infra/stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf
Viktor Barzin cbca281aaa feat(authentik): TripIt external self-signup group + forward-auth fence (ADR-0020)
Viktor wants people outside the homelab to self-register to TripIt with email + a passkey (no password), kept separate from the rest of the homelab. Adds the empty, parentless 'TripIt External' Authentik group and a first-position branch in the catch-all policy that admits those users to tripit.viktorbarzin.me only and denies every other forward-auth host. Inert on apply (group empty => matches no existing user => no lockout). An adversarial review found the fence is forward-auth-only, so the runbook records the OIDC-app containment audit (every sensitive app already requires a trusted group External users won't hold), the Vault->Allow Login Users binding that closes the one open OIDC app, the SMTP prerequisite for email verification, and the before/after access-matrix verification. Flows/SMTP/Vault binding are UI steps per the runbook; the push that applies the catch-all edit must be human-watched (CI auto-applies the authentik stack).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 21:48:04 +00:00

85 lines
3.8 KiB
HCL

# Catch-all forward-auth restriction: gate the admin-only hostnames to the
# "Home Server Admins" group. Bound to the "Domain wide catch all" application
# (binding stays UI-managed; only the expression is adopted here).
#
# Adopted into Terraform 2026-06-04 to add a carve-out: the Kubernetes Dashboard
# (k8s.viktorbarzin.me) ALSO admits the kubernetes-* RBAC groups, so
# namespace-owners (e.g. gheorghe) can reach the dashboard login page. The
# dashboard itself enforces per-namespace access via the pasted ServiceAccount
# token (stacks/rbac/modules/rbac/dashboard-sa.tf) — this policy only controls
# who reaches the page. All other admin-only hosts remain Home-Server-Admins-only.
import {
to = authentik_policy_expression.admin_services_restriction
id = "07a11b85-8f37-4844-aebb-ac9c112ec87c"
}
resource "authentik_policy_expression" "admin_services_restriction" {
name = "admin-services-restriction"
expression = trimspace(<<-EOT
ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS = {
"terminal.viktorbarzin.me",
"frigate.viktorbarzin.me",
"netbox.viktorbarzin.me",
"trading.viktorbarzin.me",
"speedtest.viktorbarzin.me",
"meshcentral.viktorbarzin.me",
"k8s.viktorbarzin.me",
"dashy.viktorbarzin.me",
"prowlarr.viktorbarzin.me",
"qbittorrent.viktorbarzin.me",
"listenarr.viktorbarzin.me",
"shlink.viktorbarzin.me",
"openclaw.viktorbarzin.me",
"openlobster.viktorbarzin.me",
"wealthfolio.viktorbarzin.me",
}
ADMIN_GROUP = "Home Server Admins"
# The K8s Dashboard additionally admits the Kubernetes RBAC groups. Access
# to the page is not the security boundary — the pasted ServiceAccount token
# is (per-namespace admin + cluster read-only). See dashboard-sa.tf.
K8S_DASHBOARD_HOST = "k8s.viktorbarzin.me"
K8S_DASHBOARD_GROUPS = [
"Home Server Admins",
"kubernetes-admins",
"kubernetes-power-users",
"kubernetes-namespace-owners",
]
host = request.context.get("host", "")
# TripIt External containment fence (ADR-0020 in the tripit repo). Publicly
# self-enrolled TripIt users (group "TripIt External", assigned by the
# tripit-enrollment flow's user_write) may reach tripit.viktorbarzin.me and
# NOTHING else. MUST be the FIRST host-dispatch branch: it is a request.user
# predicate that must dominate every host branch below, ESPECIALLY the
# default-allow `if host not in ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS: return True` — placed after
# it, a tagged user would slip into other hosts. Safe to add: the group is
# net-new and created EMPTY, so this matches zero existing principals (no
# lockout). The fence is forward-auth ONLY; OIDC apps (Vault, Immich, …)
# contain External users via their own per-app group bindings — see
# docs/runbooks/tripit-external-signup.md. NEVER co-assign "TripIt External"
# to a trusted/internal user (this branch would fence them out of admin hosts).
if ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="TripIt External"):
return host == "tripit.viktorbarzin.me"
# t3 Workstation edge gate: only members of "T3 Users" may reach t3.
# Placed BEFORE the ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS early-return (t3 is intentionally not in
# that set — it must not require Home-Server-Admins, just T3 Users membership).
if host == "t3.viktorbarzin.me":
return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="T3 Users")
# Not an admin-only host: allow any authenticated user.
if host not in ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS:
return True
# K8s Dashboard: allow admins OR any Kubernetes RBAC group.
if host == K8S_DASHBOARD_HOST:
return any(ak_is_group_member(request.user, name=g) for g in K8S_DASHBOARD_GROUPS)
# Every other admin-only host: Home Server Admins only.
return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name=ADMIN_GROUP)
EOT
)
}