`homelab vault` only spoke to Vaultwarden (the password manager), but the
name reads as HashiCorp Vault (the infra secrets store — actually OpenBao
here). Make the two unmistakable and support both.
Distinction (no breakage — the existing Vaultwarden verbs are unchanged):
- bare `homelab vault` help now LEADS with the two-stores split;
- every verb summary is tagged `[vaultwarden]` or `[hashicorp-vault]`;
- HashiCorp Vault/OpenBao lives under a clearly-named `vault kv` group.
New `vault kv` (HashiCorp Vault / OpenBao, the secret/… KV store):
- `kv get <path> [--field K]` — read; --field → one value (TTY-aware
clipboard/stdout), no field → full secret JSON (refuses a bare TTY).
- `kv list <path>` — list sub-paths (no values).
- `kv put <path> <key>` — write one key; value via stdin (piped or
no-echo prompt, never argv); creates the path or merges (never
clobbers siblings; uses kv patch -method=rw so no `patch` cap needed).
Critical: `kv` uses the caller's OWN Vault token (OIDC ~/.vault-token /
$VAULT_TOKEN), NOT the per-user scoped Vaultwarden token (bound only to
claude-users/<user>, which would 403 elsewhere) — handlers set VAULT_ADDR
but never inject the scoped token. Access is whatever the policy grants.
Logic in cmd_vault_kv.go (pure cores extractKVData/parseKVList/arg
builders/kvGet/List/Put; file header documents the credential split).
CLI v0.11.0. Tests: no value in put argv, create-then-merge, KV-v2
envelope strip, help names both systems. Verified e2e against live Vault
(read key-names-only + a scratch put/merge/cleanup).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`homelab vault get` could only fetch one of five allow-listed fields and
had no way to see what fields an item even has — in particular it could
not reach arbitrary user-defined custom fields. Add a `--all` flag that
dumps the whole item as a normalized JSON object
(`{name, username?, password?, uris?, totp?, notes?, fields?}`), so a
Claude session can discover and read every field, custom ones included,
in a single call.
Security model preserved:
- Like `get --json`, the dump is all secret values, so it refuses a bare
TTY (pipe it, e.g. `| jq`); the machine/agent path is stdout.
- The TOTP *seed* is reduced to a presence flag (`"totp": true`) and
never emitted — the seed is more powerful than a one-time code, so the
only seed-derived path stays the specially-audited `vault code`. Tests
assert the seed and password-history never appear in the dump.
- Op-log uses a distinct `get-all` verb (item name still never logged) so
a bulk dump is distinguishable from a single-field read.
`normalizeItem` is a pure, unit-tested core; `getItem` is the
session+fetch seam. CLI bumped to v0.10.0. Docs: README changelog,
onboarding runbook, design spec §16.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The onboarding runbook's "rebuild the binary" command stamped the version
from `git describe --tags --always`, but setup-devvm.sh stamps it from
`cli/VERSION`. The v0.8.1 tag is no longer reachable from master, so the
describe form silently produced a bare commit sha — diverging from what a
provisioner reconcile stamps. Match the canonical source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Setting up emo's Bitwarden access via `homelab vault`, his one-time
`homelab vault setup` failed with an opaque "exit status 2". Two latent
CLI bugs, both of which any non-admin AFK invocation can hit:
1. The CLI set VAULT_TOKEN but never VAULT_ADDR, relying on the ambient
value. It IS in /etc/environment (login shells), but emo runs his
agents from long-lived tmux / non-login shells that never sourced it,
so every `vault` child hit the 127.0.0.1:8200 default -> connection
refused. claude-auth-sync already self-defaults VAULT_ADDR; the CLI
now does the same.
2. Token precedence was env > ~/.vault-token > scoped. A power-user who
ran `vault login -method=oidc` carries a read-only ~/.vault-token
(policy `default`, capability `deny` on their workstation path), which
shadowed the purpose-built scoped token -> 403 permission denied on
the user's OWN path. This tool only ever touches
secret/workstation/claude-users/<user>, which the scoped token covers
exactly, so precedence is now env > scoped > ~/.vault-token. Verified
the scoped tokens for both emo and wizard hold create/read/update on
their own paths, so admins are unaffected.
Also stop swallowing the shelled `vault`/`bw` stderr: errors now carry
the real message (connection refused / permission denied) instead of a
bare "exit status N" — without that, (1) and (2) were indistinguishable.
Verified end-to-end as emo (VAULT_ADDR unset + his read-only
~/.vault-token present): writeCreds now succeeds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two remaining gaps to let non-admins (emo) use `homelab vault`:
- setup-devvm.sh installed `@bitwarden/cli` only when `command -v bw`
failed, which an admin's own ~/.local/bin/bw satisfied — so the
system-wide copy was never installed and non-admins had no `bw`
backend. Install to the npm /usr prefix and guard on the system path
(/usr/bin/bw) instead.
- Add docs/runbooks/homelab-vault-onboarding.md (per-user setup, the
shared Organization/Collection flow for sharing passwords, admin
deploy + verification, security model) and repoint the two code
comments that cited a design-spec path which never existed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
