homelab vault: make it work for non-admin workstation users

`homelab vault` was effectively admin-only: two bugs blocked every
non-admin (e.g. emo) from using it for their own Vaultwarden vault.

1. Token: the CLI relied purely on ambient `vault` auth (~/.vault-token
   / $VAULT_TOKEN), which only admins have. Non-admins carry a scoped
   token at ~/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token (policy
   workstation-claude-<user>). Add ensureVaultToken(): explicit env >
   ~/.vault-token > scoped fallback, wired into every vault verb. Admins
   are unaffected (their ambient token wins).

2. Write capability: `homelab vault setup` used plain `vault kv patch`,
   which needs the `patch` capability the scoped policy does not grant
   (only create/read/update) — so setup 403'd for non-admins. Switch to
   `kv patch -method=rw` (read-modify-write; same approach
   claude-auth-sync already uses), with `kv put` only when the path
   doesn't exist yet. Preserves co-located keys (claude_ai_oauth_json).

Enables onboarding emo onto the per-user Vaultwarden access tool.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-27 08:15:42 +00:00
parent 006f97ef58
commit 51dc5d031c
2 changed files with 283 additions and 35 deletions

View file

@ -128,6 +128,53 @@ func loadCreds(run cmdRunner, user string) (vwCreds, error) {
var vaultCurrentUser = func() string { return os.Getenv("USER") }
var vaultCurrentUID = func() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid()) }
// scopedTokenPath is where claude-auth-sync keeps the user's scoped Vault token.
// MUST match CAS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE in scripts/workstation/claude-auth-sync.sh.
func scopedTokenPath(home string) string {
return home + "/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token"
}
// vaultTokenSource decides which Vault token the `vault` child processes should
// use. Precedence: an explicit $VAULT_TOKEN, then a native ~/.vault-token (what
// admins carry), then the per-user scoped token claude-auth-sync maintains at
// scopedTokenPath(HOME) (policy workstation-claude-<user>, which grants exactly
// the create/read/update this tool needs on the user's own path). Returns the
// token to export — "" when nothing must be exported because the vault CLI reads
// the ambient credential natively — plus a source tag for tests/logging.
func vaultTokenSource(envToken string, haveVaultTokenFile bool, scopedToken string) (token, source string) {
switch {
case envToken != "":
return "", "env"
case haveVaultTokenFile:
return "", "file"
default:
if t := strings.TrimSpace(scopedToken); t != "" {
return t, "scoped"
}
return "", "none"
}
}
// fileNonEmpty reports whether path exists and has content.
func fileNonEmpty(path string) bool {
fi, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil && fi.Size() > 0
}
// ensureVaultToken wires vaultTokenSource to the real environment: when the user
// has no ambient Vault credential, it exports the claude-auth-sync scoped token
// so the `vault` child processes authenticate as workstation-claude-<user>. It
// is idempotent and safe for admins, whose explicit $VAULT_TOKEN / ~/.vault-token
// take precedence and are left untouched.
func ensureVaultToken() {
home := os.Getenv("HOME")
scoped, _ := os.ReadFile(scopedTokenPath(home))
tok, src := vaultTokenSource(os.Getenv("VAULT_TOKEN"), home != "" && fileNonEmpty(home+"/.vault-token"), string(scoped))
if src == "scoped" {
os.Setenv("VAULT_TOKEN", tok)
}
}
// bwBaseEnv is the minimal non-secret environment bw/node need. We deliberately
// do NOT inherit the full parent env (keeps stray secrets out of the child).
func bwBaseEnv(appdata string) []string {
@ -157,10 +204,10 @@ func bwSecretEnv(appdata string, c vwCreds, session string) []string {
return env
}
func bwLoginArgs() []string { return []string{"login", "--apikey"} }
func bwUnlockArgs() []string { return []string{"unlock", "--passwordenv", "BW_PASSWORD", "--raw"} }
func bwLoginArgs() []string { return []string{"login", "--apikey"} }
func bwUnlockArgs() []string { return []string{"unlock", "--passwordenv", "BW_PASSWORD", "--raw"} }
func bwGetArgs(field, name string) []string { return []string{"get", field, name} }
func bwStatusArgs() []string { return []string{"status"} }
func bwStatusArgs() []string { return []string{"status"} }
// bwNeedsLogin parses `bw status` JSON and reports whether a `bw login` is
// required. Unparseable/empty output → true (safer to attempt login).
@ -443,6 +490,7 @@ func runList(run cmdRunner, user, uid, search string) ([]string, error) {
func vaultList(args []string) error {
hardenProcess()
ensureVaultToken()
search := ""
for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
if args[i] == "--search" && i+1 < len(args) {
@ -477,6 +525,7 @@ func vaultSearch(args []string) error {
func vaultCode(args []string) error {
hardenProcess()
ensureVaultToken()
if len(args) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("usage: homelab vault code <name>")
}
@ -516,6 +565,7 @@ func statusSummary(run cmdRunner, user, uid string) string {
func vaultStatus(args []string) error {
hardenProcess()
ensureVaultToken()
uid := vaultCurrentUID()
unlock, err := withUserLock(uid)
if err != nil {
@ -542,32 +592,61 @@ func vaultLock(args []string) error {
return nil // lock/logout best-effort; never error the caller
}
