Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Viktor Barzin
fd0f4a0365 fix: restore tree dropped by 6d224861; land stem95su gdrive-sync (10m) [ci skip]
6d224861 came from a --no-checkout worktree whose empty index made the
commit drop every file except two. This restores 05b50d2b's full tree and
correctly adds stacks/stem95su/gdrive-sync.tf + the service-catalog stem95su
entry. Forward-only (parent=6d224861, no force-push); [ci skip] since the
live infra was never applied from the broken commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 08:45:33 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
6d224861c4 stem95su: scheduled Drive->site sync CronJob (every 10m)
CronJob stem95su-gdrive-sync (*/10) mounts the content PVC RW and
rclone-syncs the read-only Drive folder "claude" (stem claude/files) onto
it (rclone/rclone:1.74.3, scope=drive.readonly, empty-source guard +
--max-delete 25). ESO ExternalSecret stem95su-rclone <- Vault
secret/stem95su. Requires the GCP OAuth app published to Production or the
refresh token expires ~weekly.

Lands the gdrive-sync stack on master (it had landed on a feature branch
by accident on the shared devvm checkout).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 08:42:26 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
467eb7d7ee claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.

Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
  bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
  token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
  backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
  read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
  secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
  time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
  secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.

claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
  viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
  forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
  get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
  apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
  existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
  very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
  sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
  emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
  ${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).

Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 09:19:10 +00:00