CCTV segment (dCCTV 10.0.30.0/24) on a dedicated pfSense leg for the garage camera

Viktor and emo are adding the first owned camera at the Sofia site (HiLook
IPC-T241H-C watching the garage / server rack). Viktor asked to finalize
emo's plan; the grilling session resolved emo's five open decisions and
replaced the doc's 802.1Q-trunk idea with the site idiom: a dedicated
physical leg (R730 eno2 -> vmbr2 -> pfSense net3 = dCCTV 10.0.30.1/24),
port-based VLAN split on the shared TL-SG105PE, camera default-deny with
NTP-only egress, Frigate + ha-sofia as the only consumers.

The PVE bridge, pfSense interface, Kea subnet and firewall rules were
applied live this session (hand-managed hosts, backed up). This commit
records the decision (ADR-0017), the glossary terms (Segment / CCTV
segment), the as-built architecture doc, and bumps Frigate's ADR-0016
VRAM budget 2000 -> 2300 MiB for the upcoming NVDEC stream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CONTEXT.md

@@ -118,6 +118,14 @@ _Avoid_: "external", "outside".
 `viktorbarzin.lan`, served by Technitium DNS. Resolves only inside the homelab network.
 _Avoid_: bare "lan", "private", "intranet".
 
+**Segment**:
+One isolated L2/L3 network with pfSense as its gateway — realised as one Proxmox bridge feeding one dedicated pfSense interface (dManagementsVms 10.0.10.0/24, dKubernetes 10.0.20.0/24, dCCTV 10.0.30.0/24). pfSense itself never terminates 802.1Q; any tagging happens on the bridge or a switch.
+_Avoid_: "VLAN" as the primary name (VLAN 10/20 are informal aliases; dCCTV has no tag on the wire at all).
+
+**CCTV segment**:
+The untrusted camera **Segment** (`dCCTV`) — devices in it may be pulled from (RTSP/ISAPI) but may initiate nothing except NTP to their gateway. Deliberately outside every trusted source-IP allowlist (ADR-0017).
+_Avoid_: "camera VLAN", "CCTV LAN".
+
 **Ingress auth**:
 The `auth = "..."` parameter on `ingress_factory` — a discrete *mode*, not a ranked tier — one of `required` (Authentik forward-auth gates every request), `app` (the backend owns its login), `public` (anonymous Authentik binding for audit only), or `none` (Anubis-fronted content, or native-client API). Default `required` (fail-closed).
 _Avoid_: "auth tier" / "auth mode" — refer to it by the canonical key, `auth` (e.g. `auth = "required"`). "tier" is reserved for State tier and Namespace tier.

docs/adr/0017-cctv-segment-dedicated-pfsense-leg.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# CCTV segment on a dedicated pfSense leg, not an 802.1Q trunk
+
+Status: accepted (2026-07-02)
+
+The first owned camera at the Sofia/Vermont site (`vermont-garage`, HiLook
+IPC-T241H-C at the garage entrance) needs to be network-isolated: its cable is
+physically exposed outside the apartment, so anything plugged into that cable
+must land in a segment that can reach nothing. The original design doc
+(NAS: `Emo shared/Claude shared/garage-camera/`) called for an "802.1Q trunk
+to pfSense" — but nothing in this network terminates dot1q on pfSense; the
+site idiom is one vlan-aware Proxmox bridge → one tagged VM NIC → one clean
+untagged pfSense interface per segment.
+
+**Decision:** the CCTV segment (`dCCTV`, 10.0.30.1/24) rides a dedicated
+physical leg — R730 `eno2` (spare) → new bridge `vmbr2` → pfSense `net3`
+(vtnet3), untagged end-to-end. The shared TL-SG105PE PoE switch in the rack
+splits via port-based VLANs: {camera port, eno2 uplink} in an internal VLAN,
+{home-LAN uplink, 4G router 192.168.1.7, UPS mgmt, switch mgmt 192.168.1.6}
+stay in VLAN 1. Cameras are untrusted: default-deny on dCCTV with a single
+NTP-to-gateway exception; Frigate (k8s) pulls RTSP in; ha-sofia (192.168.1.8)
+may reach ISAPI/RTSP directly; home-LAN clients route in via an AX6000 static
+route (10.0.30.0/24 via 192.168.1.2). 10.0.30.0/24 is deliberately NOT in the
+10.0.20.0/22 trusted source-IP allowlist.
+
+## Considered options
+
+- **802.1Q tag over the existing LAN path (eno1/vmbr0)** — rejected: vmbr0 is
+  vlan-aware with `bridge-vids 2-4094`, so ANY device on the home LAN could
+  inject tagged frames straight into the camera segment (defeats the
+  cable-tap threat model); tag-passing through the unmanaged SW1 is
+  undefined; and it reconfigures the live bridge carrying the host IP and
+  pfSense WAN.
+- **AX6000 as the camera gateway** — rejected earlier in the design (consumer
+  router, no inter-VLAN firewall).
+
+## Consequences
+
+- eno2 is consumed; eno3/eno4 remain the last spare NICs on the R730.
+- The TL-SG105PE is now load-bearing shared infra: it carries pfSense's
+  backup-WAN path (4G router), UPS mgmt, AND the CCTV segment. Its Easy
+  Smart mgmt UI answers on every port regardless of VLAN — mitigated by a
+  strong password; residual L2 risk accepted.
+- Adding a future camera = one PoE port in the CCTV VLAN + a Kea
+  reservation; no pfSense/PVE work.
+- Frigate's ADR-0016 VRAM budget was bumped 2000 → 2300 MiB for the extra
+  NVDEC stream.

