ingress_factory: replace protected bool with auth enum + audit pass across 100 stacks

Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.

ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
  `protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
  middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
  keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
  client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
  itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
  ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).

Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true`     → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false`     → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
  reviewed individually:
  * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
    homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
  * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
    handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
    xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
    location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
    drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
    `auth = "none"`
  * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
    UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
  k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.

Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.

Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.

Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Barzin 2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
parent 317d6aa99f
commit e4f806abe3
100 changed files with 351 additions and 165 deletions

View file

@ -136,19 +136,19 @@ resource "helm_release" "postiz" {
# Non-secret env. Note: BACKEND_INTERNAL_URL stays in-pod (Postiz convention).
env = {
MAIN_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me"
FRONTEND_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me"
NEXT_PUBLIC_BACKEND_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me/api"
BACKEND_INTERNAL_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
STORAGE_PROVIDER = "local"
UPLOAD_DIRECTORY = "/uploads"
NEXT_PUBLIC_UPLOAD_DIRECTORY = "/uploads"
MAIN_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me"
FRONTEND_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me"
NEXT_PUBLIC_BACKEND_URL = "https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me/api"
BACKEND_INTERNAL_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
STORAGE_PROVIDER = "local"
UPLOAD_DIRECTORY = "/uploads"
NEXT_PUBLIC_UPLOAD_DIRECTORY = "/uploads"
# Disabled admin user already created; sign-in only.
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = "true"
IS_GENERAL = "true"
NX_ADD_PLUGINS = "false"
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = "true"
IS_GENERAL = "true"
NX_ADD_PLUGINS = "false"
# Postiz uses Temporal for cron/scheduling bring our own; Helm chart doesn't.
TEMPORAL_ADDRESS = "temporal:7233"
TEMPORAL_ADDRESS = "temporal:7233"
}
# Postiz reads DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL from this Secret. The chart does
@ -159,13 +159,13 @@ resource "helm_release" "postiz" {
# postiz-redis-password) both Services are ClusterIP, only routable
# from inside the postiz namespace, so the well-known creds are safe.
secrets = {
DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://postiz:postiz-password@postiz-postgresql:5432/postiz"
REDIS_URL = "redis://default:postiz-redis-password@postiz-redis-master:6379"
JWT_SECRET = ""
DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://postiz:postiz-password@postiz-postgresql:5432/postiz"
REDIS_URL = "redis://default:postiz-redis-password@postiz-redis-master:6379"
JWT_SECRET = ""
# IG-via-Facebook OAuth (Postiz Instagram-Business integration). Empty
# placeholder; ESO patches the real values from Vault below.
FACEBOOK_APP_ID = ""
FACEBOOK_APP_SECRET = ""
FACEBOOK_APP_ID = ""
FACEBOOK_APP_SECRET = ""
# IG standalone (Postiz Instagram-Login integration). Uses the modern
# `instagram_business_*` scopes does not require the FB Login dance.
INSTAGRAM_APP_ID = ""
@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ module "ingress_uploads_public" {
host = var.host
service_name = "postiz"
port = 80
protected = false
auth = "none"
ingress_path = ["/uploads"]
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ module "ingress" {
host = var.host
service_name = "postiz"
port = 80
protected = true # Authentik forward-auth on the UI / API path
auth = "required" # Authentik forward-auth on the UI / API path
ingress_path = ["/"]
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
extra_annotations = {
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ resource "kubernetes_cron_job_v1" "postgres_backup" {
spec {
restart_policy = "OnFailure"
container {
name = "backup"
name = "backup"
# Same image/pattern as dbaas/postgresql-backup: official postgres
# client tools + apt-installed curl for the Pushgateway push. The
# bitnamilegacy/postgresql variant is stripped (no curl/wget/python),