Lets admin natively share folders from inside an external mount with
internal users/groups or via public link. The two PVE pool browsers
(visible to admin only) get enableSharing=true so they can act as a
"share-from picker" over /srv/nfs and /srv/nfs-ssd; /anca-elements
stays false so anca manages re-sharing inside her own view.
- Manifest schema gains enableSharing on rootMounts + archiveMounts.
- Bootstrap Job adds sync_option() and reconciles enable_sharing via
occ files_external:option (idempotent — occ no-ops same-value set).
Mounts the Proxmox host NFS exports (/srv/nfs and /srv/nfs-ssd) into
the NC pod and surfaces them through occ files_external:create:
- /PVE NFS Pool → /mnt/pve-nfs (admin group only)
- /PVE NFS-SSD Pool → /mnt/pve-nfs-ssd (admin group only)
- /anca-elements → /mnt/pve-nfs/anca-elements (admin, anca users)
Mount visibility is controlled by occ files_external:applicable; no
Files Access Control. ACL state is reconciled idempotently by a
bootstrap Job that diffs desired vs current applicable_users /
applicable_groups (via files_external:list --output=json).
Bootstrap fixes vs initial design:
- Sync loop used `[ -n "$U" ] && cmd` which returns 1 on empty input,
triggering set -e on no-op re-runs. Switched to process substitution
`< <(jq ...)` so empty diff -> loop body never runs -> 0 exit.
- RBAC missed `watch` verb (kubectl wait spammed reflector errors).
- Manifest used display-name "viktor" instead of NC username "admin"
for the /anca-elements applicable list.
Chart values: added two PV-backed volume mounts at /mnt/pve-nfs[+ssd]
and pinned securityContext to fsGroup=33 with fsGroupChangePolicy:
OnRootMismatch (chart default Always would recurse 600k+ files on
every pod restart).
Bulk enrollment commit 8f4b1956 had its CI pipeline #689 killed before
terragrunt apply ran. The enrollment label + V2 lifecycle changes are
in master but never reached the cluster. Appending a one-line marker
to each pending stack's main.tf so Woodpecker's diff-detection picks
them up and applies them serially.
Idempotent — re-applying a stack whose state already matches is a no-op.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenClaw can now answer 'what do we know about <company>?' from cache
via the new recruiter_company_research tool, and recruiter_get embeds
the cached research payload inline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier
and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why
they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the
call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future
readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their
own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately:
- navidrome (Subsonic user/password)
- ntfy (deny-all default + user.db tokens)
- nextcloud (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords)
- vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth)
- headscale (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes)
- paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens)
Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public,
webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or
Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt),
claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api,
fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA
integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster
(meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2
(HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT),
owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc),
rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge
(API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker
(forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports).
real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a
prior edit — not touched here.
No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware
chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit
is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
After fixing the threshold=80% misconfig and seeing two PVCs
(prometheus + technitium primary) get stuck Terminating, a 3rd round
showed four more PVCs (frigate, hackmd, immich-postgresql,
paperless-ngx) in the same state. Same root cause: TF spec'd a
smaller storage size than the autoresizer-grown live value, K8s
rejected the shrink, TF force-replaced the PVC, and the
pvc-protection finalizer held it in Terminating while the pod kept
using the underlying volume.
Bulk-inject lifecycle.ignore_changes = [spec[0].resources[0].requests]
on every kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim block that has
resize.topolvm.io/threshold annotations. The pattern was already
documented in .claude/CLAUDE.md but ~63 stacks were missing it.
Live PVCs are unaffected; this only prevents future TF applies from
attempting the destroy+recreate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
topolvm/pvc-autoresizer's threshold annotation is the FREE-SPACE
percentage below which expansion fires (per upstream README). Setting
it to "80%" means "expand when free-space drops below 80%", i.e. as
soon as the PVC crosses 20% utilization — which caused
prometheus-data-proxmox to be repeatedly expanded from 200Gi to 433Gi
in 70 minutes (six 10% bumps, all when the volume was only ~14% used).
Once the SC opt-in fix landed (1e4eac53) and the inode metrics fix
landed (02a12f1a), the autoresizer started actively misfiring across
75+ PVCs cluster-wide.
