workstation: switch devvm OOM backstop from systemd-oomd to earlyoom
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The systemd-oomd backstop added in the previous commit is INERT on this box.
oomd's memory-pressure kill only acts on cgroups doing active reclaim (pgscan
rising); with MemorySwapMax=0 + anonymous agent memory there is nothing to
reclaim, so pgscan stays 0 and oomd never fires. Proven live: a cgroup held at
96-99% memory.pressure for >70s with pgscan=0 was never killed (oomctl + balloon).
The very swap=0 that kills the IO storm also neuters oomd.

Replace it with earlyoom, which watches free RAM (MemAvailable%) and is
swap-independent: SIGTERM the biggest task at 5%, SIGKILL at 3%, swap ignored
(-s 100). It --avoids sshd/systemd/dockerd/containerd/t3-dispatch/tmux (the
admin's way in always survives) and --prefers the agent/browser hogs. Verified
via --dryrun: fires on the RAM threshold and selects a chrome process, not a
protected daemon.

The per-cgroup caps (MemoryHigh=12G/MemoryMax=16G/MemorySwapMax=0 per user,
docker.slice 8G) are unchanged and remain the PRIMARY guard — earlyoom is the
aggregate net for the rare all-users-maxed case. systemd-oomd purged; its config
+ ManagedOOM drop-ins removed. Post-mortem updated with the finding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-06-22 10:39:16 +00:00
parent 3a59f4a8bf
commit de163aa6af
3 changed files with 88 additions and 68 deletions

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@ -52,21 +52,23 @@ backstop** (no systemd-oomd / earlyoom) to shed the worst offender before the
kernel OOM or the thrash-wedge. And even the existing t3 caps don't sum safely
(3 users × 16G = 48G > 32G RAM) — nothing reasoned about the *whole box*.
## Fix (shipped this commit — `setup-devvm.sh` §10, applied live 2026-06-22)
## Fix (`setup-devvm.sh` §10, applied live 2026-06-22)
Design decisions (interviewed with the admin via `/grill-me`): **soft-generous
per-user caps + a hard ceiling + an oomd backstop**, maximising single-user
utilisation while making a box-wide wedge impossible.
per-user caps + a hard ceiling + a kill-the-worst backstop**, maximising
single-user utilisation while making a box-wide wedge impossible. (The backstop
was first built on systemd-oomd, then switched to earlyoom mid-rollout when oomd
proved inert with `swap=0` — see Verification + Lessons.)
| Layer | What |
|---|---|
| **Per-user caps, BOTH trees** | `user-.slice.d` drop-in gives every `user-<uid>.slice` the same `MemoryHigh=12G / MemoryMax=16G / MemorySwapMax=0` the t3 tree already had. A user is now bounded in whichever surface they work in. |
| **No disk swap for work** | `MemorySwapMax=0` on every work cgroup → a spike OOMs **locally** at the ceiling instead of thrashing the throttled disk. Kills the IO-storm-via-swap mechanism at the source. The 14G swapfile stays for system cold pages only. |
| **systemd-oomd backstop (PSI)** | New package. Kills the single worst-pressured descendant of a policed slice when memory-pressure (`full`) stays **>60% for 20s**; global swap guard **80%**. Polices `user.slice`, `system-t3\x2dserve.slice`, `docker.slice`. **`system.slice` is deliberately NOT policed** — sshd + services + the admin's way in always survive; only a runaway *user* session is ever sacrificed, locally, under genuine box-wide pressure. |
