workstation: emo direct master push — allow-then-audit [ci skip]

Viktor: emo may make any change; what matters is tracking what changed
and why. ebarzin added to master push+merge whitelists (force-push
stays disabled — append-only history). Tracking enforced three ways:
- agent instructions (managed claudeMd + AGENTS.md): commit body MUST
  carry the user's plain-language intent; commits land on master
  directly; [ci skip] forbidden for non-admins
- new notify-nonadmin-push step in .woodpecker/default.yml: Slack
  message for every non-admin master push (admin pushes silent)
- PR flow remains the fallback for non-whitelisted users

Accepted consequence (informed): emo's pushes auto-apply changed
stacks via CI. Offboard runbook gains whitelist-removal step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-10 14:53:43 +00:00
parent 6d8773573c
commit a49d1eadf6
6 changed files with 60 additions and 17 deletions

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@ -24,6 +24,26 @@ clone:
backoff: 10s backoff: 10s
steps: steps:
# Audit feed for the allow-then-audit contribution model: any master push by
# a NON-admin author is surfaced in Slack (Viktor's own pushes are not).
# Runs before apply and never blocks it. Note: [ci skip] commits never reach
# this step (Woodpecker skips the whole pipeline) — hence the rule that
# non-admins must not use [ci skip].
- name: notify-nonadmin-push
image: curlimages/curl
environment:
SLACK_WEBHOOK:
from_secret: slack_webhook
commands:
- |
case "$CI_COMMIT_AUTHOR" in
viktor|ViktorBarzin|wizard) echo "admin push — no notify"; exit 0 ;;
esac
SUBJECT=$(echo "$CI_COMMIT_MESSAGE" | head -1 | tr -d '"\\')
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-type: application/json' \
--data "{\"text\":\"📝 infra master push by *$CI_COMMIT_AUTHOR*: $SUBJECT\n$CI_REPO_URL/commit/$CI_COMMIT_SHA\"}" \
"$SLACK_WEBHOOK" || true
- name: apply - name: apply
image: forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/infra-ci:latest image: forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/infra-ci:latest
pull: true pull: true

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@ -235,23 +235,39 @@ Their `~/code` clone arrives preconfigured: git identity, a `forgejo` remote
authenticated via `~/.git-credentials`, and `master` tracking `forgejo/master` authenticated via `~/.git-credentials`, and `master` tracking `forgejo/master`
(auto-freshened hourly and at session launch, fast-forward only). (auto-freshened hourly and at session launch, fast-forward only).
The model is **allow-then-audit** (Viktor, 2026-06-10): whitelisted users (emo)
push straight to `master` — no PR gate — and the record of *what changed and
why* is what matters. Force-push is disabled for everyone, so master history
is append-only.
To land a finished change from such a clone: To land a finished change from such a clone:
1. `git checkout -b <os-user>/<short-topic> master` — always branch off fresh master 1. Commit on `master`. **The commit message is the audit trail** — this matters
2. Commit with a clear message (identity is preconfigured) more than the change itself:
3. `git push forgejo <os-user>/<short-topic>` - subject: what changed, specific ("ha-sofia: lower fan curve bias to -5")
4. Open the PR with the user's own PAT (`write:repository` suffices — verified 2026-06-10): - body: WHY, in plain words — paraphrase the user's actual request and any
```bash reasoning ("Emil asked for quieter fans in the evening; curve was
TOK=$(sed -E 's#https://[^:]+:([^@]+)@.*#\1#' ~/.git-credentials) overshooting after the 2026-06-08 redesign")
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: token $TOK" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ 2. `git push forgejo master`. If rejected non-fast-forward: `git pull --rebase
https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/pulls \ forgejo master` and push again.
-d '{"title":"<title>","head":"<os-user>/<short-topic>","base":"master","body":"<what + why>"}' 3. **Never use `[ci skip]`** as a non-admin — it hides the change from the
``` Slack audit feed; a no-op CI apply on a docs-only commit is harmless.
