_deployment` for the marker; absence = missing
suppression.
Closes: code-28m
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:15:51 +00:00
|
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|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config] # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1
|
[claude-agent-service] Add CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN env var — 1-year long-lived auth
## Context
Earlier today we hit a silent auth failure on the upgrade agent: the
short-lived `sk-ant-oat01-*` access token in `.credentials.json` had
expired and the CLI's refresh path failed (refresh token either stale
or invalidated after the creds sat in Vault for 5 days).
The real fix isn't "refresh more often" — it's switching to the
long-lived auth mechanism `claude setup-token` provides. Unlike
`claude login` (OAuth flow → 6–8h access token + refresh token JSON),
`setup-token` mints a single opaque token valid for **1 year** that
the CLI consumes via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env var. No refresh
dance, no JSON file, no rotation for a year.
## This change
Adds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the existing
`claude-agent-secrets` ExternalSecret, sourced from a new
`claude_oauth_token` field at `secret/claude-agent-service`. The
container already pulls that secret via `envFrom`, so no other wiring
needed.
The Claude CLI prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` over the OAuth JSON
file when both are present, so this is additive — `.credentials.json`
stays mounted as a fallback while we validate the long-lived path.
Future cleanup can remove the JSON mount entirely.
Verified E2E: synthetic DIUN webhook for `docker.io/library/httpd`
→ n8n → claude-agent-service /execute → agent job `fea5ff70dcfe`
completed in 30s with exit_code=0, agent correctly identified no
matching stack and aborted without changes. No API auth errors.
## Spares
Harvested two additional long-lived tokens and stored them at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` for failover if the
primary is compromised or revoked. Verified both coexist with the
primary (no revocation on mint).
## What is NOT in this change
- No removal of `.credentials.json` mount or its Vault source (keep
as fallback until we've run for 24h on env-var auth with no issues).
- No cron rotator — 1-year TTL means this can be a yearly manual
rotation, alerted on from Vault metadata. If we add rotation, we'll
source from the spares pool rather than minting new tokens.
## Reproduce locally
```
1. vault login -method=oidc
2. vault kv get -field=claude_oauth_token secret/claude-agent-service | head -c 25
3. cd stacks/claude-agent-service && ../../scripts/tg apply
4. kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -- \
printenv CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN # should be 108 chars
5. Fire synthetic DIUN webhook (see docs/architecture/automated-upgrades.md)
```
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- Service ---
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "claude_agent" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-agent-service"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = local.labels
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
selector = local.labels
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
target_port = 8080
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
type = "ClusterIP"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[monitoring] Add Claude OAuth token expiry monitoring + alerts
## Context
The new CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN mechanism (commit 8a054752) uses
long-lived 1-year tokens minted via `claude setup-token`. Tokens don't
auto-refresh — at the 1-year mark they expire hard and the upgrade
agent stops working. We need to be told 30 days ahead, not find out
when DIUN fires and gets 401 again.
A cron rotator doesn't make sense here (tokens don't refresh, they
just expire) so we alert instead. Two spares at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` provide failover runway —
monitor covers all three.
## This change
**CronJob** (`claude-agent` ns, every 6h): reads a ConfigMap
containing `<path> → expiry_unix_timestamp` entries, pushes
`claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path="..."}` and
`claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp` to Pushgateway at
`prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091`.
**ConfigMap** generated from a Terraform local `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs`
— source of truth for mint times. On rotation, update the map + apply.
TTL is a shared local (365d).
**PrometheusRules** (in prometheus_chart_values.tpl):
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` — <30d, warning, for 1h
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenCritical` — <7d, critical, for 10m
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorStale` — last push >48h, warning
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorNeverRun` — metric absent for 2h, warning
Alert labels include `{{ $labels.path }}` so we know which token is
expiring (primary / spare-1 / spare-2).
