viktor/infra
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 1

workstation: per-user code_layout — workspace puts project repos under ~/code (ancamilea + tripit)

Browse source 
Viktor asked to restructure Anca's setup: her ~/code WAS the infra clone
itself; he wants ~/code to be the directory where all her project repos
(tripit etc.) live side by side, with infra moved to a subdirectory.

- roster.yaml gains per-user 'code_layout: single|workspace' + 'repos',
  validated + derived by roster_engine.py (12 new tests, 40 total).
- t3-provision-users reconcile: auto-migrates a single-layout ~/code to
  ~/code/infra (running processes follow the moved inode), hoists nested
  project clones to the workspace root, clones roster repos from Forgejo
  AS the user (their PAT makes private repos work), and wires the
  documented forgejo remote + forgejo/master upstream into clones that
  predate that contract.
- Fixed a latent TSV bug: empty jq @tsv fields collapse under tab-IFS
  read, shifting later fields left (groups was only safe by being the
  last field) — emit '-' sentinels instead.
- start-claude.sh session freshen is layout-aware (freshens each repo
  under ~/code for workspace users).
- managed claudeMd + AGENTS.md non-admin recipe + multi-tenancy.md
  updated in the same change.

Applied live: ancamilea = workspace (infra at ~/code/infra, her existing
tripit clone hoisted to ~/code/tripit, master upstream switched to
forgejo/master); emo stays single layout, untouched. [ci skip]
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-10 18:05:31 +00:00
parent 3b6a5c6737
commit 2825cb1703
8 changed files with 306 additions and 44 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