Flip the value to "10%" everywhere — that's "expand when free-space
drops below 10%", i.e. at 90% utilization, which is the conventional
semantic and matches the alert thresholds in
prometheus_chart_values.tpl (PVAutoExpanding fires at 80%, PVFillingUp
at 95%).
The CLAUDE.md PVC template was the source of the misconfig, so update
it too. Live PVC annotations were patched in parallel via kubectl
annotate; TF apply on each affected stack will be a no-op against
those live values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The weekly backup mounts the same RWO PVC (proxmox-lvm-encrypted) as the
main nextcloud deployment. Single-node attach — the backup pod can never
mount the volume if it lands on a different node, and was stuck in
ContainerCreating for 6+ hours when cron fired today.
Add pod_affinity (required, hostname topology) so the backup co-locates
with the nextcloud app pod. Discovered via cluster-health probe; manual
verify run scheduled on k8s-node3 next to nextcloud's pod and completed
the rsync in seconds.
Phase 3 — replication chain (old → v2):
- Discovered the v2 cluster was running redis:7.4-alpine, but the
Bitnami old master ships redis 8.6.2 which writes RDB format 13 —
the 7.4 replicas rejected the stream with "Can't handle RDB format
version 13". Bumped v2 image to redis:8-alpine (also 8.6.2) to
restore PSYNC compatibility.
- Discovered that sentinel on BOTH v2 and old Bitnami clusters
auto-discovered the cross-cluster replication chain when v2-0
REPLICAOF'd the old master, triggering a failover that reparented
old-master to a v2 replica and took HAProxy's backend offline.
Mitigation: `SENTINEL REMOVE mymaster` on all 5 sentinels (both
clusters) during the REPLICAOF surgery, then re-MONITOR after
cutover. This must be done on the OLD sentinels too, not just v2 —
they're the ones that kept fighting our REPLICAOF.
- Set up the chain: v2-0 REPLICAOF old-master; v2-{1,2} REPLICAOF v2-0.
All 76 keys (db0:76, db1:22, db4:16) synced including `immich_bull:*`
BullMQ queues and `_kombu.*` Celery queues — the user-stated
must-survive data class.
Phase 4 — HAProxy cutover:
- Updated `kubernetes_config_map.haproxy` to point at
`redis-v2-{0,1,2}.redis-v2-headless` for both redis_master and
redis_sentinel backends (removed redis-node-{0,1}).
- Promoted v2-0 (`REPLICAOF NO ONE`) at the same time as the
ConfigMap apply so HAProxy's 1s health-check interval found a
role:master within a few seconds. Cutover disruption on HAProxy
rollout was brief; old clients naturally moved to new HAProxy pods
within the rolling update window.
- Re-enabled sentinel monitoring on v2 with `SENTINEL MONITOR
mymaster <hostname> 6379 2` after verifying `resolve-hostnames yes`
+ `announce-hostnames yes` were active — this ensures sentinel
stores the hostname (not resolved IP) in its rewritten config, so
pod-IP churn on restart doesn't break failover.
Phase 5 — chaos:
- Round 1: killed master v2-0 mid-probe. First run exposed the
sentinel IP-storage issue (stored 10.10.107.222, went stale on
restart) — ~12s probe disruption. Fixed hostname persistence and
re-MONITORed.
- Round 2: killed new master v2-2 with hostnames correctly stored.
Sentinel elected v2-0, HAProxy re-routed, 1/40 probe failures over
60s — target <3s of actual user-visible disruption.
Phase 6 — Nextcloud simplification:
- `zzz-redis.config.php` no longer queries sentinel in-process —
just points at `redis-master.redis.svc.cluster.local`. Removed 20
lines of PHP. HAProxy handles master tracking transparently now
that it's scaled to 3 + PDB minAvailable=2.
Phase 7 step 1:
- `kubectl scale statefulset/redis-node --replicas=0` (transient —
TF removal in a 24h follow-up). Old PVCs `redis-data-redis-node-{0,1}`
preserved as cold rollback.
Docs:
- Rewrote `databases.md` Redis section to reflect post-cutover reality
and the sentinel hostname gotcha (so future sessions don't relearn it).
