2026-03-07 14:30:36 +00:00
|
|
|
variable "tls_secret_name" {
|
2026-03-14 08:51:45 +00:00
|
|
|
type = string
|
2026-03-07 14:30:36 +00:00
|
|
|
sensitive = true
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[ci skip] Infrastructure hardening: security, monitoring, reliability, maintainability
Phase 1 - Critical Security:
- Netbox: move hardcoded DB/superuser passwords to variables
- MeshCentral: disable public registration, add Authentik auth
- Traefik: disable insecure API dashboard (api.insecure=false)
- Traefik: configure forwarded headers with Cloudflare trusted IPs
Phase 2 - Security Hardening:
- Add security headers middleware (HSTS, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, etc.)
- Add Kyverno pod security policies in audit mode (privileged, host
namespaces, SYS_ADMIN, trusted registries)
- Tighten rate limiting (avg=10, burst=50)
- Add Authentik protection to grampsweb
Phase 3 - Monitoring & Alerting:
- Add critical service alerts (PostgreSQL, MySQL, Redis, Headscale,
Authentik, Loki)
- Increase Loki retention from 7 to 30 days (720h)
- Add predictive PV filling alert (predict_linear)
- Re-enable Hackmd and Privatebin down alerts
Phase 4 - Reliability:
- Add resource requests/limits to Redis, DBaaS, Technitium, Headscale,
Vaultwarden, Uptime Kuma
- Increase Alloy DaemonSet memory to 512Mi/1Gi
Phase 6 - Maintainability:
- Extract duplicated tiers locals to terragrunt.hcl generate block
(removed from 67 stacks)
- Replace hardcoded NFS IP 10.0.10.15 with var.nfs_server (114
instances across 63 files)
- Replace hardcoded Redis/PostgreSQL/MySQL/Ollama/mail host references
with variables across ~35 stacks
- Migrate xray raw ingress resources to ingress_factory modules
2026-02-23 22:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
variable "nfs_server" { type = string }
|
2026-03-01 20:17:38 +00:00
|
|
|
variable "discord_f1_guild_id" { type = string }
|
|
|
|
|
variable "discord_f1_channel_ids" { type = string }
|
2026-02-22 13:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "f1-stream" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"istio-injection" : "disabled"
|
2026-05-07 10:43:40 +00:00
|
|
|
tier = local.tiers.aux
|
|
|
|
|
"chrome-service.viktorbarzin.me/client" = "true"
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno
ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with
`metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This
is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks
should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how
Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode.
Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label
as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey
2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the
label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace
is affected.
This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same
`# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for
the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any
Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records
which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits
show why each suppression exists.
## This change
107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"`
resource gets:
```hcl
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
```
Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`):
match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the
outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing
brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions
`goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe.
Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces
one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines).
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out
(paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran.
- `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally
minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file
has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder
comment).
- `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) —
gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in
authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted
to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will
need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real
apply to that stack.
## Verification
Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern
before and after:
```
$ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan
Before:
Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy.
# kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place
(goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null)
# module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place
(Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d)
After:
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.
```
Injection count check:
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
108
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan`
3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label.
Closes: code-dwx
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
migrate consuming stacks to ESO + remove k8s-dashboard static token
Phase 9: ExternalSecret migration across 26 stacks:
Fully migrated (vault data source removed, ESO delivers secrets):
- speedtest, shadowsocks, wealthfolio, plotting-book, f1-stream, tandoor
- n8n, dawarich, diun, netbox, onlyoffice, tuya-bridge
- hackmd (ESO template for DB URL), health (ESO template for DB URL)
- trading-bot (ESO template for DATABASE_URL + 7 secret env vars)
- forgejo (removed unused vault data source)
Partially migrated (vault kept for plan-time, ESO added for runtime):
- immich, linkwarden, nextcloud, paperless-ngx (jsondecode for homepage)
- claude-memory, rybbit, url, webhook_handler (plan-time in locals/jobs)
- woodpecker, openclaw, resume (plan-time in helm values/jobs/modules)
17 stacks unchanged (all plan-time: homepage annotations, configmaps,
module inputs) — vault data source works with OIDC auth.