// vaultPatchPublicArgs writes the non-secret identifiers via argv. Neither the
// kvWriteVerb selects the KV write semantics. merge=true → `kv patch -method=rw`
// (read-modify-write: needs only read+update, NOT the `patch` capability the
// scoped workstation-claude-<user> policy lacks, and preserves co-located keys
// such as claude-auth-sync's claude_ai_oauth_json). merge=false → `kv put`
// (creates the path on first use, before any sibling keys exist).
func kvWriteVerb(merge bool) []string {
if merge {
return []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw"}
}
return []string{"kv", "put"}
}
// vaultWritePublicArgs writes the non-secret identifiers via argv. Neither the
// email nor the API client_id is a usable credential on its own.
func vaultPatchPublicArgs(user, email, clientID string) []string {
return []string{"kv", "patch", vwCredsPath(user),
"vaultwarden_email=" + email,
"vaultwarden_client_id=" + clientID,
}
func vaultWritePublicArgs(merge bool, user, email, clientID string) []string {
return append(kvWriteVerb(merge), vwCredsPath(user),
"vaultwarden_email="+email,
"vaultwarden_client_id="+clientID,
)
}
// vaultPatchSecretArgs writes ONE secret value via the `key=-` stdin form, so
// the value never appears in argv (ps / /proc/<pid>/cmdline). The value is fed
// on stdin by realRunnerStdin.
func vaultPatchSecretArgs(user, key string) []string {
return []string{"kv", "patch", vwCredsPath(user), key + "=-"}
// vaultWriteSecretArgs writes ONE secret value via the `key=-` stdin form, so the
// value never appears in argv (ps / /proc/<pid>/cmdline). Fed on stdin by
// realRunnerStdin.
func vaultWriteSecretArgs(merge bool, user, key string) []string {
return append(kvWriteVerb(merge), vwCredsPath(user), key+"=-")
}
// writeCreds stores all four fields in the user's Vault path. The two real
// secrets (master password, API client_secret) go via stdin — never argv.
func writeCreds(user string, c vwCreds) error {
if _, err := realRunner("vault", vaultPatchPublicArgs(user, c.Email, c.ClientID), nil); err != nil {
// credsPathExists reports whether the user's KV path already holds data. Used to
// pick create (`kv put`) vs merge (`kv patch -method=rw`) for the first write:
// claude-auth-sync usually creates the path first (Claude OAuth backup), but a
// user could run `homelab vault setup` before that ever happens.
func credsPathExists(run cmdRunner, user string) bool {
_, err := run("vault", []string{"kv", "get", "-format=json", vwCredsPath(user)}, nil)
return err == nil
}
// cmdRunnerStdin is realRunnerStdin's shape, injected so writeCreds is testable.
type cmdRunnerStdin func(name string, argv, envv []string, stdin string) (string, error)
// writeCreds stores all four fields in the user's Vault path using only the
// capabilities the scoped policy grants (create/read/update — NOT `patch`). The
// first (public) write creates the path when absent; the two real secrets then
// merge in via read-modify-write so the public keys — and any claude-auth-sync
// keys already present — survive. Secret values travel on stdin, never argv.
func writeCreds(run cmdRunner, runStdin cmdRunnerStdin, user string, c vwCreds) error {
merge := credsPathExists(run, user)
if _, err := run("vault", vaultWritePublicArgs(merge, user, c.Email, c.ClientID), nil); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := realRunnerStdin("vault", vaultPatchSecretArgs(user, "vaultwarden_master_password"), nil, c.MasterPassword); err != nil {
// The path now exists regardless of the branch above → merge the secrets in.
if _, err := runStdin("vault", vaultWriteSecretArgs(true, user, "vaultwarden_master_password"), nil, c.MasterPassword); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := realRunnerStdin("vault", vaultPatchSecretArgs(user, "vaultwarden_client_secret"), nil, c.ClientSecret); err != nil {
if _, err := runStdin("vault", vaultWriteSecretArgs(true, user, "vaultwarden_client_secret"), nil, c.ClientSecret); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
@ -593,6 +672,7 @@ func promptLine(prompt string) (string, error) {
func vaultSetup(args []string) error {
hardenProcess()
ensureVaultToken()
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "One-time setup. Stored ONLY in your own Vault path; the admin never sees it.")
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Get your API key at https://vaultwarden.viktorbarzin.me → Settings → Security → Keys → View API key.")
email, err := promptLine("Vaultwarden email: ")
@ -615,7 +695,7 @@ func vaultSetup(args []string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("all fields are required")
}
c := vwCreds{Email: email, MasterPassword: master, ClientID: clientID, ClientSecret: clientSecret}
if err := writeCreds(vaultCurrentUser(), c); err != nil {
if err := writeCreds(realRunner, realRunnerStdin, vaultCurrentUser(), c); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing creds to your Vault path failed (scoped token present?): %w", err)
}
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Stored. Verifying unlock…")
@ -634,6 +714,7 @@ func vaultSetup(args []string) error {
func vaultGet(args []string) error {
hardenProcess()
ensureVaultToken()
o, err := parseGetArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return err
@ -660,4 +741,3 @@ func vaultGet(args []string) error {
emitSecret(val)
return nil
}