5. `git checkout master` — leave the clone clean so auto-refresh keeps working 4. Leave the clone on clean `master` so auto-refresh keeps working.
6. Tell the user in plain language that the change is submitted for Viktor's review 5. Tell the user in plain language what happened. Stack changes are
auto-applied by CI — verify the live result with the user's read-only
kubectl before saying "it's live".
Direct pushes to `master` are rejected by branch protection; merging (and the If a push to `master` is rejected by branch protection (user not on the
CI apply a master push triggers) is admin-only. whitelist — e.g. new users before Viktor grants it), fall back to a
`<os-user>/<short-topic>` branch + PR with the user's own PAT
(`write:repository` suffices — verified 2026-06-10):
```bash
TOK=$(sed -E 's#https://[^:]+:([^@]+)@.*#\1#' ~/.git-credentials)
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: token $TOK" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/pulls \
-d '{"title":"<title>","head":"<os-user>/<short-topic>","base":"master","body":"<what + why>"}'
```
## Common Operations ## Common Operations
- **Deploy new service**: Use `stacks/<existing-service>/` as template. Create stack, add DNS in tfvars, apply platform then service. - **Deploy new service**: Use `stacks/<existing-service>/` as template. Create stack, add DNS in tfvars, apply platform then service.

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@ -543,14 +543,15 @@ Separate from the in-cluster namespace-owner model above, the **devvm** (`10.0.1
**Config inheritance (live):** wizard authors the base (his chezmoi-versioned `~/.claude`). Two native layers carry it to every user — the enforced org `claudeMd` in `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` (top precedence, all sessions) and per-user `~/.claude/{skills,rules,…}` **symlinks** to the base (seeded via `/etc/skel`; edits propagate live). Secrets stay per-user at mode 600, never symlinked. **Config inheritance (live):** wizard authors the base (his chezmoi-versioned `~/.claude`). Two native layers carry it to every user — the enforced org `claudeMd` in `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` (top precedence, all sessions) and per-user `~/.claude/{skills,rules,…}` **symlinks** to the base (seeded via `/etc/skel`; edits propagate live). Secrets stay per-user at mode 600, never symlinked.
**Infra access:** non-admins get their own **writable, git-crypt-LOCKED** clone of the (public) infra repo at `~/code` — code/docs plaintext, secret files (`*.tfvars`, `secrets/**`) stay ciphertext. The provisioner clones anonymously from the public GitHub mirror; **contribute access is wired per-user on top** (see below). The apply boundary still holds (`scripts/tg apply` needs an admin Vault token + cluster RBAC), but **pushing `master` is NOT inert** — the Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` (`event: push, branch: master`, `require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks. `master` is therefore **branch-protected on Forgejo** (push + merge whitelists = `viktor`, deploy keys allowed): non-admins contribute via `<user>/<topic>` branches + PRs, and only an admin merge lands (and thus applies) their change. **Clones stay fresh automatically** (2026-06-10): the hourly `t3-provision-users` reconcile runs `refresh_locked_clone` (fetch all remotes + fast-forward `master`, ONLY when on master with a clean tree and an upstream — dirty trees and local commits are left alone with a WARN), and `start-claude.sh` does the same freshen at session launch (15s-capped so an offline remote never stalls the session). **Infra access:** non-admins get their own **writable, git-crypt-LOCKED** clone of the (public) infra repo at `~/code` — code/docs plaintext, secret files (`*.tfvars`, `secrets/**`) stay ciphertext. The provisioner clones anonymously from the public GitHub mirror; **contribute access is wired per-user on top** (see below). The apply boundary still holds (`scripts/tg apply` needs an admin Vault token + cluster RBAC), but **pushing `master` is NOT inert** — the Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` (`event: push, branch: master`, `require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks. `master` is **branch-protected on Forgejo** (force-push disabled for everyone — history is append-only; push + merge whitelists = `viktor` + explicitly granted users, deploy keys allowed). **Allow-then-audit (Viktor, 2026-06-10):** `ebarzin` (emo) is on the whitelist and pushes straight to `master` — no PR gate. The tracking burden moves to: (a) **commit messages that record what + why** (the agent instructions in AGENTS.md and the managed claudeMd require the body to paraphrase the user's request), (b) the **`notify-nonadmin-push` Slack audit step** in `.woodpecker/default.yml` — every master push by a non-admin author is posted to Slack (admin pushes are not), and (c) non-admins **never use `[ci skip]`** so every change fires the pipeline (and thus the audit feed). Users NOT on the whitelist fall back to `<user>/<topic>` branches + PRs. **Clones stay fresh automatically** (2026-06-10): the hourly `t3-provision-users` reconcile runs `refresh_locked_clone` (fetch all remotes + fast-forward `master`, ONLY when on master with a clean tree and an upstream — dirty trees and local commits are left alone with a WARN), and `start-claude.sh` does the same freshen at session launch (15s-capped so an offline remote never stalls the session).