## Verification
```
$ kubectl -n claude-agent create job --from=cronjob/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor manual
$ curl pushgateway/metrics | grep claude_oauth_token_expiry
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="primary"} 1.808064429e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-1"} 1.80806428e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-2"} 1.808064429e+09
$ query: (claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp - time()) / 86400
primary: 365.2 days
spare-1: 365.2 days
spare-2: 365.2 days
```
## Rotation playbook (future)
1. `kubectl run -it --rm --image=registry.viktorbarzin.me/claude-agent-service:latest tokmint -- claude setup-token`
(or harvest via `harvest3.py` pattern in memory for headless flow)
2. `vault kv patch secret/claude-agent-service claude_oauth_token=<new>`
3. Update `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs["primary"]` in
`stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf` with new unix timestamp
4. `scripts/tg apply` claude-agent-service + monitoring
5. Alert clears within 6h (next cron tick) + 1h of the
`ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` "for:" duration
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:27:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
|
# Token expiry monitor
|
|
|
|
|
# Long-lived CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN values expire 1y after mint. We track
|
|
|
|
|
# mint timestamps here — on rotation, update the map below. A CronJob pushes
|
|
|
|
|
# the computed expiry_timestamp to Pushgateway, Prometheus alerts 30d out.
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
|
locals {
|
|
|
|
|
claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs = {
|
|
|
|
|
# unix seconds (UTC) — when `claude setup-token` finished minting
|
[infra/claude-agent-service] Seed beads metadata + scratch dir at runtime
## Context
Review of the BeadBoard Dispatch wiring found that the claude-agent-service
Dockerfile's `COPY beads/metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json` and
`COPY agents/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/...` both land
on paths that are volume-mounted at runtime:
- `/workspace` → `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC (main.tf:394-398)
- `/home/agent/.claude` → `claude-home` emptyDir (main.tf:424-427)
Kubernetes mounts hide image-layer content at those paths, so the COPYs are
dead. The companion commit in `claude-agent-service` restages both files to
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` (an image-layer path that is never mounted).
Additionally, the beads-task-runner agent rails expect
`/workspace/scratch/<job_id>/` to exist, but nothing was creating it.
## Layout before / after
```
Before (dead COPYs):
image layer runtime (mounted volumes hide the files)
----------- -----------------------------------
/workspace/ <- hidden by PVC mount
.beads/
metadata.json <- UNREACHABLE
/home/agent/.claude/ <- hidden by emptyDir mount
agents/
beads-task-runner.md <- UNREACHABLE
After (init container seeds volumes at pod start):
image layer runtime
----------- ------------------------------------
/usr/share/agent-seed/
beads-metadata.json --+
beads-task-runner.md --+-> copied by seed-beads-agent init
container into the mounted volumes
on every pod start:
/workspace/.beads/metadata.json
/workspace/scratch/
/home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
```
## What
### New init container: `seed-beads-agent`
- Positioned AFTER `git-init`, BEFORE the main container.
- Uses the same service image (`${local.image}:${local.image_tag}`) — the
seed files are baked in at `/usr/share/agent-seed/`.
- Runs as default uid 1000 (the PVCs are already chowned by `fix-perms`).
- Shell body:
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
- Mounts: `workspace` at `/workspace`, `claude-home` at `/home/agent/.claude`.
- Resources: 32Mi requests / 64Mi limits (matches `fix-perms`/`copy-claude-creds`).
### Formatting
- `terraform fmt -recursive` also normalised whitespace in the token-expiry
locals block and the CronJob container definition. No semantic change.
## What is NOT in this change
- No image tag bump. The Dockerfile refactor that produces the
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` path lands in the claude-agent-service repo
and will roll in on the next CI build. Until that build ships and the
tag is bumped in this file, the new init container will `cp` from a
path that doesn't exist yet — so do NOT apply this commit until the
corresponding image tag bump is ready. The commit is declarative prep.
- No changes to storage class, RBAC, Service, or any other init.
- The main container mounts remain unchanged — only the init containers
prepare volume contents.
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ terraform fmt -check -recursive stacks/claude-agent-service/
(no output — clean)
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ init -backend=false
Terraform has been successfully initialized!
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ validate
Warning: Deprecated Resource (pre-existing; use kubernetes_namespace_v1)
Success! The configuration is valid, but there were some validation warnings
as shown above.
```
### Manual Verification (after image bump + apply)
1. Bump `local.image_tag` in main.tf to the SHA of a build that has
`/usr/share/agent-seed/*` (verify with `docker inspect $IMAGE | jq ...`
or `kubectl run tmp --image ... -- ls /usr/share/agent-seed`).
2. `scripts/tg apply stacks/claude-agent-service`
3. `kubectl -n claude-agent get pods -w` — all init containers complete.
4. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- ls -la /workspace/.beads/metadata.json /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md /workspace/scratch`
Expected: all three paths exist; first two are regular files with the
expected content, `scratch` is a directory.
5. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- jq -r .dolt_server_host /workspace/.beads/metadata.json`
Expected: `dolt.beads-server.svc.cluster.local`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"primary" = 1776528429 # 2026-04-18T12:07:09Z (TOKEN2)
|
|
|
|
|
"spare-1" = 1776528280 # 2026-04-18T12:04:40Z (TOKEN1)
|
|
|
|
|
"spare-2" = 1776528429 # 2026-04-18T12:07:09Z (TOKEN2 — redundant w/ primary)
|
[monitoring] Add Claude OAuth token expiry monitoring + alerts
## Context
The new CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN mechanism (commit 8a054752) uses
long-lived 1-year tokens minted via `claude setup-token`. Tokens don't
auto-refresh — at the 1-year mark they expire hard and the upgrade
agent stops working. We need to be told 30 days ahead, not find out
when DIUN fires and gets 401 again.
A cron rotator doesn't make sense here (tokens don't refresh, they
just expire) so we alert instead. Two spares at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` provide failover runway —
monitor covers all three.
## This change
**CronJob** (`claude-agent` ns, every 6h): reads a ConfigMap
containing `<path> → expiry_unix_timestamp` entries, pushes
`claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path="..."}` and
`claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp` to Pushgateway at
`prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091`.
**ConfigMap** generated from a Terraform local `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs`
— source of truth for mint times. On rotation, update the map + apply.
TTL is a shared local (365d).
**PrometheusRules** (in prometheus_chart_values.tpl):
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` — <30d, warning, for 1h
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenCritical` — <7d, critical, for 10m
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorStale` — last push >48h, warning
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorNeverRun` — metric absent for 2h, warning
Alert labels include `{{ $labels.path }}` so we know which token is
expiring (primary / spare-1 / spare-2).
## Verification
```
$ kubectl -n claude-agent create job --from=cronjob/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor manual
$ curl pushgateway/metrics | grep claude_oauth_token_expiry
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="primary"} 1.808064429e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-1"} 1.80806428e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-2"} 1.808064429e+09
$ query: (claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp - time()) / 86400
primary: 365.2 days
spare-1: 365.2 days
spare-2: 365.2 days
```
## Rotation playbook (future)
1. `kubectl run -it --rm --image=registry.viktorbarzin.me/claude-agent-service:latest tokmint -- claude setup-token`
(or harvest via `harvest3.py` pattern in memory for headless flow)
2. `vault kv patch secret/claude-agent-service claude_oauth_token=<new>`
3. Update `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs["primary"]` in
`stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf` with new unix timestamp
4. `scripts/tg apply` claude-agent-service + monitoring
5. Alert clears within 6h (next cron tick) + 1h of the
`ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` "for:" duration
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:27:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
claude_oauth_token_ttl_seconds = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "claude_oauth_expiry" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-oauth-expiry"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
data = {
|
|
|
|
|
for path, mint in local.claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs :
|
|
|
|
|
path => tostring(mint + local.claude_oauth_token_ttl_seconds)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_cron_job_v1" "claude_oauth_expiry_monitor" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "claude-oauth-expiry-monitor"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
concurrency_policy = "Replace"
|
|
|
|
|
failed_jobs_history_limit = 3
|
|
|
|
|
successful_jobs_history_limit = 1
|
|
|
|
|
schedule = "17 */6 * * *" # every 6h at :17 past
|
|
|
|
|
job_template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
backoff_limit = 1
|
|
|
|
|
ttl_seconds_after_finished = 300
|
|
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
restart_policy = "OnFailure"
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
[infra/claude-agent-service] Seed beads metadata + scratch dir at runtime
## Context
Review of the BeadBoard Dispatch wiring found that the claude-agent-service
Dockerfile's `COPY beads/metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json` and
`COPY agents/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/...` both land
on paths that are volume-mounted at runtime:
- `/workspace` → `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC (main.tf:394-398)
- `/home/agent/.claude` → `claude-home` emptyDir (main.tf:424-427)
Kubernetes mounts hide image-layer content at those paths, so the COPYs are
dead. The companion commit in `claude-agent-service` restages both files to
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` (an image-layer path that is never mounted).
Additionally, the beads-task-runner agent rails expect
`/workspace/scratch/<job_id>/` to exist, but nothing was creating it.