| **earlyoom backstop (free-RAM threshold)** | New package — used **instead of systemd-oomd** (which is inert with `swap=0`; see Lessons). Watches `MemAvailable%` and SIGTERMs the biggest task at **5%**, SIGKILL at **3%**, swap ignored (`-s 100`). `--avoid` keeps sshd/systemd/dockerd/containerd/t3-dispatch/tmux off the victim list (**the admin's way in always survives**); `--prefer` targets the agent/browser hogs (python3/node/chrome/…). Swap-independent and reliable, where oomd's pressure-kill was not. |
| **Fair-share CPU/IO** | `CPUWeight`/`IOWeight` per slice (system.slice 200, users + docker 100 each). Work-conserving — a lone user still gets all 32 cores + the full IO budget when others idle; weights only bite under contention. No hard CPU/IO caps. |
| **Docker containment** | Containers previously landed in `system.slice` — uncapped AND protected from oomd, so a ballooning container would mis-target oomd onto an innocent user. Now `cgroup-parent: docker.slice` in `daemon.json` routes every container into a capped (`MemoryMax=8G`, swap 0), oomd-policed slice. |
| **Docker containment** | Containers previously landed in `system.slice` — uncapped. Now `cgroup-parent: docker.slice` in `daemon.json` routes every container into a capped (`MemoryMax=8G`, swap 0) slice, so a runaway container is cgroup-OOM'd locally instead of escaping into the uncapped `system.slice`. |
Durable in `setup-devvm.sh` (survives a VM rebuild); `systemd-oomd` added to
Durable in `setup-devvm.sh` (survives a VM rebuild); `earlyoom` added to
`packages.txt`. The numbers are tunable — `MemoryHigh=12G` will throttle a *lone*
heavy user between 1216G even with RAM free; bump to 16/20 if that bites.
@ -76,22 +78,30 @@ heavy user between 1216G even with RAM free; bump to 16/20 if that bites.
`memory.high=12G memory.max=16G memory.swap.max=0`; `docker.slice` `memory.max=8G`;
daemon.json kept buildkit/nvidia/insecure-registries; paperless-mcp recovered
under `docker.slice`.
- **oomd armed**: `oomctl` shows `Dry Run: no`, swap-limit 80%, pressure-limit
60% / 20s, and the 5 policed cgroups — `system.slice` absent (protected).
- **Stress test A (hard cap)**: a 2G-capped, swap=0 balloon was killed at exactly
2G by the cgroup-local OOM (`constraint=CONSTRAINT_MEMCG`) with **swap flat at
0MB throughout** — no thrash. This is the mechanism protecting every slice.
- **Stress test B (oomd backstop)**: a self-policed balloon (256M soft / 20%
pressure limit) was killed by **systemd-oomd on memory pressure**, confirming
the backstop fires, not just arms.
- **Stress test A (hard cap)** — the PRIMARY guard: a 2G-capped, swap=0 balloon was
killed at exactly 2G by the cgroup-local OOM (`constraint=CONSTRAINT_MEMCG`) with
**swap flat at 0MB throughout** — no thrash. Same mechanism protects every user
slice (16G) and `docker.slice` (8G).
- **Soft cap observed**: a balloon pushed past `MemoryHigh` sat at ~220M / 99%
memory.pressure, throttled to a crawl, making no progress and harming nothing —
a runaway is throttled, not just killed.
- **systemd-oomd disproven, then dropped**: a self-policed balloon held
`memory.pressure full avg10 = 9699%` (≫ its 20% limit) for >70s but oomd never
killed it — `Pgscan: 0`. oomd's pressure-kill only acts on cgroups doing active
reclaim, which a `swap=0` anon workload never does. oomd was purged.
- **earlyoom backstop** — verified via `--dryrun`: at the threshold it logs
`low memory! … mem 90% swap 100%` (fires on RAM alone, swap ignored) and selects
`SIGTERM … "chrome"` (a `--prefer` hog), never an `--avoid`'d daemon. Live
earlyoom v1.7 confirms `SIGTERM mem<=5% / SIGKILL mem<=3%, swap<=100%`.
