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docs(k8s-dashboard): dashboard SSO as-built (Option B multi-issuer apiserver)

Browse source 
Update authentication.md (structured multi-issuer AuthenticationConfiguration
+ dashboard SSO flow), multi-tenancy.md (web dashboard access), authentik-state
(new k8s-dashboard app + gheorghe groups), service-catalog (dashboard auth),
and the k8s-version-upgrade runbook (kubeadm wipes --authentication-config →
re-apply rbac post-upgrade). Design/plan addenda record the issuer-constraint
pivot from the original dual-aud approach. [ci skip]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-04 02:58:27 +00:00
parent c9b22c7dd3
commit ad3432d685
7 changed files with 147 additions and 13 deletions
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13
.claude/reference/authentik-state.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
> Snapshot of applications, groups, users, and flows. Use `authentik` skill for management tasks.
## Applications (10)
## Applications (11)
| Application | Provider Type | Auth Flow |
|-------------|--------------|-----------|
| Cloudflare Access | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
@ -12,10 +12,19 @@
| Headscale | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Immich | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Kubernetes | OAuth2/OIDC (public) | implicit consent |
| Kubernetes Dashboard | OAuth2/OIDC (confidential) | implicit consent |
| linkwarden | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Matrix | OAuth2/OIDC | implicit consent |
| wrongmove | OAuth2/OIDC | implicit consent |
> **Kubernetes Dashboard** (TF-managed in `stacks/k8s-dashboard/authentik.tf`):
> confidential client `k8s-dashboard` consumed by oauth2-proxy in front of the
> web dashboard. Has a custom scope mapping `k8s-dashboard audience` (scope
> `k8s-dashboard-audience`) emitting `aud=[kubernetes,k8s-dashboard]`, plus a
> group-access policy restricting login to `kubernetes-admins` /
> `kubernetes-power-users` / `kubernetes-namespace-owners`. The apiserver trusts
> this app's issuer via the `rbac` stack structured `AuthenticationConfiguration`.
## Groups (9)
| Group | Parent | Superuser | Purpose |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|
@ -36,7 +45,7 @@
| vbarzin@gmail.com | Viktor Barzin | internal | authentik Admins, Home Server Admins, Wrongmove Users, Headscale Users |
| emil.barzin@gmail.com | Emil Barzin | internal | Home Server Admins, Headscale Users |
| ancaelena98@gmail.com | Anca Milea | external | Wrongmove Users, Headscale Users |
| vabbit81@gmail.com | GHEORGHE Milea | external | Headscale Users |
| vabbit81@gmail.com | GHEORGHE Milea | external | Headscale Users, kubernetes-namespace-owners, sops-vabbit81 |
| valentinakolevabarzina@gmail.com | Valentina | internal | Headscale Users |
| anca.r.cristian10@gmail.com | -- | internal | Wrongmove Users |
| kadir.tugan@gmail.com | Kadir | internal | Wrongmove Users |

2
.claude/reference/service-catalog.md
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
## Admin
| Service | Description | Stack |
|---------|-------------|-------|
| k8s-dashboard | Kubernetes dashboard | k8s-dashboard |
| k8s-dashboard | Kubernetes dashboard at `k8s.viktorbarzin.me`. Authentik SSO via **oauth2-proxy** (`auth=none`; oauth2-proxy injects the user's OIDC id_token from the `k8s-dashboard` confidential client as Bearer → per-user RBAC at the apiserver). Multi-issuer apiserver auth in `stacks/rbac`. | k8s-dashboard |
| reverse-proxy | Generic reverse proxy | reverse-proxy |
