# NFS-Hostile Workload Migration — Plan **Date**: 2026-04-25 **Design**: `2026-04-25-nfs-hostile-migration-design.md` **Beads**: code-gy7h (Vault, epic), code-ahr7 (Immich PG) ## Phase 1 — Immich PG (DONE 2026-04-25) | Step | Done | |---|---| | Snapshot extensions + row counts to `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-*` | ✓ | | Quiesce `immich-server` + `immich-machine-learning` + `immich-frame` | ✓ | | `pg_dumpall` → `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-.sql` (1.9 GB) | ✓ | | Add `kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.immich_postgresql_encrypted` (10Gi, autoresize 20Gi cap) | ✓ | | Swap `claim_name` at `infra/stacks/immich/main.tf` deployment | ✓ | | Patch init container to gate on `PG_VERSION` (chicken-and-egg fix) | ✓ | | Force pod restart so override.conf gets written | ✓ | | Restore dump | ✓ | | `REINDEX clip_index`, `REINDEX face_index` | ✓ | | Scale apps back up | ✓ | | Verify: `\dx`, row counts (~111k assets), HTTP 200 internal/external | ✓ | | LV present on PVE host (`vm-9999-pvc-...`) | ✓ | ### Phase 1 follow-ups (not blocking) - Old NFS PVC `immich-postgresql-data-host` retained 7 days for rollback. After 2026-05-02: remove `module.nfs_postgresql_host` from `infra/stacks/immich/main.tf` and the CronJob's reference. - Backup CronJob (`postgresql-backup`) still writes to the NFS module. After cleanup, point it at a dedicated backup PVC or to the existing `immich-backups` NFS share. ## Phase 2 — Vault Raft (DONE 2026-04-25) **Phase 2 complete 2026-04-25; all 3 voters on `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`.** ### Pre-flight (T-0) — DONE 2026-04-25 15:50 UTC - [x] Verify all 3 vault pods sealed=false, raft healthy. - [x] Take fresh `vault operator raft snapshot save` (anchor saved at `/tmp/vault-pre-migration-20260425-155029.snap`, 1.5 MB). - [ ] Optional: scale ESO to 0 — skipped (auto-unseal sidecar is independent; ESO refresh churn is non-disruptive for one swap). - [x] Confirmed leader is **vault-2** → migrate vault-0 first (non-leader), vault-1 next, vault-2 last (with step-down). Plan originally assumed vault-0 was leader; same intent (non-leader first). - [x] Thin pool headroom: 54.63% used, plenty for 6 × 2 GiB LVs. ### Step 0 — Helm values + StatefulSet swap — DONE 2026-04-25 16:08 UTC - [x] Edit `infra/stacks/vault/main.tf`: change `dataStorage.storageClass` and `auditStorage.storageClass` from `nfs-proxmox` → `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`. - [x] `kubectl -n vault delete sts vault --cascade=orphan` (StatefulSet `volumeClaimTemplates` is immutable; orphan keeps pods+PVCs alive while we recreate the controller with the new template). - [x] `tg apply -target=helm_release.vault` → recreates STS with new VCT (full-stack `tg plan` blocks on unrelated for_each-with- apply-time-keys errors at lines 848/865/909/917; targeted apply on the helm release alone is the right scope here). Existing pods still on old NFS PVCs. ### Step 1 — Roll vault-0 first (non-leader) — DONE 2026-04-25 16:18 UTC - [x] `kubectl -n vault delete pod vault-0 --grace-period=30` - [x] `kubectl -n vault delete pvc data-vault-0 audit-vault-0` - [x] STS controller recreated pod; new PVCs auto-provisioned on `proxmox-lvm-encrypted` (LVs `vm-9999-pvc-fb732fd7-...` data 4.12%, `vm-9999-pvc-36451f42-...