CCTV segment (dCCTV 10.0.30.0/24) on a dedicated pfSense leg for the garage camera

Viktor and emo are adding the first owned camera at the Sofia site (HiLook
IPC-T241H-C watching the garage / server rack). Viktor asked to finalize
emo's plan; the grilling session resolved emo's five open decisions and
replaced the doc's 802.1Q-trunk idea with the site idiom: a dedicated
physical leg (R730 eno2 -> vmbr2 -> pfSense net3 = dCCTV 10.0.30.1/24),
port-based VLAN split on the shared TL-SG105PE, camera default-deny with
NTP-only egress, Frigate + ha-sofia as the only consumers.

The PVE bridge, pfSense interface, Kea subnet and firewall rules were
applied live this session (hand-managed hosts, backed up). This commit
records the decision (ADR-0017), the glossary terms (Segment / CCTV
segment), the as-built architecture doc, and bumps Frigate's ADR-0016
VRAM budget 2000 -> 2300 MiB for the upcoming NVDEC stream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/adr/0017-cctv-segment-dedicated-pfsense-leg.md

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+# CCTV segment on a dedicated pfSense leg, not an 802.1Q trunk
+
+Status: accepted (2026-07-02)
+
+The first owned camera at the Sofia/Vermont site (`vermont-garage`, HiLook
+IPC-T241H-C at the garage entrance) needs to be network-isolated: its cable is
+physically exposed outside the apartment, so anything plugged into that cable
+must land in a segment that can reach nothing. The original design doc
+(NAS: `Emo shared/Claude shared/garage-camera/`) called for an "802.1Q trunk
+to pfSense" — but nothing in this network terminates dot1q on pfSense; the
+site idiom is one vlan-aware Proxmox bridge → one tagged VM NIC → one clean
+untagged pfSense interface per segment.
+
+**Decision:** the CCTV segment (`dCCTV`, 10.0.30.1/24) rides a dedicated
+physical leg — R730 `eno2` (spare) → new bridge `vmbr2` → pfSense `net3`
+(vtnet3), untagged end-to-end. The shared TL-SG105PE PoE switch in the rack
+splits via port-based VLANs: {camera port, eno2 uplink} in an internal VLAN,
+{home-LAN uplink, 4G router 192.168.1.7, UPS mgmt, switch mgmt 192.168.1.6}
+stay in VLAN 1. Cameras are untrusted: default-deny on dCCTV with a single
+NTP-to-gateway exception; Frigate (k8s) pulls RTSP in; ha-sofia (192.168.1.8)
+may reach ISAPI/RTSP directly; home-LAN clients route in via an AX6000 static
+route (10.0.30.0/24 via 192.168.1.2). 10.0.30.0/24 is deliberately NOT in the
+10.0.20.0/22 trusted source-IP allowlist.
+
+## Considered options
+
+- **802.1Q tag over the existing LAN path (eno1/vmbr0)** — rejected: vmbr0 is
+  vlan-aware with `bridge-vids 2-4094`, so ANY device on the home LAN could
+  inject tagged frames straight into the camera segment (defeats the
+  cable-tap threat model); tag-passing through the unmanaged SW1 is
+  undefined; and it reconfigures the live bridge carrying the host IP and
+  pfSense WAN.
+- **AX6000 as the camera gateway** — rejected earlier in the design (consumer
+  router, no inter-VLAN firewall).
+
+## Consequences
+
+- eno2 is consumed; eno3/eno4 remain the last spare NICs on the R730.
+- The TL-SG105PE is now load-bearing shared infra: it carries pfSense's
+  backup-WAN path (4G router), UPS mgmt, AND the CCTV segment. Its Easy
+  Smart mgmt UI answers on every port regardless of VLAN — mitigated by a
+  strong password; residual L2 risk accepted.
+- Adding a future camera = one PoE port in the CCTV VLAN + a Kea
+  reservation; no pfSense/PVE work.
+- Frigate's ADR-0016 VRAM budget was bumped 2000 → 2300 MiB for the extra
+  NVDEC stream.