| t3code | Multi-user coding-agent GUI at t3.viktorbarzin.me. `auth=required` (Authentik) → DevVM `t3-dispatch` service (`10.0.10.10:3780`, unprivileged user) maps `X-authentik-username` → that user's own `t3-serve@<u>` instance (file perms enforced by uid; wizard→:3773, emo→:3774; unmapped→403) and **auto-injects the t3 session on first visit** (mints via the root `t3-mint` wrapper, scoped sudoers → `/api/auth/bootstrap` `t3_session` cookie). Source of truth `/etc/ttyd-user-map`; `t3-provision-users` reconcile (systemd timer) turns map entries into `t3-serve@<u>` instances + `dispatch.json`. **Add a user:** one line in `/etc/ttyd-user-map` (must already be an OS account + Authentik identity) → reconcile. DevVM artifacts versioned in `infra/scripts/` (`t3-serve@.service`, `t3-provision-users`, `t3-dispatch/`, `t3-mint`, `sudoers-t3-autopair`, `t3-autoupdate.*`); TF (`stacks/t3code`) owns only the ingress + Endpoints→:3780. **t3 binary tracks `nightly`** via `t3-autoupdate` (daily systemd timer; health-check + auto-rollback on a bad build; restarts only idle instances) — so new models (e.g. Opus 4.8) land as t3 ships them. Native app/app.t3.codes unsupported (cross-origin) — deferred until published. Design: `docs/plans/2026-06-01-t3-auto-provision-*`. | t3code |

51
docs/architecture/authentication.md
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@ -99,24 +99,55 @@ Authentik provides OIDC for 10 applications:
| Grafana | OIDC | Monitoring dashboard SSO |
| Headscale | OIDC | Tailscale control plane auth |
| Immich | OIDC | Photo management SSO |
| Kubernetes | OIDC (public client) | K8s API authentication |
| Kubernetes | OIDC (public client) | K8s API authentication (kubectl / kubelogin CLI) |
| Kubernetes Dashboard | OIDC (confidential, via oauth2-proxy) | Web dashboard SSO with per-user RBAC |
| Linkwarden | OIDC | Bookmark manager SSO |
| Matrix | OIDC | Matrix homeserver SSO |
| Wrongmove | OIDC | Real estate app SSO |
### Kubernetes RBAC via OIDC
Kubernetes API server is configured with OIDC issuer: `https://authentik.viktorbarzin.me/application/o/kubernetes/`
The kube-apiserver uses a **structured `AuthenticationConfiguration`**
(`apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1`, file `/etc/kubernetes/pki/auth-config.yaml`,
flag `--authentication-config`) that trusts **two** Authentik issuers — managed
by `stacks/rbac/modules/rbac/apiserver-oidc.tf`:
The public client flow:
| Issuer (Authentik app) | Audience | Used by |
|---|---|---|
| `…/application/o/kubernetes/` | `kubernetes` | `kubectl` / kubelogin CLI (public client) |
| `…/application/o/k8s-dashboard/` | `k8s-dashboard` | oauth2-proxy in front of the web Dashboard (confidential client) |
1. User authenticates to Authentik via `kubectl` plugin or dashboard
2. Receives OIDC token with group claims
3. K8s API validates token against Authentik JWKS endpoint
4. Maps groups to ClusterRoleBindings:
- `kubernetes-admins` → `cluster-admin` (full cluster access)
- `kubernetes-power-users` → custom ClusterRole (read-mostly, limited write)
- `kubernetes-namespace-owners` → RoleBindings per namespace (namespace-scoped admin)
Both map `username <- email` and `groups <- groups` with **empty prefixes** (so
tokens map to RBAC subjects `kind: User, name: <raw email>` and verbatim group
names). This replaced the legacy single `--oidc-*` flags (one issuer only),
which a kubeadm upgrade had silently wiped.
The flow:
1. User authenticates to Authentik (via the `kubectl` plugin, or via oauth2-proxy
for the web Dashboard).