docs/architecture/networking.md

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # Networking Architecture
 
-Last updated: 2026-04-19 (WS E — Kea DHCP pushes dual DNS per subnet; Kea DDNS TSIG-signed)
+Last updated: 2026-07-02 (dCCTV segment added — dedicated pfSense leg for the garage camera, ADR-0017)
 
 ## Overview
 
-The homelab network is built on a dual-VLAN architecture with pfSense providing gateway services, Technitium for internal DNS, and Cloudflare for external DNS. Traefik serves as the Kubernetes ingress controller with a middleware chain of anti-AI bot-blocking, Authentik forward-auth, rate limiting, and retry. CrowdSec IP-reputation enforcement is **out-of-band** (not a Traefik hop): banned IPs are dropped in-kernel via nftables on direct hosts and blocked at the Cloudflare edge on proxied hosts (see `docs/architecture/security.md`). All HTTP traffic flows through Cloudflared tunnels, avoiding the need for port forwarding or exposing public IPs.
+The homelab network is built on three isolated segments behind pfSense (management VLAN 10, Kubernetes VLAN 20, and the physically-legged dCCTV camera segment — see ADR-0017) with pfSense providing gateway services, Technitium for internal DNS, and Cloudflare for external DNS. Traefik serves as the Kubernetes ingress controller with a middleware chain of anti-AI bot-blocking, Authentik forward-auth, rate limiting, and retry. CrowdSec IP-reputation enforcement is **out-of-band** (not a Traefik hop): banned IPs are dropped in-kernel via nftables on direct hosts and blocked at the Cloudflare edge on proxied hosts (see `docs/architecture/security.md`). All HTTP traffic flows through Cloudflared tunnels, avoiding the need for port forwarding or exposing public IPs.
 
 ## Architecture Diagram
 
@@ -24,9 +24,14 @@ graph TB
 
     CSdrop[CrowdSec drop<br/>nftables / CF edge<br/>out-of-band, pre-Traefik]
 
-    subgraph "Proxmox Host (eno1)"
+    subgraph "Proxmox Host (eno1, eno2)"
         vmbr0[vmbr0 Bridge<br/>192.168.1.127/24]
         vmbr1[vmbr1 Internal<br/>VLAN-aware]
+        vmbr2[vmbr2 Bridge<br/>eno2 → TL-SG105PE]
+
+        subgraph "dCCTV - 10.0.30.0/24<br/>ADR-0017"
+            Camera[vermont-garage<br/>10.0.30.70]
+        end
 
