infra/docs/runbooks/offboard-user.md

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# Runbook: Offboard a User
Removing a user can span two surfaces — the **in-cluster** namespace-owner model
(Vault `k8s_users` / RBAC / namespace) and the **devvm Workstation** (roster /
OS account / t3 instance). Both are **staged**: a *reversible cut* (revoke access,
delete nothing) first, then an explicit, gated *destructive removal*. Do the
reversible cut immediately; only do the destructive step once you're sure.
> Architecture: `../architecture/multi-tenancy.md`. Workstation design:
> `../plans/2026-06-07-multi-user-workstation-design.md`.
---
## Part A — DevVM Workstation offboarding
Driven by removing the user's entry from `infra/scripts/workstation/roster.yaml`.
`roster_engine.py offboard_plan` computes the staged actions (reversible cut vs the
gated `userdel_archive`, which is **never** auto-applied).
### A1. Reversible cut (revoke access; delete nothing)
1. **Delete the user's entry** from `roster.yaml`; commit + push.
2. **Reconcile** (`sudo /usr/local/bin/t3-provision-users`, or wait for the hourly
timer). This **regenerates** `/etc/ttyd-user-map` + `dispatch.json` *without* the
user → `t3-dispatch` now returns **403** for them. *(Automated.)*
3. **Disable their instance + lock login** *(manual today; Phase 7 will fold this into
the reconcile):*
```bash
sudo systemctl disable --now t3-serve@<os_user>.service
sudo passwd -l <os_user>
```
4. **Verify:** they can no longer reach `t3.viktorbarzin.me` (302 → Authentik, then
denied once removed from the `T3 Users` group — Part C) and cannot log in. Nothing
is deleted; re-adding the roster entry + reconcile fully restores them.
### A2. Destructive removal (explicit, gated — NEVER automatic)
Only after the reversible cut and a deliberate decision:
```bash
sudo tar czf /mnt/backup/offboard/<os_user>-$(date +%Y%m%d).tar.gz /home/<os_user>
sudo userdel -r <os_user> # removes home + mail spool — IRREVERSIBLE
```
Rollback before this step: re-add the roster entry + reconcile. After it: restore
from the archive.
---
## Part B — In-cluster (namespace-owner) offboarding
1. **Reversible cut:** remove the user's Authentik group membership (edge/RBAC blocked)
and their entry from the Vault `k8s_users` map (`secret/platform`).
2. **Apply:** `scripts/tg apply` the `vault``platform``woodpecker` stacks (drops the
RBAC binding, Vault identity/policy, and per-user CI). Their OIDC kubeconfig stops
authorizing immediately.
3. **Destructive (gated):** deleting their namespace(s) removes all their workloads +
data — back up first (PVCs, DBs), then delete only on explicit decision.
---
## Part C — Authentik (both surfaces)
Remove the user from the relevant Authentik group(s) — `kubernetes-namespace-owners`
(cluster) and/or `T3 Users` (workstation edge gate). This is the edge revocation; do
it as part of the reversible cut so they're locked out at the front door.
---
## Order of operations
Reversible cut on **all** relevant surfaces first (Authentik group → roster removal +
reconcile → `k8s_users` removal + apply) → verify access is gone → only then the gated
destructive steps (`userdel -r`, namespace deletion), each after its own archive.