infra/stacks/rybbit/lapi_kv_sync.py
Viktor Barzin f55bb6c422 rybbit: sync excludes CAPI blocklist + fix CF items per_page (500)
The edge CF IP List can't hold the ~31k CAPI community blocklist (already
enforced in-kernel by the firewall-bouncer), so the sync now skips origin=CAPI
and carries only high-signal local/curated decisions (+ a 9000 safety cap).
Also fixes the list-items GET: per_page=1000 returned a misleading CF 400
'invalid or expired cursor' (10027); the endpoint max is 500. Verified live:
crowdsec_ban populates (4 IPs) and the sync exits 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-21 00:05:05 +00:00

346 lines
15 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sync CrowdSec LAPI decisions -> ONE Cloudflare account IP List (block-only).
Cloudflare-PROXIED hosts terminate at the CF edge, so the in-cluster CrowdSec
bouncer (which keys on the client IP Traefik sees) never decides on them. We
push the decisions into the edge instead: a zone-scoped WAF custom rule blocks
`(ip.src in $crowdsec_ban)` across EVERY proxied host in the zone (the Authentik
auth hosts are carved out in crowdsec_edge.tf so a ban can't break login). This
job is the control plane that keeps that one IP List in sync with LAPI.
Enforcement is BAN-ONLY: only scope=="ip" decisions of type "ban" are synced.
"captcha" decisions are deliberately NOT pushed — the CF account allows only ONE
Rules List with a single block action, so folding captcha in would hard-block a
soft challenge across every proxied host. Captcha remediation stays at the
in-cluster Traefik bouncer (Turnstile) for non-proxied apps. (Changed 2026-06-20
from the prior ban+captcha fold that downgraded captcha to a hard edge block.)
(Filename kept as lapi_kv_sync.py for path/ConfigMap continuity with the prior
Workers-KV design; it no longer touches KV — it reconciles a CF Rules List.)
Design notes:
* Pure Python stdlib (no pip/apk at runtime) — runs on stock python:3.12-alpine
mounted from a ConfigMap, the alert_digest pattern.
* FULL RECONCILE each run: read the complete decision set from LAPI, take the
UNION of ban + captcha (scope=="ip") as the single desired set, then compute
add (desired - existing) and remove (existing - desired) against the one
crowdsec_ban list and apply both. A `cscli decisions delete` therefore
clears from the edge within one interval (<=2 min).
* FAIL-SAFE on LAPI: if LAPI can't be read we SKIP the run (list untouched,
exit 0). A LAPI outage thus freezes the edge state rather than wiping the
block list — degrade toward the last-known-good block set, never toward
all-block or a thundering un-ban. (Decisions linger only until the next
successful sync, not their TTL — we reconcile to LAPI truth, we don't
expire entries.)
* FAIL-LOUD on Cloudflare: any CF API error is logged and the job exits
non-zero so the failure is visible (CronJob backoff + missing success
metric + the next run retries).
Cloudflare Rules-Lists API (account-level IP list items), verified against the
official API reference (developers.cloudflare.com, 2026):
* GET /accounts/{acct}/rules/lists/{list}/items -> paginated; next page
cursor at result_info.cursors.after, passed back as ?cursor=. Each
item = {"id","ip","created_on",...}.
* POST /accounts/{acct}/rules/lists/{list}/items -> body JSON ARRAY
[{"ip":"1.2.3.4"},...]. APPENDS/upserts (does NOT replace the list).
ASYNCHRONOUS: returns {"result":{"operation_id":...}}.
* DELETE /accounts/{acct}/rules/lists/{list}/items -> body {"items":[{"id":
"<item_id>"},...]} (delete by item id, not ip). ASYNCHRONOUS.
* GET /accounts/{acct}/rules/lists/bulk_operations/{op_id} -> status in
{pending,running,completed,failed} (failed carries `error`).
ASYNC HANDLING: Cloudflare allows only ONE pending bulk operation per ACCOUNT.