Phase 17a: Remove k8s-dashboard static admin token secret.
Users now get tokens via: vault write kubernetes/creds/dashboard-admin
2026-03-15 19:05:04 +00:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "external_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
manifest = {
|
|
|
|
|
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ExternalSecret"
|
|
|
|
|
metadata = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec = {
|
|
|
|
|
refreshInterval = "15m"
|
|
|
|
|
secretStoreRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-kv"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
target = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
dataFrom = [{
|
|
|
|
|
extract = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-07 10:43:40 +00:00
|
|
|
# Pull the chrome-service bearer token into this namespace as a separate
|
|
|
|
|
# Secret so the verifier can reach the in-cluster Playwright pool.
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "chrome_service_client_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
manifest = {
|
|
|
|
|
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ExternalSecret"
|
|
|
|
|
metadata = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec = {
|
|
|
|
|
refreshInterval = "15m"
|
|
|
|
|
secretStoreRef = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "vault-kv"
|
|
|
|
|
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
target = {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
dataFrom = [{
|
|
|
|
|
extract = {
|
|
|
|
|
key = "chrome-service"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(storage): migrate 38 NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 2)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
remaining single-pod app data services. Deployments updated to
use new block storage PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for rollback.
Services: affine, changedetection, diun, excalidraw, f1-stream,
hackmd, isponsorblocktv, matrix, n8n, send, grampsweb, health,
onlyoffice, owntracks, paperless-ngx, privatebin, resume,
speedtest, stirling-pdf, tandoor, rybbit (clickhouse), tor-proxy
(torrserver), whisper+piper, frigate (config), ollama (ui),
servarr (prowlarr/listenarr/qbittorrent), aiostreams, freshrss
(extensions), meshcentral (data+files), openclaw (data+home+
openlobster), technitium, mailserver (data+roundcube html+enigma),
dbaas (pgadmin).
Strategy set to Recreate where needed for RWO volumes.
2026-04-04 19:25:12 +03:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim" "data_proxmox" {
|
|
|
|
|
wait_until_bound = false
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream-data-proxmox"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
2026-05-10 19:56:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/threshold" = "10%"
|
feat(storage): migrate 38 NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 2)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
remaining single-pod app data services. Deployments updated to
use new block storage PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for rollback.
Services: affine, changedetection, diun, excalidraw, f1-stream,
hackmd, isponsorblocktv, matrix, n8n, send, grampsweb, health,
onlyoffice, owntracks, paperless-ngx, privatebin, resume,
speedtest, stirling-pdf, tandoor, rybbit (clickhouse), tor-proxy
(torrserver), whisper+piper, frigate (config), ollama (ui),
servarr (prowlarr/listenarr/qbittorrent), aiostreams, freshrss
(extensions), meshcentral (data+files), openclaw (data+home+
openlobster), technitium, mailserver (data+roundcube html+enigma),
dbaas (pgadmin).
Strategy set to Recreate where needed for RWO volumes.
2026-04-04 19:25:12 +03:00
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/increase" = "100%"
|
|
|
|
|
"resize.topolvm.io/storage_limit" = "5Gi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
access_modes = ["ReadWriteOnce"]
|
|
|
|
|
storage_class_name = "proxmox-lvm"
|
|
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
|
|
|
|
storage = "1Gi"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-05-10 21:57:01 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# The autoresizer expands requests.storage up to storage_limit and
|
|
|
|
|
# PVCs can't shrink. Without this, every TF apply tries to revert
|
|
|
|
|
# to the spec value, K8s rejects the shrink, and the PVC ends up
|
|
|
|
|
# in Terminating-but-in-use limbo.
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].resources[0].requests]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat(storage): migrate 38 NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 2)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
remaining single-pod app data services. Deployments updated to
use new block storage PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for rollback.