- `.claude/reference/service-catalog.md` entry updated.
The parallel-bootstrap race documented in the previous commit is still
worth watching — the init container now defaults to pod-0 as master
when no peer reports role:master-with-slaves, so fresh boots land in
a deterministic topology.
Closes: code-7n4
Closes: code-9y6
Closes: code-cnf
Closes: code-tc4
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Wave 3B-continued: the Goldilocks VPA dashboard (stacks/vpa) runs a Kyverno
ClusterPolicy `goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode` that mutates every namespace with
`metadata.labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"] = "off"`. This
is intentional — Terraform owns container resource limits, and Goldilocks
should only provide recommendations, never auto-update. The label is how
Goldilocks decides per-namespace whether to run its VPA in `off` mode.
Effect on Terraform: every `kubernetes_namespace` resource shows the label
as pending-removal (`-> null`) on every `scripts/tg plan`. Dawarich survey
2026-04-18 confirmed the drift. Cluster-side count: 88 namespaces carry the
label (`kubectl get ns -o json | jq ... | wc -l`). Every TF-managed namespace
is affected.
This commit brings the intentional admission drift under the same
`# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` discoverability marker introduced in c9d221d5 for
the ndots dns_config pattern. The marker now stands generically for any
Kyverno admission-webhook drift suppression; the inline comment records
which specific policy stamps which specific field so future grep audits
show why each suppression exists.
## This change
107 `.tf` files touched — every stack's `resource "kubernetes_namespace"`
resource gets:
```hcl
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
```
Injection was done with a brace-depth-tracking Python pass (`/tmp/add_goldilocks_ignore.py`):
match `^resource "kubernetes_namespace" ` → track `{` / `}` until the
outermost closing brace → insert the lifecycle block before the closing
brace. The script is idempotent (skips any file that already mentions
`goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode`) so re-running is safe.
Vault stack picked up 2 namespaces in the same file (k8s-users produces
one, plus a second explicit ns) — confirmed via file diff (+8 lines).
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entire file is `/* … */` commented out
(paused 2026-04-06 per user decision). Reverted after the script ran.
- `stacks/_template/main.tf.example` — per-stack skeleton, intentionally
minimal. User keeps it that way. Not touched by the script (file
has no real `resource "kubernetes_namespace"` — only a placeholder
comment).
- `.terraform/` copies (e.g. `stacks/metallb/.terraform/modules/...`) —
gitignored, won't commit; the live path was edited.
- `terraform fmt` cleanup of adjacent pre-existing alignment issues in
authentik, freedify, hermes-agent, nvidia, vault, meshcentral. Reverted
to keep the commit scoped to the Goldilocks sweep. Those files will
need a separate fmt-only commit or will be cleaned up on next real
apply to that stack.
## Verification
Dawarich (one of the hundred-plus touched stacks) showed the pattern
before and after:
```
$ cd stacks/dawarich && ../../scripts/tg plan
Before:
Plan: 0 to add, 2 to change, 0 to destroy.
# kubernetes_namespace.dawarich will be updated in-place
(goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode -> null)
# module.tls_secret.kubernetes_secret.tls_secret will be updated in-place
(Kyverno generate.* labels — fixed in 8d94688d)
After:
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.
```
Injection count check:
```
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode' stacks/ | awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
108
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. Pick any stack: `cd stacks/<name> && ../../scripts/tg plan`
3. Expect: no drift on the namespace's goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode label.
Closes: code-dwx
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rewrite-body Traefik plugin (both packruler/rewrite-body v1.2.0 and
the-ccsn/traefik-plugin-rewritebody v0.1.3) silently fails on Traefik
v3.6.12 due to Yaegi interpreter issues with ResponseWriter wrapping.
Both plugins load without errors but never inject content.