So we must NOT fire add+delete concurrently — we serialize and poll each
operation_id to a terminal state (short bounded timeout) before the next
mutation. If a poll times out we stop mutating for this run and report
partial success (the next 2-min run reconciles the rest); we never abandon an
in-flight op and immediately issue another (that would 409/reject).
"""
import json
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
LAPI_URL = os.environ.get(
"LAPI_URL", "http://crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local:8080"
).rstrip("/")
LAPI_KEY = os.environ["LAPI_KEY"] # kvsync bouncer key, registered in LAPI
CF_ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ["CF_ACCOUNT_ID"]
CF_API_TOKEN = os.environ["CF_API_TOKEN"] # scoped: Account Filter Lists Edit
CF_BAN_LIST_ID = os.environ["CF_BAN_LIST_ID"]
PUSHGATEWAY = os.environ.get("PUSHGATEWAY_URL", "").rstrip("/") # optional
CF_API = "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4"
# Cloudflare item objects expose the ip differently between list and create
# responses; for an IP-kind list each GET item carries a top-level "ip".
# Batch sizes: no official per-request cap is documented, so keep batches
# generous but bounded (well under the global 1200 req / 5 min limit).
BATCH = 1000
# Async op polling: 1 pending bulk op per account, so poll to terminal state.
POLL_TIMEOUT = 25 # seconds to wait for one bulk op (the run has ~110s budget)
POLL_INTERVAL = 1.0
class CFError(Exception):
"""Cloudflare API failure -> job should exit non-zero (fail loud)."""
def _req(url, *, method="GET", headers=None, data=None, timeout=20):
req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method, headers=headers or {}, data=data)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
body = resp.read()
return json.loads(body) if body else None
def _cf(url, *, method="GET", payload=None, timeout=20):
"""Call the CF API with the bearer token; raise CFError on any failure."""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {CF_API_TOKEN}"}
data = None
if payload is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
try:
res = _req(url, method=method, headers=headers, data=data, timeout=timeout)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
detail = ""
try:
detail = e.read().decode(errors="replace")[:500]
except Exception:
pass
raise CFError(f"{method} {url} -> HTTP {e.code} {detail}") from e
except urllib.error.URLError as e:
raise CFError(f"{method} {url} -> {e}") from e
if res is not None and not res.get("success", True):
raise CFError(f"{method} {url} -> not success: {res.get('errors')}")
return res
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# LAPI
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def fetch_decisions():
"""Return the desired set of IPs to BLOCK at the edge.
Only scope=="ip" decisions of type "ban" are projected (the WAF rule keys on
ip.src). "captcha" decisions are deliberately NOT pushed to the edge: the CF
account allows only ONE Rules List with a single block action, so folding
captcha in would HARD-BLOCK a soft challenge across every proxied host (and,
before the auth-host carve-out in crowdsec_edge.tf, could lock a user out of
Authentik itself). Edge enforcement is therefore ban-only; captcha
remediation stays at the in-cluster Traefik bouncer (Turnstile) for
non-proxied apps. Raises on transport/HTTP error so the caller can SKIP the
run (fail-safe). 2026-06-20.
"""
data = _req(
f"{LAPI_URL}/v1/decisions",
headers={"X-Api-Key": LAPI_KEY, "Accept": "application/json"},
)
block = set()
skipped_capi = 0
for d in data or []:
if (d.get("scope") or "").lower() != "ip":
continue
# EXCLUDE the CAPI community blocklist: ~31k IPs, far over a CF IP
# List's capacity, and ALREADY enforced in-kernel for direct hosts by
# the cs-firewall-bouncer DaemonSet. The edge list carries only our
# HIGH-SIGNAL local + curated decisions (own scenarios, cscli-import,
# subscribed lists).
if (d.get("origin") or "").upper() == "CAPI":
skipped_capi += 1
continue
ip = d.get("value")
if not ip:
continue
dtype = (d.get("type") or "").lower()
if dtype == "ban":
block.add(ip)
# captcha / throttle / other remediation types are ignored at the edge
# (ban-only enforcement — see the docstring above)
if skipped_capi:
print(f"[info] excluded {skipped_capi} CAPI decisions (enforced at L3 by "
f"the firewall-bouncer; too many for a CF list)")
