diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-03-07-sops-migration-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-03-07-sops-migration-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b7a762ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-03-07-sops-migration-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+# SOPS Multi-User Secrets Migration — Design Document (v3)
+
+## Goal
+Enable non-technical operators to manage cluster services via PR → review → merge → CI apply, without access to secrets. Viktor retains full local apply capability.
+
+## Current State
+- **terraform.tfvars**: 211 variables (mix of secrets + non-secret config), git-crypt encrypted as a whole
+- **secrets/**: TLS certs, deploy keys, NFS config — git-crypt encrypted (binary files)
+- **.gitattributes**: encrypts `*.tfvars`, `*.tfstate`, `secrets/**`
+- **Woodpecker CI**: unlocks git-crypt via K8s ConfigMap, applies `stacks/platform/` on push
+- **Terragrunt**: loads `terraform.tfvars` via `required_var_files` for all stacks
+
+## Design
+
+### 1. Split terraform.tfvars into Two Files
+
+**`config.tfvars`** (NOT encrypted — committed in plaintext):
+Non-secret configuration that operators need to read/edit:
+- `nfs_server`, `redis_host`, `postgresql_host`, `mysql_host`, `ollama_host`, `mail_host`
+- `bind_db_viktorbarzin_me`, `bind_db_viktorbarzin_lan`, `bind_named_conf_options`
+- `tls_secret_name`, `client_certificate_secret_name`
+- WireGuard peer **public** keys and AllowedIPs only — **NOT** `wireguard_wg_0_conf` (contains private key inline), NOT any `PrivateKey` fields
+- Cloudflare DNS zone definitions (record names, not tokens)
+
+**`secrets.sops.json`** (SOPS-encrypted, per-value, JSON format):
+All actual secrets, including complex types. JSON format chosen because:
+- `sops -d` outputs the same format as input — JSON in, JSON out
+- Terraform natively supports `*.auto.tfvars.json` files
+- JSON supports all Terraform types: strings, maps, lists, nested objects
+- No format conversion needed in the decryption pipeline
+
+**Complex types** in JSON (these are NOT flat strings):
+```json
+{
+  "hackmd_db_password": "simple-string-secret",
+  "mailserver_accounts": {
+    "info@viktorbarzin.me": "password1",
+    "admin@viktorbarzin.me": "password2"
+  },
+  "homepage_credentials": {
+    "technitium": {"token": "abc123"},
+    "crowdsec": {"username": "user", "password": "pass"}
+  },
+  "k8s_users": {
+    "viktor": {"role": "admin", "email": "v@example.com", "namespaces": []}
+  },
+  "xray_reality_clients": [
+    {"id": "uuid-here", "flow": "xtls-rprx-vision"}
+  ],
+  "webhook_handler_ssh_key": "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nb3Blbn...\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
+  "wireguard_wg_0_conf": "[Interface]\nPrivateKey = ...\nAddress = ...\n\n[Peer]\n..."
+}
+```
+
+### 2. SOPS Configuration
+
+```yaml
+# .sops.yaml
+creation_rules:
+  - path_regex: ^secrets\.sops\.json$
+    age: >-
+      age1viktor_public_key,
+      age1ci_public_key
+```
+
+Path regex anchored to repo root (`^`). All secrets encrypted to Viktor + CI.
+
+### 3. Terragrunt Changes
+
+```hcl
+# terragrunt.hcl — updated variable loading
+terraform {
+  extra_arguments "common_vars" {
+    commands = get_terraform_commands_that_need_vars()
+    required_var_files = [
+      "${get_repo_root()}/config.tfvars"
+    ]
+  }
+
+  extra_arguments "secrets" {
+    commands = get_terraform_commands_that_need_vars()
+    optional_var_files = [
+      "${get_repo_root()}/secrets.auto.tfvars.json"
+    ]
+  }
+
+  # Safety check: fail loudly if secrets file is missing (prevents silent apply with empty secrets)
+  before_hook "check_secrets" {
+    commands = ["apply", "plan", "destroy"]
+    execute  = ["test", "-f", "${get_repo_root()}/secrets.auto.tfvars.json"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Global decrypt-once wrapper** (run instead of raw terragrunt):
+```bash
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/tg — wrapper: decrypt then terragrunt
+set -euo pipefail
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+SOPS_FILE="$REPO_ROOT/secrets.sops.json"
+OUT_FILE="$REPO_ROOT/secrets.auto.tfvars.json"
+
+if [ ! -f "$OUT_FILE" ] && [ -f "$SOPS_FILE" ]; then
+  TEMP=$(mktemp "$OUT_FILE.XXXXXX")
+  trap "rm -f '$TEMP'" EXIT
+  sops -d "$SOPS_FILE" > "$TEMP"
+  mv "$TEMP" "$OUT_FILE"
+  echo "Decrypted secrets → secrets.auto.tfvars.json"
+fi
+
+exec terragrunt "$@"
+```
+
+Usage: `scripts/tg apply --non-interactive` instead of `terragrunt apply --non-interactive`.
