PrivateBin's UI POSTs the encrypted blob to `/` via XHR. With Anubis in
front, the catch-all CHALLENGE rule returned an HTML challenge page
where the JS expected JSON, so paste creation failed silently for every
user. The challenge cookie didn't bypass it — Anubis appears to issue a
fresh challenge on POST regardless of cookie state.
Pastes are client-side encrypted; AI scrapers gain nothing from
indexing them, so the default `anti_ai_scraping` middleware is enough
protection. Restoring the ingress to point straight at the privatebin
service. CSP `wasm-unsafe-eval` retained — PrivateBin's zlib.wasm
needs it independent of Anubis.
This matches the rule already documented in infra/.claude/CLAUDE.md:
"DO NOT put Anubis in front of Git/API/WebDAV/CLI endpoints — clients
without JS can't solve PoW." A SPA's XHR is the same shape.
Verified: GET / returns PrivateBin HTML (not the Anubis challenge),
POST / returns PrivateBin's own JSON error envelope.
Single Deployment of mostlygeek/llama-swap:cuda hot-swaps three
GGUF vision models (qwen3vl-8b, minicpm-v-4-5, qwen3vl-4b) at one
OpenAI-compat /v1 endpoint on Service llama-swap.llama-cpp.svc.
Idle TTL 10min so models unload between benchmark batches.
Storage: NFS-RWX from /srv/nfs-ssd/llamacpp (30Gi). One-shot
download Job pulls Q4_K_M GGUF + mmproj per model, creates stable
model.gguf / mmproj.gguf symlinks so the llama-swap config is
filename-agnostic, then warms the kernel page cache.
GPU: nvidia.com/gpu=1 = whole T4 — operator must scale immich-ml
to 0 during benchmark windows. wait_for_rollout=false so apply
doesn't block on GPU availability.
Initial use case: vision-LLM benchmark for instagram-poster
candidate scoring; future consumers (HA, agentic tooling) hit
the same endpoint via LiteLLM at the gateway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug found via E2E test against the Windows VM (VMID 300). The single
shared `state` dict in slack-notifier.py worked when vlmcsd processed
one connection at a time, but real Windows KMS activations hold the
connection open ~30 seconds (handshake + keep-alive). During that
window vlmcsd accepts other concurrent connections — most relevantly
the new kubelet TCP readiness probe every 5s — and each new OPEN line
reset the shared state, wiping the in-flight activation's
app/product/host before its CLOSE arrived. Result: real activations
were misclassified as probes (no Slack post, no metric increment).
Fix: state is now a dict keyed by `ip:port` with one sub-dict per
in-flight connection. A `__current` pointer tracks the most recent
OPEN so unkeyed detail lines (Application ID, Workstation name, etc.)
can be attributed correctly — vlmcsd writes detail lines immediately
after the OPEN and before any subsequent OPEN, so the heuristic holds.
Orphan CLOSEs (notifier started mid-conn) are now silently dropped
instead of emitting an empty probe event.
Two new regression tests:
- test_kubelet_probe_during_long_activation: 5s probe interleaved into
a 31s activation block — exact production failure mode.
- test_orphan_close_no_event: bare CLOSE without prior OPEN.
Verified live: triggered slmgr /upk + /ipk + /skms 10.0.20.202 + /ato
on WIN10Pro-DS32. vlmcsd logged the full activation block, notifier
posted to Slack with ip=192.168.1.230 source=external
product='Windows 10 Professional' host='WIN10Pro-DS32.viktorbarzin.lan'
and kms_activations_total{product=Windows 10 Professional,
status=Licensed} 1 — real WAN client IP preserved through the
ETP=Local + dedicated MetalLB IP chain end to end.
After a rollout-restart, the main container (default Always for :latest)
pulled the new image with alembic 0003, but the init container
defaulted to IfNotPresent and reused a cached old image lacking 0003 →
"Can't locate revision identified by '0003'" → CrashLoopBackOff.
Setting Always on the init container so both containers stay in lockstep
across rollouts. Longer term we should switch the deployment to 8-char
git-SHA tags per the cluster policy in .claude/CLAUDE.md, but this
unblocks the Wave 1 deploy in the meantime.
Two coupled fixes for the hourly Slack noise + missing client IPs:
1. Move windows-kms off shared 10.0.20.200 to a dedicated MetalLB IP
10.0.20.202 with externalTrafficPolicy=Local, so vlmcsd sees real
WAN client IPs (pfSense WAN forwards do DNAT-only; ETP=Local skips
kube-proxy SNAT). Same pattern mailserver used pre-2026-04-19.