## Layout before / after
```
Before (dead COPYs):
image layer runtime (mounted volumes hide the files)
----------- -----------------------------------
/workspace/ <- hidden by PVC mount
.beads/
metadata.json <- UNREACHABLE
/home/agent/.claude/ <- hidden by emptyDir mount
agents/
beads-task-runner.md <- UNREACHABLE
After (init container seeds volumes at pod start):
image layer runtime
----------- ------------------------------------
/usr/share/agent-seed/
beads-metadata.json --+
beads-task-runner.md --+-> copied by seed-beads-agent init
container into the mounted volumes
on every pod start:
/workspace/.beads/metadata.json
/workspace/scratch/
/home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
```
## What
### New init container: `seed-beads-agent`
- Positioned AFTER `git-init`, BEFORE the main container.
- Uses the same service image (`${local.image}:${local.image_tag}`) — the
seed files are baked in at `/usr/share/agent-seed/`.
- Runs as default uid 1000 (the PVCs are already chowned by `fix-perms`).
- Shell body:
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
- Mounts: `workspace` at `/workspace`, `claude-home` at `/home/agent/.claude`.
- Resources: 32Mi requests / 64Mi limits (matches `fix-perms`/`copy-claude-creds`).
### Formatting
- `terraform fmt -recursive` also normalised whitespace in the token-expiry
locals block and the CronJob container definition. No semantic change.
## What is NOT in this change
- No image tag bump. The Dockerfile refactor that produces the
`/usr/share/agent-seed/` path lands in the claude-agent-service repo
and will roll in on the next CI build. Until that build ships and the
tag is bumped in this file, the new init container will `cp` from a
path that doesn't exist yet — so do NOT apply this commit until the
corresponding image tag bump is ready. The commit is declarative prep.
- No changes to storage class, RBAC, Service, or any other init.
- The main container mounts remain unchanged — only the init containers
prepare volume contents.
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ terraform fmt -check -recursive stacks/claude-agent-service/
(no output — clean)
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ init -backend=false
Terraform has been successfully initialized!
$ terraform -chdir=stacks/claude-agent-service/ validate
Warning: Deprecated Resource (pre-existing; use kubernetes_namespace_v1)
Success! The configuration is valid, but there were some validation warnings
as shown above.
```
### Manual Verification (after image bump + apply)
1. Bump `local.image_tag` in main.tf to the SHA of a build that has
`/usr/share/agent-seed/*` (verify with `docker inspect $IMAGE | jq ...`
or `kubectl run tmp --image ... -- ls /usr/share/agent-seed`).
2. `scripts/tg apply stacks/claude-agent-service`
3. `kubectl -n claude-agent get pods -w` — all init containers complete.
4. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- ls -la /workspace/.beads/metadata.json /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md /workspace/scratch`
Expected: all three paths exist; first two are regular files with the
expected content, `scratch` is a directory.
5. `kubectl -n claude-agent exec deploy/claude-agent-service -c claude-agent-service -- jq -r .dolt_server_host /workspace/.beads/metadata.json`
Expected: `dolt.beads-server.svc.cluster.local`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "push-expiry"
|
|
|
|
|
image = "docker.io/curlimages/curl:8.11.0"
|
[monitoring] Add Claude OAuth token expiry monitoring + alerts
## Context
The new CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN mechanism (commit 8a054752) uses
long-lived 1-year tokens minted via `claude setup-token`. Tokens don't
auto-refresh — at the 1-year mark they expire hard and the upgrade
agent stops working. We need to be told 30 days ahead, not find out
when DIUN fires and gets 401 again.
A cron rotator doesn't make sense here (tokens don't refresh, they
just expire) so we alert instead. Two spares at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` provide failover runway —
monitor covers all three.
## This change
**CronJob** (`claude-agent` ns, every 6h): reads a ConfigMap
containing `<path> → expiry_unix_timestamp` entries, pushes
`claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path="..."}` and
`claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp` to Pushgateway at
`prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091`.
**ConfigMap** generated from a Terraform local `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs`
— source of truth for mint times. On rotation, update the map + apply.
TTL is a shared local (365d).
**PrometheusRules** (in prometheus_chart_values.tpl):
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` — <30d, warning, for 1h
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenCritical` — <7d, critical, for 10m
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorStale` — last push >48h, warning
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorNeverRun` — metric absent for 2h, warning
Alert labels include `{{ $labels.path }}` so we know which token is
expiring (primary / spare-1 / spare-2).