+
+**Why not before_hook/after_hook for decryption?** When using `run --all`, each of 70+ stacks would run hooks in parallel, all writing to the same file — race condition. The wrapper decrypts once.
+
+**Why before_hook for the existence check?** It's read-only (just `test -f`) — safe in parallel. Fails loudly if someone forgets to decrypt, instead of silently applying with empty secrets.
+
+### 4. File Protection
+
+**.gitignore** (add these entries):
+```
+/secrets.auto.tfvars.json
+/secrets.auto.tfvars.json.*
+```
+
+**.gitattributes** changes (done atomically in Phase 4):
+```
+# KEEP for binary files
+secrets/** filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
+*.tfstate filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
+
+# REMOVED: *.tfvars filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
+```
+
+### 5. Woodpecker CI Pipeline Changes
+
+**default.yml**:
+```yaml
+steps:
+  - name: prepare
+    image: alpine
+    commands:
+      - "apk update && apk add jq curl git git-crypt"
+      # git-crypt for secrets/ directory (TLS certs, deploy key)
+      # Note: K8s Secret .data values are base64-encoded by the API
+      - |
+        curl -k https://10.0.20.100:6443/api/v1/namespaces/woodpecker/secrets/git-crypt-key \
+          -H "Authorization:Bearer $(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)" \
+          | jq -r '.data.key' | base64 -d > /tmp/key
+      - "git-crypt unlock /tmp/key && rm /tmp/key"
+      # Install SOPS to workspace (shared across steps via workspace volume)
+      - "wget -qO ./sops https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/v3.9.4/sops-v3.9.4.linux.amd64"
+      - "echo '848ac8ee4b4e3ae1e72a58f0e9bae04b3e85ca59fa06f0dcd2d32b76542e8417  ./sops' | sha256sum -c"
+      - "chmod +x ./sops"
+      # Write age key to file (Woodpecker from_secret injects as env var, not file)
+      - "echo \"$SOPS_AGE_KEY\" > /tmp/age-key.txt"
+      - "SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/tmp/age-key.txt ./sops -d secrets.sops.json > secrets.auto.tfvars.json"
+      - "shred -u /tmp/age-key.txt"
+    environment:
+      SOPS_AGE_KEY:
+        from_secret: sops_age_key  # CI's age private key material
+
+  - name: terragrunt-plan
+    image: alpine
+    commands:
+      - "apk update && apk add curl unzip git openssh-client"
+      - "wget -qO /tmp/tf.zip https://releases.hashicorp.com/terraform/1.5.7/terraform_1.5.7_linux_amd64.zip"
+      - "unzip -o /tmp/tf.zip -d /usr/local/bin/ && chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/terraform"
+      - "wget -qO /usr/local/bin/terragrunt https://github.com/gruntwork-io/terragrunt/releases/download/v0.99.4/terragrunt_linux_amd64"
+      - "chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/terragrunt"
+      - "cd stacks/platform && terragrunt plan --non-interactive -out=tfplan 2>&1 | grep -v 'sensitive'"
+    when:
+      event: pull_request
+
+  - name: terragrunt-apply
+    image: alpine
+    commands:
+      - "apk update && apk add curl unzip git openssh-client"
+      - "wget -qO /tmp/tf.zip https://releases.hashicorp.com/terraform/1.5.7/terraform_1.5.7_linux_amd64.zip"
+      - "unzip -o /tmp/tf.zip -d /usr/local/bin/ && chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/terraform"
+      - "wget -qO /usr/local/bin/terragrunt https://github.com/gruntwork-io/terragrunt/releases/download/v0.99.4/terragrunt_linux_amd64"
+      - "chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/terragrunt"
+      - "cd stacks/platform && terragrunt apply --non-interactive -auto-approve"
+    when:
+      event: push
+      branch: master
+
+  - name: cleanup-and-push
+    image: alpine
+    commands:
+      - "rm -f secrets.auto.tfvars.json secrets.auto.tfvars.json.*"
+      - "apk update && apk add openssh-client git git-crypt"
+      - "mkdir -p ~/.ssh && ssh-keyscan -H github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts"
+      - "chmod 400 secrets/deploy_key"
