TrueNAS VM 9000 was operationally decommissioned 2026-04-13; NFS has been
served by Proxmox host (192.168.1.127) since. This commit scrubs remaining
references from active docs. VM 9000 itself remains on PVE in stopped state
pending user decision on deletion.
In-session cleanup already landed: reverse-proxy ingress + Cloudflare record
removed; Technitium DNS records deleted; Vault truenas_{api_key,ssh_private_key}
purged; homepage_credentials.reverse_proxy.truenas_token removed;
truenas_homepage_token variable + module deleted; Loki + Dashy cleaned;
config.tfvars deprecated DNS lines removed; historical-name comment added to
the nfs-truenas StorageClass (48 bound PVs, immutable name — kept).
Historical records (docs/plans/, docs/post-mortems/, .planning/) intentionally
untouched — they describe state at a point in time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
After code-yiu Phases 1a–6 landed, `docs/architecture/mailserver.md` still
carried the pre-HAProxy Mermaid diagram, a retired Dovecot-exporter
component row, stale PVC names (`-proxmox` suffixes that were renamed
`-encrypted` during the LUKS migration), a wrong probe schedule
(claimed 10 min, actually 20 min), and a Mailgun-API claim for the
probe (it's been on Brevo since code-n5l). The two-path architecture
(external-via-HAProxy + intra-cluster-via-ClusterIP) that defines the
current design wasn't visualised at all.
## This change
Rewrote the Architecture Diagram section to show **both ingress paths
in one Mermaid flowchart**, colour-coded:
- External (orange): Sender → pfSense NAT → HAProxy → NodePort →
**alt PROXY listeners** (2525/4465/5587/10993).
- Intra-cluster (blue): Roundcube / probe → ClusterIP Service →
**stock listeners** (25/465/587/993), no PROXY.
- The pod subgraph shows both listener sets feeding the same Postfix /
Rspamd / Dovecot / Maildir pipeline.
- Security dotted edges: Postfix log stream → CrowdSec agent →
LAPI → pfSense bouncer decisions.
- Monitoring dotted edges: probe → Brevo HTTP → MX → pod → IMAP →
Pushgateway/Uptime Kuma.
Added a **sequenceDiagram** for the external SMTP roundtrip — walks
through the wire-level handshake from external MTA → pfSense NAT →
HAProxy TCP connect → PROXY v2 header write → kube-proxy SNAT → pod
postscreen parse → smtpd banner. Makes the "how does the pod see the
real IP despite SNAT?" question self-answering.
Added a **Port mapping table** listing all 8 container listeners (4
stock + 4 alt) with their Service, NodePort, PROXY-required flag, and
who uses each path. Replaces the ambiguous prose about "alt ports".
Fixed stale bits:
- Removed Dovecot Exporter row from Components (retired in code-1ik).
- Added pfSense HAProxy row.
- Probe schedule: every 10 min → **every 20 min** (`*/20 * * * *`).
- Probe API: Mailgun → **Brevo HTTP**.
- PVC names: `-proxmox` → **`-encrypted`** (all three); storage class
`proxmox-lvm` → **`proxmox-lvm-encrypted`**.
- Added `mailserver-backup-host` + `roundcube-backup-host` RWX NFS
PVCs to the Storage table with backup flow pointer.
- Expanded Troubleshooting → Inbound to include HAProxy health check
+ container-listener verification steps.
- Secrets table: `brevo_api_key` now marked as used by both relay +
probe; `mailgun_api_key` marked historical.
Added a prominent **UPDATE 2026-04-19** header to
`docs/runbooks/mailserver-proxy-protocol.md` pointing future readers
at the implemented state in `mailserver-pfsense-haproxy.md`. Research
doc preserved as a decision record — it's the canonical "why not just
pin the pod?" reference.
## What is NOT in this change
- No Terraform changes; this is docs-only.
- No changes to the runbook (`mailserver-pfsense-haproxy.md`) — it was
already rewritten during Phase 6.
## Test Plan
### Automated
```
$ awk '/^```mermaid/ {c++} END{print c}' docs/architecture/mailserver.md
2
$ grep -c '\-encrypted' docs/architecture/mailserver.md
5 # PVC references normalised
$ grep -c '\-proxmox' docs/architecture/mailserver.md
0 # no stale names left
```
### Manual Verification
Render `docs/architecture/mailserver.md` on GitHub or any Mermaid-
capable viewer:
1. Top Architecture Diagram should show two labelled paths into the
pod, colour-coded (orange = external, blue = intra-cluster).
2. Sequence diagram should show 10 numbered steps ending at Rspamd +
Dovecot delivery.
3. Port Mapping table should make it obvious that the 4 alt container
ports are only reachable via `mailserver-proxy` NodePort and require
PROXY v2.
