chore(authentik): tear down obsolete tripit-enrollment (ADR-0020 superseded by ADR-0028)
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TripIt external users are now LOCAL TripIt accounts (ADR-0028 native passkey + Authentik OIDC), so the Authentik-side self-enrollment machinery is dead. Removes the tripit-enrollment + tripit-recovery flows and all their stages/prompts/policies/bindings, the tripit-email-stages blueprint (+yaml), and the 'TripIt External' group; reverts the admin-services-restriction fence branch that contained those users (its sole member, the leftover tripit-demo@ test account, was deleted first, so the revert affects zero live principals). Real external collaborators (type=external) are untouched. tg plan: 0 add, 1 change (the policy expression), 20 destroy (all tripit_*). Closes tripit#97; moots the B2 per-app OIDC fences. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin
parent
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7 changed files with 0 additions and 564 deletions
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@ -108,31 +108,6 @@ All new users must use an invitation link to register. The invitation-enrollment
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Group membership is auto-assigned from the invitation's `fixed_data` field. This prevents open registration while maintaining SSO convenience.
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### TripIt External self-signup (open enrollment, fenced)
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Unlike every other app, **TripIt allows open public self-signup** for people
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outside the homelab (ADR-0020 in the tripit repo; runbook
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`docs/runbooks/tripit-external-signup.md`). A dedicated public `tripit-enrollment`
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flow (email + passkey, no password) creates the account and stamps it into the
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parentless **`TripIt External`** group. Containment is two-layered:
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- **Forward-auth apps**: a branch prepended to the `admin-services-restriction`
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catch-all policy admits `TripIt External` to `tripit.viktorbarzin.me` only and
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denies every other `auth="required"` host.
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- **OIDC apps**: that branch does NOT cover OIDC (OIDC bypasses forward-auth).
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External users are contained because every sensitive OIDC app already requires a
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trusted group they do not hold — audited 2026-06-15:
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Immich/Grafana/Linkwarden/Cloudflare Access → `Home Server Admins`, Forgejo →
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`Task Submitters`/`Forgejo Users`, Headscale → `Headscale Users`, wrongmove →
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`Wrongmove Users`. **Vault** was OPEN (any OIDC identity got a powerless
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`default`-policy token) and is bound to **`Allow Login Users`** as part of this
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change. The Kubernetes OIDC clients are OPEN but idle (apiserver rejects OIDC).
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**Invariants**: keep `TripIt External` parentless (never under `Allow Login
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Users`); keep the catch-all branch first; never co-assign `TripIt External` to a
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trusted/internal user; the `tripit-enrollment` user_write "Create users group"
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setting is the keystone that tags every signup.
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### OIDC Applications
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Authentik provides OIDC for 10 applications:
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@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
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# Runbook — TripIt external user self-signup (email + passkey)
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Implements ADR-0020 (tripit repo): people outside the homelab self-register to
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TripIt with **email + a passkey** (no password), are auto-tagged into the
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**`TripIt External`** Authentik group, and are fenced to `tripit.viktorbarzin.me`
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only. Audience: people Viktor knows; open public registration.
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> **Safety model.** Containment is two-layered. (1) **Forward-auth apps** — the
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> branch in `stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf` admits `TripIt
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> External` to `tripit.viktorbarzin.me` and denies every other `auth="required"`
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> host. (2) **OIDC apps** — the branch does NOT cover OIDC (it bypasses
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> forward-auth); External users are contained because every sensitive OIDC app
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> already requires a trusted group they do not hold (audit below). The no-lockout
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> guarantee is that the group is created **empty**, so the new branch matches
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> zero existing users on day one.
