The Actual web app boots with ~70 near-parallel requests (55
/data/migrations/*.sql + statics, all served cache-control max-age=0 so
every page load re-validates them). The shared rate-limit middleware
(average 10, burst 50) 429s the tail of that storm, so every cold boot
shows 'Server returned an error while checking its status' and every
load stalls in retry backoff — measured up to 5min stalls when two
loads from one IP overlap. Viktor asked to relax the limit after the
anca slow-load investigation (beads code-7zv).
Same pattern as immich: dedicated actualbudget-rate-limit middleware in
the traefik stack, budget-* ingresses opt out of the default via
skip_default_rate_limit + extra_middlewares.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
6d224861 came from a --no-checkout worktree whose empty index made the
commit drop every file except two. This restores 05b50d2b's full tree and
correctly adds stacks/stem95su/gdrive-sync.tf + the service-catalog stem95su
entry. Forward-only (parent=6d224861, no force-push); [ci skip] since the
live infra was never applied from the broken commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CronJob stem95su-gdrive-sync (*/10) mounts the content PVC RW and
rclone-syncs the read-only Drive folder "claude" (stem claude/files) onto
it (rclone/rclone:1.74.3, scope=drive.readonly, empty-source guard +
--max-delete 25). ESO ExternalSecret stem95su-rclone <- Vault
secret/stem95su. Requires the GCP OAuth app published to Production or the
refresh token expires ~weekly.
Lands the gdrive-sync stack on master (it had landed on a feature branch
by accident on the shared devvm checkout).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second-tier keel drift: actualbudget, mailserver (docker-mailserver + roundcube),
servarr (8 deployments), and authentik pgbouncer are live-enrolled (Kyverno injects
keel.sh/policy=patch) and drifting, but never had the V2 block in Terraform. Added
the full block (KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V2 + keel.sh/match-tag + per-container
KEEL_IGNORE_IMAGE + KEEL_LIFECYCLE_V1) to all 13 deployments. The docker-mailserver
deployment had no resource-level lifecycle at all — added one.
Also fixes a pre-existing bug in modules/kubernetes/anubis_instance: the `replicas`
validation `var.replicas == null || (...)` doesn't null-short-circuit in the current
TF version, failing apply on every single-replica Anubis site (blog, cyberchef,
f1-stream, homepage, jsoncrack, kms, postiz, real-estate-crawler, travel_blog) with
"argument must not be null". Switched to a null-safe ternary.
Verified: actualbudget plan shows no image drift (http-api 26.5.2 downgrade prevented).
The anubis module change triggers a full platform apply.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Emo isn't using the instance and the daily bank-sync CronJob has been
failing because the budget has zero accounts (deleted from the UI),
triggering BankSyncStale. Adds an `enabled` toggle that gates the core
Deployment + Service + Ingress + http-api + CronJob behind a single
plan-time bool while preserving the PVC, so we can flip back to true
later to restore the instance as-was.
Also fixes a latent bug where the http-api Service was always created
even when `enable_http_api=false`.
Apply: 7 resources destroyed (emo deploy/svc/ingress/cf dns/http-api
deploy+svc/cronjob), 0 changes for viktor/anca (moved blocks
migrated their state cleanly to the new [0] addresses). Pushgateway
job bank-sync-emo cleared manually; orphaned external-monitor
synced out by external-monitor-sync.
Adds a fourth auth tier alongside required/public/none. "app" is
functionally identical to "none" — no Authentik middleware attached —
but the distinct name records intent at the call site: this backend
has its own user login (NextAuth, Django, OAuth, bearer-token API,
etc.) and Authentik would only break it.
Why the new tier: with only required/none, every "the app has its
own auth so drop Authentik" decision looked identical at the call
site to "this is an OAuth callback / webhook receiver / native-client
API". Future readers couldn't tell whether a stack was intentionally
unauthenticated or relying on backend auth. Now they can.