**Contribute access (per non-admin, manual — the anca/tripit PAT precedent):** **Contribute access (per non-admin, manual — the anca/tripit PAT precedent):**
1. Add their Forgejo user as a **write** collaborator on `viktor/infra` (`PUT /api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/collaborators/<login>`). 1. Add their Forgejo user as a **write** collaborator on `viktor/infra` (`PUT /api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/collaborators/<login>`).
2. Mint a PAT — the admin REST endpoint 404s here, use the in-pod CLI: `kubectl -n forgejo exec deploy/forgejo -- su -s /bin/sh git -c "forgejo admin user generate-access-token --username <login> --token-name devvm-infra-git --scopes 'write:repository'"`. 2. Mint a PAT — the admin REST endpoint 404s here, use the in-pod CLI: `kubectl -n forgejo exec deploy/forgejo -- su -s /bin/sh git -c "forgejo admin user generate-access-token --username <login> --token-name devvm-infra-git --scopes 'write:repository'"`.
3. Install it in their `~/.git-credentials` (`https://<login>:<token>@forgejo.viktorbarzin.me`, mode 600) + `git config --global credential.helper store`, set `user.name`/`user.email`. 3. Install it in their `~/.git-credentials` (`https://<login>:<token>@forgejo.viktorbarzin.me`, mode 600) + `git config --global credential.helper store`, set `user.name`/`user.email`.
4. In their clone: `git remote add forgejo https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/infra.git` and `git branch --set-upstream-to=forgejo/master master` (origin stays the anonymous GitHub mirror). 4. In their clone: `git remote add forgejo https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/infra.git` and `git branch --set-upstream-to=forgejo/master master` (origin stays the anonymous GitHub mirror).
5. Verify: branch push succeeds; a push to `master` is rejected with `Not allowed to push to protected branch`. 5. (Optional — Viktor's call per user) Grant direct master push: add their login to the `master` branch-protection push + merge whitelists (`PATCH /api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/branch_protections/master`). Done for `ebarzin` 2026-06-10.
6. Verify: branch push succeeds; a `master` push succeeds for whitelisted users and is rejected with `Not allowed to push to protected branch` otherwise.
