add modsecurity waf to ingress with some blacklisted ips [ci skip]

main.tf

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ variable "finance_app_gocardless_secret_key" {}
 variable "finance_app_gocardless_secret_id" {}
 variable "headscale_config" {}
 variable "immich_postgresql_password" {}
+variable "ingress_honeypotapikey" {}
 
 variable "ansible_prefix" {
   default     = "ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=~/.ansible/vault_pass.txt ansible-playbook -i playbook/hosts.yaml playbook/linux.yml -t linux/initial_setup"
@@ -280,6 +281,8 @@ module "kubernetes_cluster" {
   headscale_config = var.headscale_config
 
   immich_postgresql_password = var.immich_postgresql_password
+
+  ingress_honeypotapikey = var.ingress_honeypotapikey
 }
 
 

modules/kubernetes/main.tf

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ variable "finance_app_gocardless_secret_key" {}
 variable "finance_app_gocardless_secret_id" {}
 variable "headscale_config" {}
 variable "immich_postgresql_password" {}
+variable "ingress_honeypotapikey" {}
 
 resource "null_resource" "core_services" {
   # List all the core modules that must be provisioned first
@@ -341,5 +342,6 @@ module "immich" {
 }
 
 module "nginx-ingress" {
-  source = "./nginx-ingress"
+  source         = "./nginx-ingress"
+  honeypotapikey = var.ingress_honeypotapikey
 }

modules/kubernetes/nginx-ingress/main.tf

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #   ingress_class_is_default = false
 #   ingress_class_name       = "nginx-test"
 # }
+variable "honeypotapikey" {
+  default = null
+}
 resource "kubernetes_namespace" "ingress_nginx" {
   metadata {
     name = "ingress-nginx"
@@ -303,7 +306,22 @@ resource "kubernetes_config_map" "ingress_nginx_controller" {
     }
   }
   data = {
-    allow-snippet-annotations = "true"
+    allow-snippet-annotations    = true
+    enable-modsecurity           = true
+    enable-owasp-modsecurity-crs = true
+    modsecurity-snippet : <<-EOT
+        SecRuleEngine On
+        ${var.honeypotapikey != null ? format("%s %s", "SecHttpBlKey", var.honeypotapikey) : ""}
+        SecAction "id:900500,\
+        phase:1,\
+        nolog,\
+        pass,\
+        t:none,\
+        setvar:tx.block_search_ip=0,\
+        setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
+        setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
+        setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1"
+        EOT
   }
 }
 resource "kubernetes_service" "ingress_nginx_controller" {
@@ -377,6 +395,9 @@ resource "kubernetes_deployment" "ingress_nginx_controller" {
       "app.kubernetes.io/part-of"   = "ingress-nginx"
       "app.kubernetes.io/version"   = "1.8.2"
     }
+    annotations = {
+      "reloader.stakater.com/search" = "true"
+    }
   }
   spec {
     selector {
@@ -403,6 +424,12 @@ resource "kubernetes_deployment" "ingress_nginx_controller" {
             secret_name = "ingress-nginx-admission"
           }
         }
+        # volume {
+        #   name = "modsecurity"
+        #   config_map {
+        #     name = "modsecurity"
+        #   }
+        # }
         container {
           name  = "controller"
           image = "registry.k8s.io/ingress-nginx/controller:v1.8.2@sha256:74834d3d25b336b62cabeb8bf7f1d788706e2cf1cfd64022de4137ade8881ff2"
@@ -453,6 +480,13 @@ resource "kubernetes_deployment" "ingress_nginx_controller" {
             read_only  = true
             mount_path = "/usr/local/certificates/"
           }
+          # Not used atm
+          #   volume_mount {
+          #     name       = "modsecurity"
+          #     read_only  = true
+          #     mount_path = "/etc/nginx/modsecurity"
+          #     # sub_path   = "modsecurity.conf"
+          #   }
           liveness_probe {
             http_get {
               path   = "/healthz"
@@ -672,3 +706,17 @@ resource "kubernetes_ingress_class" "nginx" {
 #     admission_review_versions = ["v1"]
 #   }
 # }
+
+resource "kubernetes_config_map" "modsecurity" {
+  metadata {
+    name      = "modsecurity"
+    namespace = "ingress-nginx"
+    annotations = {
+      "reloader.stakater.com/match" = "true"
+    }
+  }
+
+  data = {
+    "modsecurity.conf" = file("${path.module}/modsecurity.conf")
+  }
+}