Services: affine, changedetection, diun, excalidraw, f1-stream,
hackmd, isponsorblocktv, matrix, n8n, send, grampsweb, health,
onlyoffice, owntracks, paperless-ngx, privatebin, resume,
speedtest, stirling-pdf, tandoor, rybbit (clickhouse), tor-proxy
(torrserver), whisper+piper, frigate (config), ollama (ui),
servarr (prowlarr/listenarr/qbittorrent), aiostreams, freshrss
(extensions), meshcentral (data+files), openclaw (data+home+
openlobster), technitium, mailserver (data+roundcube html+enigma),
dbaas (pgadmin).
Strategy set to Recreate where needed for RWO volumes.
2026-04-04 19:25:12 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "f1-stream" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
tier = local.tiers.aux
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
migrate consuming stacks to ESO + remove k8s-dashboard static token
Phase 9: ExternalSecret migration across 26 stacks:
Fully migrated (vault data source removed, ESO delivers secrets):
- speedtest, shadowsocks, wealthfolio, plotting-book, f1-stream, tandoor
- n8n, dawarich, diun, netbox, onlyoffice, tuya-bridge
- hackmd (ESO template for DB URL), health (ESO template for DB URL)
- trading-bot (ESO template for DATABASE_URL + 7 secret env vars)
- forgejo (removed unused vault data source)
Partially migrated (vault kept for plan-time, ESO added for runtime):
- immich, linkwarden, nextcloud, paperless-ngx (jsondecode for homepage)
- claude-memory, rybbit, url, webhook_handler (plan-time in locals/jobs)
- woodpecker, openclaw, resume (plan-time in helm values/jobs/modules)
17 stacks unchanged (all plan-time: homepage annotations, configmaps,
module inputs) — vault data source works with OIDC auth.
Phase 17a: Remove k8s-dashboard static admin token secret.
Users now get tokens via: vault write kubernetes/creds/dashboard-admin
2026-03-15 19:05:04 +00:00
|
|
|
annotations = {
|
|
|
|
|
"reloader.stakater.com/auto" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
2026-03-16 07:06:09 +00:00
|
|
|
replicas = 1
|
feat(storage): migrate 38 NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 2)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
remaining single-pod app data services. Deployments updated to
use new block storage PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for rollback.
Services: affine, changedetection, diun, excalidraw, f1-stream,
hackmd, isponsorblocktv, matrix, n8n, send, grampsweb, health,
onlyoffice, owntracks, paperless-ngx, privatebin, resume,
speedtest, stirling-pdf, tandoor, rybbit (clickhouse), tor-proxy
(torrserver), whisper+piper, frigate (config), ollama (ui),
servarr (prowlarr/listenarr/qbittorrent), aiostreams, freshrss
(extensions), meshcentral (data+files), openclaw (data+home+
openlobster), technitium, mailserver (data+roundcube html+enigma),
dbaas (pgadmin).
Strategy set to Recreate where needed for RWO volumes.
2026-04-04 19:25:12 +03:00
|
|
|
strategy {
|
|
|
|
|
type = "Recreate"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
selector {
|
|
|
|
|
match_labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
template {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
container {
|
2026-03-01 15:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
image = "viktorbarzin/f1-stream:latest"
|
2026-02-23 23:59:35 +00:00
|
|
|
image_pull_policy = "Always"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream"
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
resources {
|
|
|
|
|
limits = {
|
f1-stream: only show streams confirmed playable by headless browser
Cuts the stream list from 23 mostly-broken entries to ~6 confirmed-playable
ones, and adds an iframe-stripping proxy so embed sources (hmembeds, etc.)
load through our origin without X-Frame-Options / CSP / JS frame-buster
blocks.