+      - "git add stacks/ state/ .woodpecker/ || true"
+      - "git remote set-url origin git@github.com:ViktorBarzin/infra.git"
+      - "git commit -m 'Woodpecker CI deploy commit [CI SKIP]' || echo 'No changes'"
+      - "GIT_SSH_COMMAND='ssh -i ./secrets/deploy_key -o IdentitiesOnly=yes' git push origin master"
+    when:
+      - event: push
+        branch: master
+      - status: [success, failure]  # Always clean up, even on failure
+
+  - name: slack
+    image: curlimages/curl
+    commands:
+      - |
+        curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-type: application/json' \
+          --data "{\"text\":\"Woodpecker CI: infra pipeline ${CI_PIPELINE_STATUS}\"}" \
+          "$SLACK_WEBHOOK" || true
+    environment:
+      SLACK_WEBHOOK:
+        from_secret: slack_webhook
+    when:
+      - status: [success, failure]
+```
+
+**renew-tls.yml** — ALSO update this pipeline:
+- Change `git add .` to `git add secrets/ state/` in the `commit-certs` step
+- Same defense-in-depth as default.yml
+
+Key design decisions:
+- `SOPS_AGE_KEY` (env var, not file) — Woodpecker `from_secret` only supports env vars. The prepare step writes it to a temp file, uses `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE`, then `shred`s the file
+- SOPS binary in workspace (shared volume) — not per-container `/usr/local/bin/`
+- `cleanup-and-push` runs on `status: [success, failure]` — always cleans up decrypted file
+- `git add stacks/ state/ .woodpecker/` — never `git add .`
+- Plan output filtered through `grep -v sensitive` — belt-and-suspenders with `sensitive = true`
+
+### 6. Branch Protection (Required)
+
+GitHub branch protection on `master`:
+- **Require pull request reviews**: at least 1 reviewer (Viktor)
+- **Restrict who can push**: Viktor only (direct push for `[ci skip]` commits)
+- **Restrict who can dismiss reviews**: Viktor only
+
+This prevents operators from modifying `.woodpecker/`, `terragrunt.hcl`, or `.sops.yaml` without review.
+
+**Residual risk**: An operator can add `provisioner "local-exec" { command = "echo ${var.secret}" }` in a PR. Viktor must catch this in review. Mitigated by: (1) PR review is required, (2) `sensitive = true` hides values in plan output, (3) `local-exec` provisioners are unusual in this codebase and should be flagged during review.
+
+### 7. K8s RBAC for Operators
+
+Scoped operator role — no cluster-wide secrets access:
+
+```hcl
+resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "operator" {
+  metadata { name = "cluster-operator" }
+  rule {
+    api_groups = [""]
+    resources  = ["pods", "pods/log", "services", "endpoints", "configmaps", "events"]
+    verbs      = ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  }
+  rule {
+    api_groups = ["apps"]
+    resources  = ["deployments", "statefulsets", "daemonsets", "replicasets"]
+    verbs      = ["get", "list", "watch"]
+  }
+}
+
+# Per-namespace full access (edit role includes secrets within namespace — accepted residual risk)
+resource "kubernetes_role_binding" "operator_namespace" {
+  for_each = toset(var.operator_namespaces)
+  metadata {
+    name      = "operator-access"
+    namespace = each.value
+  }
+  role_ref {
+    api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
+    kind      = "ClusterRole"
+    name      = "edit"
+  }
+  subject {
+    kind = "Group"
+    name = "operators"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Excluded namespaces** (never in `operator_namespaces`): `woodpecker`, `kube-system`, `dbaas`, `monitoring`, `authentik`.
+
+### 8. Operator Workflow
+
+**Setup (one-time)**: GitHub collaborator + Authentik "operators" group. No encryption keys, no local tools beyond git.
+
+**Day-to-day**: Create branch → edit → push → open PR → Viktor reviews → merge → CI applies → Slack notification.
+
+**kubectl**: `kubectl oidc-login` → Authentik → scoped to assigned namespaces.
+
+**New secrets**: Comment on PR, Viktor adds to `secrets.sops.json`.