Sharing 10.0.20.200 is blocked because all 10 services there are
ETP=Cluster and MetalLB requires consistent ETP per shared IP.
2. Slack notifier now suppresses Slack posts for bare TCP open/close
pairs (no Application/Activation block) — these are Uptime Kuma's
port monitor and the new kubelet readiness/liveness probes. Probe
counts go to a new metric kms_connection_probes_total{source} where
source classifies the IP as internal_pod / cluster_node / external.
Real activations are unaffected.
Pod fluidity: added TCP readiness/liveness probes on 1688 to gate Pod
Ready on the listener actually being up — required for ETP=Local so
MetalLB only advertises 10.0.20.202 from a node where vlmcsd is serving.
pfSense side (applied separately, not codified):
- New alias k8s_kms_lb = 10.0.20.202 (KMS-only)
- WAN:1688 NAT + filter rule retargeted from k8s_shared_lb to k8s_kms_lb
- All other forwards on k8s_shared_lb (WireGuard, HTTPS, shadowsocks,
smtps, etc.) untouched
Runbook updated. Tests added for classify_source / is_probe / process_line.
Adds 3 new keys (ACTUALBUDGET_API_URL/KEY/SYNC_ID) sourced from
Vault secret/fire-planner so the FastAPI backend can read viktor's
spending from the in-cluster actualbudget HTTP API and prefill the
Annual spending field on the WhatIf form. Vault keys seeded manually
ahead of this commit; ESO has already synced the K8s Secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-site `x402_instance` module created one Deployment + Service +
PDB per protected host (9 in total, 9×64Mi). Every pod was running the
exact same logic with the same config — the only thing that varied
was the upstream URL, which we don't even need since the gateway can
return 200 to "allow" and Traefik handles the upstream itself.
Refactor to the same pattern as `ai-bot-block`:
* single deployment + service in `traefik` namespace, 2 replicas, HA
* Traefik `Middleware` CRD `x402` (forwardAuth → x402-gateway:8080/auth)
* each consumer ingress just appends `traefik-x402@kubernetescrd` to
its middleware chain via `extra_middlewares`
x402-gateway gains a `MODE=forwardauth` env var that returns 200 (allow)
or 402 (with x402 PaymentRequiredResponse body) instead of reverse-
proxying. Image: ghcr ... f4804d62.
Pod count: 9 → 2 (78% memory saved). All 9 sites verified still
serving the Anubis challenge to plain curl with identical TTFB.
DRY_RUN until `var.x402_wallet_address` is set on the traefik stack.
Removes `modules/kubernetes/x402_instance/` (dead code now).
Adds modules/kubernetes/x402_instance/ — a small Go reverse proxy
(forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/x402-gateway:ce333419) that selectively
issues HTTP 402 Payment Required to declared AI-bot User-Agents and
validates X-PAYMENT headers against a Coinbase x402 facilitator.
Browsers are forwarded transparently to Anubis (which then handles the
JS PoW gate as before).
Wired into all nine Anubis-fronted sites:
ingress -> x402-X -> anubis-X -> backend
While `wallet_address` is empty the gateway runs in DRY_RUN — every
request is transparent-proxied, no 402s issued. This lets the pod sit
in the request path with zero behavioural impact today; flipping the
wallet variable in the per-stack module call activates payment-required
mode for AI-bot UAs.
Default config: Base mainnet USDC, $0.01/req, x402.org/facilitator,
catch-all UA list (ClaudeBot|GPTBot|Bytespider|meta-externalagent|
PerplexityBot|GoogleOther|cohere-ai|Diffbot|Amazonbot|
Applebot-Extended|FacebookBot|ImagesiftBot|YouBot|anthropic-ai|
Claude-Web|petalbot|spawning-ai|scrapy|python-requests).
Verified post-apply: 9/9 pods Running, all 9 sites still serve the
Anubis challenge to plain curl with identical TTFB, x402 logs confirm
"dry_run":true on every instance.
Earlier f1 revert left the host fully unprotected (no Anubis,
exclude_crowdsec=true on the ingress already). Re-add Anubis with
a custom policy_yaml that:
- ALLOWs /_app/* (SvelteKit immutable JS/CSS chunks loaded before
any cookie exists), /openapi.json, /docs, /api/* (FastAPI meta).