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## OIDC app authorization audit (2026-06-15, read-only)
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A parentless `TripIt External` user holds NONE of these groups, so:
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| OIDC app | Requires | External user |
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|---|---|---|
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| Immich, Grafana, Linkwarden, Cloudflare Access | `Home Server Admins` | DENIED ✓ |
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| Forgejo | `Task Submitters` / `Forgejo Users` | DENIED ✓ |
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| Headscale | `Headscale Users` | DENIED ✓ |
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| wrongmove | `Wrongmove Users` | DENIED ✓ |
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| **Vault** | **was OPEN** → bound to `Allow Login Users` in Step 3 | DENIED after Step 3 |
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| Kubernetes, Kubernetes Dashboard | OPEN | harmless — apiserver rejects OIDC tokens (idle) |
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| TripIt App, Public | OPEN | by design (TripIt's own provider / guest) |
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Vault's JWT `default` role grants only Vault's built-in `default` policy (token
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self-management, cubbyhole — **no** secret access), so the pre-fix exposure was a
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near-powerless token; Step 3 closes it anyway.
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---
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## Pre-flight gates (STOP if any fails)
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1. **`TripIt External` is net-new / empty** (no-lockout precondition):
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```
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kubectl -n authentik exec -i deploy/goauthentik-server -- ak shell <<'PY'
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from authentik.core.models import Group
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g = Group.objects.filter(name="TripIt External").first()
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print("exists:", bool(g), "members:", g.users.count() if g else 0)
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PY
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```
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Expect `exists: False`. If it exists with members → STOP.
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2. **Authentik image pin matches live (B5)** — the policy edit auto-applies the
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whole `authentik` stack; a stale pin re-triggers the 2026-06-10 downgrade
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boot-storm:
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```
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kubectl -n authentik get deploy -o custom-columns=N:.metadata.name,IMG:.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image
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```
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Every `goauthentik`/`ak-outpost` image tag MUST equal
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`stacks/authentik/modules/authentik/values.yaml` `global.image.tag`
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(currently `2026.2.4`). If they differ → refresh the pin first.
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---
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## Step 1 — Terraform (group + fence branch)
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Already written on this branch:
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- `stacks/authentik/tripit-external.tf` — the empty, parentless group.
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- `stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf` — the prepended fence branch.
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**Local plan gate (B4 — CI auto-applies on push with `-auto-approve`, so there is
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NO human plan review in the apply path; do it here):**
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```
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vault login -method=oidc
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cd stacks/authentik && ../../scripts/tg plan
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```
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Confirm the plan is **exactly**:
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- `+ authentik_group.tripit_external` (create)
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- `~ authentik_policy_expression.admin_services_restriction` (update in place — the
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`expression` body gains ONLY the new branch; every other line byte-identical)
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- **`Plan: 1 to add, 1 to change, 0 to destroy.`**
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ABORT if the plan shows any destroy/replace, any `authentik_provider_*` /
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`authentik_outpost` / `authentik_flow*` / `helm_release`, or any other expression
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change.
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**Apply** (presence-claim courtesy, then push = apply; land human-watched, B5):
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```
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~/code/scripts/presence claim stack:authentik --purpose "ADR-0020 TripIt External group + fence branch"
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# push the branch to master (this triggers CI tg apply on the authentik stack)
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```
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Watch: GHA → Woodpecker `default.yml` apply → outpost stays healthy
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(`kubectl -n authentik get endpoints ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost` = 2
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IPs; an anonymous request to any `auth=required` host still 302s to Authentik).
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The branch is inert (empty group) so no access changes yet.
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---
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## Step 2 — Authentik SMTP (B1, BLOCKER before any flow)
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Email verification is the **entire identity boundary** (TripIt trusts the
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Authentik email verbatim). Authentik currently has the **default/unconfigured**
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transport (`email.host = localhost`), so verification/recovery mail cannot send.
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Add to **both** `server.env` and `worker.env` in
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`stacks/authentik/modules/authentik/values.yaml` (wire the password from a secret;
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the cluster mailserver is what TripIt already relays through —
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`mailserver.mailserver.svc`):
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```yaml
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__HOST, value: "mailserver.mailserver.svc" }
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__PORT, value: "587" }
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__USE_TLS, value: "true" }
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__FROM, value: "noreply@viktorbarzin.me" }
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__USERNAME, value: "<relay user>" } # confirm relay creds
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- { name: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__PASSWORD, valueFrom: { secretKeyRef: { name: <secret>, key: <key> } } }
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```
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**Gate:** after apply, Authentik UI → System → Settings (or an Email stage) →
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**Send test email**; it must arrive. Then prove enrollment cannot complete for an
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address you do NOT control.