## Out of scope / follow-ups
- **Alerting** (tracked, fast-follow bead): `DevvmDown` (closes the 90-min
detection gap the 2026-06-11 PM flagged), sustained-memory-PSI/swap pressure
early-warning, and an "oomd-killed-something" alert. devvm node-exporter is
already scraped (`job=devvm`, `10.0.10.10:9100`), so only alert *rules* are new
(a monitoring-stack Terraform change).
early-warning, and an "earlyoom-killed-something" alert (earlyoom logs each kill;
`-N /script` can push a metric). devvm node-exporter is already scraped
(`job=devvm`, `10.0.10.10:9100`), so only alert *rules* are new (a
monitoring-stack Terraform change).
- **zram cushion**: considered, deferred. Could let work cgroups absorb spikes in
compressed RAM instead of OOMing at the ceiling; not needed for the wedge fix.
- **Per-user docker isolation**: containers share one `docker.slice` budget, not
@ -108,6 +118,14 @@ heavy user between 1216G even with RAM free; bump to 16/20 if that bites.
- **Cap the box, not one surface.** t3 sessions were capped for months while the
same user's tmux was unbounded — and the caps that existed didn't sum to < RAM.
Containment has to reason about every tree and the aggregate.
- **A backstop must protect the operator's way in.** oomd polices the work trees
only; `system.slice` (sshd, the daemons) is never a victim, so the box always
stays reachable to recover.
- **A backstop must protect the operator's way in.** earlyoom `--avoid`s
sshd/systemd/dockerd/containerd/t3-dispatch/tmux, so the box always stays
reachable to recover; only the agent/browser hogs are eligible victims.
- **systemd-oomd is the wrong backstop for a no-swap box — verify, don't assume.**
oomd's memory-pressure killer only fires on cgroups doing active reclaim
(`pgscan` rising). With `MemorySwapMax=0` + anonymous memory there is nothing to
reclaim, so a cgroup sat at 99% `memory.pressure` indefinitely and oomd never
acted (proven with `oomctl` + a balloon). The very `swap=0` that kills the IO
storm also neuters oomd. earlyoom (free-RAM threshold, swap-independent) is the
correct pairing. A famous tool that "does OOM" still has to be proven to fire
under *your* configuration.

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@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ rsync
wget
tree
shellcheck
# resource containment — the systemd-oomd backstop (setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22):
# a PSI-based, cgroup-aware OOM killer that sheds the single worst work cgroup
# before the box swap-thrashes/wedges. Ships SEPARATELY from core systemd on Ubuntu.
systemd-oomd
# resource containment — earlyoom backstop (setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22): a
# free-RAM-threshold OOM killer used INSTEAD of systemd-oomd, which is inert with
# swap=0 (its pressure-kill needs reclaim/pgscan that no-swap anon workloads never
# produce; verified live — 99% mem.pressure, pgscan=0, no kill). earlyoom watches
# MemAvailable% and is swap-independent.
earlyoom
# --- installed by setup-devvm.sh via NON-apt paths (not apt-installable) ---
# nodejs + npm -> NodeSource repo (claude-code needs node >= 18; distro nodejs is too old)

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@ -233,16 +233,20 @@ log "service units installed + enabled (t3-dispatch + 3 timers; t3-serve@ per-us