## Context (bd code-yiu)
With Phase 4+5 proven (external mail flows through pfSense HAProxy +
PROXY v2 to the alt PROXY-speaking container listeners), the MetalLB
LoadBalancer Service + `10.0.20.202` external IP + ETP:Local policy are
obsolete. Phase 6 decommissions them and documents the steady-state
architecture.
## This change
### Terraform (stacks/mailserver/modules/mailserver/main.tf)
- `kubernetes_service.mailserver` downgraded: `LoadBalancer` → `ClusterIP`.
- Removed `metallb.io/loadBalancerIPs = "10.0.20.202"` annotation.
- Removed `external_traffic_policy = "Local"` (irrelevant for ClusterIP).
- Port set unchanged — the Service still exposes 25/465/587/993 for
intra-cluster clients (Roundcube pod, `email-roundtrip-monitor`
CronJob) that hit the stock PROXY-free container listeners.
- Inline comment documents the downgrade rationale + companion
`mailserver-proxy` NodePort Service that now carries external traffic.
### pfSense (ops, not in git)
- `mailserver` host alias (pointing at `10.0.20.202`) deleted. No NAT
rule references it post-Phase-4; keeping it would be misleading dead
metadata. Reversible via WebUI + `php /tmp/delete-mailserver-alias.php`
companion script (ad-hoc, not checked in — alias is just a
Firewall → Aliases → Hosts entry).
### Uptime Kuma (ops)
- Monitors `282` and `283` (PORT checks) retargeted from `10.0.20.202`
→ `10.0.20.1`. Renamed to `Mailserver HAProxy SMTP (pfSense :25)` /
`... IMAPS (pfSense :993)` to reflect their new purpose (HAProxy
layer liveness). History retained (edit, not delete-recreate).
### Docs
- `docs/runbooks/mailserver-pfsense-haproxy.md` — fully rewritten
"Current state" section; now reflects steady-state architecture with
two-path diagram (external via HAProxy / intra-cluster via ClusterIP).
Phase history table marks Phase 6 ✅. Rollback section updated (no
one-liner post-Phase-6; need Service-type re-upgrade + alias re-add).
- `docs/architecture/mailserver.md` — Overview, Mermaid diagram, Inbound
flow, CrowdSec section, Uptime Kuma monitors list, Decisions section
(dedicated MetalLB IP → "Client-IP Preservation via HAProxy + PROXY
v2"), Troubleshooting all updated.
- `.claude/CLAUDE.md` — mailserver monitoring + architecture paragraph
updated with new external path description; references the new runbook.
## What is NOT in this change
- Removal of `10.0.20.202` from `cloudflare_proxied_names` or any
reserved-IP tracking — wasn't there to begin with. The
`metallb-system default` IPAddressPool (10.0.20.200-220) shows 2 of
19 available after this, confirming `.202` went back to the pool.
- Phase 4 NAT-flip rollback scripts — kept on-disk, still valid if
someone re-introduces the MetalLB LB (see runbook "Rollback").
## Test Plan
### Automated (verified pre-commit 2026-04-19)
```
# Service is ClusterIP with no EXTERNAL-IP
$ kubectl get svc -n mailserver mailserver
mailserver ClusterIP 10.103.108.217 <none> 25/TCP,465/TCP,587/TCP,993/TCP
# 10.0.20.202 no longer answers ARP (ping from pfSense)
$ ssh admin@10.0.20.1 'ping -c 2 -t 2 10.0.20.202'
2 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100.0% packet loss
# MetalLB pool released the IP
$ kubectl get ipaddresspool default -n metallb-system \
-o jsonpath='{.status.assignedIPv4} of {.status.availableIPv4}'
2 of 19 available
# E2E probe — external Brevo → WAN:25 → pfSense HAProxy → pod — STILL SUCCEEDS
$ kubectl create job --from=cronjob/email-roundtrip-monitor probe-phase6 -n mailserver
... Round-trip SUCCESS in 20.3s ...
$ kubectl delete job probe-phase6 -n mailserver
# pfSense mailserver alias removed
$ ssh admin@10.0.20.1 'php -r "..." | grep mailserver'
(no output)
```
### Manual Verification
1. Visit `https://uptime.viktorbarzin.me` — monitors 282/283 green on new
hostname `10.0.20.1`.
2. Roundcube login works (`https://mail.viktorbarzin.me/`).
3. Send test email to `smoke-test@viktorbarzin.me` from Gmail — observe
`postfix/smtpd-proxy25/postscreen: CONNECT from [<Gmail-IP>]` in
mailserver logs within ~10s.
4. CrowdSec should still see real client IPs in postfix/dovecot parsers
(verify with `cscli alerts list` on next auth-fail event).