View file

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (f *fakeRunner) run(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
func TestLoadCredsReadsFourFields(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_email secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "emo@x.me",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_email secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "emo@x.me",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "hunter2",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.abc",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "sek",
@ -233,12 +233,96 @@ func TestStatusSummaryUnconfigured(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestVaultPatchPublicArgs(t *testing.T) {
got := vaultPatchPublicArgs("emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci")
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo",
func TestEnsureVaultTokenSetsScopedFallback(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfg := dir + "/.config/claude-auth-sync"
if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(cfg+"/vault-token", []byte("SCOPED-TOK\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("HOME", dir)
t.Setenv("VAULT_TOKEN", "") // no ambient token
ensureVaultToken()
if got := os.Getenv("VAULT_TOKEN"); got != "SCOPED-TOK" {
t.Fatalf("VAULT_TOKEN = %q, want scoped fallback to be exported", got)
}
}
func TestEnsureVaultTokenKeepsExplicitEnv(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfg := dir + "/.config/claude-auth-sync"
if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(cfg+"/vault-token", []byte("SCOPED-TOK"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("HOME", dir)
t.Setenv("VAULT_TOKEN", "ADMIN-TOK")
ensureVaultToken()
if got := os.Getenv("VAULT_TOKEN"); got != "ADMIN-TOK" {
t.Fatalf("VAULT_TOKEN = %q, must not override an explicit token", got)
}
}
func TestScopedTokenPath(t *testing.T) {
if got := scopedTokenPath("/home/emo"); got != "/home/emo/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token" {
t.Fatalf("scopedTokenPath = %q", got)
}
}
func TestVaultTokenSource(t *testing.T) {
// Precedence: explicit $VAULT_TOKEN > ~/.vault-token (vault CLI native) >
// the claude-auth-sync per-user scoped token. This is what lets a non-admin
// workstation user (no ambient token) reach their own Vault path.
cases := []struct {
name string
env string
haveVaultToken bool
scoped string
wantTok, wantSrc string
}{
{"explicit env wins", "abc", true, "S", "", "env"},
{"vault-token file used natively", "", true, "S", "", "file"},
{"scoped fallback for non-admin", "", false, "S-TOK", "S-TOK", "scoped"},
{"scoped value is trimmed", "", false, " S-TOK\n", "S-TOK", "scoped"},
{"whitespace-only scoped is no token", "", false, " \n", "", "none"},
{"nothing configured", "", false, "", "", "none"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
tok, src := vaultTokenSource(c.env, c.haveVaultToken, c.scoped)
if tok != c.wantTok || src != c.wantSrc {
t.Errorf("%s: vaultTokenSource(%q,%v,%q) = (%q,%q), want (%q,%q)",
c.name, c.env, c.haveVaultToken, c.scoped, tok, src, c.wantTok, c.wantSrc)
}
}
}
func TestKvWriteVerb(t *testing.T) {
// merge=true → read-modify-write patch (needs only read+update, NOT the
// `patch` capability the scoped workstation policy lacks).
if got := kvWriteVerb(true); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw"}) {
t.Fatalf("kvWriteVerb(true) = %v", got)
}
// merge=false → put (creates the path on first use)
if got := kvWriteVerb(false); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"kv", "put"}) {
t.Fatalf("kvWriteVerb(false) = %v", got)
}
}
func TestVaultWritePublicArgs(t *testing.T) {
got := vaultWritePublicArgs(true, "emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci")
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo",
"vaultwarden_email=e@x.me", "vaultwarden_client_id=user.ci"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("vaultPatchPublicArgs = %v", got)
t.Fatalf("vaultWritePublicArgs(merge) = %v", got)
}
if got := vaultWritePublicArgs(false, "emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci"); got[0] != "kv" || got[1] != "put" {
t.Fatalf("vaultWritePublicArgs(create) must use `kv put`, got %v", got)
}
for _, a := range got {
if strings.Contains(a, "master_password") || strings.Contains(a, "client_secret") {
@ -247,12 +331,12 @@ func TestVaultPatchPublicArgs(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestVaultPatchSecretArgsNoValueInArgv(t *testing.T) {
func TestVaultWriteSecretArgsNoValueInArgv(t *testing.T) {
for _, key := range []string{"vaultwarden_master_password", "vaultwarden_client_secret"} {