# virtual disk into an IO storm + multi-minute freeze (hard-killed 2026-06-22).
# t3-serve@ was already capped (its [Service] block); the HOLE was the uncapped
# user-<uid>.slice (all ssh/tmux work). Design — per user, on BOTH trees:
# MemoryHigh=12G soft, MemoryMax=16G hard, MemorySwapMax=0 (work never touches
# disk swap → no thrash; it OOMs locally at the ceiling instead), fair-share
# CPU/IO weights, and systemd-oomd (PSI) killing the single worst work cgroup on
# sustained box-wide memory pressure. system.slice is NOT policed, so sshd +
# services + your way in always survive. Docker containers are routed into a
# capped, oomd-policed docker.slice so they can't dodge the caps or mis-target
# oomd onto an innocent user. systemd-oomd pkg comes from packages.txt (§1).
# MemoryHigh=12G soft (throttles a runaway to a crawl), MemoryMax=16G hard,
# MemorySwapMax=0 (work never touches disk swap → no thrash; it OOMs locally at
# the ceiling instead), plus fair-share CPU/IO weights.
# BACKSTOP = earlyoom, NOT systemd-oomd. We first shipped systemd-oomd but it is
# INERT with swap=0: its pressure-kill only acts on cgroups doing active reclaim
# (pgscan rising), and a no-swap anon workload never reclaims — verified live, a
# cgroup at 99% memory.pressure / pgscan=0 was never killed. earlyoom instead
# watches FREE RAM (MemAvailable%) and SIGTERMs the biggest process at 5% / -k 3%,
# swap-independent and reliable. It --avoids sshd/systemd/dockerd (your way in
# stays alive) and --prefers the agent/browser hogs. earlyoom pkg = packages.txt
# (§1). Per-cgroup MemoryMax is the PRIMARY guard; earlyoom is the aggregate net.
# Post-mortem: docs/post-mortems/2026-06-22-devvm-mem-io-overload-containment.md
# 10a) per-user caps + weights + oomd policing on EVERY user-<uid>.slice (ssh/tmux)
# 10a) per-user caps + fair-share weights on EVERY user-<uid>.slice (ssh/tmux)
install -d -m 0755 /etc/systemd/system/user-.slice.d
cat > /etc/systemd/system/user-.slice.d/50-devvm-resource.conf <<'SLICE_EOF'
# Per-user containment for the shared devvm (setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22).
@ -257,31 +261,31 @@ CPUAccounting=yes
CPUWeight=100
IOAccounting=yes
IOWeight=100
ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
ManagedOOMSwap=kill
SLICE_EOF
# 10b) systemd-oomd backstop (PSI-based). Kill the worst-pressured descendant of a
# policed slice when memory-pressure 'full' stays >60% for 20s; swap guard 80%.
install -d -m 0755 /etc/systemd/oomd.conf.d
cat > /etc/systemd/oomd.conf.d/10-devvm.conf <<'OOMD_EOF'
# devvm OOM backstop (setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22). Acts only on slices that
# opt in via ManagedOOM*=kill (user-<uid>.slice, system-t3\x2dserve.slice,
# docker.slice). system.slice is deliberately NOT policed.
[OOM]
SwapUsedLimit=80%
DefaultMemoryPressureLimit=60%
DefaultMemoryPressureDurationSec=20s
OOMD_EOF
# 10b) earlyoom backstop config — RAM-threshold, swap-INDEPENDENT (see header note
# on why systemd-oomd is inert with swap=0). The Debian unit reads /etc/default.
cat > /etc/default/earlyoom <<'EARLYOOM_EOF'
# devvm aggregate OOM backstop (setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22). Watches FREE RAM
# (MemAvailable%) and kills the biggest task before the box exhausts. Unlike
# systemd-oomd it needs NO swap/reclaim, so it works with our swap=0 work cgroups.
# -m 5,3 SIGTERM the victim at MemAvailable<5%, SIGKILL at <3%
# -s 100,100 ignore swap in the decision (RAM-only; work cgroups are swap=0)
# --avoid never the box's nervous system / your way back in
# --prefer target the agent/browser/build hogs that actually exhaust RAM
# -r 3600 hourly memory report (the 60s default is log spam)
EARLYOOM_ARGS="-m 5,3 -s 100,100 -r 3600 --avoid ^(systemd|systemd-.*|sshd|dockerd|containerd|init|t3-dispatch|tmux.*)$ --prefer ^(python3|node|chrome|chromium|ugrep|rg|go|claude)$"