- ALLOWs the 9 known JSON/proxy routes (schedule, streams,
embed, embed-asset, extract, extractors, health, proxy, relay)
so the SvelteKit SPA's XHRs return JSON instead of the challenge
HTML.
- Catch-all CHALLENGE for everything else — the SPA HTML pages
(which fall through to FastAPI's `/{path}` catch-all) get the
PoW gate.
The ALLOWed JSON routes are technically scrapeable by a determined
bot, but the user's stated goal is "avoid accidental scrapes" — the
HTML/SPA is the AI-training target, and that stays gated.
Verified: / → Anubis challenge HTML; /schedule, /streams → JSON;
/_app/.../app.js → text/javascript; ClaudeBot UA → Anubis deny page.
f1.viktorbarzin.me is a SPA whose JS fetches /schedule, /embed,
/embed-asset, … on the same path tree. With Anubis fronting `/`,
those XHRs land on the challenge HTML even when the cookie *should*
be valid, breaking the page with `Unexpected token '<', "<!doctype "
... is not valid JSON`. Removed Anubis from f1 — would need a path
carve-out (the way wrongmove does for /api) to re-enable. Added a
top-of-block comment so future me remembers why.
Plus four new Prometheus alerts in `Slow Ingress Latency` group
(stacks/monitoring/.../prometheus_chart_values.tpl):
- IngressTTFBHigh (warn, 10m, avg latency >1s)
- IngressTTFBCritical (crit, 5m, avg latency >3s)
- IngressErrorRate5xxHigh (crit, 5m, 5xx >5%)
- AnubisChallengeStoreErrors (crit, 5m, any 5xx on *anubis* services
via Traefik — proxies for the in-pod challenge-store error since
Anubis itself only exposes Go-runtime metrics)
Notes from the alert author: avg-not-p95 because the existing
Prometheus scrape config drops traefik bucket series; once those
are restored, swap to histogram_quantile(0.95). TraefikDown inhibit
rule extended to suppress these four during a Traefik outage.
Browser visits to viktorbarzin.me started returning HTTP 500 with
`store: key not found: "challenge:..."` in pod logs. Root cause:
each Anubis pod stores in-flight challenges in process memory; with
2 replicas behind a ClusterIP, the PoW-solved request can be
routed to a different pod than the one that issued the challenge.
Anubis upstream documents the same caveat ("when running multiple
instances on the same base domain, the key must be the same across
all instances" — true for the ed25519 signing key, but the
challenge store is still pod-local without a shared backend).
Drop module default replicas: 2 → 1. Worst-case: ~1s cold-start on
pod restart. Real fix (Redis-backed challenge store) noted as a
follow-up in CLAUDE.md.
Roll Anubis out to: f1-stream, cyberchef (cc), jsoncrack (json),
privatebin (pb), homepage (home), real-estate-crawler (wrongmove
UI only — `/api` ingress stays direct via path-based ingress carve-
out so XHRs from the SPA bypass the challenge).
End-state: 9 public hosts now Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms,
travel, f1, cc, json, pb, home, wrongmove). All return the
challenge HTML to bare curl/browser; verified-IP search engines and
/robots.txt + /.well-known still skip via the strict-policy
allowlist.
The SPA can't carry an Authentik session on its own fetch() XHRs in
all cases (cross-origin redirect to authentik.viktorbarzin.me on a
stale cookie returns HTML, fetch().json() parse fails). Splitting
the ingress so /api/ paths skip forward-auth lets the React app talk
to its API end-to-end. The browser still has to log in via
Authentik to load the SPA at /.
Verified end-to-end via chrome-service Playwright: dashboard load,
scenario list, what-if run with real Monte Carlo, save-as-scenario
round-trip, run-now on detail, delete — all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds modules/kubernetes/anubis_instance/ — a per-site reverse proxy
instance pinned to ghcr.io/techarohq/anubis:v1.25.0. Each instance
issues a 30-day JWT cookie scoped to viktorbarzin.me after a tiny
proof-of-work (difficulty 2 ≈ 250 ms desktop / 700 ms mobile). The
shared ed25519 signing key (Vault: secret/viktor → anubis_ed25519_key)
makes a single solve good across every Anubis-fronted subdomain.
Wired into blog (viktorbarzin.me + www), kms.viktorbarzin.me, and
travel.viktorbarzin.me — each with anti_ai_scraping=false on the
ingress so the redundant ai-bot-block forwardAuth is dropped from the
chain. Skipped forgejo (Git/API clients can't solve PoW) and resume
(replicas=0).