## Phase history (bd code-yiu)
| Phase | Status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1a | ✅ `ef75c02f` | k8s alt :2525 listener + NodePort Service |
| 2 | ✅ 2026-04-19 | pfSense HAProxy pkg installed |
| 3 | ✅ `ba697b02` | HAProxy config persisted in pfSense XML |
| 4+5 | ✅ `9806d515` | 4-port alt listeners + HAProxy frontends + NAT flip |
| 6 | ✅ **this commit** | MetalLB LB retired; 10.0.20.202 released; docs updated |
Closes: code-yiu
## Context
An audit of the mailserver stack raised the question: why is Fail2ban
disabled in the docker-mailserver deployment? The setting
`ENABLE_FAIL2BAN = "0"` lives in the env ConfigMap at
`stacks/mailserver/modules/mailserver/main.tf:68` with no documented
rationale, which made the decision look accidental rather than
deliberate.
The decision is deliberate: CrowdSec is the cluster-wide bouncer for
SSH, HTTP, and SMTP/IMAP brute-force defence. It already tails
`postfix` + `dovecot` logs via the installed collections and enforces
decisions at the LB/firewall tier with real client IPs preserved by
`externalTrafficPolicy: Local` on the dedicated MetalLB IP. Enabling
Fail2ban in-pod would duplicate that response path — two systems
racing to ban the same offender from different enforcement points,
iptables churn inside the container, and a split audit trail across
two decision stores. User decision 2026-04-18: keep disabled, document
the decision so the next auditor doesn't have to re-derive it.
## This change
Adds a new subsection "Fail2ban Disabled (CrowdSec is the Policy)" to
the Security section of `docs/architecture/mailserver.md`, placed
immediately after the existing CrowdSec Integration block. The
paragraph cites `stacks/mailserver/modules/mailserver/main.tf:68`
(where `ENABLE_FAIL2BAN = "0"` lives) and explains why duplicating the
layer would make things worse, not better. Pure docs — no Terraform
touched.
## Test Plan
### Automated
None — docs-only change. No tests, lint, or type checks apply to
markdown prose.
### Manual Verification
1. `less infra/docs/architecture/mailserver.md` — locate the Security
section; confirm the new "Fail2ban Disabled (CrowdSec is the
Policy)" subsection appears between "CrowdSec Integration" and
"Rspamd".
2. Render on GitHub or via a markdown previewer; confirm the inline
link to `main.tf` resolves and the paragraph reads cleanly.
3. `grep -n 'ENABLE_FAIL2BAN' infra/stacks/mailserver/modules/mailserver/main.tf`
— confirm it still reports the value on line 68, matching the
citation in the doc.
Closes: code-zhn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Outbound mail relay migrated from Mailgun EU to Brevo EU on 2026-04-12 when
variables.tf:6 of the mailserver stack was switched to `smtp-relay.brevo.com:587`.
Postfix immediately began using Brevo for user mail — but the SPF TXT record
at viktorbarzin.me was left pointing at `include:mailgun.org -all`, so every
Brevo-relayed message failed SPF alignment and was spam-foldered or
DMARC-quarantined by Gmail/Outlook.
Observed on 2026-04-18 via `dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @1.1.1.1`:
"v=spf1 include:mailgun.org -all" <-- wrong sender network
User decision (2026-04-18): switch to `v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all`.
Soft-fail (`~all`) is intentional during cutover — keeps unauthorized Brevo
sends quarantined rather than outright rejected while we validate Brevo's
sending IPs + rate limits for real user mail. Tighten to `-all` once the
relay is proven stable.
The docs in `docs/architecture/mailserver.md` still described the old
Mailgun-based configuration (Overview paragraph, DNS table, Vault secrets
table). Per `infra/.claude/CLAUDE.md` rule "Update docs with every change",
those are updated in the same commit.
## This change
Coupled commit covering beads tasks code-q8p (SPF) + code-9pe (docs):
1. `stacks/cloudflared/modules/cloudflared/cloudflare.tf` — SPF TXT content
flipped from `include:mailgun.org -all` to `include:spf.brevo.com ~all`,
with an inline comment pointing at the mailserver docs for rationale.
2. `docs/architecture/mailserver.md` —
- Last-updated stamp moved to 2026-04-18 with the cutover note.
- Overview paragraph now says "relays through Brevo EU" (was Mailgun).
- DNS table SPF row reflects the new value plus an annotated history
note ("was include:mailgun.org -all until 2026-04-18").
- DMARC row now calls out the intended `dmarc@viktorbarzin.me` rua
target and flags that the current live record still points at
e21c0ff8@dmarc.mailgun.org, tracked under follow-up code-569.