EARLYOOM_EOF
# 10c) capped, oomd-policed docker.slice (top-level sibling of system/user slices);
# daemon.json cgroup-parent (10d) makes EVERY container land here.
# 10c) capped docker.slice (top-level sibling of system/user slices); daemon.json
# cgroup-parent (10d) makes EVERY container land here under one bounded budget.
cat > /etc/systemd/system/docker.slice <<'DOCKER_SLICE_EOF'
# All docker containers live here (cgroup-parent in /etc/docker/daemon.json) so
# they share one bounded budget and a runaway container dies ITSELF instead of
# mis-targeting oomd onto an innocent user. setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22.
# they share one bounded budget and a runaway container is capped at MemoryMax
# (cgroup-OOM'd locally) instead of escaping into the uncapped system.slice.
# setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22.
[Unit]
Description=Docker containers slice (capped + oomd-policed)
Description=Docker containers slice (capped)
[Slice]
MemoryAccounting=yes
MemoryHigh=6G
@ -291,8 +295,6 @@ CPUAccounting=yes
CPUWeight=100
IOAccounting=yes
IOWeight=100
ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
ManagedOOMSwap=kill
DOCKER_SLICE_EOF
# 10d) point dockerd at docker.slice (idempotent JSON merge; flag a needed restart).
@ -320,17 +322,9 @@ case $rc in
*) log "WARN: could not patch /etc/docker/daemon.json — docker.slice NOT wired" ;;
esac
# 10e) ManagedOOM on the auto-generated t3-serve slice. Its name carries an escaped
# '-' (system-t3\x2dserve.slice); a static drop-in works whether or not an
# instance is currently running (set-property would need it loaded).
install -d -m 0755 '/etc/systemd/system/system-t3\x2dserve.slice.d'
cat > '/etc/systemd/system/system-t3\x2dserve.slice.d/50-devvm-oomd.conf' <<'T3SLICE_EOF'
# oomd policing for all t3-serve@ instances (per-service caps live in
# t3-serve@.service). setup-devvm.sh §10, 2026-06-22.
[Slice]
ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
ManagedOOMSwap=kill
T3SLICE_EOF
# 10e) t3-serve@ instances need no extra drop-in: their per-instance MemoryMax /
# MemorySwapMax caps live in t3-serve@.service [Service]; earlyoom (10b) is the
# box-wide net. (The earlier oomd slice-policing drop-in was removed — inert.)
# 10f) give system.slice a priority edge so sshd/services stay snappy under
# contention (weights are work-conserving — users still get idle CPU/IO).
@ -344,15 +338,21 @@ IOAccounting=yes
IOWeight=200
SYS_EOF
# 10g) activate: reload, arm oomd, restart dockerd ONLY if daemon.json changed.
# 10g) activate: reload, arm earlyoom, restart dockerd ONLY if daemon.json changed.
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now systemd-oomd.service >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| log "WARN: systemd-oomd failed to enable — is the package installed? (packages.txt §1)"
# earlyoom reads /etc/default/earlyoom (10b); enable + restart so new args take effect
# even on a re-run where it was already running.
systemctl enable --now earlyoom.service >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| log "WARN: earlyoom failed to enable — is the package installed? (packages.txt §1)"
systemctl restart earlyoom.service 2>/dev/null || true
# systemd-oomd is inert with swap=0 (see header) — ensure it isn't also running from
# an earlier iteration of this section. No-op if the package was never installed.
systemctl disable --now systemd-oomd.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [[ $docker_restart -eq 1 ]] && systemctl is-active --quiet docker; then
log "restarting dockerd to apply cgroup-parent=docker.slice (running containers bounce briefly)"
systemctl restart docker || log "WARN: docker restart failed"
fi
log "§10 resource containment: per-user 12G/16G swap=0, oomd PSI backstop, docker.slice"
log "§10 resource containment: per-user 12G/16G swap=0, earlyoom RAM backstop, docker.slice"
# Run one foreground reconcile while the admin Vault token borrowed in section 8
# is still available. This is what mints new roster users' isolated periodic