Why: the previous list was dominated by Discord-shared news article URLs,
hardcoded aggregator landing pages, and other non-stream URLs that all sat
at is_live=true because embed streams skipped the health check entirely.
Users could not tell which links would actually play.
What:
- backend/playback_verifier.py: new headless-Chromium verifier (Playwright)
that polls each candidate stream for a codec-independent "playable" signal
(hls.js MANIFEST_PARSED for m3u8; <video>/player div for embed). Replaces
the unconditional is_live=True for embed streams in service.py.
- backend/embed_proxy.py: new /embed and /embed-asset routes that fetch
upstream embed pages, strip X-Frame-Options/CSP/Set-Cookie, and inject a
<base href> + frame-buster-defeat <script> that locks down window.top,
document.referrer, console.clear/table, and window.location so the
hmembeds disable-devtool.js redirect-to-google trap can't fire.
- extractors/curated.py: new always-on extractor with two known-good 24/7
hmembeds embeds (Sky Sports F1, DAZN F1) so the list isn't empty between
race weekends.
- extractors/__init__.py: register CuratedExtractor first; drop
FallbackExtractor (its 10 aggregator landing-pages can't iframe-play).
- extractors/discord_source.py: positive-match path filter (must look like
/embed/, /stream, /watch, /live, /player, *.m3u8, *.php) plus expanded
domain blocklist for news sites — was 10 noise URLs, now ~1.
- extractors/service.py: run_extraction now health-checks AND verifier-
checks both stream types; only verified-playable streams reach is_live.
- main.py: register /embed + /embed-asset routes; defer initial extraction
by 8s so the verifier can reach the local /embed proxy on 127.0.0.1:8000.
- frontend/lib/api.js + watch/+page.svelte: route embed iframes through
/embed proxy instead of the upstream URL, so X-Frame-Options/CSP can't
block them.
- Dockerfile: install Playwright chromium + system codec-runtime libs.
- main.tf: bump pod memory 256Mi → 1Gi for chromium.
Verified end-to-end with Playwright against
https://f1.viktorbarzin.me/watch — 6/6 streams reach a player UI; the 3
demo m3u8s actually play (codec-bearing browser); the 3 embeds (Sky
Sports F1, DAZN F1, sportsurge) render iframes through the proxy.
Image: viktorbarzin/f1-stream:v6.0.5
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-06 21:00:07 +00:00
|
|
|
memory = "1Gi"
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
requests = {
|
f1-stream: only show streams confirmed playable by headless browser
Cuts the stream list from 23 mostly-broken entries to ~6 confirmed-playable
ones, and adds an iframe-stripping proxy so embed sources (hmembeds, etc.)
load through our origin without X-Frame-Options / CSP / JS frame-buster
blocks.
Why: the previous list was dominated by Discord-shared news article URLs,
hardcoded aggregator landing pages, and other non-stream URLs that all sat
at is_live=true because embed streams skipped the health check entirely.
Users could not tell which links would actually play.
What:
- backend/playback_verifier.py: new headless-Chromium verifier (Playwright)
that polls each candidate stream for a codec-independent "playable" signal
(hls.js MANIFEST_PARSED for m3u8; <video>/player div for embed). Replaces
the unconditional is_live=True for embed streams in service.py.
- backend/embed_proxy.py: new /embed and /embed-asset routes that fetch
upstream embed pages, strip X-Frame-Options/CSP/Set-Cookie, and inject a
<base href> + frame-buster-defeat <script> that locks down window.top,
document.referrer, console.clear/table, and window.location so the
hmembeds disable-devtool.js redirect-to-google trap can't fire.
- extractors/curated.py: new always-on extractor with two known-good 24/7
hmembeds embeds (Sky Sports F1, DAZN F1) so the list isn't empty between
race weekends.
- extractors/__init__.py: register CuratedExtractor first; drop
FallbackExtractor (its 10 aggregator landing-pages can't iframe-play).
