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vault: deny secret/data/vault for claude-agent terraform-state policy (executor elevation safety narrowing)

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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-04 08:17:36 +00:00
parent 63ee655c08
commit bf6ede2b9e
1 changed files with 13 additions and 3 deletions
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16
stacks/vault/main.tf
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@ -572,9 +572,9 @@ resource "vault_policy" "terraform_state" {
# SECURITY: this grants the SHARED claude-agent pod broad Vault READ —
# effectively every app secret under secret/ and every rotating DB
# credential. Every agent that runs on this pod inherits it. Vault's own
# admin/root secrets are under secret/data/vault (covered by secret/data/*
# here — NOT explicitly denied; tighten with an explicit deny if that path
# must stay out of reach). No write/delete on secret/ or database/.
# admin/root secrets are under secret/data/vault — now explicitly DENIED
# below (2026-06-04, Viktor's choice) so they stay out of the pod's reach.
# No write/delete on secret/ or database/.
policy = <<-EOT
path "database/static-creds/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
@ -588,6 +588,16 @@ resource "vault_policy" "terraform_state" {
path "secret/metadata/*" {
capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
# Explicit deny on Vault's own admin/root creds (Viktor's choice 2026-06-04).
# An explicit deny overrides the secret/data/* read grant above, so the
# shared claude-agent pod cannot read Vault's bootstrap/admin secrets even
# though it can read every other app secret.
path "secret/data/vault" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
path "secret/metadata/vault" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
EOT
}