## Verification
```
$ kubectl -n claude-agent create job --from=cronjob/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor manual
$ curl pushgateway/metrics | grep claude_oauth_token_expiry
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="primary"} 1.808064429e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-1"} 1.80806428e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-2"} 1.808064429e+09
$ query: (claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp - time()) / 86400
primary: 365.2 days
spare-1: 365.2 days
spare-2: 365.2 days
```
## Rotation playbook (future)
1. `kubectl run -it --rm --image=registry.viktorbarzin.me/claude-agent-service:latest tokmint -- claude setup-token`
(or harvest via `harvest3.py` pattern in memory for headless flow)
2. `vault kv patch secret/claude-agent-service claude_oauth_token=<new>`
3. Update `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs["primary"]` in
`stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf` with new unix timestamp
4. `scripts/tg apply` claude-agent-service + monitoring
5. Alert clears within 6h (next cron tick) + 1h of the
`ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` "for:" duration
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:27:11 +00:00
|
|
|
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOT
|
|
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|
|
set -e
|
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|
|
PG='http://prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091/metrics/job/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor'
|
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|
NOW=$(date +%s)
|
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|
PAYLOAD=''
|
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PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# HELP claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp Unix epoch when the CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN for this path expires
|
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|
"
|
|
|
|
|
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# TYPE claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp gauge
|
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|
|
"
|
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|
|
|
for path in /mnt/expiry/*; do
|
|
|
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|
name=$(basename "$path")
|
|
|
|
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exp=$(cat "$path")
|
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|
|
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path=\"$name\"} $exp
|
|
|
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
|
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# HELP claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp Last time the expiry monitor pushed metrics
|
|
|
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
|
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# TYPE claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp gauge
|
|
|
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
|
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp $NOW
|
|
|
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
|
echo "$PAYLOAD"
|
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|
|
echo "$PAYLOAD" | curl -sS --data-binary @- "$PG"
|
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|
|
echo "pushed at $NOW"
|
|
|
|
|
EOT
|
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|
|
|
]
|
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volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "expiry"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/mnt/expiry"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
resources {
|
|
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|
|
requests = { cpu = "10m", memory = "32Mi" }
|
|
|
|
|
limits = { memory = "64Mi" }
|
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|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
volume {
|
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|
|
|
name = "expiry"
|
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config_map {
|
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|
|
|
name = kubernetes_config_map.claude_oauth_expiry.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[monitoring] Add Claude OAuth token expiry monitoring + alerts
## Context
The new CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN mechanism (commit 8a054752) uses
long-lived 1-year tokens minted via `claude setup-token`. Tokens don't
auto-refresh — at the 1-year mark they expire hard and the upgrade
agent stops working. We need to be told 30 days ahead, not find out
when DIUN fires and gets 401 again.
A cron rotator doesn't make sense here (tokens don't refresh, they
just expire) so we alert instead. Two spares at
`secret/claude-agent-service-spare-{1,2}` provide failover runway —
monitor covers all three.
## This change
**CronJob** (`claude-agent` ns, every 6h): reads a ConfigMap
containing `<path> → expiry_unix_timestamp` entries, pushes
`claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path="..."}` and
`claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp` to Pushgateway at
`prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091`.
**ConfigMap** generated from a Terraform local `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs`
— source of truth for mint times. On rotation, update the map + apply.
TTL is a shared local (365d).
**PrometheusRules** (in prometheus_chart_values.tpl):
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` — <30d, warning, for 1h
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenCritical` — <7d, critical, for 10m
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorStale` — last push >48h, warning
- `ClaudeOAuthTokenMonitorNeverRun` — metric absent for 2h, warning
Alert labels include `{{ $labels.path }}` so we know which token is
expiring (primary / spare-1 / spare-2).
## Verification
```
$ kubectl -n claude-agent create job --from=cronjob/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor manual
$ curl pushgateway/metrics | grep claude_oauth_token_expiry
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="primary"} 1.808064429e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-1"} 1.80806428e+09
claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{...,path="spare-2"} 1.808064429e+09
$ query: (claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp - time()) / 86400
primary: 365.2 days
spare-1: 365.2 days
spare-2: 365.2 days
```
## Rotation playbook (future)
1. `kubectl run -it --rm --image=registry.viktorbarzin.me/claude-agent-service:latest tokmint -- claude setup-token`
(or harvest via `harvest3.py` pattern in memory for headless flow)
2. `vault kv patch secret/claude-agent-service claude_oauth_token=<new>`
3. Update `claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs["primary"]` in
`stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf` with new unix timestamp
4. `scripts/tg apply` claude-agent-service + monitoring
5. Alert clears within 6h (next cron tick) + 1h of the
`ClaudeOAuthTokenExpiringSoon` "for:" duration
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:27:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|