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---
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## Step 3 — Bind Vault → `Allow Login Users` (close the one open OIDC gap)
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Authentik UI → Applications → **Vault** → bind an authorization policy requiring
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group **`Allow Login Users`** (the base group every real homelab user inherits;
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parentless `TripIt External` is excluded). This changes nothing for existing
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users and denies External users at the Vault consent step.
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Verify: an External test account (Step 6) cannot complete Vault OIDC login.
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---
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## Step 4 — Build the flows (Authentik UI; UI-managed per ADR split)
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All three flows: designation as noted, no password stage.
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**Flow `tripit-enrollment`** (Enrollment):
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| Order | Stage | Key settings |
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|---|---|---|
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| 5 | Captcha | reCAPTCHA **v2 checkbox** keys (v3/invisible fail — see `crowdsec-recaptcha-key-type`) |
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| 10 | Identification | email only; **no** `password_stage`; `sources` optional |
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| 20 | Email (verification) | activate, blocking — **before** user_write |
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| 30 | WebAuthn authenticator setup | `user_verification = required`, `resident_key = required` |
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| 40 | User Write | **`create_users_group` = `TripIt External`** (the keystone tag); `user_type = external` |
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| 50 | User Login | session as default (`weeks=4`) |
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**Flow `tripit-login`** (Authentication, passwordless):
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Identification (sets `enrollment_flow`/`recovery_flow`) → Authenticator
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Validation (`device_classes = [webauthn]`, `user_verification = required`) → User
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Login. Prefer routing a passkey-less email to recovery over minting a credential.
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**Flow `tripit-recovery`** (Recovery):
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Identification (`pretend_user_exists = on`) → Email (recovery link) → WebAuthn
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authenticator setup → User Login. Notify the account on recovery + new-passkey.
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> Do **NOT** bind the `brute-force-protection` ReputationPolicy to these flows —
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> it denies anonymous users (2026-04-06 regression). The Captcha is the bot gate.
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---
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## Step 5 — Surface "Sign up"
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Recommended: a **TripIt-scoped** signup link / share-invite rather than a global
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login-screen button (narrower bot surface). Enrollment URL:
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`https://authentik.viktorbarzin.me/if/flow/tripit-enrollment/`.
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---
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## Step 6 — Verification (before/after — "all access keeps working")
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Hosts for the matrix (must be real `auth="required"` default-allow hosts, NOT
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`auth="app"` apps like immich/nextcloud which bypass the catch-all):
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`tripit`, `family`, `hackmd`, `health` (default-allow) + `terminal` (admin-only).
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**Before** (capture per user, no redirect-follow; 200=ALLOW, 302→authentik/403=DENY):
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```
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COOKIE='authentik_session=<paste for this user>'; for H in tripit family hackmd health terminal; do
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printf '%-10s %s\n' "$H" "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-redirs 0 -H "Cookie: $COOKIE" https://$H.viktorbarzin.me/)"; done
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```
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Representative non-admin: `kadir.tugan@gmail.com` (Wrongmove-only) → tripit/family/hackmd/health ALLOW, terminal DENY. Admin `vbarzin@gmail.com` → all ALLOW.
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**After Step 1 apply — regression:** re-run identically; both users' results MUST
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be unchanged (diff empty).
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**After flows — external smoke test (the security proof):** enrol a throwaway
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account via the enrollment URL (email verify + passkey). Confirm it is tagged
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`TripIt External`, then with its cookie:
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```
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for H in tripit family hackmd health terminal frigate; do printf '%-10s %s\n' "$H" \
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"$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-redirs 0 -H "Cookie: authentik_session=<external>" https://$H.viktorbarzin.me/)"; done
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```
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Expect **tripit=200, every other host DENY** (family/hackmd/health were ALLOW for
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kadir — the contrast is the fence proof). Then:
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- **OIDC containment:** with the external account, attempt OIDC login to Vault,
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Immich, Forgejo, Grafana → each must be DENIED at the app's own login.