- extractors/discord_source.py: positive-match path filter (must look like
/embed/, /stream, /watch, /live, /player, *.m3u8, *.php) plus expanded
domain blocklist for news sites — was 10 noise URLs, now ~1.
- extractors/service.py: run_extraction now health-checks AND verifier-
checks both stream types; only verified-playable streams reach is_live.
- main.py: register /embed + /embed-asset routes; defer initial extraction
by 8s so the verifier can reach the local /embed proxy on 127.0.0.1:8000.
- frontend/lib/api.js + watch/+page.svelte: route embed iframes through
/embed proxy instead of the upstream URL, so X-Frame-Options/CSP can't
block them.
- Dockerfile: install Playwright chromium + system codec-runtime libs.
- main.tf: bump pod memory 256Mi → 1Gi for chromium.
Verified end-to-end with Playwright against
https://f1.viktorbarzin.me/watch — 6/6 streams reach a player UI; the 3
demo m3u8s actually play (codec-bearing browser); the 3 embeds (Sky
Sports F1, DAZN F1, sportsurge) render iframes through the proxy.
Image: viktorbarzin/f1-stream:v6.0.5
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-06 21:00:07 +00:00
|
|
|
cpu = "100m"
|
|
|
|
|
memory = "1Gi"
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
2026-02-23 22:47:06 +00:00
|
|
|
container_port = 8000
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-01 20:17:38 +00:00
|
|
|
env {
|
migrate consuming stacks to ESO + remove k8s-dashboard static token
Phase 9: ExternalSecret migration across 26 stacks:
Fully migrated (vault data source removed, ESO delivers secrets):
- speedtest, shadowsocks, wealthfolio, plotting-book, f1-stream, tandoor
- n8n, dawarich, diun, netbox, onlyoffice, tuya-bridge
- hackmd (ESO template for DB URL), health (ESO template for DB URL)
- trading-bot (ESO template for DATABASE_URL + 7 secret env vars)
- forgejo (removed unused vault data source)
Partially migrated (vault kept for plan-time, ESO added for runtime):
- immich, linkwarden, nextcloud, paperless-ngx (jsondecode for homepage)
- claude-memory, rybbit, url, webhook_handler (plan-time in locals/jobs)
- woodpecker, openclaw, resume (plan-time in helm values/jobs/modules)
17 stacks unchanged (all plan-time: homepage annotations, configmaps,
module inputs) — vault data source works with OIDC auth.
Phase 17a: Remove k8s-dashboard static admin token secret.
Users now get tokens via: vault write kubernetes/creds/dashboard-admin
2026-03-15 19:05:04 +00:00
|
|
|
name = "DISCORD_TOKEN"
|
|
|
|
|
value_from {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_key_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
key = "discord_user_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-03-01 20:17:38 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "DISCORD_CHANNELS"
|
|
|
|
|
value = var.discord_f1_channel_ids
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-05-07 10:43:40 +00:00
|
|
|
# Verifier connects to in-cluster headed Chromium pool — see
|
|
|
|
|
# stacks/chrome-service/. Falls back to in-process headless if unset.
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "CHROME_WS_URL"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "ws://chrome-service.chrome-service.svc.cluster.local:3000"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "CHROME_WS_TOKEN"
|
|
|
|
|
value_from {
|
|
|
|
|
secret_key_ref {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
|
|
|
|
|
key = "api_bearer_token"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
# The embed proxy (this pod's /embed?url=…) must be reachable from
|
|
|
|
|
# the remote chrome-service pod. Default 127.0.0.1 only works for
|
|
|
|
|
# in-process Chromium — for the remote browser we point it at our
|
|
|
|
|
# own ClusterIP service.
|
|
|
|
|
env {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "PLAYBACK_VERIFY_PROXY_BASE"
|
|
|
|
|
value = "http://f1.f1-stream.svc.cluster.local"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
volume_mount {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "data"
|
|
|
|
|
mount_path = "/data"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
volume {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "data"
|
[ci skip] complete NFS CSI migration: complex stacks + platform modules
Migrate remaining multi-volume stacks and all platform modules from
inline NFS volumes to CSI-backed PV/PVC with nfs-truenas StorageClass
(soft,timeo=30,retrans=3 mount options).