got := vaultPatchSecretArgs("emo", key)
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo", key + "=-"}
got := vaultWriteSecretArgs(true, "emo", key)
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo", key + "=-"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("vaultPatchSecretArgs(%q) = %v", key, got)
t.Fatalf("vaultWriteSecretArgs(%q) = %v", key, got)
}
if got[len(got)-1] != key+"=-" {
t.Fatalf("secret value must be read from stdin (`%s=-`), got %v", key, got)
@ -260,6 +344,90 @@ func TestVaultPatchSecretArgsNoValueInArgv(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// recStdin records a stdin-bearing call for assertions.
type recStdin struct {
argv []string
stdin string
}
// TestWriteCredsCreatesThenMerges: when the path is ABSENT the first (public)
// write must `kv put` (create), and the two secrets must merge via patch -rw
// with values on stdin only — never the buggy plain `kv patch` (needs `patch`).
func TestWriteCredsCreatesThenMerges(t *testing.T) {
var calls [][]string
var stdinCalls []recStdin
run := func(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
if len(argv) >= 2 && argv[0] == "kv" && argv[1] == "get" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no value found") // path absent
}
return "", nil
}
runStdin := func(name string, argv, envv []string, stdin string) (string, error) {
stdinCalls = append(stdinCalls, recStdin{append([]string{name}, argv...), stdin})
return "", nil
}
c := vwCreds{Email: "e@x.me", MasterPassword: "PW", ClientID: "user.ci", ClientSecret: "CS"}
if err := writeCreds(run, runStdin, "emo", c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeCreds: %v", err)
}
var sawPut, sawPlainPatch bool
for _, cl := range calls {
j := strings.Join(cl, " ")
if strings.Contains(j, "kv put") {
sawPut = true
}
if strings.Contains(j, "kv patch") && !strings.Contains(j, "-method=rw") {
sawPlainPatch = true
}
}
if !sawPut {
t.Fatalf("path absent → public write must be `kv put`; calls=%v", calls)
}
if sawPlainPatch {
t.Fatalf("must never use plain `kv patch` (needs `patch` capability); calls=%v", calls)
}
if len(stdinCalls) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 stdin secret writes, got %d", len(stdinCalls))
}
for _, sc := range stdinCalls {
if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(sc.argv, " "), "kv patch -method=rw") {
t.Errorf("secret write must use patch -method=rw: %v", sc.argv)
}
for _, a := range sc.argv {
if strings.Contains(a, "PW") || strings.Contains(a, "CS") {
t.Errorf("secret leaked into argv: %v", sc.argv)
}
}
}
if stdinCalls[0].stdin != "PW" || stdinCalls[1].stdin != "CS" {
t.Errorf("stdin values wrong: %q,%q", stdinCalls[0].stdin, stdinCalls[1].stdin)
}
}
// TestWriteCredsMergesWhenPresent: when the path EXISTS, every write must merge
// (patch -rw) — a `kv put` would wipe sibling keys (e.g. claude_ai_oauth_json).
func TestWriteCredsMergesWhenPresent(t *testing.T) {
var calls [][]string
run := func(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
return "{}", nil // get succeeds → path exists
}
runStdin := func(name string, argv, envv []string, stdin string) (string, error) {
calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
return "", nil
}
c := vwCreds{Email: "e@x.me", MasterPassword: "PW", ClientID: "user.ci", ClientSecret: "CS"}
if err := writeCreds(run, runStdin, "emo", c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeCreds: %v", err)
}
for _, cl := range calls {
if strings.Contains(strings.Join(cl, " "), "kv put") {
t.Fatalf("path exists → must NOT `kv put` (wipes siblings): %v", cl)
}
}
}
// TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow is the load-bearing security test: across the
// whole get flow (vault reads, bw config/status/login/unlock/get) NO secret
// value may appear in any command's argv — secrets travel via env/stdin only.
@ -267,8 +435,8 @@ func TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow(t *testing.T) {
uid := fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "SUPERSECRETPW",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "CLIENTSEKRET",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "CLIENTSEKRET",
"bw status": `{"status":"locked"}`,
"bw unlock": "SESSIONXYZ",
"bw get password github": "p@ss",
@ -353,8 +521,8 @@ func TestVaultBareGroupRegistered(t *testing.T) {
func TestGetValueFlow(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "pw",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "cs",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "cs",
"bw status": `{"status":"locked"}`,
"bw unlock": "SESS",
"bw get password github": "p@ss",