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- **Auto-provision:** the TripIt `users` row exists (CNPG primary in ns `dbaas`:
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`select id,email from tripit.users where email='<throwaway>'`).
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- **Walling-off guard** `AuthentikWallingOffPublicPath` stays green.
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**Any 200 on a non-tripit host, or any OIDC app admitting the external account →
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ROLLBACK.**
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---
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## Step 7 — Standing regression probe (recommended)
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Add a permanent `TripIt External` identity to the `blackbox-exporter` guard
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(`stacks/monitoring/.../authentik_walloff_probe.tf` pattern): assert 200 on
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`tripit.viktorbarzin.me` AND DENY on `family.viktorbarzin.me`. This converts the
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"branch stays first" and "user_write keeps the keystone tag" invariants into
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automated `#security` alerts.
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---
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## Rollback
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Revert the `admin-services-restriction.tf` expression (delete the branch) and push
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(= apply); removing a prepended `if g: return …` is behaviour-preserving on
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non-members, restoring prior authz. Disable/delete the throwaway external account
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(with the branch gone, a tagged account falls into default-allow). The empty group
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may stay (harmless). Plan-gate the revert too.
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## Operational invariants
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- `TripIt External` stays **parentless** (never under `Allow Login Users`).
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- The fence branch stays **first** in `admin-services-restriction`.
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- **Never** co-assign `TripIt External` to a trusted/internal user.
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- The `tripit-enrollment` user_write **`create_users_group`** setting is the
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keystone — re-verify after any flow edit (clearing it makes UNtagged accounts
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that fall into default-allow).
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- Authentik SMTP is a live dependency of enrollment + recovery.
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@ -49,21 +49,6 @@ resource "authentik_policy_expression" "admin_services_restriction" {
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host = request.context.get("host", "")
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# TripIt External containment fence (ADR-0020 in the tripit repo). Publicly
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# self-enrolled TripIt users (group "TripIt External", assigned by the
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# tripit-enrollment flow's user_write) may reach tripit.viktorbarzin.me and
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# NOTHING else. MUST be the FIRST host-dispatch branch: it is a request.user
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# predicate that must dominate every host branch below, ESPECIALLY the
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# default-allow `if host not in ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS: return True` — placed after
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# it, a tagged user would slip into other hosts. Safe to add: the group is
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# net-new and created EMPTY, so this matches zero existing principals (no
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# lockout). The fence is forward-auth ONLY; OIDC apps (Vault, Immich, …)
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# contain External users via their own per-app group bindings — see
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# docs/runbooks/tripit-external-signup.md. NEVER co-assign "TripIt External"
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# to a trusted/internal user (this branch would fence them out of admin hosts).
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if ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="TripIt External"):
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return host == "tripit.viktorbarzin.me"
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# t3 Workstation edge gate: only members of "T3 Users" may reach t3.
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# Placed BEFORE the ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS early-return (t3 is intentionally not in
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# that set — it must not require Home-Server-Admins, just T3 Users membership).
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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
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# Delivers the TripIt enrollment/recovery email-verification stages + their flow
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# bindings (tripit-email-stages.yaml) as a server-applied Authentik blueprint.
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#
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# Why a blueprint and not authentik_stage_email resources: the globally-pinned
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# provider (goauthentik 2024.x in terragrunt.hcl) models EmailStage.token_expiry
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# as an integer, but the live server (2026.2.x) requires a duration string and
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# 400s any number. The blueprint is parsed by the server, which accepts the
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# string. Bumping the provider would mean a global terragrunt.hcl change that
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# re-applies every platform stack — disproportionate. See tripit-flows.tf.
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#
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# depends_on the flows so they exist before Authentik resolves the blueprint's
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# !Find [..., slug, tripit-enrollment|tripit-recovery] references.
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resource "authentik_blueprint" "tripit_email_stages" {
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name = "tripit-email-stages"
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content = file("${path.module}/tripit-email-stages.yaml")
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enabled = true
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depends_on = [
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authentik_flow.tripit_enrollment,
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authentik_flow.tripit_recovery,
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]
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}
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
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# TripIt enrollment + recovery email-verification stages (tripit ADR-0020).