Migrates the 8 stacks flipped earlier this session (novelapp, immich,
linkwarden, tandoor, freshrss, affine, actualbudget, ebooks/audiobookshelf)
from "none" to "app". Confirmed no-op: `tg plan` on novelapp showed
"No changes" — same middleware chain, same live state.
The variable description and the .claude/CLAUDE.md Auth section now
spell out the anti-exposure rule: only pick "app" or "none" AFTER
verifying the app has its own user auth ("app") or the endpoint is
intentionally public ("none"). Default stays "required" so accidental
omission fails closed.
[ci skip]
The bank-sync CronJob was posting to /accounts/banksync which fans out to
ALL accounts in a single call. With PSD2/GoCardless's 4-successful-pulls
per-account per-24h quota, a single rate-limited account would 500 the
whole call, and `bank_sync_success` would flip to 0 even though the data
itself was still flowing through manual UI syncs. Result: BankSyncFailing
fired routinely whenever the user had been active in the UI that day —
a structural false positive.
Fix:
* CronJob: enumerate accounts via GET /accounts, POST per-account
/accounts/{id}/banksync, emit bank_sync_account_success and
bank_sync_account_last_success_timestamp labelled by account name.
Roll up bank_sync_success = 1 iff any account succeeded.
* Alerts: drop BankSyncFailing (noise generator). Keep BankSyncStale
at 48h (global drought). Add BankSyncAccountStale at 72h (catches
single-account auth expiry — the real signal we wanted).
Verified: manual run on bank-sync-viktor pushes 6 per-account success +
timestamp series; roll-up bank_sync_success=1; no firing alerts.
Apps with their own user auth + bearer-token APIs were being broken by
Traefik → Authentik forward-auth: every iOS/Android/native client got a
302 to authentik.viktorbarzin.me instead of the JSON they expected.
Authentik's 302+cookie dance can only be followed by a real browser.
Changed:
- immich (Immich mobile app + bearer-token /api)
- linkwarden (NextAuth + Linkwarden mobile clients)
- tandoor (Django auth + Tandoor mobile clients)
- freshrss (Fever/GReader API used by Reeder/FeedMe/etc.)
- affine (workspace auth + AFFiNE desktop/mobile sync)
- actualbudget (server password + Actual mobile/sync clients)
- ebooks/abs (Audiobookshelf iOS/Android app)
Each app's own auth is the gate now. CrowdSec + rate-limit + anti-AI
UA filter still front the ingresses. Same pattern as the novelapp
change earlier this session.
[ci skip]
After fixing the threshold=80% misconfig and seeing two PVCs
(prometheus + technitium primary) get stuck Terminating, a 3rd round
showed four more PVCs (frigate, hackmd, immich-postgresql,
paperless-ngx) in the same state. Same root cause: TF spec'd a
smaller storage size than the autoresizer-grown live value, K8s
rejected the shrink, TF force-replaced the PVC, and the
pvc-protection finalizer held it in Terminating while the pod kept
using the underlying volume.
Bulk-inject lifecycle.ignore_changes = [spec[0].resources[0].requests]
on every kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim block that has
resize.topolvm.io/threshold annotations. The pattern was already
documented in .claude/CLAUDE.md but ~63 stacks were missing it.
Live PVCs are unaffected; this only prevents future TF applies from
attempting the destroy+recreate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
topolvm/pvc-autoresizer's threshold annotation is the FREE-SPACE
percentage below which expansion fires (per upstream README). Setting
it to "80%" means "expand when free-space drops below 80%", i.e. as
soon as the PVC crosses 20% utilization — which caused
prometheus-data-proxmox to be repeatedly expanded from 200Gi to 433Gi
in 70 minutes (six 10% bumps, all when the volume was only ~14% used).
Once the SC opt-in fix landed (1e4eac53) and the inode metrics fix
landed (02a12f1a), the autoresizer started actively misfiring across
75+ PVCs cluster-wide.
Flip the value to "10%" everywhere — that's "expand when free-space
drops below 10%", i.e. at 90% utilization, which is the conventional
semantic and matches the alert thresholds in
prometheus_chart_values.tpl (PVAutoExpanding fires at 80%, PVFillingUp
at 95%).