2. Receives an OIDC id_token with `email` + `groups` claims.
3. K8s API validates the token against the matching issuer's Authentik JWKS.
4. RBAC binds the user (by email) to roles — see `stacks/rbac/modules/rbac/main.tf`:
- `admin` role users → `cluster-admin`
- `power-user` role → custom cluster ClusterRole (read-mostly, limited write)
- `namespace-owner` role → `admin` RoleBinding in their namespace(s) + cluster read-only
> **Web Dashboard SSO:** the `k8s.viktorbarzin.me` ingress points at
> **oauth2-proxy** (`stacks/k8s-dashboard/oauth2_proxy.tf`, `auth = "none"` —
> oauth2-proxy is the gate), which runs the Authentik OIDC code-flow against the
> `k8s-dashboard` confidential client and injects the user's id_token as
> `Authorization: Bearer` upstream to the Dashboard's Kong proxy. The Dashboard
> then talks to the apiserver **as the user**, so per-user RBAC applies (a
> namespace-owner manages only their namespace; admins see everything). A group
> policy on the Authentik app restricts login to the `kubernetes-*` groups.
> Replaced the prior forward-auth + static cluster-admin ServiceAccount (which
> made every authenticated user cluster-admin). Design:
> `docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md`.
> **Upgrade caveat:** `--authentication-config` lives in the kube-apiserver
> static-pod manifest, which `kubeadm upgrade` regenerates — **re-apply the
> `rbac` stack after any control-plane upgrade** to restore apiserver OIDC.
### Authentik Groups

12
docs/architecture/multi-tenancy.md
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@ -171,6 +171,18 @@ Each user receives:
```
6. User can now run `kubectl` commands
### Web Dashboard (no CLI needed)
Namespace-owners can also manage their namespace from the **Kubernetes
Dashboard** at `https://k8s.viktorbarzin.me` using their Authentik account — no
kubectl, no token paste. oauth2-proxy runs the SSO flow and injects the user's
OIDC id_token, so the dashboard talks to the apiserver **as the user**: a
namespace-owner gets full control of their namespace(s) and read-only
visibility elsewhere; admins see everything. Login is restricted (Authentik
group policy) to the `kubernetes-*` groups. See
`docs/architecture/authentication.md` → "Kubernetes RBAC via OIDC" and
`docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md`.
### RBAC Groups
| Group | ClusterRole | Scope | Members |

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docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md
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@ -266,3 +266,55 @@ follow-up. No apiserver, RBAC, data, or CLI changes to unwind.
| Dashboard v7 ignores a pre-set Authorization header (known friction: kubernetes/dashboard #5105, #1213) | `pass_authorization_header` + `set_authorization_header`; validate in §7; kong forwards headers by default |
| ESO first-apply ordering | `terragrunt apply -target` the ExternalSecret first (documented plan-time pattern) |
| Single-master apiserver assumption (memory id=2484) | We don't touch apiserver flags; no new exposure |
---
## 12. ADDENDUM (2026-06-04) — As-built pivoted to Option B (apiserver multi-issuer)
Sections 4–5 above describe the *original* plan: a separate `k8s-dashboard`
confidential client whose token carries a dual `aud` so the apiserver (pinned
to `--oidc-client-id=kubernetes`) would accept it **without** an apiserver
change. **That approach does not work**, for a reason discovered during
implementation:
1. **The issuer is the binding constraint, not the audience.** Every Authentik
OAuth2 application has its own per-slug issuer. A token from the
`k8s-dashboard` app has `iss=…/o/k8s-dashboard/`, but the apiserver does an
**exact issuer-string match** against its single configured issuer
(`…/o/kubernetes/`). The dual-`aud` scope mapping is irrelevant — the token
is rejected on issuer before audience is even considered.
2. **Apiserver OIDC was already silently broken.** Inspecting the live
`kube-apiserver` static-pod manifest showed **no `--oidc-*` flags at all** —
the kubeadm v1.34 upgrade had regenerated the manifest and dropped the
flags the `rbac` stack's `null_resource` had injected (its content-hash
trigger never re-fired). So OIDC apiserver auth was off cluster-wide.
3. **Reusing the `kubernetes` app (make it confidential) — rejected.** It would
force distributing the now-confidential client secret to every CLI user via
the **public** k8s-portal `/setup/script` endpoint (a leak), plus
re-onboarding existing CLI users. Too invasive.