6
docs/architecture/multi-tenancy.md
View file

@ -543,19 +543,19 @@ Separate from the in-cluster namespace-owner model above, the **devvm** (`10.0.1
**Config inheritance (live):** wizard authors the base (his chezmoi-versioned `~/.claude`). Two native layers carry it to every user — the enforced org `claudeMd` in `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` (top precedence, all sessions) and per-user `~/.claude/{skills,rules,…}` **symlinks** to the base (seeded via `/etc/skel`; edits propagate live). Secrets stay per-user at mode 600, never symlinked. **The managed config self-deploys from the repo** (2026-06-10): the hourly reconcile's `sync_managed_config` installs `scripts/workstation/managed-settings.json` to `/etc/claude-code/` whenever the repo copy changes — so editing the claudeMd = edit + commit, no manual install — and `refresh_codex_mirror` regenerates each user's `~/.codex/AGENTS.md` (a static mirror of the claudeMd; only files carrying the mirror header are touched, user-customized ones are left alone). Repo-level guidance (`.claude/CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `CONTEXT.md` in the infra repo) reaches non-admins through their auto-freshened clones — commit + push and every user has it within the hour.
**Infra access:** non-admins get their own **writable, git-crypt-LOCKED** clone of the (public) infra repo at `~/code` — code/docs plaintext, secret files (`*.tfvars`, `secrets/**`) stay ciphertext. The provisioner clones anonymously from the public GitHub mirror; **contribute access is wired per-user on top** (see below). The apply boundary still holds (`scripts/tg apply` needs an admin Vault token + cluster RBAC), but **pushing `master` is NOT inert** — the Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` (`event: push, branch: master`, `require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks. `master` is **branch-protected on Forgejo** (force-push disabled for everyone — history is append-only; push + merge whitelists = `viktor` + explicitly granted users, deploy keys allowed). **Allow-then-audit (Viktor, 2026-06-10):** `ebarzin` (emo) is on the whitelist and pushes straight to `master` — no PR gate. The tracking burden moves to: (a) **commit messages that record what + why** (the agent instructions in AGENTS.md and the managed claudeMd require the body to paraphrase the user's request), (b) the **`notify-nonadmin-push` Slack audit step** in `.woodpecker/default.yml` — every master push by a non-admin author is posted to Slack (admin pushes are not), and (c) non-admins **never use `[ci skip]`** so every change fires the pipeline (and thus the audit feed). Users NOT on the whitelist fall back to `<user>/<topic>` branches + PRs. **Clones stay fresh automatically** (2026-06-10): the hourly `t3-provision-users` reconcile runs `refresh_locked_clone` (fetch all remotes + fast-forward `master`, ONLY when on master with a clean tree and an upstream — dirty trees and local commits are left alone with a WARN), and `start-claude.sh` does the same freshen at session launch (15s-capped so an offline remote never stalls the session).
**Infra access:** non-admins get their own **writable, git-crypt-LOCKED** clone of the (public) infra repo — code/docs plaintext, secret files (`*.tfvars`, `secrets/**`) stay ciphertext. Its location depends on the per-user `code_layout` in `roster.yaml`: `single` (default) puts the clone AT `~/code`; `workspace` makes `~/code` a plain directory of per-project clones — the infra clone at `~/code/infra` plus each roster `repos` entry cloned from Forgejo `viktor/<name>` **as the user** (their PAT authenticates, so private repos work; clone failures WARN and retry next hour). Flipping a user to `workspace` auto-migrates their existing `~/code` clone to `~/code/infra` (local branches/dirty state survive; running processes follow the moved inode). ancamilea = workspace + `tripit` since 2026-06-10. The provisioner clones infra anonymously from the public GitHub mirror; **contribute access is wired per-user on top** (see below). The apply boundary still holds (`scripts/tg apply` needs an admin Vault token + cluster RBAC), but **pushing `master` is NOT inert** — the Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` (`event: push, branch: master`, `require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks. `master` is **branch-protected on Forgejo** (force-push disabled for everyone — history is append-only; push + merge whitelists = `viktor` + explicitly granted users, deploy keys allowed). **Allow-then-audit (Viktor, 2026-06-10):** `ebarzin` (emo) is on the whitelist and pushes straight to `master` — no PR gate. The tracking burden moves to: (a) **commit messages that record what + why** (the agent instructions in AGENTS.md and the managed claudeMd require the body to paraphrase the user's request), (b) the **`notify-nonadmin-push` Slack audit step** in `.woodpecker/default.yml` — every master push by a non-admin author is posted to Slack (admin pushes are not), and (c) non-admins **never use `[ci skip]`** so every change fires the pipeline (and thus the audit feed). Users NOT on the whitelist fall back to `<user>/<topic>` branches + PRs. **Clones stay fresh automatically** (2026-06-10): the hourly `t3-provision-users` reconcile runs `refresh_user_clone` over every managed clone — the infra clone and any workspace repos (fetch all remotes + fast-forward `master`, ONLY when on master with a clean tree and an upstream — dirty trees and local commits are left alone with a WARN) — and also `wire_forgejo_remote`, which idempotently adds the documented `forgejo` remote + `forgejo/master` upstream to infra clones that predate that contract. `start-claude.sh` does the same freshen at session launch (10s fetch cap per repo so an offline remote never stalls the session; workspace layouts freshen each repo under `~/code`).
**Contribute access (per non-admin, manual — the anca/tripit PAT precedent):**
1. Add their Forgejo user as a **write** collaborator on `viktor/infra` (`PUT /api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/collaborators/<login>`).
2. Mint a PAT — the admin REST endpoint 404s here, use the in-pod CLI: `kubectl -n forgejo exec deploy/forgejo -- su -s /bin/sh git -c "forgejo admin user generate-access-token --username <login> --token-name devvm-infra-git --scopes 'write:repository'"`.
3. Install it in their `~/.git-credentials` (`https://<login>:<token>@forgejo.viktorbarzin.me`, mode 600) + `git config --global credential.helper store`, set `user.name`/`user.email`.
4. In their clone: `git remote add forgejo https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/infra.git` and `git branch --set-upstream-to=forgejo/master master` (origin stays the anonymous GitHub mirror).
4. The reconcile wires the clone side automatically (`wire_forgejo_remote`): `forgejo` remote + `master` tracking `forgejo/master` on every non-admin infra clone (origin stays the anonymous GitHub mirror). No manual step since 2026-06-10.
5. (Optional — Viktor's call per user) Grant direct master push: add their login to the `master` branch-protection push + merge whitelists (`PATCH /api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/branch_protections/master`). Done for `ebarzin` 2026-06-10.
6. Verify: branch push succeeds; a `master` push succeeds for whitelisted users and is rejected with `Not allowed to push to protected branch` otherwise.
**Web-terminal session persistence (2026-06-10):** the tmux-based web terminal's named sessions (each running one Claude conversation) survive devvm reboots — `tmux-persist-save.timer` (5-min) snapshots every terminal user's sessions (name, cwd, conversation uuid from argv or the cwd-slug transcript dir) to `/var/lib/tmux-persist/<user>.tsv`, and `tmux-persist-restore.service` recreates missing sessions at boot with `claude --resume <uuid>` (per-session idempotent; also handles partial loss). This is a **tmux/terminal-surface** feature, deliberately outside the t3 namespace: the t3 chat surface persists its own threads (`~/.t3` state, plus the daily `t3-backup-state` dump), and Claude conversations themselves were always durable (`~/.claude/projects/`) — what this adds is the volatile tmux wiring.
**Status (2026-06-10):** built + verified on the live host — capacity (8 GiB swap), config inheritance, roster-driven provisioner, per-user locked clone, per-user OIDC kubeconfig + the `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole + emo's `k8s_users` entry (applied + impersonation-verified), the Authentik `T3 Users` edge gate, **the emo Phase-5 cutover (own clone + launcher repoint + `code-shared` removal, completed 2026-06-10) and emo's contribute access (`ebarzin` write collaborator + PAT + protected `master`)**. Per the live `/etc/skel` design, non-admin `~/.claude/{rules,skills}` symlinks into the admin base are **kept** (they ARE the shared-base delivery mechanism — the plan's step to remove them is obsolete). **Remaining (held / future):** the offboarding apply-side (Phase 7), per-user MCP/auth injection, and roster-reconciled `T3 Users` membership. See `../runbooks/offboard-user.md` for deprovisioning.
**Status (2026-06-10):** built + verified on the live host — capacity (8 GiB swap), config inheritance, roster-driven provisioner, per-user locked clone, per-user OIDC kubeconfig + the `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole + emo's `k8s_users` entry (applied + impersonation-verified), the Authentik `T3 Users` edge gate, **the emo Phase-5 cutover (own clone + launcher repoint + `code-shared` removal, completed 2026-06-10) and emo's contribute access (`ebarzin` write collaborator + PAT + protected `master`)**, and **per-user `code_layout` with the ancamilea workspace cutover (infra → `~/code/infra`, `tripit` alongside, 2026-06-10)**. Per the live `/etc/skel` design, non-admin `~/.claude/{rules,skills}` symlinks into the admin base are **kept** (they ARE the shared-base delivery mechanism — the plan's step to remove them is obsolete). **Remaining (held / future):** the offboarding apply-side (Phase 7), per-user MCP/auth injection, and roster-reconciled `T3 Users` membership. See `../runbooks/offboard-user.md` for deprovisioning.
## Related