Removed:
- rewrite-body plugin download (init container) and registration
- strip-accept-encoding middleware (only existed for rewrite-body bug)
- anti-ai-trap-links middleware (used rewrite-body for injection)
- rybbit_site_id variable from ingress_factory and reverse_proxy factory
- rybbit_site_id from 25 service stacks (39 instances)
- Per-service rybbit-analytics middleware CRD resources
Kept:
- compress middleware (entrypoint-level, working correctly)
- ai-bot-block middleware (ForwardAuth to bot-block-proxy)
- anti-ai-headers middleware (X-Robots-Tag: noai, noimageai)
- All CrowdSec, Authentik, rate-limit middleware unchanged
Next: Cloudflare Workers with HTMLRewriter for edge-side injection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two-tier state architecture:
- Tier 0 (infra, platform, cnpg, vault, dbaas, external-secrets): local
state with SOPS encryption in git — unchanged, required for bootstrap.
- Tier 1 (105 app stacks): PostgreSQL backend on CNPG cluster at
10.0.20.200:5432/terraform_state with native pg_advisory_lock.
Motivation: multi-operator friction (every workstation needed SOPS + age +
git-crypt), bootstrap complexity for new operators, and headless agents/CI
needing the full encryption toolchain just to read state.
Changes:
- terragrunt.hcl: conditional backend (local vs pg) based on tier0 list
- scripts/tg: tier detection, auto-fetch PG creds from Vault for Tier 1,
skip SOPS and Vault KV locking for Tier 1 stacks
- scripts/state-sync: tier-aware encrypt/decrypt (skips Tier 1)
- scripts/migrate-state-to-pg: one-shot migration script (idempotent)
- stacks/vault/main.tf: pg-terraform-state static role + K8s auth role
for claude-agent namespace
- stacks/dbaas: terraform_state DB creation + MetalLB LoadBalancer
service on shared IP 10.0.20.200
- Deleted 107 .tfstate.enc files for migrated Tier 1 stacks
- Cleaned up per-stack tiers.tf (now generated by root terragrunt.hcl)
[ci skip]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Terragrunt now generates cloudflare_provider.tf (Vault-sourced API key)
and includes cloudflare in required_providers. These are the generated
files from running `terragrunt init -upgrade` across all stacks.
[ci skip]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to
cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars —
a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten,
leaving services unreachable externally.
## This change:
- Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory`
modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates
the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP).
- Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard
`*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing.
- Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate
cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key).
- Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service
dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses,
special cases).
- Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook.
```
BEFORE AFTER
config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf
| module "ingress" {
v dns_type = "proxied"
stacks/cloudflared/ }
for_each = list |
cloudflare_record auto-creates
tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation
```
## What is NOT in this change:
- Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars)
- 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases)
- Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applied all 20 NFS stacks to converge PV mount_options (nfsvers=4).
State files encrypted and committed.
[ci skip]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nextcloud persists dbpassword in config.php on its PVC and ignores
MYSQL_PASSWORD env var after initial install. When Vault rotates the
MySQL password, config.php goes stale causing HTTP 500 crash loops.
Adds a before-starting hook that patches config.php with the current
MYSQL_PASSWORD on every pod start. Combined with Stakater Reloader
annotation, the full rotation chain is now automated:
Vault rotates → ESO syncs Secret → Reloader restarts pod → hook
patches config.php → Nextcloud connects with new password.
Also fixes stale existingClaim (nextcloud-data-iscsi → nextcloud-data-proxmox).
MySQL 8.4 remapped `utf8` to mean `utf8mb4`, but Nextcloud without this
config sends `COLLATE UTF8_general_ci` (a utf8mb3-only collation) in
queries, causing SQLSTATE[42000] errors that broke occ commands and sync.
Also removed stale `Work 🎯.csv` whose emoji filename was stripped in the
DB filecache (stored as `Work .csv`), causing permanent sync errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploy topolvm/pvc-autoresizer controller that monitors kubelet_volume_stats
via Prometheus and auto-expands annotated PVCs. Annotated all 9 block-storage
PVCs (proxmox-lvm) with per-PVC thresholds and max limits. Updated PVFillingUp
alert to critical/10m (means auto-expansion failed) and added PVAutoExpanding
info alert at 80%.
Vault DB engine rotates passwords weekly but 5 stacks baked passwords
at Terraform plan time, causing stale credentials until next apply.