**Status (2026-06-10):** built + verified on the live host — capacity (8 GiB swap), config inheritance, roster-driven provisioner, per-user locked clone, per-user OIDC kubeconfig + the `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole + emo's `k8s_users` entry (applied + impersonation-verified), the Authentik `T3 Users` edge gate, **the emo Phase-5 cutover (own clone + launcher repoint + `code-shared` removal, completed 2026-06-10) and emo's contribute access (`ebarzin` write collaborator + PAT + protected `master`)**. Per the live `/etc/skel` design, non-admin `~/.claude/{rules,skills}` symlinks into the admin base are **kept** (they ARE the shared-base delivery mechanism — the plan's step to remove them is obsolete). **Remaining (held / future):** the offboarding apply-side (Phase 7), per-user MCP/auth injection, and roster-reconciled `T3 Users` membership. See `../runbooks/offboard-user.md` for deprovisioning. **Status (2026-06-10):** built + verified on the live host — capacity (8 GiB swap), config inheritance, roster-driven provisioner, per-user locked clone, per-user OIDC kubeconfig + the `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole + emo's `k8s_users` entry (applied + impersonation-verified), the Authentik `T3 Users` edge gate, **the emo Phase-5 cutover (own clone + launcher repoint + `code-shared` removal, completed 2026-06-10) and emo's contribute access (`ebarzin` write collaborator + PAT + protected `master`)**. Per the live `/etc/skel` design, non-admin `~/.claude/{rules,skills}` symlinks into the admin base are **kept** (they ARE the shared-base delivery mechanism — the plan's step to remove them is obsolete). **Remaining (held / future):** the offboarding apply-side (Phase 7), per-user MCP/auth injection, and roster-reconciled `T3 Users` membership. See `../runbooks/offboard-user.md` for deprovisioning.

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@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ Design principle: **every bit of devvm setup is an idempotent git script** — n
- **ADR-0003 — Config inheritance via native machine-wide layers + per-user override.** Rejected: periodic sync, OverlayFS (no live lowerdir edits), Nix (rebuild not live). - **ADR-0003 — Config inheritance via native machine-wide layers + per-user override.** Rejected: periodic sync, OverlayFS (no live lowerdir edits), Nix (rebuild not live).
- **ADR-0004 — Infra access via per-user writable git-crypt-locked clones (changes ungated).** Each non-admin gets their own writable, keyless (locked) clone — read + edit + push freely, no PR gate. Safe because infra apply is manual + admin-only (push ≠ apply, id=4355) and the clone can't decrypt secrets. Rejected: the shared read-only mirror (gated changes) and the shared unlocked tree (secret leak + commit entanglement). Trade: repo-local CLAUDE.md updates via pull, not live (global config inheritance stays live via §4). - **ADR-0004 — Infra access via per-user writable git-crypt-locked clones (changes ungated).** Each non-admin gets their own writable, keyless (locked) clone — read + edit + push freely, no PR gate. Safe because infra apply is manual + admin-only (push ≠ apply, id=4355) and the clone can't decrypt secrets. Rejected: the shared read-only mirror (gated changes) and the shared unlocked tree (secret leak + commit entanglement). Trade: repo-local CLAUDE.md updates via pull, not live (global config inheritance stays live via §4).
- **AMENDED 2026-06-10 — the "push ≠ apply" premise was WRONG.** The Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook on `viktor/infra` fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` on `push` to `master` (`require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks — so an ungated master push IS a deploy. Enforcement added instead of dropping the ADR: Forgejo **branch protection on `master`** (push + merge whitelists = `viktor`, deploy keys allowed). Non-admins keep free branch pushes + PRs; only admin merges land on master. "No PR gate" is thereby reversed for non-admins; the rest of the ADR (per-user locked clones) stands. As-built: `../architecture/multi-tenancy.md` → "Contribute access". - **AMENDED 2026-06-10 — the "push ≠ apply" premise was WRONG.** The Forgejo→Woodpecker webhook on `viktor/infra` fires `.woodpecker/default.yml` on `push` to `master` (`require_approval: forks` only), which terragrunt-applies changed stacks — so an ungated master push IS a deploy. Enforcement added instead of dropping the ADR: Forgejo **branch protection on `master`** (push + merge whitelists = `viktor`, deploy keys allowed). Non-admins keep free branch pushes + PRs; only admin merges land on master. "No PR gate" is thereby reversed for non-admins; the rest of the ADR (per-user locked clones) stands. As-built: `../architecture/multi-tenancy.md` → "Contribute access".
