chrome-service: grant emo shared browser access (noVNC + homelab browser CLI)

Viktor asked to give emo access to the cluster's headed Chrome so he can fill
in forms and get past anti-bot / captcha pages. emo was deliberately locked
out of chrome-service (noVNC Authentik allowlist was Viktor-only + his
power-user RBAC has no pods/portforward). Viktor's explicit decision: SHARE
his existing browser rather than stand up an isolated per-user instance,
accepting that emo can therefore reach Viktor's warmed logged-in sessions
(CDP has no per-context auth, so the single shared persistent profile is
reachable by anyone who can drive the browser). emo's CLI use is hands-off
(his agent can run it unattended).

- authentik: add emo (emil.barzin / emil.barzin@gmail.com) to CHROME_ALLOWED
  so the admin-services-restriction policy admits him to chrome.viktorbarzin.me
  (noVNC). Reverses the prior Viktor-only lock; comment updated to record why.
- chrome-service/rbac.tf (new): emo-browser ServiceAccount + long-lived token
  (dashboard-sa.tf pattern), a chrome-service-portforward Role granting
  pods/portforward, and a cluster read-only binding (oidc-power-user-readonly)
  so the SA can resolve the Service and emo's normal read access doesn't regress.
- t3-provision-users.sh: install_browser_kubeconfig installs a dual-context
  kubeconfig for any user with a <user>-browser SA — SA token as the default
  context (non-interactive, works headless), personal OIDC retained as the
  oidc@homelab named context. emo's OIDC-only kubeconfig can't authenticate the
  headless agent session that homelab browser needs.
- docs/architecture/chrome-service.md: document the shared-browser multi-user
  access model, the session-exposure trade-off, and how to grant/revoke a user.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf

@@ -49,14 +49,15 @@ resource "authentik_policy_expression" "admin_services_restriction" {
 
     host = request.context.get("host", "")
 
-    # chrome-service noVNC (chrome.viktorbarzin.me) exposes Viktor's LIVE
-    # logged-in browser sessions, so lock it to Viktor's own accounts ONLY.
-    # "Home Server Admins" is NOT sufficient — emo (emil.barzin@gmail.com) is a
-    # member. akadmin kept as break-glass. The homelab-browser CDP path is
-    # already RBAC-gated (emo = oidc-power-user-readonly, no pods/portforward),
-    # so this closes the only remaining, human, noVNC path. Match username OR
-    # email so neither attribute alone can lock Viktor out.
-    CHROME_ALLOWED = {"akadmin", "akadmin@viktorbarzin.me", "vbarzin@gmail.com"}
+    # chrome-service noVNC (chrome.viktorbarzin.me) exposes LIVE logged-in browser
+    # sessions from the SHARED persistent profile. Originally Viktor-only.
+    # 2026-06-28 (Viktor's explicit decision): emo SHARES Viktor's browser, so emo
+    # (emil.barzin / emil.barzin@gmail.com) is allowed in for noVNC form-filling +
+    # captcha solving. Trade-off accepted: emo can therefore reach Viktor's warmed
+    # sessions (the CLI half is the emo-browser ServiceAccount in
+    # stacks/chrome-service/rbac.tf). akadmin kept as break-glass. Match username OR
+    # email so neither attribute alone can lock anyone out.
+    CHROME_ALLOWED = {"akadmin", "akadmin@viktorbarzin.me", "vbarzin@gmail.com", "emil.barzin", "emil.barzin@gmail.com"}
     if host == "chrome.viktorbarzin.me":
         return request.user.username in CHROME_ALLOWED or request.user.email in CHROME_ALLOWED