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#
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# Delivered as an Authentik blueprint (applied server-side by Authentik) instead
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# of via the Terraform provider, because the globally-pinned provider
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# (goauthentik 2024.x) models EmailStage.token_expiry as an integer while the
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# live server (2026.2.x) requires a duration string ("hours=24") and rejects any
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# number. See tripit-flows.tf for the rest of the flow and tripit-email-blueprint.tf
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# for the delivery resource.
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#
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# These two stages + their flow bindings are the SECURITY BOUNDARY of ADR-0020:
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# enrollment creates the user inactive; only clicking the link from
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# tripit-enrollment-verify (activate_user_on_success) makes the account usable.
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# Without this, anyone could self-enroll under an address they don't control and
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# tripit (which trusts X-authentik-email) would treat them as that identity.
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version: 1
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metadata:
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name: tripit-email-stages
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entries:
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# Enrollment: verify the email and ACTIVATE the (initially inactive) user.
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- model: authentik_stages_email.emailstage
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state: present
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identifiers:
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name: tripit-enrollment-verify
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attrs:
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use_global_settings: true # noreply@viktorbarzin.me via mail.viktorbarzin.me
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activate_user_on_success: true
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subject: Confirm your TripIt account
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template: email/account_confirmation.html
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token_expiry: hours=24
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# Recovery: prove inbox ownership before letting the user register a new passkey.
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- model: authentik_stages_email.emailstage
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state: present
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identifiers:
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name: tripit-recovery-email
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attrs:
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use_global_settings: true
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activate_user_on_success: false
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subject: Recover your TripIt access
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template: email/account_confirmation.html
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token_expiry: hours=1
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# Bind enrollment-verify into tripit-enrollment at order 30
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# (prompt 10 -> write 20 -> VERIFY 30 -> passkey 40 -> login 50).
|
||||
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
identifiers:
|
||||
target: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, tripit-enrollment]]
|
||||
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_email.emailstage, [name, tripit-enrollment-verify]]
|
||||
attrs:
|
||||
order: 30
|
||||
# Bind recovery-email into tripit-recovery at order 20
|
||||
# (identify 10 -> EMAIL 20 -> new passkey 30 -> login 40).
|
||||
- model: authentik_flows.flowstagebinding
|
||||
state: present
|
||||
identifiers:
|
||||
target: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, tripit-recovery]]
|
||||
stage: !Find [authentik_stages_email.emailstage, [name, tripit-recovery-email]]
|
||||
attrs:
|
||||
order: 20
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
|
|||
# "TripIt External" group — containment anchor for publicly self-enrolled TripIt
|
||||
# users (ADR-0020 in the tripit repo). Members are admitted to
|
||||
# tripit.viktorbarzin.me ONLY and denied every other *.viktorbarzin.me
|
||||
# forward-auth host by the prepended branch in admin-services-restriction.tf.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Created EMPTY and PARENTLESS, on purpose:
|
||||
# * EMPTY — the no-lockout guarantee. Zero members at apply time => the
|
||||
# prepended policy branch matches zero existing principals => it cannot
|
||||
# change anyone's authorization (contrast authentik_group "T3 Users", which
|
||||
# is created WITH members atomically because THAT gate's safety property is
|
||||
# the opposite). Membership is assigned at RUNTIME by the tripit-enrollment
|
||||
# flow's user_write "Create users group" option (authentik_stage_user_write
|
||||
# in tripit-flows.tf). Terraform owns the group's EXISTENCE and the flow that
|
||||
# assigns it.
|
||||
# * PARENTLESS — do NOT make this a child of "Allow Login Users". The sensitive
|
||||
# OIDC apps gate on "Home Server Admins" / "Headscale Users" / "Wrongmove
|
||||
# Users" (children of "Allow Login Users") or, for Vault, on "Allow Login
|
||||
# Users" itself (bound as part of ADR-0020). Keeping External out of that
|
||||
# tree is what stops these users reaching OIDC apps — mirrors guest.tf, which
|
||||
# keeps the guest group out of "Allow Login Users" for the same reason.
|
||||
resource "authentik_group" "tripit_external" {
|
||||
name = "TripIt External"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
|
|||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
# TripIt external-user self-service flows (tripit ADR-0020).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Public, passwordless self-signup for external users (people Viktor shares
|
||||
# trips with). Three concerns:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# * tripit-enrollment — open registration with email + passkey. Creates an
|
||||
# INACTIVE external user in "TripIt External", then an email-verification
|
||||
# stage ACTIVATES it. Email verification is the SECURITY BOUNDARY: tripit's
|
||||
# backend trusts the X-authentik-email header (AUTH_MODE=hybrid), so a user
|
||||
# must not be able to enroll under an address they don't control. Creating
|
||||
# the user inactive and activating ONLY on a clicked verification link
|
||||
# enforces that — an attacker who enters someone else's address produces an
|
||||
# inactive account that never activates and can never log in.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# * passwordless login — already provided by the built-in `webauthn` flow,
|
||||
# wired as passwordless_flow on the default login page's identification
|
||||
# stage. No new flow needed; external users with a passkey log in there.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# * tripit-recovery — email-anchored: prove inbox ownership, then register a
|
||||
# NEW passkey (the "lost my device" path; multi-passkey per ADR-0020). NOT
|
||||
# wired into the brand/global login flow (that would change ADMIN recovery
|
||||
# behaviour) — reached via its own /if/flow/tripit-recovery/ URL.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Fence: the "TripIt External" group (tripit-external.tf) + the prepended branch
|
||||
# in admin-services-restriction.tf admit these users to tripit.viktorbarzin.me
|
||||
# ONLY and deny every other *.viktorbarzin.me forward-auth host. Email is sent
|
||||
# via the global SMTP settings wired in modules/authentik/values.yaml
|
||||
# (noreply@viktorbarzin.me through mail.viktorbarzin.me).
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Shared stages (used by both enrollment and recovery) -------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Discoverable (resident) credential => usernameless passwordless login via the
|
||||
# built-in `webauthn` flow, which has no identification stage and so REQUIRES a
|
||||
# discoverable credential to resolve the user. "required" guarantees that;
|
||||
# every modern passkey authenticator supports it.
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_authenticator_webauthn" "tripit_passkey" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-passkey-setup"
|
||||
resident_key_requirement = "required"
|
||||
user_verification = "preferred"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_user_login" "tripit_login" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-login"
|
||||
session_duration = "weeks=4"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Enrollment -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_prompt_field" "tripit_enroll_email" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-enroll-email"
|
||||
field_key = "email"
|
||||
label = "Email"
|
||||
type = "email"
|
||||
required = true
|
||||
order = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_prompt_field" "tripit_enroll_name" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-enroll-name"
|
||||
field_key = "name"
|
||||
label = "Full name"
|
||||
type = "text"
|
||||
required = true
|
||||
order = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_prompt" "tripit_enroll_prompt" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-enrollment-prompt"
|
||||
fields = [
|
||||
authentik_stage_prompt_field.tripit_enroll_email.id,
|
||||
authentik_stage_prompt_field.tripit_enroll_name.id,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_user_write" "tripit_enroll_write" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-enrollment-write"
|
||||
# Created INACTIVE: only the email-verification stage (below) activates it.
|
||||
create_users_as_inactive = true
|
||||
# Land in the fenced group (tripit-only via admin-services-restriction).
|
||||
create_users_group = authentik_group.tripit_external.id
|
||||
user_type = "external"
