fix(cli): vault security review fixes

C1 (critical): setup wrote the master password + API client_secret as
`vault kv patch key=value` argv, leaking them via /proc/<pid>/cmdline to
same-UID processes. Now written via stdin (key=- form); only email +
client_id (non-credentials) remain in argv.
I1: `get --json` refused on a TTY (was dumping the secret to scrollback).
M1: vaultLock now holds the per-user flock (it mutates bw state).
M4: bw login-detection parses status JSON instead of substring matching.
M5: clipboard path refuses when stderr is not a TTY (was silently failing).
M6: realRunner trims only trailing newline, preserving secret whitespace;
    secret prompts likewise.
Adds security-property tests: no secret in argv across the get flow,
clipboard decision matrix, --json TTY gate, bw status parsing.
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-24 10:28:31 +00:00
parent 5a864cf19c
commit 772aed5370
2 changed files with 206 additions and 30 deletions

View file

@ -233,13 +233,101 @@ func TestStatusSummaryUnconfigured(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestVaultPutArgs(t *testing.T) {
got := vaultPutArgs("emo", vwCreds{Email: "e", MasterPassword: "m", ClientID: "ci", ClientSecret: "cs"})
func TestVaultPatchPublicArgs(t *testing.T) {
got := vaultPatchPublicArgs("emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci")
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo",
"vaultwarden_email=e", "vaultwarden_master_password=m",
"vaultwarden_client_id=ci", "vaultwarden_client_secret=cs"}
"vaultwarden_email=e@x.me", "vaultwarden_client_id=user.ci"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("vaultPutArgs = %v", got)
t.Fatalf("vaultPatchPublicArgs = %v", got)
}
for _, a := range got {
if strings.Contains(a, "master_password") || strings.Contains(a, "client_secret") {
t.Fatalf("secret key leaked into public argv: %v", got)
}
}
}
func TestVaultPatchSecretArgsNoValueInArgv(t *testing.T) {
for _, key := range []string{"vaultwarden_master_password", "vaultwarden_client_secret"} {
got := vaultPatchSecretArgs("emo", key)
want := []string{"kv", "patch", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo", key + "=-"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("vaultPatchSecretArgs(%q) = %v", key, got)
}
if got[len(got)-1] != key+"=-" {
t.Fatalf("secret value must be read from stdin (`%s=-`), got %v", key, got)
}
}
}
// TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow is the load-bearing security test: across the
// whole get flow (vault reads, bw config/status/login/unlock/get) NO secret
// value may appear in any command's argv — secrets travel via env/stdin only.
func TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow(t *testing.T) {
uid := fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "SUPERSECRETPW",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "CLIENTSEKRET",
"bw status": `{"status":"locked"}`,
"bw unlock": "SESSIONXYZ",
"bw get password github": "p@ss",
}}
if _, err := getValue(f.run, "emo", uid, getOpts{name: "github", field: "password"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getValue: %v", err)
}
for _, call := range f.calls {
for _, arg := range call {
for _, s := range []string{"SUPERSECRETPW", "CLIENTSEKRET", "SESSIONXYZ"} {
if strings.Contains(arg, s) {
t.Errorf("secret %q leaked into argv: %v", s, call)
}
}
}
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(f.lastEnv, "\n"), "BW_SESSION=SESSIONXYZ") {
t.Error("expected BW_SESSION in the bw get env (test would be vacuous otherwise)")
}
}
func TestClipboardDecision(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
stdoutTTY, stderrTTY bool
term, prog, want string
}{
{false, true, "xterm-kitty", "", "stdout"},
{true, true, "xterm-kitty", "", "clipboard"},
{true, true, "dumb", "", "refuse"},
{true, false, "xterm-kitty", "", "refuse"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := clipboardDecision(c.stdoutTTY, c.stderrTTY, c.term, c.prog); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("clipboardDecision(%v,%v,%q) = %q, want %q", c.stdoutTTY, c.stderrTTY, c.term, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestJSONToStdoutOK(t *testing.T) {
if jsonToStdoutOK(true) {
t.Error("must refuse JSON secret on a terminal")
}
if !jsonToStdoutOK(false) {
t.Error("must allow JSON when piped")
}
}
func TestBwNeedsLogin(t *testing.T) {
if !bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"unauthenticated"}`) {
t.Error("unauthenticated → needs login")
}
if bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"locked"}`) {
t.Error("locked → no login (just unlock)")
}
if bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"unlocked"}`) {
t.Error("unlocked → no login")
}
if !bwNeedsLogin(`not json`) {
t.Error("unparseable → attempt login")
}
}