+
+### 9. Migration Plan (Phased)
+
+**Phase 1 — Setup tooling (no functional change)**
+- Install `sops` and `age` locally (Docker)
+- Generate age keys: Viktor + CI
+- Store CI age key as Woodpecker secret (`sops_age_key`)
+- Move git-crypt key from K8s ConfigMap to Secret (update RBAC for Woodpecker SA)
+- Create `.sops.yaml` config file
+- Add `/secrets.auto.tfvars.json` to `.gitignore`
+- Create `scripts/tg` wrapper
+- Backup Viktor's age private key to Vaultwarden
+
+**Phase 2 — Create SOPS file alongside existing tfvars**
+- Categorize all 211 variables: secret vs. non-secret (WireGuard private keys → secrets)
+- Extract non-secret config into `config.tfvars` (plaintext)
+- Extract secrets into `secrets.sops.json` (JSON, including complex types: maps, lists, nested objects)
+- Encrypt with SOPS
+- Verify round-trip: `sops -d secrets.sops.json | jq .` produces valid JSON
+- Verify SSH keys: `sops -d secrets.sops.json | jq -r '.truenas_ssh_private_key' | ssh-keygen -l -f -`
+- Verify complex types: `sops -d secrets.sops.json | jq '.mailserver_accounts'` returns expected map
+- Add `sensitive = true` to ALL secret variable declarations across all stacks (BEFORE CI plan step is enabled)
+
+**Phase 3 — Switch terragrunt to SOPS**
+- Update `terragrunt.hcl`: `config.tfvars` (required) + `secrets.auto.tfvars.json` (optional) + existence check hook
+- Test: `scripts/tg apply --non-interactive` works per-stack
+- Test: `scripts/tg run --all -- plan` works (no race condition)
+- Test failure mode: delete `secrets.auto.tfvars.json`, verify `before_hook` fails loudly
+
+**Phase 4 — Atomic cutover**
+- Step 1: `git rm terraform.tfvars` (removes file while git-crypt filter still active — clean deletion)
+- Step 2: Remove `*.tfvars filter=git-crypt` from `.gitattributes`
+- Step 3: `git commit` both changes
+
+**Phase 5 — Update CI pipelines**
+- Update `.woodpecker/default.yml` with new pipeline
+- Update `.woodpecker/renew-tls.yml`: change `git add .` to `git add secrets/ state/`
+- Add `sops_age_key` Woodpecker secret
+- Enable GitHub branch protection on master
+- Test: CI pipeline applies successfully
+
+**Phase 6 — Security hardening**
+- Create scoped operator RBAC role
+- Remove `secrets` from `power-user` ClusterRole
+- Update CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md documentation
+
+**Phase 7 — Onboard operator**
+- Add as GitHub collaborator
+- Create Authentik account in "operators" group
+- Walk through first PR workflow
+
+### 10. Rollback Plan
+- **Phase 1-2**: No functional change — delete SOPS artifacts
+- **Phase 3**: Revert `terragrunt.hcl` to load `terraform.tfvars`
+- **Phase 4+**: `git show HEAD~1:terraform.tfvars > terraform.tfvars`, re-add `.gitattributes` rule. Backfill any secrets added during SOPS period.
+- Git-crypt stays functional for `secrets/` and `*.tfstate`
+
+### 11. What Stays with git-crypt
+- `secrets/` directory: TLS certs, deploy keys (binary)
+- `*.tfstate` files: Terraform state
+- git-crypt key: K8s **Secret** in `woodpecker` namespace (migrated from ConfigMap)
+
+### 12. Security Considerations
+- **Decrypted file**: temporary, `.gitignore`d, never staged by CI, cleaned up on success AND failure
+- **CI staging**: `git add stacks/ state/ .woodpecker/` — never `git add .` (all pipelines)
+- **Age key in CI**: `SOPS_AGE_KEY` env var → written to temp file → `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE` → `shred` after use
+- **Age key backup**: Viktor's in Vaultwarden. CI's as Woodpecker secret
+- **Branch protection**: Operators cannot modify CI pipeline, terragrunt.hcl, or .sops.yaml without review
+- **RBAC**: Operator role excludes cluster-wide secrets. Namespace `edit` role allows secrets within assigned namespaces (accepted residual risk). Excluded: woodpecker, kube-system, dbaas, monitoring, authentik
+- **Terraform variables**: `sensitive = true` on all secret vars — applied in Phase 2 BEFORE plan step is enabled
+- **Plan output**: filtered through `grep -v sensitive` as belt-and-suspenders
+- **`local-exec` exfiltration**: residual risk mitigated by PR review requirement — Viktor must review all PRs
+- **State files**: contain secret values, git-crypt encrypted. Future: remote backend
+- **Rotation**: new CI age key → re-encrypt → update Woodpecker secret → rotate affected secrets
+- **Git history**: old `terraform.tfvars` remains git-crypt encrypted in history — recoverable only with git-crypt key (K8s Secret, not accessible to operators)