- Vault secrets table: `mailserver_sasl_passwd` relabelled as Brevo
relay credentials; `mailgun_api_key` annotated as retained for the
E2E roundtrip probe only (inbound delivery testing, not user mail).
Apply was scoped with `-target=module.cloudflared.cloudflare_record.mail_spf`
to avoid sweeping up two unrelated pre-existing drifts that the Terraform
state shows on this stack: the DMARC + mail._domainkey_rspamd records are
stored on Cloudflare as RFC-compliant split TXT strings (>255 bytes), and
a naive refresh+apply would normalize them in the state back to single
strings. Those drifts are semantically equivalent (DNS concatenates
adjacent TXT strings at resolution time) and are out of scope for this
commit — they'll be handled under their own ticket.
## What is NOT in this change
- DMARC `rua=mailto:dmarc@viktorbarzin.me` cutover — that's code-569 (M1),
still using the legacy `e21c0ff8@dmarc.mailgun.org` + ondmarc addresses
in the live record.
- DMARC/DKIM TXT multi-string state reconciliation on `mail_dmarc` and
`mail_domainkey_rspamd` — pre-existing Cloudflare representation drift,
untouched here.
- Removal of Mailgun references in history/decision sections of the docs,
or the Mailgun-backed E2E roundtrip probe — probe still uses Mailgun API
on purpose for inbound delivery testing (code-569 scope).
- Mailgun DKIM record `s1._domainkey` — left in place; still consumed by
the roundtrip probe.
- Other pending items from the 2026-04-18 mail audit plan.
## Test Plan
### Automated
Targeted plan showed exactly one change, no other drift sneaking in:
module.cloudflared.cloudflare_record.mail_spf will be updated in-place
~ content = "\"v=spf1 include:mailgun.org -all\""
-> "\"v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all\""
Plan: 0 to add, 1 to change, 0 to destroy.
Apply result:
Apply complete! Resources: 0 added, 1 changed, 0 destroyed.
DNS propagation verified on three independent resolvers immediately after
apply:
$ dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @1.1.1.1 +short | grep spf
"v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all"
$ dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @8.8.8.8 +short | grep spf
"v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all"
$ dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @10.0.20.201 +short | grep spf # Technitium primary
"v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all"
### Manual Verification
Setup: nothing extra — change is already live (TF applied before commit
per home-lab convention; `[ci skip]` in title).
1. Confirm SPF is the Brevo-only record from an external resolver:
dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @1.1.1.1 +short
Expected: `"v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all"` — no Mailgun reference.
2. Send a test email via the mailserver (through Brevo relay) to a Gmail
account and view the original headers:
Authentication-Results: ... spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=viktorbarzin.me
...
Received-SPF: Pass (google.com: domain of ... designates ... as
permitted sender)
Expected: `spf=pass` (it was `spf=fail` or `spf=softfail` before this
change because the envelope sender IP was a Brevo IP not covered by
`include:mailgun.org`).
3. Confirm no live Mailgun references in the mailserver doc:
grep -n mailgun.org infra/docs/architecture/mailserver.md
Expected: only annotated-history mentions — SPF "was ... until
2026-04-18" and DMARC "current live record still points at
e21c0ff8@dmarc.mailgun.org pending cutover". No claims of active
Mailgun relay.
## Reproduce locally
cd infra
git pull
dig TXT viktorbarzin.me @1.1.1.1 +short | grep spf
# expected: "v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all"
# inspect the TF change:
git show HEAD -- stacks/cloudflared/modules/cloudflared/cloudflare.tf
# inspect the doc change:
git show HEAD -- docs/architecture/mailserver.md
Closes: code-q8p
Closes: code-9pe
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbound:
- Direct MX to mail.viktorbarzin.me (ForwardEmail relay attempted and abandoned)
- Dedicated MetalLB IP 10.0.20.202 with ETP: Local for CrowdSec real-IP detection
- Removed Cloudflare Email Routing (can't store-and-forward)
- Fixed dual SPF violation, hardened to -all
- Added MTA-STS, TLSRPT, imported Rspamd DKIM into Terraform
- Removed dead BIND zones from config.tfvars (199 lines)
Outbound:
- Migrated from Mailgun (100/day) to Brevo (300/day free)
- Added Brevo DKIM CNAMEs and verification TXT
Monitoring:
- Probe frequency: 30m → 20m, alert thresholds adjusted to 60m
- Enabled Dovecot exporter scraping (port 9166)
- Added external SMTP monitor on public IP
Documentation:
- New docs/architecture/mailserver.md with full architecture
- New docs/architecture/mailserver-visual.html visualization
- Updated monitoring.md, CLAUDE.md, historical plan docs
Viktor Barzin