- **AMENDED AGAIN 2026-06-10 (later) — allow-then-audit.** Viktor granted emo (`ebarzin`) direct master push ("he's allowed to make any change; what matters is tracking what changed and why"). The PR gate is dropped FOR WHITELISTED USERS; tracking is enforced instead: agent-written commit messages must carry the user's plain-language intent (the WHY), a `notify-nonadmin-push` Slack step in `.woodpecker/default.yml` surfaces every non-admin master push, `[ci skip]` is forbidden for non-admins, and force-push stays disabled (append-only history). Accepted consequence: emo's pushes auto-apply changed stacks via CI. Branch protection + the PR fallback remain for non-whitelisted users.
- **ADR-0005 — Power-user = cluster-wide read-only (no Secrets), via a NEW dedicated ClusterRole.** Re-widens cross-tenant READ for the trusted power-user tier only — but via a NEW `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole (get/list/watch, NO `secrets`), NOT the existing `oidc-power-user` (which grants read+write+Secrets and is unbound). Bound to the user's OIDC identity (kubelogin) — the apiserver accepts Authentik OIDC for the `kubernetes` audience; the dashboard's SA-token pattern is for the dashboard UI only. - **ADR-0005 — Power-user = cluster-wide read-only (no Secrets), via a NEW dedicated ClusterRole.** Re-widens cross-tenant READ for the trusted power-user tier only — but via a NEW `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole (get/list/watch, NO `secrets`), NOT the existing `oidc-power-user` (which grants read+write+Secrets and is unbound). Bound to the user's OIDC identity (kubelogin) — the apiserver accepts Authentik OIDC for the `kubernetes` audience; the dashboard's SA-token pattern is for the dashboard UI only.
- **ADR-0006 — The roster is the single source of truth for the FULL lifecycle.** `roster.yaml` drives onboard *and* offboard; `/etc/ttyd-user-map`, `dispatch.json`, and Authentik `T3 Users` membership are *derived* from it, and tier is *validated* against `k8s_users` (fail-loud on mismatch). Rejected: hand-maintaining the four membership lists in parallel (guaranteed drift). Offboarding is first-class + staged (reversible cut → cluster revoke → gated `userdel`), not an afterthought. - **ADR-0006 — The roster is the single source of truth for the FULL lifecycle.** `roster.yaml` drives onboard *and* offboard; `/etc/ttyd-user-map`, `dispatch.json`, and Authentik `T3 Users` membership are *derived* from it, and tier is *validated* against `k8s_users` (fail-loud on mismatch). Rejected: hand-maintaining the four membership lists in parallel (guaranteed drift). Offboarding is first-class + staged (reversible cut → cluster revoke → gated `userdel`), not an afterthought.
- **ADR-0007 — Add swap + a capacity budget to the devvm before onboarding active users.** A shared 24 GB / **0-swap** host OOM-kills live sessions under multi-user load (wizard alone runs ~20). Swap + a max-concurrent ceiling are prerequisites, not follow-ups. - **ADR-0007 — Add swap + a capacity budget to the devvm before onboarding active users.** A shared 24 GB / **0-swap** host OOM-kills live sessions under multi-user load (wizard alone runs ~20). Swap + a max-concurrent ceiling are prerequisites, not follow-ups.

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@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ gated `userdel_archive`, which is **never** auto-applied).