Also tightens bot-block-proxy nginx timeouts (3s/5s → 100ms/200ms) so
any ingress still using the ai-bot-block forwardAuth pays at most
~150 ms when poison-fountain is scaled down, instead of 3 s.
End-to-end TTFB on viktorbarzin.me dropped from ~3.2 s to ~150-200 ms.
Docs: .claude/reference/patterns.md "Anti-AI Scraping" updated to
4 layers; .claude/CLAUDE.md adds the Anubis usage paragraph and
Forgejo/API caveat.
ingress_factory's port var defaults to 80, but fire-planner publishes
on 8080. Traefik logged 'Cannot create service error="service port
not found"' and 404'd every request. Cloudflare's standard
origin-error decoy page (with the noindex meta + cdn-cgi/content
honeypot link) made it look like a bot-block, but it was just the
upstream coming back 404.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Slack notifier now also exposes /metrics on :9101 with stdlib HTTP — counts
activations and dedup-skips by product, gauges last-activation timestamp.
Pod template gets the standard prometheus.io/scrape annotations so the
cluster-wide kubernetes-pods job picks it up via pod IP. Memory request
bumped to 48Mi to cover counter dicts + HTTPServer.
Plus docs: networking.md footnotes the windows-kms row noting public WAN
exposure with the rate-limited (max-src-conn 50, max-src-conn-rate 10/60,
overload <virusprot> flush) pfSense filter rule, and a new runbook covers
log locations, rate-limit tuning, and how to revoke the WAN forward.
The matching pfSense rule was tightened in place (TCP-only + rate limits)
via SSH; pfSense isn't Terraform-managed.
daily-backup ran out of its 1h budget and SIGTERMed for 10 days straight (Apr
30 → May 9). Each failed run left its snapshot mount stacked on /tmp/pvc-mount,
which blocked the next run from completing — root cause of the WeeklyBackupStale
alert going silent (the metric never reached its end-of-script push).
Fixes:
- TimeoutStartSec 1h → 4h (current workload of 118 PVCs needs ~1.5h, was hitting
the wall during week 18 runs)
- Recursive umount + LUKS cleanup on EXIT trap, plus the same at script start as
belt-and-braces for any inherited stuck state from a prior crashed run
- TERM/INT trap pushes status=2 metric so WeeklyBackupFailing fires instead of
the alert going blind on systemd kills
- pfsense metric pushed in BOTH success and failure paths (was only on success;
any ssh-to-pfsense outage made PfsenseBackupStale silent until the alert
threshold expired)
Postiz backup CronJob: bundled bitnami PG/Redis live on local-path (K8s node
OS disk) — outside Layer 1+2 of the 3-2-1 pipeline. Added postiz-postgres-backup
that pg_dumps postiz + temporal + temporal_visibility daily 03:00 to
/srv/nfs/postiz-backup, getting Layer 3 offsite coverage. Verified end-to-end:
3 dumps written, Pushgateway metric received. Note: bitnamilegacy/postgresql
image is stripped (no curl/wget/python) — switched to docker.io/library/postgres
matching the dbaas/postgresql-backup pattern with apt-installed curl.
Doc reconcile (backup-dr.md): metric names had drifted (e.g. the docs claimed
backup_weekly_last_success_timestamp but the script pushes
daily_backup_last_run_timestamp). Updated to match what's actually emitted, and
added a "default-covered" footnote to the Service Protection Matrix so the
~40 services with PVCs not enumerated in the table are no longer ambiguous.
Manual PVE-host actions (out-of-band, not in TF):
- unmounted 6 stacked snapshots from /tmp/pvc-mount
- pruned 5 stale snapshots on vm-9999-pvc-67c90b6b... (origin LV that the
loop got SIGTERMed against repeatedly, so prune kept failing)
- created /srv/nfs/postiz-backup directory
- triggered a one-shot daily-backup run with the new TimeoutStartSec to
validate the fix end-to-end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wealth, Payslips, and Job-Hunter Grafana datasources all baked the
rotating PG password into their ConfigMap at TF-apply time, so every
7-day Vault static-role rotation silently broke the panels until a
manual `terragrunt apply`. Same family as the recurring grafana-mysql
backend bug — Grafana caches creds at startup and never picks up the
new ESO-synced password without a restart.
Fix:
- Each source stack now creates an ExternalSecret in `monitoring`
exposing the rotating password as `<NAME>_PG_PASSWORD` env-var.
