Commit graph

4 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Viktor Barzin
53657d9952 infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress
Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier
and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why
they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the
call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future
readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their
own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately:
  - navidrome   (Subsonic user/password)
  - ntfy        (deny-all default + user.db tokens)
  - nextcloud   (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords)
  - vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth)
  - headscale   (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes)
  - paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens)

Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public,
webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or
Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt),
claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api,
fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA
integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster
(meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2
(HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT),
owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc),
rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge
(API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker
(forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports).

real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a
prior edit — not touched here.

No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware
chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit
is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-11 19:25:48 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
2db8bdac0d state(dbaas): update encrypted state 2026-05-10 21:00:00 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
e4f806abe3 ingress_factory: replace protected bool with auth enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.

ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
  `protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
  middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
  keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
  client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
  itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
  ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).

Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true`     → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false`     → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
  reviewed individually:
  * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
    homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
  * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
    handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
    xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
    location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
    drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
    `auth = "none"`
  * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
    UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
  k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.

Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.

Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.

Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:53:49 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
0e837b57b8 authentik: add public guest auto-login flow + dedicated outpost + traefik public middleware
Phase 1+2 of default-deny ingress plan. Adds the infrastructure for an `auth = "public"`
ingress tier that auto-binds anonymous requests to a `guest` Authentik user (no UI
prompt), so public sites are still recorded as authenticated by Authentik for audit
purposes — but as `guest`, not by leaking the standard catchall flow.

- guest user in `Public Guests` group (NOT `Allow Login Users`).
- `public-auto-login` flow: stage_binding policy sets `pending_user = guest`,
  `evaluate_on_plan = false` + `re_evaluate_policies = true` so flow_plan is
  populated when the policy mutates it; `authentication = none` lets anonymous
  requests enter.
- `Provider for Public` proxy provider (forward_domain, cookie_domain
  viktorbarzin.me) with `authentication_flow = public-auto-login`.
- Dedicated `public` outpost: only the public provider bound, deployed as
  `ak-outpost-public` Deployment+Service in the `authentik` namespace by
  Authentik's K8s controller.
- `public-auth.viktorbarzin.me` ingress exposes the public outpost's
  `/outpost.goauthentik.io/*` so OAuth callbacks land on it (the embedded
  outpost doesn't know about the public provider, so `authentik.viktorbarzin.me`
  callbacks would fail).
- `authentik-forward-auth-public` traefik middleware points at the public
  outpost service (not via the auth-proxy nginx fallback). The plan's
  `?app=public` dispatch idea was tested and rejected — the embedded outpost
  dispatches purely by Host header, so a dedicated outpost was the only way
  to isolate the public flow without conflicts.

No ingresses use the new middleware yet — Phase 3+4 (the ingress_factory
`auth` variable refactor + audit pass) wires it up. This commit is additive
and behaviour-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 18:26:16 +00:00