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CCTV segment (dCCTV 10.0.30.0/24) on a dedicated pfSense leg for the garage camera
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Viktor and emo are adding the first owned camera at the Sofia site (HiLook
IPC-T241H-C watching the garage / server rack). Viktor asked to finalize
emo's plan; the grilling session resolved emo's five open decisions and
replaced the doc's 802.1Q-trunk idea with the site idiom: a dedicated
physical leg (R730 eno2 -> vmbr2 -> pfSense net3 = dCCTV 10.0.30.1/24),
port-based VLAN split on the shared TL-SG105PE, camera default-deny with
NTP-only egress, Frigate + ha-sofia as the only consumers.

The PVE bridge, pfSense interface, Kea subnet and firewall rules were
applied live this session (hand-managed hosts, backed up). This commit
records the decision (ADR-0017), the glossary terms (Segment / CCTV
segment), the as-built architecture doc, and bumps Frigate's ADR-0016
VRAM budget 2000 -> 2300 MiB for the upcoming NVDEC stream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-07-02 20:01:45 +00:00
parent 3a5194c9d4
commit 248e186dce
4 changed files with 85 additions and 5 deletions
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8
CONTEXT.md
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@ -118,6 +118,14 @@ _Avoid_: "external", "outside".
`viktorbarzin.lan`, served by Technitium DNS. Resolves only inside the homelab network.
_Avoid_: bare "lan", "private", "intranet".
**Segment**:
One isolated L2/L3 network with pfSense as its gateway — realised as one Proxmox bridge feeding one dedicated pfSense interface (dManagementsVms 10.0.10.0/24, dKubernetes 10.0.20.0/24, dCCTV 10.0.30.0/24). pfSense itself never terminates 802.1Q; any tagging happens on the bridge or a switch.
_Avoid_: "VLAN" as the primary name (VLAN 10/20 are informal aliases; dCCTV has no tag on the wire at all).
**CCTV segment**:
The untrusted camera **Segment** (`dCCTV`) — devices in it may be pulled from (RTSP/ISAPI) but may initiate nothing except NTP to their gateway. Deliberately outside every trusted source-IP allowlist (ADR-0017).
_Avoid_: "camera VLAN", "CCTV LAN".
**Ingress auth**:
The `auth = "..."` parameter on `ingress_factory` — a discrete *mode*, not a ranked tier — one of `required` (Authentik forward-auth gates every request), `app` (the backend owns its login), `public` (anonymous Authentik binding for audit only), or `none` (Anubis-fronted content, or native-client API). Default `required` (fail-closed).
_Avoid_: "auth tier" / "auth mode" — refer to it by the canonical key, `auth` (e.g. `auth = "required"`). "tier" is reserved for State tier and Namespace tier.