- real-estate-crawler: add vault-database ESO, use secret_key_ref in 3 deployments
- nextcloud: switch Helm chart to existingSecret for DB password
- grafana: add vault-database ESO, use envFromSecrets in Helm values
- woodpecker: use extraSecretNamesForEnvFrom, remove plan-time data source chain
- affine: add vault-database ESO, use secret_key_ref in deployment + init container
Kyverno ClusterPolicy reads dependency.kyverno.io/wait-for annotation
and injects busybox init containers that block until each dependency
is reachable (nc -z). Annotations added to 18 stacks (24 deployments).
Includes graceful-db-maintenance.sh script for planned DB maintenance
(scales dependents to 0, saves replica counts, restores on startup).
Vault is now the sole source of truth for secrets. SOPS pipeline
removed entirely — auth via `vault login -method=oidc`.
Part A: SOPS removal
- vault/main.tf: delete 990 lines (93 vars + 43 KV write resources),
add self-read data source for OIDC creds from secret/vault
- terragrunt.hcl: remove SOPS var loading, vault_root_token, check_secrets hook
- scripts/tg: remove SOPS decryption, keep -auto-approve logic
- .woodpecker/default.yml: replace SOPS with Vault K8s auth via curl
- Delete secrets.sops.json, .sops.yaml
Part B: External Secrets Operator
- New stack stacks/external-secrets/ with Helm chart + 2 ClusterSecretStores
(vault-kv for KV v2, vault-database for DB engine)
Part C: Database secrets engine (in vault/main.tf)
- MySQL + PostgreSQL connections with static role rotation (24h)
- 6 MySQL roles (speedtest, wrongmove, codimd, nextcloud, shlink, grafana)
- 6 PostgreSQL roles (trading, health, linkwarden, affine, woodpecker, claude_memory)
Part D: Kubernetes secrets engine (in vault/main.tf)
- RBAC for Vault SA to manage K8s tokens
- Roles: dashboard-admin, ci-deployer, openclaw, local-admin
- New scripts/vault-kubeconfig helper for dynamic kubeconfig
K8s auth method with scoped policies for CI, ESO, OpenClaw, Woodpecker sync.
After node2 OOM incident, right-size memory across the cluster by setting
requests=limits based on max_over_time(container_memory_working_set_bytes[7d])
with 1.3x headroom. Eliminates ~37Gi overcommit gap.
Categories:
- Safe equalization (50 containers): set req=lim where max7d well within target
- Limit increases (8 containers): raise limits for services spiking above current
- No Prometheus data (12 containers): conservatively set lim=req
- Exception: nextcloud keeps req=256Mi/lim=8Gi due to Apache memory spikes
Also increased dbaas namespace quota from 12Gi to 16Gi to accommodate mysql
4Gi limits across 3 replicas.
- Add vault provider to root terragrunt.hcl (generated providers.tf)
- Delete stacks/vault/vault_provider.tf (now in generated providers.tf)
- Add 124 variable declarations + 43 vault_kv_secret_v2 resources to
vault/main.tf to populate Vault KV at secret/<stack-name>
- Migrate 43 consuming stacks to read secrets from Vault KV via
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" instead of SOPS var-file
- Add dependency "vault" to all migrated stacks' terragrunt.hcl
- Complex types (maps/lists) stored as JSON strings, decoded with
jsondecode() in locals blocks
Bootstrap secrets (vault_root_token, vault_authentik_client_id,
vault_authentik_client_secret) remain in SOPS permanently.
Apply order: vault stack first (populates KV), then all others.
CPU limits cause CFS throttling even when nodes have idle capacity.
Move to a request-only CPU model: keep CPU requests for scheduling
fairness but remove all CPU limits. Memory limits stay (incompressible).
Changes across 108 files:
- Kyverno LimitRange policy: remove cpu from default/max in all 6 tiers
- Kyverno ResourceQuota policy: remove limits.cpu from all 5 tiers
- Custom ResourceQuotas: remove limits.cpu from 8 namespace quotas
- Custom LimitRanges: remove cpu from default/max (nextcloud, onlyoffice)
- RBAC module: remove cpu_limits variable and quota reference
- Freedify factory: remove cpu_limit variable and limits reference
- 86 deployment files: remove cpu from all limits blocks
- 6 Helm values files: remove cpu under limits sections
- Set loglevel=2 (warnings) and disable mail_smtpdebug via configs
- Enable opcache.enable_file_override for faster file checks
- Increase APCu shared memory from 32M to 128M
- Fix broken module.nfs_nextcloud_data reference in backup cron job
to use the iSCSI PVC directly
SQLite caused 4.7 CPU / 2GB usage, now MySQL uses ~95m / 95Mi.