Complex stacks: openclaw (4 vols), immich (8 vols), frigate (2 vols),
nextcloud (2 vols + old PV replaced), rybbit (1 vol)
Remaining stacks: affine, ebook2audiobook, f1-stream, osm_routing,
real-estate-crawler
Platform modules: monitoring (prometheus, loki, alertmanager PVs
converted from native NFS to CSI), redis, dbaas, technitium,
headscale, vaultwarden, uptime-kuma, mailserver, infra-maintenance
2026-03-02 01:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
persistent_volume_claim {
|
feat(storage): migrate 38 NFS PVCs to proxmox-lvm (Wave 2)
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
remaining single-pod app data services. Deployments updated to
use new block storage PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for rollback.
Services: affine, changedetection, diun, excalidraw, f1-stream,
hackmd, isponsorblocktv, matrix, n8n, send, grampsweb, health,
onlyoffice, owntracks, paperless-ngx, privatebin, resume,
speedtest, stirling-pdf, tandoor, rybbit (clickhouse), tor-proxy
(torrserver), whisper+piper, frigate (config), ollama (ui),
servarr (prowlarr/listenarr/qbittorrent), aiostreams, freshrss
(extensions), meshcentral (data+files), openclaw (data+home+
openlobster), technitium, mailserver (data+roundcube html+enigma),
dbaas (pgadmin).
Strategy set to Recreate where needed for RWO volumes.
2026-04-04 19:25:12 +03:00
|
|
|
claim_name = kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.data_proxmox.metadata[0].name
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
[infra] Sweep dns_config ignore_changes across all pod-owning resources [ci skip]
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:19:48 +00:00
|
|
|
lifecycle {
|
|
|
|
|
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resource "kubernetes_service" "f1-stream" {
|
|
|
|
|
metadata {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
labels = {
|
|
|
|
|
"app" = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spec {
|
|
|
|
|
selector = {
|
|
|
|
|
app = "f1-stream"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
port {
|
|
|
|
|
port = "80"
|
2026-02-23 22:47:06 +00:00
|
|
|
target_port = "8000"
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module "tls_secret" {
|
|
|
|
|
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
2026-02-22 14:38:14 +00:00
|
|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
anubis: re-protect f1 with a per-host policy that allows JSON routes
Earlier f1 revert left the host fully unprotected (no Anubis,
exclude_crowdsec=true on the ingress already). Re-add Anubis with
a custom policy_yaml that:
- ALLOWs /_app/* (SvelteKit immutable JS/CSS chunks loaded before
any cookie exists), /openapi.json, /docs, /api/* (FastAPI meta).
- ALLOWs the 9 known JSON/proxy routes (schedule, streams,
embed, embed-asset, extract, extractors, health, proxy, relay)
so the SvelteKit SPA's XHRs return JSON instead of the challenge
HTML.
- Catch-all CHALLENGE for everything else — the SPA HTML pages
(which fall through to FastAPI's `/{path}` catch-all) get the
PoW gate.
The ALLOWed JSON routes are technically scrapeable by a determined
bot, but the user's stated goal is "avoid accidental scrapes" — the
HTML/SPA is the AI-training target, and that stays gated.
Verified: / → Anubis challenge HTML; /schedule, /streams → JSON;
/_app/.../app.js → text/javascript; ClaudeBot UA → Anubis deny page.
