infra/stacks/terminal/main.tf

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variable "tls_secret_name" {
type = string
sensitive = true
}
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "terminal" {
metadata {
name = "terminal"
labels = {
"istio-injection" : "disabled"
tier = local.tiers.aux
}
}
[infra] Suppress Goldilocks vpa-update-mode label drift on all namespaces [ci skip] ## Context Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with `metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode. Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey 2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace is affected. This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits show why each suppression exists. ## This change 107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` resource gets: ```hcl lifecycle { # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]] } ``` Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`): match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions `goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe. Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines). ## What is NOT in this change - `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out (paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran. - `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder comment). - `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) — gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited. - `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real apply to that stack. ## Verification Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern before and after: ``` $ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan Before: Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy. # kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place (goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null) # module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place (Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d) After: No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration. ``` Injection count check: ``` $ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}' 108 ``` ## Reproduce locally 1. `git pull` 2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan` 3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label. Closes: code-dwx Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 21:15:27 +00:00
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
module "tls_secret" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
# Service + Endpoints to reverse-proxy to ttyd at 10.0.10.10:7681
resource "kubernetes_service" "terminal" {
metadata {
name = "terminal"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "terminal"
}
}
spec {
port {
name = "http"
port = 80
target_port = 7681
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_endpoints" "terminal" {
metadata {
name = "terminal"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
subset {
address {
ip = "10.0.10.10"
}
port {
name = "http"
port = 7681
}
}
}
module "ingress" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
[infra] Auto-create Cloudflare DNS records from ingress_factory ## Context Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars — a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten, leaving services unreachable externally. ## This change: - Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory` modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP). - Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard `*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing. - Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key). - Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses, special cases). - Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook. ``` BEFORE AFTER config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf | module "ingress" { v dns_type = "proxied" stacks/cloudflared/ } for_each = list | cloudflare_record auto-creates tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation ``` ## What is NOT in this change: - Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars) - 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases) - Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
dns_type = "proxied"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
name = "terminal"
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
auth = "required"
extra_annotations = {
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "Terminal"
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Web terminal (ttyd)"
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "mdi-console"
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Infrastructure"
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
}
}
# Read-only terminal session at terminal-ro.viktorbarzin.me
resource "kubernetes_service" "terminal_ro" {
metadata {
name = "terminal-ro"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "terminal-ro"
}
}
spec {
port {
name = "http"
port = 80
target_port = 7682
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_endpoints" "terminal_ro" {
metadata {
name = "terminal-ro"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
subset {
address {
ip = "10.0.10.10"
}
port {
name = "http"
port = 7682
}
}
}
# Clipboard image upload service (same-origin path routing)
resource "kubernetes_service" "clipboard_upload" {
metadata {
name = "clipboard-upload"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "clipboard-upload"
}
}
spec {
port {
name = "http"
port = 80
target_port = 7683
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_endpoints" "clipboard_upload" {
metadata {
name = "clipboard-upload"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
subset {
address {
ip = "10.0.10.10"
}
port {
name = "http"
port = 7683
}
}
}
# IngressRoute for /clipboard/* on terminal.viktorbarzin.me → clipboard-upload service
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "clipboard_ingressroute" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "traefik.io/v1alpha1"
kind = "IngressRoute"
metadata = {
name = "clipboard-upload"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
spec = {
entryPoints = ["websecure"]
routes = [{
match = "Host(`terminal.viktorbarzin.me`) && PathPrefix(`/clipboard/`)"
kind = "Rule"
middlewares = [
{
name = "authentik-forward-auth"
namespace = "traefik"
},
{
name = "clipboard-strip-prefix"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
]
services = [{
name = "clipboard-upload"
port = 80
}]
}]
tls = {
secretName = var.tls_secret_name
}
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "clipboard_strip_prefix" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "traefik.io/v1alpha1"
kind = "Middleware"
metadata = {
name = "clipboard-strip-prefix"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
spec = {
stripPrefix = {
prefixes = ["/clipboard"]
}
}
}
}
module "ingress_ro" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
[infra] Auto-create Cloudflare DNS records from ingress_factory ## Context Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars — a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten, leaving services unreachable externally. ## This change: - Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory` modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP). - Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard `*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing. - Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key). - Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses, special cases). - Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook. ``` BEFORE AFTER config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf | module "ingress" { v dns_type = "proxied" stacks/cloudflared/ } for_each = list | cloudflare_record auto-creates tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation ``` ## What is NOT in this change: - Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars) - 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases) - Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 13:45:04 +00:00
dns_type = "proxied"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
name = "terminal-ro"
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
ingress_factory: replace `protected` bool with `auth` enum + audit pass across 100 stacks Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with `auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code. ingress_factory (Phase 3): - `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy `protected = true` semantic). - `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public` middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users keep their real identity. - `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost itself. - `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots). Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites: - 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"` - 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3) - 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then reviewed individually: * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack, homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"` * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC, xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) → `auth = "none"` * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal UIs, services without app-level auth) - Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI, k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback. Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`, `stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected` bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename. Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or `auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs, webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`. Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via `terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
auth = "required"
extra_annotations = {
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "Terminal (Read-Only)"
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Read-only web terminal (ttyd)"
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "mdi-console"
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Infrastructure"
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
}
}
# === Multi-session lobby cutover on terminal.viktorbarzin.me ===
#
# The `terminal` Service+Endpoints (port 7681) above now backs the
# multi-session lobby — ttyd.service on the DevVM runs tmux-attach.sh with
# `-a`, serving index.html (the lobby HTML, ex-index-multi.html). DevVM-side
# units ship from files/devvm/ — see files/devvm/README.md.
#
# The lobby's REST API (`/api/sessions/*`) is reverse-proxied to a small Go
# binary on port 7684 via the IngressRoute below.
# Service+Endpoints → tmux-api on the DevVM (port 7684).
resource "kubernetes_service" "tmux_api" {
metadata {
name = "tmux-api"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "tmux-api"
}
}
spec {
port {
name = "http"
port = 80
target_port = 7684
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_endpoints" "tmux_api" {
metadata {
name = "tmux-api"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
subset {
address {
ip = "10.0.10.10"
}
port {
name = "http"
port = 7684
}
}
}
# IngressRoute: /api/sessions/* on terminal.viktorbarzin.me → tmux-api
# service. Path-prefix specificity beats the catch-all `module.ingress`
# (terminal.viktorbarzin.me → ttyd) above, so the lobby HTML reaches
# tmux-api directly while everything else flows to ttyd.
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "tmux_api_ingressroute" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "traefik.io/v1alpha1"
kind = "IngressRoute"
metadata = {
name = "tmux-api"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
spec = {
entryPoints = ["websecure"]
routes = [{
match = "Host(`terminal.viktorbarzin.me`) && PathPrefix(`/api/sessions/`)"
kind = "Rule"
middlewares = [
{
name = "authentik-forward-auth"
namespace = "traefik"
},
{
name = "tmux-api-strip-prefix"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
]
services = [{
name = "tmux-api"
port = 80
}]
}]
tls = {
secretName = var.tls_secret_name
}
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "tmux_api_strip_prefix" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "traefik.io/v1alpha1"
kind = "Middleware"
metadata = {
name = "tmux-api-strip-prefix"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.terminal.metadata[0].name
}
spec = {
stripPrefix = {
prefixes = ["/api/sessions"]
}
}
}
}