The CLAUDE.md PVC template was the source of the misconfig, so update
it too. Live PVC annotations were patched in parallel via kubectl
annotate; TF apply on each affected stack will be a no-op against
those live values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Wave 3A (commit c9d221d5) added the `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` marker to the
27 pre-existing `ignore_changes = [...dns_config]` sites so they could be
grepped and audited. It did NOT address pod-owning resources that were
simply missing the suppression entirely. Post-Wave-3A sampling (2026-04-18)
found that navidrome, f1-stream, frigate, servarr, monitoring, crowdsec,
and many other stacks showed perpetual `dns_config` drift every plan
because their `kubernetes_deployment` / `kubernetes_stateful_set` /
`kubernetes_cron_job_v1` resources had no `lifecycle {}` block at all.
Root cause (same as Wave 3A): Kyverno's admission webhook stamps
`dns_config { option { name = "ndots"; value = "2" } }` on every pod's
`spec.template.spec.dns_config` to prevent NxDomain search-domain flooding
(see `k8s-ndots-search-domain-nxdomain-flood` skill). Without `ignore_changes`
on every Terraform-managed pod-owner, Terraform repeatedly tries to strip
the injected field.
## This change
Extends the Wave 3A convention by sweeping EVERY `kubernetes_deployment`,
`kubernetes_stateful_set`, `kubernetes_daemon_set`, `kubernetes_cron_job_v1`,
`kubernetes_job_v1` (+ their `_v1` variants) in the repo and ensuring each
carries the right `ignore_changes` path:
- **kubernetes_deployment / stateful_set / daemon_set / job_v1**:
`spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
- **kubernetes_cron_job_v1**:
`spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config`
(extra `job_template[0]` nesting — the CronJob's PodTemplateSpec is
one level deeper)
Each injection / extension is tagged `# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno
admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2` inline so the
suppression is discoverable via `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/`.
Two insertion paths are handled by a Python pass (`/tmp/add_dns_config_ignore.py`):
1. **No existing `lifecycle {}`**: inject a brand-new block just before the
resource's closing `}`. 108 new blocks on 93 files.
2. **Existing `lifecycle {}` (usually for `DRIFT_WORKAROUND: CI owns image tag`
from Wave 4, commit a62b43d1)**: extend its `ignore_changes` list with the
dns_config path. Handles both inline (`= [x]`) and multiline
(`= [\n x,\n]`) forms; ensures the last pre-existing list item carries
a trailing comma so the extended list is valid HCL. 34 extensions.
The script skips anything already mentioning `dns_config` inside an
`ignore_changes`, so re-running is a no-op.
## Scale
- 142 total lifecycle injections/extensions
- 93 `.tf` files touched
- 108 brand-new `lifecycle {}` blocks + 34 extensions of existing ones
- Every Tier 0 and Tier 1 stack with a pod-owning resource is covered
- Together with Wave 3A's 27 pre-existing markers → **169 greppable
`KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1` dns_config sites across the repo**
## What is NOT in this change
- `stacks/trading-bot/main.tf` — entirely commented-out block (`/* … */`).
Python script touched the file, reverted manually.
- `_template/main.tf.example` skeleton — kept minimal on purpose; any
future stack created from it should either inherit the Wave 3A one-line
form or add its own on first `kubernetes_deployment`.
- `terraform fmt` fixes to pre-existing alignment issues in meshcentral,
nvidia/modules/nvidia, vault — unrelated to this commit. Left for a
separate fmt-only pass.
- Non-pod resources (`kubernetes_service`, `kubernetes_secret`,
`kubernetes_manifest`, etc.) — they don't own pods so they don't get
Kyverno dns_config mutation.
## Verification
Random sample post-commit:
```
$ cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/f1-stream && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ cd stacks/frigate && ../../scripts/tg plan → No changes.