` audit 3.99%). - [x] **Hit and fixed**: vault-0 CrashLoopBackOff'd with `permission denied` on `/vault/data/vault.db`. The helm chart's `statefulSet.securityContext.pod` block in main.tf only set `fsGroupChangePolicy`, replacing (not merging) the chart's defaults `fsGroup=1000, runAsGroup=1000, runAsUser=100, runAsNonRoot=true`. NFS exports made the missing fsGroup a no-op; ext4 LV needs it to chown the volume root for the vault user. Old vault-1/vault-2 pods were created before that block was added so they still had the chart-default securityContext from their original spec. Fix: provide all five fields explicitly in main.tf and re-apply. Same root cause will affect vault-1 and vault-2 swaps unless this stays in place. - [x] Wait Ready; auto-unseal sidecar unsealed; `retry_join` rejoined raft cluster. - [x] Verify: `vault operator raft list-peers` shows 3 voters, vault-0 follower, leader=vault-2. External HTTPS 200. ### Step 2 — 24h soak (SKIPPED per user direction 2026-04-25) User instructed "continue with all the remaining actions" — soak gates compressed to per-pod settle windows + raft-state verification between rollings. No Raft alarms, no Vault errors observed at each verification gate. ### Step 3 — Roll vault-1 — DONE 2026-04-25 - [x] Force-finalize PVCs to break re-mount race: `kubectl -n vault patch pvc data-vault-1 audit-vault-1 -p '{"metadata":{"finalizers":null}}' --type=merge`. (Initial pod-then-PVC delete recreated pod on the OLD NFS PVCs because pvc-protection finalizer hadn't cleared. Lesson learned and applied to vault-2 below.) - [x] Pod recreated on encrypted PVCs; auto-unsealed; rejoined raft. ### Step 4 — Settle window — DONE 2026-04-25 3-check verification over 90s; raft index advancing (2730010→2730012), all 3 voters healthy. ### Step 5 — Roll vault-2 (leader) — DONE 2026-04-25 - [x] `vault operator step-down` on vault-2; vault-0 took leadership. Confirmed vault-0 active, vault-1+vault-2 standby before delete. - [x] Snapshot anchor at `/tmp/vault-pre-vault2.snap` (1.5 MB) from new leader vault-0. - [x] Force-finalize + delete PVCs + delete pod (lesson from vault-1). - [x] Pod recreated on encrypted PVCs; auto-unsealed; rejoined raft. - [x] `vault operator raft list-peers` shows 3 voters all healthy on encrypted storage; leader vault-0. ### Step 6 — Cleanup — DONE 2026-04-25 - [x] `kubectl get pvc -A` cross-cluster shows zero PVCs on `nfs-proxmox` SC (only Released PVs remain → Phase 3). - [x] Removed inline `kubernetes_storage_class.nfs_proxmox` from `infra/stacks/vault/main.tf` (was lines 29–42). - [x] All 3 PVC pairs on `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`. - [x] `vault operator raft autopilot state` healthy=true. - [x] External `https://vault.viktorbarzin.me/v1/sys/health` = 200. ## Phase 3 — Released-PV cleanup (FOLLOW-UP) ### Step 3.1 — vault Released PVs — DONE 2026-04-25 6 vault NFS PVs (Released, `nfs-proxmox` SC, Retain policy) deleted along with their NFS subdirectories on PVE host (~1.5 GB reclaimed): | PV | Claim | Size on disk | |---|---|---| | pvc-004a5d3b-… | data-vault-2 | 45M | | pvc-808a78ec-… | audit-vault-1 | 1.4M | | pvc-918ee7c1-… | audit-vault-0 | 3.2M | | pvc-9d2ddcb4-… | data-vault-0 | 46M | | pvc-a659711d-… | data-vault-1 | 46M | | pvc-d2e65109-… | audit-vault-2 | 1.4G | Procedure: `kubectl delete pv ` (cluster object only — Retain policy means CSI never touches NFS) then `rm -rf /srv/nfs/` on 192.168.1.127. ### Step 3.2 — Cluster-wide Released PV sweep (DEFERRED) ~50 other Released PVs persist across the cluster (~200 GiB on `proxmox-lvm` and `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`). Out of scope for the 2026-04-25 NFS-hostile session per user direction. To reclaim: 1. List Released PVs, confirm LV exists on PVE. 2. `kubectl delete pv ` (CSI removes underlying LV when PV is orphaned with `Retain` reclaim policy and no PVC reference). 3. If LV survives: manual `lvremove pve/vm-9999-pvc-`. ## Rollback | Phase | Trigger | Action | |---|---|---| | 1 | Immich UI broken / data loss | Revert `claim_name`; restore from `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-*.sql` to old NFS PVC | | 2 (mid-rolling) | Single pod broken | Delete the encrypted PVC; recreate with NFS SC explicitly; cluster keeps quorum from 2 healthy pods | | 2 (post-rolling, raft corrupt) | Cluster-wide failure | `vault operator raft snapshot restore ` | | Catastrophic | All Vault data lost | Restore from latest `/srv/nfs/vault-backup/` snapshot via CronJob output |