- Grafana mounts those via `envFromSecrets` (optional=true so a
missing source stack doesn't block boot) and the datasource
ConfigMaps reference `$__env{<NAME>_PG_PASSWORD}` instead of a
literal password.
- `reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"` on the Grafana pod restarts
it whenever any of the four DB-cred Secrets is updated.
Tested end-to-end: forced `vault write -force database/rotate-role/
pg-wealthfolio-sync` → ESO synced (~30s) → reloader fired →
Grafana booted with new env in ~50s total → all three /api/datasources
/uid/*/health endpoints return "Database Connection OK".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mysql-standalone OOMKilled May 8 18:05 (anon-rss 2 GB at the 2 Gi limit).
innodb_buffer_pool_size=1Gi plus connection buffers and InnoDB internals
don't fit in 2 Gi. Bumping limit to 4 Gi (request 3 Gi) leaves headroom
without changing the buffer pool config.
/srv/nfs was at 90% (1.7T / 2T); grew the underlying pve/nfs-data LV
1 TiB online and ran resize2fs (now 60% used). Triggered by surfacing
during the 2026-05-09 IO-pressure post-mortem; thinpool had ~4.6 TiB
free.
The post-mortem also covers the stale-NFS-client trigger (legacy
/usr/local/bin/weekly-backup pointing at the decommissioned TrueNAS IP)
and the resulting wedged kthread on the PVE host. Script removed and
node_exporter restarted out-of-band; kthread will clear at next PVE
reboot. See docs/post-mortems/2026-05-09-io-pressure-stale-nfs.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
instagram-approval: after every tap, immediately fetch /candidates?limit=1
and send the next photo as a fresh inline-keyboard message — the user's
tap chains back into this same workflow, so the loop is user-paced.
When the pool is exhausted, send an 'all caught up' summary with the
backlog count + cumulative training stats.
instagram-discover: cron throttled from every-30-min to daily 09:00.
The chain handles ongoing training; the daily run only kickstarts a
session if the user hasn't been tapping. Limit reduced from 3 → 1 so
each kickstart sends a single photo (chain takes over).
Stories+feed posts via Postiz failed with state=ERROR and Postiz
mistranslated the cause as 'Invalid Instagram image resolution
max: 1920x1080px'. Real cause: Postiz hands Meta an upload URL
under https://postiz.viktorbarzin.me/uploads/... and Meta gets a
302 to the Authentik login page instead of bytes. Meta returns
error 36001 (image not fetchable) which Postiz maps to that
misleading resolution string.
Split the ingress: /uploads/* on a public ingress (matches the
instagram-poster /image+/original pattern), everything else
remains behind Authentik forward-auth. /uploads contents are
random UUIDs, low blast radius if scraped.
Standalone provider (instagram-standalone OAuth flow) is what the user
is trying after the FB-Login path was blocked by their Business Account
ad-policy flag. Uses modern scope names (instagram_business_*), so no
JS patch needed unlike the FB-Login provider.
The old port-5050 R/W private registry was decommissioned 2026-05-07
(forgejo-registry-consolidation Phase 4). The reverse-proxy ingress
+ ExternalName service + Cloudflare DNS record kept pointing at the
dead backend, returning 502 to anyone hitting registry.viktorbarzin.me.
This was driving 3 monitoring artifacts that auto-cleared on cleanup:
- Uptime Kuma external monitor #586 (deleted)
- Pushgateway stale registry-integrity-probe metrics (deleted)
- ExternalAccessDivergence + RegistryIntegrityProbeStale alerts
The Prometheus scrape config for the kubernetes-nodes job kept
capacity_bytes + used_bytes but dropped available_bytes. pvc-autoresizer
computes utilization from available/capacity, so without that metric it
was silent for every PVC in the cluster — including mailserver, which
filled to 89% (1.7G/2.0G) and started rejecting all inbound mail with
'452 4.3.1 Insufficient system storage' (15+ hours, all real senders:
Brevo, Gmail, Facebook).
Also bumps the floors of mailserver (2Gi -> 5Gi, limit 10Gi) and forgejo
(15Gi -> 30Gi) PVCs to recover from the immediate outage, and adds
ignore_changes on requests.storage so future autoresizer expansions
don't cause TF drift.
User dropped Postiz/Instagram OAuth (Meta Business Account flagged
+ Postiz scope drift). New pipeline ends at Telegram — full-quality
JPEG delivered to the bot chat, manually uploaded to IG by the user.