$ rg -c 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ --include='*.tf' --include='*.tf.example' \
| awk -F: '{s+=$2} END {print s}'
169
```
## Reproduce locally
1. `git pull`
2. `rg 'KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1' stacks/ | wc -l` → 169+
3. `cd stacks/navidrome && ../../scripts/tg plan` → expect 0 drift on
the deployment's dns_config field.
Refs: code-seq (Wave 3B dns_config class closed; kubernetes_manifest
annotation class handled separately in 8d94688d for tls_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rewrite-body Traefik plugin (both packruler/rewrite-body v1.2.0 and
the-ccsn/traefik-plugin-rewritebody v0.1.3) silently fails on Traefik
v3.6.12 due to Yaegi interpreter issues with ResponseWriter wrapping.
Both plugins load without errors but never inject content.
Removed:
- rewrite-body plugin download (init container) and registration
- strip-accept-encoding middleware (only existed for rewrite-body bug)
- anti-ai-trap-links middleware (used rewrite-body for injection)
- rybbit_site_id variable from ingress_factory and reverse_proxy factory
- rybbit_site_id from 25 service stacks (39 instances)
- Per-service rybbit-analytics middleware CRD resources
Kept:
- compress middleware (entrypoint-level, working correctly)
- ai-bot-block middleware (ForwardAuth to bot-block-proxy)
- anti-ai-headers middleware (X-Robots-Tag: noai, noimageai)
- All CrowdSec, Authentik, rate-limit middleware unchanged
Next: Cloudflare Workers with HTMLRewriter for edge-side injection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Two operational gaps surfaced during a healthcheck sweep today:
1. **External monitoring coverage**: Only ~13 hostnames (via `cloudflare_proxied_names`
in `config.tfvars`) had `[External]` monitors in Uptime Kuma. Any service deployed via
`ingress_factory` with `dns_type = "proxied"` auto-created its DNS record but was NOT
registered for external probing — so outages like Immich going down externally were
invisible until a user complained. 99 of ~125 public ingresses had no external
monitor.
2. **actualbudget stack unplannable**: `count = var.budget_encryption_password != null
? 1 : 0` in `factory/main.tf:152` failed with "Invalid count argument" because the
value flows from a `data.kubernetes_secret` whose contents are `(known after apply)`
at plan time. Blocked CI applies and drift reconciliation.
## This change
### Per-ingress external-monitor annotation (ingress_factory + reverse_proxy/factory)
- New variables `external_monitor` (bool, nullable) + `external_monitor_name` (string,
nullable). Default is "follow dns_type" — enabled for any public DNS record
(`dns_type != "none"`, covers both proxied and non-proxied so Immich and other
direct-A records are also monitored).
- Emits two annotations on the Ingress:
- `uptime.viktorbarzin.me/external-monitor = "true"`
- `uptime.viktorbarzin.me/external-monitor-name = "<label>"` (optional override)
### external-monitor-sync CronJob (uptime-kuma stack)
- Discovers targets from live Ingress objects via the K8s API first (filter by
annotation), falls back to the legacy `external-monitor-targets` ConfigMap on any
API error (zero rollout risk).
- New `ServiceAccount` + cluster-wide `ClusterRole`/`ClusterRoleBinding` giving
`list`/`get` on `networking.k8s.io/ingresses`.
- `API_SERVER` now uses the `KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST` env var (always injected by K8s)
instead of `kubernetes.default.svc` — the search-domain expansion failed in the
CronJob pod's DNS config. Verified working: CronJob now logs
`Loaded N external monitor targets (source=k8s-api)`.
### actualbudget count-on-unknown refactor
- Replaced `count = var.budget_encryption_password != null ? 1 : 0` with two explicit
plan-time booleans: `enable_http_api` and `enable_bank_sync`. Values are known at
plan; no `-target` workaround needed.
- Callers (`stacks/actualbudget/main.tf`) pass `true` explicitly. Runtime behaviour is
unchanged — the secret is still consumed via env var.