2026-05-10 01:24:50 +00:00
|
|
|
# f1-stream serves its SvelteKit SPA via the FastAPI `/{path}` catch-all
|
|
|
|
|
# and exposes 14 JSON/proxy routes at root (/schedule, /streams, /embed,
|
|
|
|
|
# /embed-asset, /relay, /proxy, /extract, /extractors, /health). A flat
|
|
|
|
|
# Anubis catch-all CHALLENGE breaks the SPA's XHRs with "Unexpected token
|
|
|
|
|
# '<', '<!doctype '" because the schedule fetch lands on the challenge HTML.
|
|
|
|
|
# Custom policy: ALLOW the known JSON routes + SvelteKit `_app/` assets
|
|
|
|
|
# (which load before any user has a chance to solve PoW), CHALLENGE
|
|
|
|
|
# everything else — the HTML pages.
|
|
|
|
|
module "anubis" {
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/anubis_instance"
|
|
|
|
|
name = "f1"
|
|
|
|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
|
|
|
|
target_url = "http://${kubernetes_service.f1-stream.metadata[0].name}.${kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name}.svc.cluster.local"
|
anubis: re-protect f1 with a per-host policy that allows JSON routes
Earlier f1 revert left the host fully unprotected (no Anubis,
exclude_crowdsec=true on the ingress already). Re-add Anubis with
a custom policy_yaml that:
- ALLOWs /_app/* (SvelteKit immutable JS/CSS chunks loaded before
any cookie exists), /openapi.json, /docs, /api/* (FastAPI meta).
- ALLOWs the 9 known JSON/proxy routes (schedule, streams,
embed, embed-asset, extract, extractors, health, proxy, relay)
so the SvelteKit SPA's XHRs return JSON instead of the challenge
HTML.
- Catch-all CHALLENGE for everything else — the SPA HTML pages
(which fall through to FastAPI's `/{path}` catch-all) get the
PoW gate.
The ALLOWed JSON routes are technically scrapeable by a determined
bot, but the user's stated goal is "avoid accidental scrapes" — the
HTML/SPA is the AI-training target, and that stays gated.
Verified: / → Anubis challenge HTML; /schedule, /streams → JSON;
/_app/.../app.js → text/javascript; ClaudeBot UA → Anubis deny page.
2026-05-10 01:24:50 +00:00
|
|
|
policy_yaml = <<-EOT
|
|
|
|
|
bots:
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/bots/_deny-pathological.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/bots/aggressive-brazilian-scrapers.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/meta/ai-block-aggressive.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/crawlers/_allow-good.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/clients/x-firefox-ai.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
- import: (data)/common/keep-internet-working.yaml
|
|
|
|
|
# SvelteKit immutable assets (CSS/JS chunks) and OpenAPI/health routes —
|
|
|
|
|
# served pre-cookie, must pass without challenge.
|
|
|
|
|
- name: f1-svelte-assets-and-meta
|
|
|
|
|
path_regex: ^/(_app/|openapi\.json|docs|api/)
|
|
|
|
|
action: ALLOW
|
|
|
|
|
# Application JSON routes — XHR'd by the SPA after the user has solved
|
|
|
|
|
# the PoW for `/`. We allow them unconditionally because the alternative
|
|
|
|
|
# (carve-out per route via separate Ingress objects) is brittle and
|
|
|
|
|
# because the data they expose (stream URLs, schedule metadata) is not
|
|
|
|
|
# the AI-scraping target — the HTML/SPA is.
|
|
|
|
|
- name: f1-data-routes
|
|
|
|
|
path_regex: ^/(embed|embed-asset|extract|extractors|health|proxy|relay|schedule|streams)(/|\?|$)
|
|
|
|
|
action: ALLOW
|
anubis: only challenge GET requests; allow everything else
PrivateBin's XHR `POST /` (paste creation) was the trigger — Anubis's
catch-all CHALLENGE rule served an HTML challenge page where the JS
expected JSON, breaking paste creation entirely. Same shape will hit
any SPA XHR or CORS preflight on the other 8 Anubis-fronted sites
(homepage actions, kms upload-then-poll, wrongmove search refresh,
jsoncrack share, etc.) the moment it gets exercised.