# drop write access to the infra repo # drop write access to the infra repo
curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token <admin_pat>" \ curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token <admin_pat>" \
https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/collaborators/<forgejo_login> https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/collaborators/<forgejo_login>
# if they were whitelisted for direct master push, remove them from the
# branch-protection whitelists (PATCH with the remaining usernames)
curl -X PATCH -H "Authorization: token <admin_pat>" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/api/v1/repos/viktor/infra/branch_protections/master \
-d '{"push_whitelist_usernames":["viktor"],"merge_whitelist_usernames":["viktor"]}'
# revoke their devvm git PAT (token name: devvm-infra-git; admin PAT may # revoke their devvm git PAT (token name: devvm-infra-git; admin PAT may
# manage other users' tokens — verified 2026-06-10; the CLI has no delete) # manage other users' tokens — verified 2026-06-10; the CLI has no delete)
curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token <admin_pat>" \ curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token <admin_pat>" \

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
{ {
"claudeMd": "# Viktor Barzin homelab — shared multi-user Claude Code Workstation (devvm)\n\nYou are running as a specific OS user on a SHARED devvm Workstation, not as the admin. These org-wide rules apply to EVERY user and sit at the top of settings precedence (they cannot be overridden by a user's own config):\n\n- Respect your permission tier. Your kubectl, Vault, and infra access are scoped to your RBAC tier (admin / power-user / namespace-owner). Do not attempt to escalate privileges or reach another user's resources.\n- Secrets are per-user. Never read another user's home directory, credentials, tokens, or ~/.claude secrets. Your own secrets live in your home at mode 600.\n- Infrastructure changes go through Terraform/Terragrunt (scripts/tg apply) — never direct kubectl apply/edit/patch. Applies are manual and admin-gated: a non-admin's edits cannot take effect without an admin merge + apply.\n- Non-admins land changes via branch + PR, and the AGENT does ALL git/PR mechanics silently — the user may not know git, so never ask them to commit, push, pull, or open anything. When you finish a change in ~/code: commit it, push to a branch named <os-user>/<short-topic> on the forgejo remote, open a PR to master via the Forgejo API (token = the password field in ~/.git-credentials), then check out clean master again so background auto-refresh keeps working. Tell the user in plain words that the change is submitted for Viktor's review. Direct pushes to master are rejected (branch protection). Full recipe: AGENTS.md → 'Non-admin workstation users' in ~/code.\n- Follow the engineering rules in ~/.claude/rules/ (execution, planning, quality) and every CLAUDE.md in the repo tree.\n- The monorepo is at ~/code. Non-admins get a git-crypt-LOCKED clone: secret files read as ciphertext — that is expected, not an error.", "claudeMd": "# Viktor Barzin homelab — shared multi-user Claude Code Workstation (devvm)\n\nYou are running as a specific OS user on a SHARED devvm Workstation, not as the admin. These org-wide rules apply to EVERY user and sit at the top of settings precedence (they cannot be overridden by a user's own config):\n\n- Respect your permission tier. Your kubectl, Vault, and infra access are scoped to your RBAC tier (admin / power-user / namespace-owner). Do not attempt to escalate privileges or reach another user's resources.\n- Secrets are per-user. Never read another user's home directory, credentials, tokens, or ~/.claude secrets. Your own secrets live in your home at mode 600.\n- Infrastructure changes go through Terraform/Terragrunt — never direct kubectl apply/edit/patch. Committed stack changes are auto-applied by CI on push to master; you can verify the live result with your read-only kubectl.\n- The AGENT does ALL git mechanics silently — the user may not know git, so never ask them to commit, push, pull, or open anything, and never surface git jargon. When you finish a change in ~/code: commit it ON master and push to the forgejo remote. THE COMMIT MESSAGE IS THE AUDIT TRAIL — subject says WHAT changed; body says WHY in plain words (paraphrase the user's actual request) — this matters more than the change itself. Never use [ci skip] as a non-admin (it would hide the change from the audit feed; harmless no-op applies are fine). If the push is rejected non-fast-forward, git pull --rebase forgejo master and push again. If it is rejected by branch protection (user not whitelisted), fall back to a <os-user>/<topic> branch + PR via the Forgejo API (token = password field in ~/.git-credentials). Keep ~/code on a clean master when done so background auto-refresh keeps working. Tell the user in plain words what happened ('done — your change is live/recorded'). Full recipe: AGENTS.md → 'Non-admin workstation users' in ~/code.\n- Follow the engineering rules in ~/.claude/rules/ (execution, planning, quality) and every CLAUDE.md in the repo tree.\n- The monorepo is at ~/code. Non-admins get a git-crypt-LOCKED clone: secret files read as ciphertext — that is expected, not an error.",
"model": "claude-fable-5" "model": "claude-fable-5"
} }