ingress_factory: replace protected bool with auth enum + audit pass across 100 stacks

Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.

ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
  `protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
  middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
  keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
  client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
  itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
  ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).

Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true`     → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false`     → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
  reviewed individually:
  * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
    homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
  * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
    handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
    xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
    location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
    drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
    `auth = "none"`
  * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
    UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
  k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.

Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.

Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.

Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
parent 317d6aa99f
commit e4f806abe3
100 changed files with 351 additions and 165 deletions

View file

@ -31,9 +31,28 @@ variable "tls_secret_name" {}
variable "backend_protocol" {
default = "HTTP"
}
variable "protected" {
type = bool
default = false
variable "auth" {
type = string
default = "required"
description = <<-EOT
Authentik auth posture for this ingress:
* "required" (default): standard Authentik forward-auth login required.
Catches the legacy `protected = true` semantics.
* "public": public-tier auto-bind anonymous requests to the `guest`
Authentik user (no UI prompt), audited but not gated. Logged-in
users keep their real identity in X-authentik-username.
* "none": no Authentik forward-auth middleware at all. Use for
Anubis-fronted content sites, native-client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV),
webhook receivers, and the Authentik outpost itself. Anti-AI
headers are auto-enabled when auth = "none" unless overridden.
Defaulting to "required" enforces "every ingress must have an explicit
auth decision recorded by Authentik" — accidental omission fails closed.
EOT
validation {
condition = contains(["required", "public", "none"], var.auth)
error_message = "auth must be one of: required, public, none."
}
}
variable "ingress_path" {
type = list(string)
@ -142,8 +161,19 @@ variable "homepage_enabled" {
}
locals {
effective_host = var.full_host != null ? var.full_host : "${var.host != null ? var.host : var.name}.${var.root_domain}"
effective_anti_ai = var.anti_ai_scraping != null ? var.anti_ai_scraping : !var.protected
effective_host = var.full_host != null ? var.full_host : "${var.host != null ? var.host : var.name}.${var.root_domain}"
# Anti-AI default: ON only when no Authentik auth is in front of the ingress
# (i.e. auth = "none" public Anubis-fronted content sites, etc.). When
# Authentik gates the request (required/public), the auth flow already
# discourages bots, so anti-AI noise is redundant.
effective_anti_ai = var.anti_ai_scraping != null ? var.anti_ai_scraping : (var.auth == "none")
# Auth middleware selection. "none" attaches no Authentik middleware at all.
auth_middleware = (
var.auth == "required" ? "traefik-authentik-forward-auth@kubernetescrd" :
var.auth == "public" ? "traefik-authentik-forward-auth-public@kubernetescrd" :
null
)
# External monitor enabled by default when the ingress has a public DNS
# record (either CF-proxied or direct A/AAAA). Explicit bool overrides.
@ -254,7 +284,7 @@ resource "kubernetes_ingress_v1" "proxied-ingress" {
var.exclude_crowdsec ? null : "traefik-crowdsec@kubernetescrd",
local.effective_anti_ai ? "traefik-ai-bot-block@kubernetescrd" : null,
local.effective_anti_ai ? "traefik-anti-ai-headers@kubernetescrd" : null,
var.protected ? "traefik-authentik-forward-auth@kubernetescrd" : null,
local.auth_middleware,
var.allow_local_access_only ? "traefik-local-only@kubernetescrd" : null,
var.custom_content_security_policy != null ? "${var.namespace}-custom-csp-${var.name}@kubernetescrd" : null,
var.max_body_size != null ? "${var.namespace}-buffering-${var.name}@kubernetescrd" : null,