Reduced limits from 16 CPU / 6Gi to 2 CPU / 1Gi.
Reduced requests from 100m / 1Gi to 50m / 256Mi.
Frees ~14 CPU cores and 5Gi memory for other workloads.
With SQLite, 50 workers caused all workers to block on DB locks.
On MySQL, CPU is ~20m and memory ~143Mi — no resource pressure.
The crash-looping was caused by hitting MaxRequestWorkers=50 limit
("server reached MaxRequestWorkers setting"), not by DB contention.
SQLite was causing constant crash-looping (138 restarts/day) due to
write lock contention with concurrent sync clients.
Migration required workarounds for multiple occ db:convert-type bugs:
- GR error 3100: SET GLOBAL sql_generate_invisible_primary_key = ON
- utf8mb3 column creation: stripped 4-byte emoji + invalid UTF-8 from
SQLite (F1 calendar events, filecache)
- SQLite index corruption: repaired via .dump + INSERT OR IGNORE reimport
- kubectl exec timeouts: used nohup + detached process
Verified: all 136 tables migrated, 100% row count match across 15 key
tables (users, files, calendars, contacts, shares, activity).
Also fixed typo: databse → database in chart values.
- Restored clean SQLite database from pre-migration backup
- Fixed severe database corruption (rowid ordering, page corruption, index issues)
- Applied conservative MaxRequestWorkers=15 for SQLite stability
- Database integrity now perfect, all health checks passing
- Ready for future MySQL migration with clean data
[ci skip]
- Increase MaxRequestWorkers from 10 to 25 for 4 CPU + 3Gi memory container
- Update Apache tuning for Redis + SQLite backend (not pure SQLite)
- Resolves CrashLoopBackOff caused by health probe timeouts
- Allows handling concurrent users without MaxRequestWorkers limit errors
[ci skip]
MySQL (3 OOM kills):
- Cap group_replication_message_cache_size to 128MB (default 1GB caused OOM)
- Reduce innodb_log_buffer_size from 64MB to 16MB
- Lower max_connections from 151 to 80 (peak usage ~40)
- Increase memory limit from 3Gi to 4Gi for headroom
Nextcloud (30+ apache2 OOM kills per incident):
- Reduce MaxRequestWorkers from 50 to 10 to prevent fork bomb
when SQLite locks cause request pileup
- Lower StartServers/MinSpare/MaxSpare proportionally
Uptime Kuma (Node.js memory leak):
- Increase memory limit from 256Mi to 512Mi
- Increase CPU limit from 200m to 500m
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SQLite on NFS caused persistent 500 errors on WebDAV PROPFIND due to
missing fsync guarantees and database locking under concurrent access.
iSCSI (ext4) provides proper fsync and block-level I/O.
- Replace nfs_volume module with iscsi-truenas PVC (20Gi)
- Update Helm chart to use nextcloud-data-iscsi claim
- Excluded 12.5GB nextcloud.log and corrupted DB from migration
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- MaxRequestWorkers 25→50: too few workers caused ALL workers to block
on SQLite locks, making liveness probes fail even faster (131 restarts
vs 50 before). 50 is a compromise — enough workers for probes.
- Excluded nextcloud from HighServiceErrorRate alert (chronic SQLite issue)
- MySQL migration attempted but hit: GR error 3100 (fixed with GIPK),
emoji in calendar/filecache (stripped), SQLite corruption (pre-existing
from crash-looping). Migration rolled back, Nextcloud restored to SQLite.
The Nextcloud Helm chart expects extraVolumes/extraVolumeMounts nested
under the nextcloud: key. Also mount to mods-available/ (the actual file)
not mods-enabled/ (which is a symlink).
Verified: MaxRequestWorkers 150→25, workers dropped from 49 to 6.