         subgraph "VLAN 10 - Management<br/>10.0.10.0/24"
             Proxmox[Proxmox Host<br/>10.0.10.1]
@@ -71,6 +76,9 @@ graph TB
     vmbr1 -.VLAN 20.- Tech
     vmbr1 -.VLAN 20.- Master
     vmbr1 -.VLAN 20.- Node1
+    vmbr2 -.physical link.- eno2
+    vmbr2 -.untagged.- Camera
+    vmbr2 -.pfSense net3 = dCCTV 10.0.30.1.- pfSense
 ```
 
 ## Components
@@ -81,6 +89,7 @@ graph TB
 | phpIPAM | v1.7.0 | phpipam.viktorbarzin.me | IP address management, device inventory, DNS sync |
 | vmbr0 | Linux bridge | 192.168.1.127/24 | Physical bridge on eno1, uplink to LAN |
 | vmbr1 | Linux bridge (VLAN-aware) | Internal | VLAN trunk for VM isolation |
+| vmbr2 | Linux bridge | Physical (eno2) | dCCTV segment leg: eno2 → TL-SG105PE (rack) → cameras; pfSense net3 is the only L3 exit (ADR-0017) |
 | Technitium DNS | Container | 10.0.20.201 (LB) / 10.96.0.53 (ClusterIP) | Internal DNS (viktorbarzin.lan) + full recursive resolver |
 | Cloudflare DNS | SaaS | External | ~50 public domains under viktorbarzin.me |
 | Cloudflared | Container | K8s (3 replicas) | Tunnel ingress, replaces port forwarding |
@@ -90,6 +99,22 @@ graph TB
 | MetalLB | v0.15.3 Helm chart | K8s | LoadBalancer IPs (10.0.20.200-10.0.20.220), all services on 10.0.20.200 |
 | Registry Cache | Container | 10.0.20.10 | Pull-through for docker.io:5000, ghcr.io:5010 |
 
+## CCTV Segment (dCCTV) — as-built 2026-07-02
+
+Isolated camera segment for owned cameras at the Sofia site (first: `vermont-garage`, HiLook IPC-T241H-C at the garage entrance). Decision + rejected alternatives: `docs/adr/0017-cctv-segment-dedicated-pfsense-leg.md`.
+
+**Physical path**: camera → TL-SG105PE PoE port (CCTV VLAN, port-based) → R730 `eno2` → `vmbr2` (bridge-ports eno2, not vlan-aware) → pfSense `net3`/vtnet3 = interface **dCCTV `10.0.30.1/24`**. Untagged end-to-end; the only 802.1Q is the internal port-VLAN table on the TL-SG105PE, which also keeps its home-LAN ports (uplink, 4G router `192.168.1.7`, UPS mgmt, switch mgmt `192.168.1.6`) in VLAN 1.
+
+**Addressing**: Kea DHCP pool `10.0.30.100-199`; devices get MAC reservations (camera `10.0.30.70`). Kea DDNS auto-registers names in Technitium; `phpipam-pfsense-import` picks up leases hourly.
+
+**Firewall** (all on pfSense):
+- dCCTV in: pass `udp OPT4-net → 10.0.30.1:123` (NTP) — everything else hits the interface's default deny. Cameras cannot reach LAN, other segments, or the internet.
+- WAN in (home LAN side): pass `192.168.1.8` (ha-sofia) → `10.0.30.70:80` (ISAPI/hikvision_next) and `:554` (RTSP), reply-to disabled on both.
+- dKubernetes is allow-all, so cluster Frigate/go2rtc pulls RTSP with no extra rule (pod egress SNATs to node IPs).
+- Home-LAN clients need the **AX6000 static route** `10.0.30.0/24 via 192.168.1.2` (camera-day step) to reach the camera UI.
+
+**Consumers**: cluster Frigate (`/srv/nfs/frigate/config/config.yml` — NOT Terraform) pulls `rtsp://10.0.30.70:554` main+sub as `vermont-garage`; HA integrates via Frigate plus direct hikvision_next for tamper events.
+
 ## IPAM & DNS Auto-Registration
 
 Devices are automatically discovered, named, and registered in DNS without manual intervention.

stacks/frigate/main.tf

@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ resource "kubernetes_deployment" "frigate" {
             limits = {
               memory           = "10Gi"
               "nvidia.com/gpu" = "1"
-              # GPU VRAM budget (ADR-0016): detector + ffmpeg decode (~1.9 GiB).
+              # GPU VRAM budget (ADR-0016): detector + ffmpeg decode (~1.9 GiB),
-              "viktorbarzin.me/gpumem" = "2000"
+              # +~250 MiB NVDEC headroom for the vermont-garage camera (ADR-0017).
+              "viktorbarzin.me/gpumem" = "2300"
             }
           }
           env {