**As-built = Option B: structured `AuthenticationConfiguration` on the
apiserver trusting BOTH issuers.** `stacks/rbac/modules/rbac/apiserver-oidc.tf`
now writes `/etc/kubernetes/pki/auth-config.yaml`
(`apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1`) with two `jwt` issuers — `kubernetes`
(audience `kubernetes`, for the kubelogin CLI) and `k8s-dashboard` (audience
`k8s-dashboard`, for oauth2-proxy) — each mapping `username<-email` and
`groups<-groups` with empty prefixes (to match existing RBAC subjects). The
legacy `--oidc-*` flags are replaced by `--authentication-config=…`. The remote
script health-gates `/livez` and **auto-rolls-back** the manifest if the
single-master apiserver doesn't recover. The oauth2-proxy + `k8s-dashboard`
Authentik app from §4 are reused unchanged (the dual-`aud` mapping is now
harmless — issuer2 only requires `k8s-dashboard ∈ aud`).
This keeps the CLI flow 100% untouched (its own `kubernetes` issuer is one of
the two trusted issuers) and restores the apiserver OIDC that the kubeadm
upgrade had broken.
**Known drift (carried forward):** a future `kubeadm upgrade` will again
regenerate the manifest and drop `--authentication-config`. The
content-hash trigger won't auto-detect this. **Operational mitigation:
re-apply the `rbac` stack after every k8s control-plane upgrade** (add to the
upgrade runbook). The `rbac` provisioner needs `TF_VAR_ssh_private_key` (an SSH
key authorized on the master) — it is not wired from Vault yet.

8
docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-plan.md
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@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
# K8s Dashboard SSO via Authentik (oauth2-proxy) — Implementation Plan
> **⚠️ AS-BUILT DIVERGED (2026-06-04).** Tasks 2–3 (oauth2-proxy + `k8s-dashboard`
> Authentik app) shipped as written, but the audience strategy here is WRONG: the
> apiserver matches the token **issuer** exactly, and a separate app has a
> different per-slug issuer — so the dual-`aud` trick can't avoid an apiserver
> change. The implementation pivoted to **Option B**: a structured multi-issuer
> `AuthenticationConfiguration` on the apiserver (`stacks/rbac`). See the
> **ADDENDUM (§12)** in `2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md` for the as-built.
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Let namespace-owner users (e.g. gheorghe / `vabbit81`) open `https://k8s.viktorbarzin.me`, log in once with Authentik, and manage their own namespace in the Kubernetes Dashboard under their existing per-user RBAC.

22
docs/runbooks/k8s-version-upgrade.md
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@ -127,6 +127,28 @@ Exposed in K8s via ExternalSecret `k8s-upgrade-creds` in the `k8s-upgrade` names
## Common Operations
### Post-upgrade: restore apiserver OIDC (REQUIRED after any control-plane bump)
`kubeadm upgrade apply` **regenerates `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml`
and drops the `--authentication-config` flag**, silently disabling apiserver
OIDC (kubectl/kubelogin CLI **and** the web dashboard SSO break — tokens get
401). This is not auto-detected (the `rbac` stack's `null_resource` trigger is a
content hash that doesn't change). After any control-plane upgrade, re-apply:
```bash
cd stacks/rbac
TF_VAR_ssh_private_key="$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519)" \
VAULT_ADDR=https://vault.viktorbarzin.me ../../scripts/tg apply \
--non-interactive -target=module.rbac.null_resource.apiserver_oidc_config
```
(`ssh_private_key` must be a key authorized for `wizard@<master>`; it is not yet
wired from Vault.) The provisioner re-writes `/etc/kubernetes/pki/auth-config.yaml`
(both `kubernetes` + `k8s-dashboard` issuers), re-adds the flag, and
health-gates `/livez` with auto-rollback. Verify: `curl -sk
https://localhost:6443/livez` on the master = `ok`, and the apiserver manifest
contains `--authentication-config`. See `docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md`.
### Verify the pipeline is healthy
```bash
# CronJob present + not suspended