- Image bumped to 25e46efd: adds /deliver/{asset_id} endpoint that
multipart-uploads to Telegram (URL-fetch fails through Cloudflare
for >5MB), then tags 'posted' in Immich.
- ESO now syncs telegram_bot_token + telegram_chat_id from Vault.
- Public ingress paths grow to ['/image', '/original'] (Authentik
bypass on /original is harmless — files are user-tagged, low blast
radius — and useful for ad-hoc browser downloads).
- Memory limit 512Mi -> 1500Mi: full-resolution Pillow HEIC decode
was OOMing on 12MP+ phone photos.
- discover.json simplified to scan -> deliver per item; approval and
post workflows already deactivated. Telegram bot webhook removed.
Postiz backend was crashlooping on connect ECONNREFUSED ::1:7233 —
Postiz needs Temporal for cron/scheduled posts and the Helm chart
doesn't bundle it. Added a single-replica temporalio/auto-setup:1.28.1
Deployment in the postiz namespace, backed by the bundled
postiz-postgresql (separate `temporal` + `temporal_visibility`
databases pre-created via init container), ENABLE_ES=false (Postiz
only uses the workflow engine, not visibility search). Skips
DYNAMIC_CONFIG_FILE_PATH because that file isn't bundled in
auto-setup.
Auth audit:
- postiz: ingress now `protected = true` (Authentik forward-auth).
Postiz also has its own login on top, but registration is no
longer exposed to the open internet.
- instagram-poster: split into two ingresses on the same host.
`/image/*` stays public (Meta + Telegram fetch the 9:16
derivatives). Everything else (/healthz, /queue, /scan,
/enqueue, /reject, /post-next) sits behind Authentik. The
protected ingress sets dns_type=none — the public one already
created the CF DNS record.
- postiz: set DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL pointing at the bundled subcharts;
the chart does NOT auto-wire even when postgresql.enabled=true, so
the prisma db:push was failing with empty DATABASE_URL.
- n8n approval workflow: swap telegramTrigger -> webhook node so it
works without an n8n-stored Telegram credential. Telegram bot's
webhook is set via setWebhook to https://n8n.viktorbarzin.me/webhook/instagram-approval.
Parse-callback Code node tolerates both shapes ({body:{callback_query:...}}
vs {callback_query:...}) so a future move back to telegramTrigger doesn't break.
- postiz: pin chart name to 'postiz-app' (was 'postiz', wrong path)
and override bundled bitnami subchart images to bitnamilegacy/* —
Bitnami removed bitnami/postgresql + bitnami/redis from DockerHub
in Aug 2025 (Broadcom acquisition).
- postiz: enable initial registration (DISABLE_REGISTRATION=false)
so first admin user can be created in UI; tighten after.
- instagram-poster: add securityContext (fsGroup/runAsUser=10001)
so kubelet chowns the PVC mount for the non-root 'poster' user;
was crashing on alembic with 'unable to open database file'.
- instagram-poster: bump image_tag to 24935ab4 (uvicorn now binds
to port 8000 to match Service contract; was 8080 -> probe 404).
New stacks:
- stacks/postiz/ — Postiz scheduler (Helm chart v1.0.5, image v2.21.7)
with bundled PG/Redis, /uploads PVC on proxmox-lvm, JWT_SECRET
via ESO from secret/instagram-poster.
- stacks/instagram-poster/ — custom Python service that polls Immich
for the 'instagram' tag, reformats photos to 9:16 with blurred-bg
letterbox, exposes /image/<asset_id> publicly so Postiz can fetch.
Image: forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/instagram-poster.
n8n: 3 new workflows (discover, approval, post) for the Telegram
inline-button approval UX. Adds ExternalSecret + env vars for
TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN, TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID, IMMICH_API_KEY, plus static
URLs for the new service.
Vault: seed secret/instagram-poster with telegram_bot_token,
telegram_chat_id, immich_api_key, postiz_api_token,
postiz_jwt_secret before applying.
The previously-baked kubeconfig at /home/node/.openclaw/kubeconfig retained
a service-account token bound to the original (long-dead) pod, so kubectl
calls from inside the openclaw container failed with "the server has asked
for the client to provide credentials" even though the openclaw SA has
cluster-admin and kubelet projects a fresh token at
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.
Add init-container "setup-kubeconfig" that writes a kubeconfig with
tokenFile + certificate-authority paths pointing at the projected
SA volume — kubelet auto-rotates the token, kubectl always reads
fresh creds, no Vault K8s-creds-engine refresh needed.
Verified end-to-end: agent ran `kubectl get nodes -o wide` inside the
pod and delivered a correct one-line summary to Telegram via
openai-codex/gpt-5.4-mini.
The helm provider in this Terraform version doesn't support
list-index access on helm_release.metadata[0]. Switch the
woodpecker_server_host_alias trigger to {helm_version, sha256(values)}
which works regardless of provider quirks. (Original fix landed
2026-05-07; got reverted by a linter pass.)
Companion commit to 92474254 — the new extractor wasn't being
registered, only the file was added. Add the import + register call
in create_registry().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four-agent parallel investigation finally pinned down what's happening
with the hmembeds.one streams. The TL;DR is unexpected: there is no
fingerprint check, no decoder failure, no broken JS — the obfuscated
decoder is trivial to reproduce, but the upstream origin is dead.
Findings (saved at /tmp/jwre/{findings.md, blob-analysis.md,
fingerprint-gap.md, trace-summary.md}):
1. **The "ZpQw9XkLmN8c3vR3" blob is decoy.** It's an Adcash adblock-
bypass config — not the stream URL. The actual stream URL is in a
different inline `<script>` block of the embed HTML.
2. **The real decoder is base64 + XOR with a hardcoded key**, the key
appears literally in the HTML (e.g. `var k="bux7ver6mow4trh1"`).
No browser-derived inputs. We can run it in Python in 50µs.
3. **The decoded URL is JWT-bound to /24 of the requestor's IP**. JWT
payload: `{stream, ip:"176.12.22.0/24", session_id, exp}`. From our
cluster (egress 176.12.22.76) the JWT IP-binding is satisfied.
4. **The origin still returns 404 (GET) / 403 (HEAD).** Tested both
curated embeds (Sky F1 888520f3..., DAZN F1 fc3a5463...) — same
404. Origin landing page (`/`) returns 200, so the host is up;
the `/sec/<JWT>/<embed_id>.m3u8` endpoint specifically refuses.
5. **No fingerprint surface trips this.** Runtime trace via
chrome-service hooks confirmed: decoder reads navigator.userAgent
(heavy), screen dimensions, and a single WebGL getParameter call.
No canvas, audio, fonts, fetch-to-fingerprint-API. JW Player setup
is given a valid file URL — the playlist stays empty because JW
can't fetch the manifest from the (dead) origin.
Verdict: **the legacy curated hmembeds embeds (`888520f3...` Sky F1,
`fc3a5463...` DAZN F1) are upstream-dead.** No browser-side fix is
possible. The community uses these IDs as "24/7 channels" but they're
in a perpetually-offline state right now.
This commit ships the offline decoder anyway, registered as a new
extractor. Two reasons:
- If those origins come back online, no code change needed.
- Future curated hmembeds IDs (added by hand or discovered via
subreddit posts) will resolve through the same path.
Files added: `extractors/hmembeds.py` (~120 lines incl. the decoder
and a `decode_embed(html) -> str | None` helper that's reusable).
Registered in `__init__.py`. The existing CuratedExtractor stays
disabled; this replaces its mechanism with one that can absorb new
embed IDs without code changes.
Bonus from the agent work:
- Confirmed our stealth.js is sufficient — the runtime trace showed
the decoder reads only the surfaces we already cover.
- Identified ~10 fingerprint surfaces we don't spoof (platform,
userAgentData, hardwareConcurrency, deviceMemory, timezone,
AudioContext, ICE candidates) but proved they're not what's
blocking us, so no change needed for now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The kms-web-page deployment now pulls
forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/kms-website:${var.image_tag} (source
in the new Forgejo repo viktor/kms-website). The ConfigMap-mounted
index.html is gone — the new site is a Hugo build with full GVLK
catalog for every Microsoft KMS-eligible Windows + Office edition,
copy-to-clipboard, dark/light themes.
The container image tag is managed by CI (kubectl set image), so
add lifecycle ignore_changes on container[0].image alongside the
existing dns_config (Kyverno) ignore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5 parallel research agents surveyed Stremio addons, F1 TV / Sky / DAZN
official APIs, IPTV M3U lists, and free-to-air broadcasters. The clean
finding: two community Stremio addons already index Sky Sports F1 +
DAZN F1 via their public HTTP APIs — no Stremio client required, just
GET /stream/<type>/<id>.json on the addon's hosted instance.
New `stremio.py` extractor pulls from:
- **TvVoo** (`https://tvvoo.hayd.uk/manifest.json`) — wraps Vavoo IPTV.
Lists Sky Sports F1 UK + Sky Sports F1 HD + Sky Sport F1 IT + Sky
Sport F1 HD DE + DAZN F1 ES. Returns 2 IP-bound m3u8 URLs per
channel. Source: github.com/qwertyuiop8899/tvvoo. Vavoo's CDN SSL
certs are currently expired so most clients fail verification today
— addon framework is right but delivery is degraded.
- **StremVerse** (`https://stremverse.onrender.com/manifest.json`) —
Returns 11+ streams per id (`stremevent_591` = F1, `stremevent_866`
= MotoGP). Mix of DRM-walled DASH, JW-broken-chain JWT URLs, and
HuggingFace-Space proxies that 404 without a per-instance api_password.
The extractor surfaces 15 candidate URLs per run; verifier filters to
the playable subset. Today that subset is 0 (Vavoo cert expiry + JW
chain + proxy auth), but the wiring is correct: as the addons fix
delivery or rotate to fresh URLs, candidates will start passing.
Other agent findings worth noting (not coded but documented):
- F1 TV Pro live = Widevine DASH; impossible without a CDM. VOD is
clean HLS but only post-session.
- Sky Go / DAZN / Viaplay / Canal+ = all Widevine + geo-fenced + active
DMCA enforcement. Pursuing not feasible.
- ServusTV AT (free F1 race weekends) = clean public HLS at
rbmn-live.akamaized.net/hls/live/2002825/geoSTVATweb/master.m3u8 but
geo-fenced; needs an Austrian-IP egress proxy/VPN.
- iptv-org/iptv has an F1 Channel (Pluto TV IE) at
jmp2.uk/plu-6661739641af6400080cd8f1.m3u8 — 24/7 free, BG works,
but only historic races + shoulder programming. Worth adding as a
curated entry later.
- boxboxbox.* (community-favourite F1 race-weekend domain) is dead
across all known TLDs as of today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The default forge-API timeout is 3 seconds. The config-loader makes
4-6 sequential calls per pipeline trigger (probing for .woodpecker dir
then each .woodpecker.{yaml,yml} variant), and Forgejo responses on
this cluster spike to 1-2s under load — easy to trip the cumulative
3s deadline. Result: 'could not load config from forge: context
deadline exceeded' on virtually every pipeline trigger.
This was the actual root cause of the 'Woodpecker forge-API bug'
that v3.13 → v3.14 was supposed to fix — turns out v3.14 didn't
change the timeout default, and the v3.13 successes I saw earlier
were warm-cache flukes.
User asked specifically for r/motorsportstreams. Reddit banned that sub
years ago; the active 12.5k-subscriber successor is r/motorsportsstreams2.
Added it to SUBREDDITS plus r/f1streams (709 subs, public).
Also extended:
- SEARCH_QUERIES with three Sky Sports F1 / live-stream phrases that
catch the `[F1 STREAM]` post pattern the community uses on race
weekends (titles like "[F1 STREAM] Bahrain GP - Live Race | No Buffer
| Mobile Friendly" linking to boxboxbox.pro/stream-1).
- _INTERESTING_HOSTS allowlist with boxboxbox.{pro,live,lol},
pitsport.live, ppv.to, streamed.pk, acestrlms/aceztrims, and the
Super Formula direct CDNs (racelive.jp, cdn.sfgo.jp) — all observed
in last-50-posts on r/motorsportsstreams2.
Where this leaves us, honestly:
- The r/motorsportsstreams2 megathread "Where to watch every F1 race"
recommends EXACTLY the four sites we already pull from: pitsport.xyz,
streamed.pk, ppv.to, acestrlms. The community has the same broken JW
Player chain we have for Sky Sports F1 24/7 streams. There is no
free-and-working alternative they know about.
- boxboxbox.pro (the most-promoted F1 stream domain in race-weekend
posts) is currently NXDOMAIN; .live is parked, .lol unreachable. The
domain rotates after takedowns; Reddit posts will surface fresh ones
when posters share them.
- For F1 specifically: extractor surfaces 2 motomundo.net candidates
(MotoGP wrappers) and lights up to ~6+ during F1 race weekends as
posters share fresh boxboxbox/equivalent URLs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