- Also aligned the factory with live state (the 3 budget-* PVCs had been migrated
`proxmox-lvm` → `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` outside Terraform): PVC resource renamed
`data_proxmox` → `data_encrypted`, storage class updated, orphaned `nfs_data` module
removed. State was rm'd + re-imported with matching UIDs, so no data was moved.
## Rollout status (already partially applied in this session)
- `stacks/uptime-kuma` applied — SA + RBAC + CronJob changes live; FQDN fix verified
- `stacks/actualbudget` applied — budget-{viktor,anca,emo} all 200 OK externally
- `stacks/mailserver` + 21 other ingress_factory consumers applied — annotations live
- CronJob `external-monitor-sync` latest run: `source=k8s-api`, 26 monitors active
(was 13 on the central list)
## Deferred (separate work)
- 4 stacks show pre-existing DESTRUCTIVE drift in plan (metallb namespace, claude-memory,
rbac, redis) — NOT triggered by this commit but will be by CI's global-file cascade.
`[ci skip]` here so those don't auto-apply; they will be fixed manually before the
next CI push.
- Cleanup of `cloudflare_proxied_names` list once Helm-managed ingresses (authentik,
grafana, vault, forgejo) are annotated — separate PR.
## Test plan
### Automated
\`\`\`
\$ kubectl -n uptime-kuma logs \$(kubectl -n uptime-kuma get pods -l job-name -o name | tail -1)
Loaded 26 external monitor targets (source=k8s-api)
Sync complete: 7 created, 0 deleted, 17 unchanged
\$ curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "Accept: text/html" \\
https://dawarich.viktorbarzin.me/https://nextcloud.viktorbarzin.me/ \\
https://budget-viktor.viktorbarzin.me/
200 302 200
\$ kubectl -n actualbudget get deploy,pvc -l app=budget-viktor
deployment.apps/budget-viktor 1/1 1 1 Ready
persistentvolumeclaim/budget-viktor-data-encrypted Bound 10Gi RWO proxmox-lvm-encrypted
\`\`\`
### Manual Verification
1. Confirm the annotation is present on an ingress_factory ingress:
\`\`\`
kubectl -n dawarich get ingress dawarich -o \\
jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations.uptime\.viktorbarzin\.me/external-monitor}'
# Expected: "true"
\`\`\`
2. Confirm the new `[External] <name>` monitor appears in Uptime Kuma within 10 min
(CronJob interval). For Immich specifically, it will appear after the immich stack
is re-applied.
3. Verify actualbudget plan is clean:
\`\`\`
cd stacks/actualbudget && scripts/tg plan --non-interactive
# Expected: no "Invalid count argument" errors
\`\`\`
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Context
Deploying new services required manually adding hostnames to
cloudflare_proxied_names/cloudflare_non_proxied_names in config.tfvars —
a separate file from the service stack. This was frequently forgotten,
leaving services unreachable externally.
## This change:
- Add `dns_type` parameter to `ingress_factory` and `reverse_proxy/factory`
modules. Setting `dns_type = "proxied"` or `"non-proxied"` auto-creates
the Cloudflare DNS record (CNAME to tunnel or A/AAAA to public IP).
- Simplify cloudflared tunnel from 100 per-hostname rules to wildcard
`*.viktorbarzin.me → Traefik`. Traefik still handles host-based routing.
- Add global Cloudflare provider via terragrunt.hcl (separate
cloudflare_provider.tf with Vault-sourced API key).
- Migrate 118 hostnames from centralized config.tfvars to per-service
dns_type. 17 hostnames remain centrally managed (Helm ingresses,
special cases).
- Update docs, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, dns.md runbook.
```
BEFORE AFTER
config.tfvars (manual list) stacks/<svc>/main.tf
| module "ingress" {
v dns_type = "proxied"
stacks/cloudflared/ }
for_each = list |
cloudflare_record auto-creates
tunnel per-hostname cloudflare_record + annotation
```
## What is NOT in this change:
- Uptime Kuma monitor migration (still reads from config.tfvars)
- 17 remaining centrally-managed hostnames (Helm, special cases)
- Removal of allow_overwrite (keep until migration confirmed stable)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The http-api sidecar was connecting to the public URL
(https://budget-*.viktorbarzin.me) which goes through Traefik/Authentik.
When pods got rescheduled to different nodes, this caused ETIMEDOUT errors.
Changed to internal service URL (http://budget-*.actualbudget.svc.cluster.local)
which is fast and reliable regardless of pod placement.
Add proxmox-lvm PVCs with pvc-autoresizer annotations for all
SQLite-backed services. Deployments updated to use new block storage
PVCs. Old NFS modules retained for 1-week rollback.
Services: ntfy, freshrss, insta2spotify, actualbudget (x3),
wealthfolio, navidrome (DB only), audiobookshelf config,
headscale, forgejo, uptime-kuma.
Also: set Recreate strategy on ntfy, forgejo, insta2spotify,
wealthfolio (required for RWO volumes).
After node2 OOM incident, right-size memory across the cluster by setting
requests=limits based on max_over_time(container_memory_working_set_bytes[7d])
with 1.3x headroom. Eliminates ~37Gi overcommit gap.
Categories:
- Safe equalization (50 containers): set req=lim where max7d well within target
- Limit increases (8 containers): raise limits for services spiking above current
- No Prometheus data (12 containers): conservatively set lim=req
- Exception: nextcloud keeps req=256Mi/lim=8Gi due to Apache memory spikes
Also increased dbaas namespace quota from 12Gi to 16Gi to accommodate mysql
4Gi limits across 3 replicas.
CPU limits cause CFS throttling even when nodes have idle capacity.
Move to a request-only CPU model: keep CPU requests for scheduling
fairness but remove all CPU limits. Memory limits stay (incompressible).
Changes across 108 files:
- Kyverno LimitRange policy: remove cpu from default/max in all 6 tiers
- Kyverno ResourceQuota policy: remove limits.cpu from all 5 tiers
- Custom ResourceQuotas: remove limits.cpu from 8 namespace quotas
- Custom LimitRanges: remove cpu from default/max (nextcloud, onlyoffice)
- RBAC module: remove cpu_limits variable and quota reference
- Freedify factory: remove cpu_limit variable and limits reference
- 86 deployment files: remove cpu from all limits blocks
- 6 Helm values files: remove cpu under limits sections
Add Kubernetes ingress annotations for Homepage auto-discovery across
~88 services organized into 11 groups. Enable serviceAccount for RBAC,
configure group layouts, and add Grafana/Frigate/Speedtest widgets.
Phase 5 — CI pipelines:
- default.yml: add SOPS decrypt in prepare step, change git add . to
specific paths (stacks/ state/ .woodpecker/), cleanup on success+failure
- renew-tls.yml: change git add . to git add secrets/ state/
Phase 6 — sensitive=true:
- Add sensitive = true to 256 variable declarations across 149 stack files
- Prevents secret values from appearing in terraform plan output
- Does NOT modify shared modules (ingress_factory, nfs_volume) to avoid
breaking module interface contracts
Note: CI pipeline SOPS decryption requires sops_age_key Woodpecker secret
to be created before the pipeline will work with SOPS. Until then, the old
terraform.tfvars path continues to function.
Final batch: servarr (aiostreams, listenarr, readarr, soulseek,
prowlarr, qbittorrent, lidarr) and actualbudget factory.
All use ../../../modules/kubernetes/nfs_volume (3 levels deep).
Remove the module "xxx" { source = "./module" } indirection layer
from all 66 service stacks. Resources are now defined directly in
each stack's main.tf instead of through a wrapper module.
- Merge module/main.tf contents into stack main.tf
- Apply variable replacements (var.tier -> local.tiers.X, renamed vars)
- Fix shared module paths (one fewer ../ at each level)
- Move extra files/dirs (factory/, chart_values, subdirs) to stack root
- Update state files to strip module.<name>. prefix
- Update CLAUDE.md to reflect flat structure
Verified: terragrunt plan shows 0 add, 0 destroy across all stacks.