|
||||
# Open registration: ALWAYS create a fresh user; never attach to / mutate an
|
||||
# existing one. There is no identification stage before this, so there is no
|
||||
# pending user to hijack — this is belt-and-suspenders against account takeover.
|
||||
user_creation_mode = "always_create"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# NOTE: the two email-verification stages (enrollment + recovery) AND their flow
|
||||
# bindings are deliberately NOT defined here — they live in an Authentik
|
||||
# BLUEPRINT (tripit-email-blueprint.tf), applied server-side. Reason: the
|
||||
# globally-pinned provider (goauthentik 2024.x, terragrunt.hcl) models
|
||||
# EmailStage.token_expiry as an INTEGER, but the live server (2026.2.x) requires
|
||||
# a duration STRING ("hours=24") and 400s any number — the provider cannot send
|
||||
# a valid value (confirmed: even the unset default `30` is rejected). The
|
||||
# blueprint is parsed by the server, which accepts the string. Bumping the
|
||||
# provider would be a global terragrunt.hcl change that re-applies every platform
|
||||
# stack and breaks 3 other authentik-using app stacks' lockfiles — out of all
|
||||
# proportion to two stages. See tripit ADR-0020.
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow" "tripit_enrollment" {
|
||||
name = "Sign up for TripIt"
|
||||
title = "Create your TripIt account"
|
||||
slug = "tripit-enrollment"
|
||||
designation = "enrollment"
|
||||
authentication = "require_unauthenticated"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# prompt -> write(inactive) -> verify(activate) -> passkey -> login
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_enroll_10_prompt" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_enrollment.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_prompt.tripit_enroll_prompt.id
|
||||
order = 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_enroll_20_write" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_enrollment.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_user_write.tripit_enroll_write.id
|
||||
order = 20
|
||||
# Run the username-from-email policy (below) at stage-execution time, when
|
||||
# prompt_data is populated — not at plan time. Mirrors guest.tf's pre-stage
|
||||
# context-mutation pattern.
|
||||
evaluate_on_plan = false
|
||||
re_evaluate_policies = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Passwordless, email-only signup collects no username, but user_write aborts on
|
||||
# an empty username ("Aborting write to empty username"). Derive the username
|
||||
# from the entered email just before user_write runs. Mutating flow_plan.context
|
||||
# is the canonical mutable path — a plain request.context mutation would not
|
||||
# propagate to the stage (see guest.tf's pending_user note).
|
||||
resource "authentik_policy_expression" "tripit_username_from_email" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-enrollment-username-from-email"
|
||||
expression = trimspace(<<-EOT
|
||||
pd = request.context["flow_plan"].context.setdefault("prompt_data", {})
|
||||
pd["username"] = pd.get("email", "")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
EOT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_policy_binding" "tripit_username_before_write" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow_stage_binding.tripit_enroll_20_write.id
|
||||
policy = authentik_policy_expression.tripit_username_from_email.id
|
||||
order = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# order 30 (email-verification binding) is in tripit-email-blueprint.tf — see note above
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_enroll_40_passkey" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_enrollment.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_authenticator_webauthn.tripit_passkey.id
|
||||
order = 40
|
||||
}
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_enroll_50_login" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_enrollment.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_user_login.tripit_login.id
|
||||
order = 50
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Recovery (email-anchored, passwordless) --------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_stage_identification" "tripit_recover_ident" {
|
||||
name = "tripit-recovery-identification"
|
||||
user_fields = ["email"]
|
||||
# Anti-enumeration: proceed even for an unknown address (no "user not found").
|
||||
pretend_user_exists = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# (recovery email-verification stage is in tripit-email-blueprint.tf — see note above)
|
||||
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow" "tripit_recovery" {
|
||||
name = "Recover TripIt access"
|
||||
title = "Recover your TripIt account"
|
||||
slug = "tripit-recovery"
|
||||
designation = "recovery"
|
||||
authentication = "require_unauthenticated"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# identify(email) -> email(prove ownership) -> new passkey -> login
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_recover_10_ident" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_recovery.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_identification.tripit_recover_ident.id
|
||||
order = 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
# order 20 (email-verification binding) is in tripit-email-blueprint.tf — see note above
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_recover_30_passkey" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_recovery.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_authenticator_webauthn.tripit_passkey.id
|
||||
order = 30
|
||||
}
|
||||
resource "authentik_flow_stage_binding" "tripit_recover_40_login" {
|
||||
target = authentik_flow.tripit_recovery.uuid
|
||||
stage = authentik_stage_user_login.tripit_login.id
|
||||
order = 40
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue