workstation: docs — multi-tenancy Workstation section + offboard runbook + service-catalog fix [ci skip]
multi-tenancy.md: new DevVM Workstation section (roster SSoT, tiers, config inheritance, locked clone, built-vs-gated status). service-catalog.md t3code row: corrected the stale 'source of truth = /etc/ttyd-user-map' (now roster.yaml; the map/dispatch are GENERATED). offboard-user.md: written (was a referenced-but-missing dead link) — staged reversible-cut-then-gated-destructive for both cluster + workstation surfaces. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Viktor Barzin
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| k8s-dashboard | Kubernetes dashboard at `k8s.viktorbarzin.me`. **Forward-auth + auto-injected SA token** (apiserver OIDC blocked, see design §12). nginx token-injector (`dashboard_injector.tf`) maps `X-authentik-username` → the user's `dashboard-<user>` SA token (ns admin + read-only on namespace-list/nodes only via `dashboard-nav-readonly` — no cross-tenant reads, `rbac/.../dashboard-sa.tf`; admins → cluster-admin SA) and sets `Authorization: Bearer` → no token-paste, dashboard auto-authenticates per user. Forward-auth admits `kubernetes-*` groups for this host (`stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf`). oauth2-proxy + `k8s-dashboard` OIDC app built but idle. | k8s-dashboard |
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| reverse-proxy | Generic reverse proxy | reverse-proxy |
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| t3code | Multi-user coding-agent GUI at t3.viktorbarzin.me. `auth=required` (Authentik) → DevVM `t3-dispatch` service (`10.0.10.10:3780`, unprivileged user) maps `X-authentik-username` → that user's own `t3-serve@<u>` instance (file perms enforced by uid; wizard→:3773, emo→:3774; unmapped→403) and **auto-injects the t3 session on first visit** (mints via the root `t3-mint` wrapper, scoped sudoers → `/api/auth/bootstrap` `t3_session` cookie). Source of truth `/etc/ttyd-user-map`; `t3-provision-users` reconcile (systemd timer) turns map entries into `t3-serve@<u>` instances + `dispatch.json`. **Add a user:** one line in `/etc/ttyd-user-map` (must already be an OS account + Authentik identity) → reconcile. DevVM artifacts versioned in `infra/scripts/` (`t3-serve@.service`, `t3-provision-users`, `t3-dispatch/`, `t3-mint`, `sudoers-t3-autopair`, `t3-autoupdate.*`); TF (`stacks/t3code`) owns only the ingress + Endpoints→:3780. **t3 binary tracks `nightly`** via `t3-autoupdate` (daily systemd timer; health-check + auto-rollback on a bad build; restarts only idle instances) — so new models (e.g. Opus 4.8) land as t3 ships them. Native app/app.t3.codes unsupported (cross-origin) — deferred until published. Design: `docs/plans/2026-06-01-t3-auto-provision-*`. | t3code |
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| t3code | Multi-user coding-agent GUI at t3.viktorbarzin.me. `auth=required` (Authentik) → DevVM `t3-dispatch` service (`10.0.10.10:3780`, unprivileged user) maps `X-authentik-username` → that user's own `t3-serve@<u>` instance (file perms enforced by uid; wizard→:3773, emo→:3774; unmapped→403) and **auto-injects the t3 session on first visit** (mints via the root `t3-mint` wrapper, scoped sudoers → `/api/auth/bootstrap` `t3_session` cookie). **Source of truth = `infra/scripts/workstation/roster.yaml`** (os_user → authentik_user/k8s_user/tier/namespaces); `roster_engine.py` (pytest-covered) derives desired state and `t3-provision-users` (hourly systemd timer) applies it — constrained accounts, additive per-tier groups, `t3-serve@<u>` instances, and **regenerating** `/etc/ttyd-user-map` + `dispatch.json` (those two are now GENERATED — do not hand-edit). New non-admins inherit wizard's Claude config (machine-wide managed `claudeMd` in `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` + per-user `~/.claude/{skills,rules}` symlinks seeded by `/etc/skel`) and get a **writable git-crypt-LOCKED** infra clone at `~/code` (code plaintext, secret files ciphertext). Tiers: admin / power-user (cluster-wide read-only) / namespace-owner. **Add a user:** one entry in `roster.yaml` → reconcile (the per-user OIDC kubeconfig + Authentik `T3 Users` gate are separate gated cluster/auth applies). DevVM artifacts versioned in `infra/scripts/` (`t3-serve@.service`, `t3-provision-users` + `workstation/{roster.yaml,roster_engine.py,setup-devvm.sh,managed-settings.json,skel/}`, `t3-dispatch/`, `t3-mint`, `sudoers-t3-autopair`, `t3-autoupdate.*`); TF (`stacks/t3code`) owns only the ingress + Endpoints→:3780. **t3 binary tracks `nightly`** via `t3-autoupdate` (daily systemd timer; health-check + auto-rollback on a bad build; restarts only idle instances) — so new models (e.g. Opus 4.8) land as t3 ships them. Native app/app.t3.codes unsupported (cross-origin) — deferred until published. Design: `docs/plans/2026-06-01-t3-auto-provision-*`. | t3code |
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## Active Use
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| Service | Description | Stack |
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@ -533,6 +533,20 @@ cd stacks/actualbudget/factory
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terragrunt apply
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```
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## DevVM Workstation (Claude Code multi-user)
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Separate from the in-cluster namespace-owner model above, the **devvm** (`10.0.10.10`, VMID 102) hosts per-user **Claude Code Workstations** behind `t3.viktorbarzin.me`. It reuses the same identity backbone — the Vault `k8s_users` map and Authentik — but adds a devvm-side layer. Authoritative design + phased plan: `docs/plans/2026-06-07-multi-user-workstation-{design,plan}.md` (PRD: ViktorBarzin/infra#9).
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**Single source of truth:** `infra/scripts/workstation/roster.yaml` (`os_user → authentik_user / k8s_user / tier / namespaces`). `roster_engine.py` (pytest-covered pure core) derives desired state; `t3-provision-users` (hourly timer) applies it — **additive-only** for existing users (never strips a group, replaces a home, or re-locks an account). `/etc/ttyd-user-map` + `dispatch.json` are **generated** from the roster (do not hand-edit).
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**RBAC tiers:** `admin` (Viktor — cluster-admin, unlocked tree, secrets) · `power-user` (cluster-wide read-only, NO Secrets, via a dedicated `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole) · `namespace-owner` (admin in own namespace only). Each session acts as the user's **own** OIDC identity (kubelogin), never the admin's.
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**Config inheritance (live):** wizard authors the base (his chezmoi-versioned `~/.claude`). Two native layers carry it to every user — the enforced org `claudeMd` in `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` (top precedence, all sessions) and per-user `~/.claude/{skills,rules,…}` **symlinks** to the base (seeded via `/etc/skel`; edits propagate live). Secrets stay per-user at mode 600, never symlinked.
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**Infra access:** non-admins get their own **writable, git-crypt-LOCKED** clone of the (public) infra repo at `~/code` — code/docs plaintext, secret files (`*.tfvars`, `secrets/**`) stay ciphertext. Changes are ungated (push ≠ apply); the real boundary is apply-time (`scripts/tg apply` needs an admin Vault token + cluster RBAC).
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**Status (2026-06-08):** built + verified on the live host — capacity (8 GiB swap), config inheritance, roster-driven provisioner, per-user locked clone. **Gated / pending:** per-user OIDC kubeconfig + the `oidc-power-user-readonly` ClusterRole + emo's `k8s_users` entry, the Authentik `T3 Users` edge gate, the emo cutover (Phase 5), and the offboarding apply-side (Phase 7). See `../runbooks/offboard-user.md` for deprovisioning.
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## Related
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- [CI/CD Pipeline](./ci-cd.md) — Per-user Woodpecker pipelines
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72
docs/runbooks/offboard-user.md
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docs/runbooks/offboard-user.md
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# Runbook: Offboard a User
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Removing a user can span two surfaces — the **in-cluster** namespace-owner model
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(Vault `k8s_users` / RBAC / namespace) and the **devvm Workstation** (roster /
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OS account / t3 instance). Both are **staged**: a *reversible cut* (revoke access,
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delete nothing) first, then an explicit, gated *destructive removal*. Do the
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reversible cut immediately; only do the destructive step once you're sure.
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> Architecture: `../architecture/multi-tenancy.md`. Workstation design:
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> `../plans/2026-06-07-multi-user-workstation-design.md`.
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---
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## Part A — DevVM Workstation offboarding
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Driven by removing the user's entry from `infra/scripts/workstation/roster.yaml`.
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`roster_engine.py offboard_plan` computes the staged actions (reversible cut vs the
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gated `userdel_archive`, which is **never** auto-applied).
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### A1. Reversible cut (revoke access; delete nothing)
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1. **Delete the user's entry** from `roster.yaml`; commit + push.
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2. **Reconcile** (`sudo /usr/local/bin/t3-provision-users`, or wait for the hourly
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timer). This **regenerates** `/etc/ttyd-user-map` + `dispatch.json` *without* the
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user → `t3-dispatch` now returns **403** for them. *(Automated.)*
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3. **Disable their instance + lock login** *(manual today; Phase 7 will fold this into
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the reconcile):*
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```bash
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sudo systemctl disable --now t3-serve@<os_user>.service
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sudo passwd -l <os_user>
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```
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4. **Verify:** they can no longer reach `t3.viktorbarzin.me` (302 → Authentik, then
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denied once removed from the `T3 Users` group — Part C) and cannot log in. Nothing
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is deleted; re-adding the roster entry + reconcile fully restores them.
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### A2. Destructive removal (explicit, gated — NEVER automatic)
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Only after the reversible cut and a deliberate decision:
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```bash
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sudo tar czf /mnt/backup/offboard/<os_user>-$(date +%Y%m%d).tar.gz /home/<os_user>
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sudo userdel -r <os_user> # removes home + mail spool — IRREVERSIBLE
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```
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Rollback before this step: re-add the roster entry + reconcile. After it: restore
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from the archive.
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---
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## Part B — In-cluster (namespace-owner) offboarding
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1. **Reversible cut:** remove the user's Authentik group membership (edge/RBAC blocked)
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and their entry from the Vault `k8s_users` map (`secret/platform`).
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2. **Apply:** `scripts/tg apply` the `vault` → `platform` → `woodpecker` stacks (drops the
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RBAC binding, Vault identity/policy, and per-user CI). Their OIDC kubeconfig stops
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authorizing immediately.
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3. **Destructive (gated):** deleting their namespace(s) removes all their workloads +
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data — back up first (PVCs, DBs), then delete only on explicit decision.
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---
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## Part C — Authentik (both surfaces)
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Remove the user from the relevant Authentik group(s) — `kubernetes-namespace-owners`
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(cluster) and/or `T3 Users` (workstation edge gate). This is the edge revocation; do
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it as part of the reversible cut so they're locked out at the front door.
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---
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## Order of operations
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Reversible cut on **all** relevant surfaces first (Authentik group → roster removal +
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reconcile → `k8s_users` removal + apply) → verify access is gone → only then the gated
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destructive steps (`userdel -r`, namespace deletion), each after its own archive.
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