modules/kubernetes/nginx-ingress/modsecurity.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+### NOT USED ATM
+
+
+# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------
+
+# Enable ModSecurity, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
+# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
+# disruption.
+#
+SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
+
+
+# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------
+
+# Allow ModSecurity to access request bodies. If you don't, ModSecurity
+# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
+# hole for attackers to exploit.
+#
+SecRequestBodyAccess On
+
+
+# Enable XML request body parser.
+# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
+#
+SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^(?:application(?:/soap\+|/)|text/)xml" \
+     "id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
+
+# Enable JSON request body parser.
+# Initiate JSON Processor in case of JSON content-type; change accordingly
+# if your application does not use 'application/json'
+#
+SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/json" \
+     "id:'200001',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
+
+# Sample rule to enable JSON request body parser for more subtypes.
+# Uncomment or adapt this rule if you want to engage the JSON
+# Processor for "+json" subtypes
+#
+#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/[a-z0-9.-]+[+]json" \
+#     "id:'200006',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
+
+# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
+# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
+# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
+# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
+# low as practical.
+#
+SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
+SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
+
+# What to do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
+# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
+# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
+# disruptions when initially deploying ModSecurity.
+#
+SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject
+
+# Maximum parsing depth allowed for JSON objects. You want to keep this
+# value as low as practical.
+#
+SecRequestBodyJsonDepthLimit 512
+
+# Maximum number of args allowed per request. You want to keep this
+# value as low as practical. The value should match that in rule 200007.
+SecArgumentsLimit 1000
+
+# If SecArgumentsLimit has been set, you probably want to reject any
+# request body that has only been partly parsed. The value used in this
+# rule should match what was used with SecArgumentsLimit
+SecRule &ARGS "@ge 1000" \
+"id:'200007', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to fully parse request body due to large argument count',severity:2"
+
+# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
+# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
+# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
+# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
+#
+SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
+"id:'200002', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"
+
+# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
+# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
+# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
+# _not_ to remove it altogether.
+#
+SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
+"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400, \
+msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
+PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
+BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
+BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
+DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
+DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
+HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
+LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
+SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
+IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
+IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
+IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
+FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
+
+# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
+#
+# Here is a short description about the ModSecurity Multipart parser: the
+# parser returns with value 0, if all "boundary-like" line matches with
+# the boundary string which given in MIME header. In any other cases it returns
+# with different value, eg. 1 or 2.
+#
+# The RFC 1341 descript the multipart content-type and its syntax must contains
+# only three mandatory lines (above the content):
+# * Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=BOUNDARY_STRING
+# * --BOUNDARY_STRING
+# * --BOUNDARY_STRING--
+#
+# First line indicates, that this is a multipart content, second shows that
+# here starts a part of the multipart content, third shows the end of content.
+#
+# If there are any other lines, which starts with "--", then it should be
+# another boundary id - or not.
+#
+# After 3.0.3, there are two kinds of types of boundary errors: strict and permissive.
+#
+# If multipart content contains the three necessary lines with correct order, but
+# there are one or more lines with "--", then parser returns with value 2 (non-zero).
+#
+# If some of the necessary lines (usually the start or end) misses, or the order
+# is wrong, then parser returns with value 1 (also a non-zero).
+#
+# You can choose, which one is what you need. The example below contains the
+# 'strict' mode, which means if there are any lines with start of "--", then
+# ModSecurity blocked the content. But the next, commented example contains
+# the 'permissive' mode, then you check only if the necessary lines exists in
+# correct order. Whit this, you can enable to upload PEM files (eg "----BEGIN.."),
+# or other text files, which contains eg. HTTP headers.
+#
+# The difference is only the operator - in strict mode (first) the content blocked
+# in case of any non-zero value. In permissive mode (second, commented) the
+# content blocked only if the value is explicit 1. If it 0 or 2, the content will
+# allowed.
+#
+
+#
+# See #1747 and #1924 for further information on the possible values for
+# MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY.
+#
+SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "@eq 1" \
+    "id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
+
+
+# PCRE Tuning
+# We want to avoid a potential RegEx DoS condition
+#
+SecPcreMatchLimit 1000
+SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion 1000
+
+# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
+# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_".  The following flags currently exist:
+#
+# MSC_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
+#
+SecRule TX:/^MSC_/ "!@streq 0" \
+        "id:'200005',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'ModSecurity internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
+
+
+# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------
+
+# Allow ModSecurity to access response bodies.
+# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
+# and data leakage issues.
+#
+# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
+# memory consumption and response latency.
+#
+SecResponseBodyAccess On
+
+# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
+# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
+# (e.g., images and archives).
+#
+SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml
+
+# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
+SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
+
+# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
+# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
+# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
+#
+SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
+
+
+# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------
+
+# The location where ModSecurity stores temporary files (for example, when
+# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
+#
+# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however,
+# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
+#
+SecTmpDir /tmp/
+
+# The location where ModSecurity will keep its persistent data.  This default setting
+# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
+# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
+#
+SecDataDir /tmp/
+
+
+# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------
+
+# The location where ModSecurity stores intercepted uploaded files. This
+# location must be private to ModSecurity. You don't want other users on
+# the server to access the files, do you?
+#
+#SecUploadDir /opt/modsecurity/var/upload/
+
+# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
+# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
+# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
+#
+#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly
+
+# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
+# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
+# interface ModSecurity to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
+#
+#SecUploadFileMode 0600
+
+
+# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------
+
+# The default debug log configuration is to duplicate the error, warning
+# and notice messages from the error log.
+#
+#SecDebugLog /opt/modsecurity/var/log/debug.log
+#SecDebugLogLevel 3
+
+
+# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------
+
+# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
+# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,
+# level response status codes).
+#
+SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
+SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5|4(?!04))"
+
+# Log everything we know about a transaction.
+SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
+
+# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
+# assumes that you will use the audit log only ocassionally.
+#
+SecAuditLogType Concurrent
+SecAuditLog /var/log/modsec_audit.log
+
+# Specify the path for concurrent audit logging.
+#SecAuditLogStorageDir /opt/modsecurity/var/audit/
+
+
+# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
+# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
+# something else so don't expect to change this value.
+#
+SecArgumentSeparator &
+
+# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
+# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
+# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
+#
+SecCookieFormat 0
+
+# Specify your Unicode Code Point.
+# This mapping is used by the t:urlDecodeUni transformation function
+# to properly map encoded data to your language. Properly setting
+# these directives helps to reduce false positives and negatives.
+#
+SecUnicodeMapFile unicode.mapping 20127
+
+# Improve the quality of ModSecurity by sharing information about your
+# current ModSecurity version and dependencies versions.
+# The following information will be shared: ModSecurity version,
+# Web Server version, APR version, PCRE version, Lua version, Libxml2
+# version, Anonymous unique id for host.
+SecStatusEngine On
+
+SecAuditLogStorageDir /var/log/audit/