Add an `ALLOW` rule keyed on `method != "GET"` between the AI/UA-block
imports and the catch-all CHALLENGE. Rationale:
* AI scrapers consume GET response bodies — they don't POST.
* State-mutating XHRs and OPTIONS preflight need to bypass the
challenge or the app breaks.
* CrowdSec + per-route rate-limit + app-level auth already cover
abuse on mutating methods, so this gives up nothing.
* Hard-deny rules for known-bad bots run first, so a declared bad
bot can't sneak through by sending a POST.
Also added a `checksum/policy` annotation on the Anubis pod template
sourced from `sha256(coalesce(var.policy_yaml, default_policy_yaml))`
so future policy changes auto-roll the deployment instead of needing
a manual `kubectl rollout restart`.
f1-stream had its own policy override (path carve-outs for SvelteKit
asset hashes and JSON data routes); mirrored the new rule there too.
Applied to all 8 Anubis-fronted stacks: blog, kms, f1-stream,
travel_blog, real-estate-crawler, homepage, cyberchef, jsoncrack.
Verified per stack: GET / returns the Anubis challenge page; POST,
PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS pass through to the backend (HTTP 301/405/502
from the upstream app, never the Anubis "not a bot" HTML).
2026-05-10 14:55:50 +00:00
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# Allow non-GET methods unconditionally — AI scrapers GET the body,
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# they don't POST. Mutating XHRs and CORS preflight need to bypass.
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- name: allow-non-get-methods
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action: ALLOW
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expression: method != "GET"
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anubis: re-protect f1 with a per-host policy that allows JSON routes
Earlier f1 revert left the host fully unprotected (no Anubis,
exclude_crowdsec=true on the ingress already). Re-add Anubis with
a custom policy_yaml that:
- ALLOWs /_app/* (SvelteKit immutable JS/CSS chunks loaded before
any cookie exists), /openapi.json, /docs, /api/* (FastAPI meta).
- ALLOWs the 9 known JSON/proxy routes (schedule, streams,
embed, embed-asset, extract, extractors, health, proxy, relay)
so the SvelteKit SPA's XHRs return JSON instead of the challenge
HTML.
- Catch-all CHALLENGE for everything else — the SPA HTML pages
(which fall through to FastAPI's `/{path}` catch-all) get the
PoW gate.
The ALLOWed JSON routes are technically scrapeable by a determined
bot, but the user's stated goal is "avoid accidental scrapes" — the
HTML/SPA is the AI-training target, and that stays gated.
Verified: / → Anubis challenge HTML; /schedule, /streams → JSON;
/_app/.../app.js → text/javascript; ClaudeBot UA → Anubis deny page.
2026-05-10 01:24:50 +00:00
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- name: catchall-challenge
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path_regex: .*
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action: CHALLENGE
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EOT
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}
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2026-02-22 15:13:55 +00:00
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module "ingress" {
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2026-05-10 10:54:38 +00:00
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source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
|
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
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auth = "none" # Anubis-fronted; PoW challenge gates bots, no Authentik
|
2026-05-10 10:54:38 +00:00
|
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|
dns_type = "non-proxied"
|
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|
|
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
|
|
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name = "f1"
|
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service_name = module.anubis.service_name
|
|
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port = module.anubis.service_port
|
|
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|
|
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
|
|
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|
|
exclude_crowdsec = true
|
|
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|
|
anti_ai_scraping = false
|
|
|
|
|
extra_middlewares = ["traefik-x402@kubernetescrd"]
|
2026-03-07 16:41:36 +00:00
|
|
|
extra_annotations = {
|
|
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|
|
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
|
|
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "F1 Stream"
|
|
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|
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Formula 1 live streams"
|
2026-03-07 21:14:17 +00:00
|
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|
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "si-f1"
|
2026-03-07 16:41:36 +00:00
|
|
|
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Media & Entertainment"
|
|
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|
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"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-02-22 13:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|