# Safety cap: a CF IP List can't hold unbounded entries. Never push more
# than this — keep a bounded, deterministic subset and warn.
MAX_ITEMS = 9000
if len(block) > MAX_ITEMS:
print(f"[warn] desired {len(block)} exceeds {MAX_ITEMS} cap; truncating "
f"(consider a CF plan with a higher list limit)", file=sys.stderr)
block = set(sorted(block)[:MAX_ITEMS])
return block
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Cloudflare list items
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def cf_list_items(list_id):
"""Return {ip: item_id} for every item currently in the list (paginated)."""
out = {}
cursor = ""
while True:
# per_page max for the list-items endpoint is 500; 1000 returns a
# misleading HTTP 400 "invalid or expired cursor" (CF error 10027).
url = f"{CF_API}/accounts/{CF_ACCOUNT_ID}/rules/lists/{list_id}/items?per_page=500"
if cursor:
url += f"&cursor={urllib.parse.quote(cursor)}"
res = _cf(url)
for it in (res.get("result") or []):
ip = it.get("ip")
if ip:
out[ip] = it.get("id")
cursor = (((res.get("result_info") or {}).get("cursors") or {}).get("after")) or ""
if not cursor:
return out
def _wait_for_op(op_id):
"""Poll a bulk operation to a terminal state. Returns True if completed,
False if it timed out (still pending/running). Raises CFError if it failed.
We must reach a terminal state before issuing the next mutation: CF allows
only one pending bulk op per account, so firing another while this is
in-flight would be rejected.
"""
if not op_id:
return True
deadline = time.time() + POLL_TIMEOUT
url = f"{CF_API}/accounts/{CF_ACCOUNT_ID}/rules/lists/bulk_operations/{op_id}"
while time.time() < deadline:
res = _cf(url)
status = ((res.get("result") or {}).get("status") or "").lower()
if status == "completed":
return True
if status == "failed":
raise CFError(f"bulk op {op_id} failed: {(res.get('result') or {}).get('error')}")
time.sleep(POLL_INTERVAL)
print(f"[warn] bulk op {op_id} still {status or 'pending'} after {POLL_TIMEOUT}s; "
f"stopping further mutations this run (next run reconciles)", file=sys.stderr)
return False
def _op_id(res):
return ((res or {}).get("result") or {}).get("operation_id")
def cf_add_items(list_id, ips):
"""POST new IPs to the list (append). Returns the operation_id (async)."""
# If callers ever exceed one batch, each POST is a separate bulk op and the
# single-pending-op rule forces us to wait between them.
last_op = None
for i in range(0, len(ips), BATCH):
chunk = [{"ip": ip} for ip in ips[i : i + BATCH]]
res = _cf(
f"{CF_API}/accounts/{CF_ACCOUNT_ID}/rules/lists/{list_id}/items",
method="POST",
payload=chunk,
)
last_op = _op_id(res)
if i + BATCH < len(ips): # more chunks coming -> serialize
if not _wait_for_op(last_op):
return last_op # timed out; bail (partial), next run continues
return last_op
def cf_delete_items(list_id, item_ids):
"""DELETE items by id. Returns the operation_id (async)."""
last_op = None
for i in range(0, len(item_ids), BATCH):
chunk = {"items": [{"id": iid} for iid in item_ids[i : i + BATCH]]}
res = _cf(
f"{CF_API}/accounts/{CF_ACCOUNT_ID}/rules/lists/{list_id}/items",
method="DELETE",
payload=chunk,
)
last_op = _op_id(res)
if i + BATCH < len(item_ids):
if not _wait_for_op(last_op):
return last_op
return last_op
def reconcile(label, list_id, desired):
"""Reconcile one list to `desired` (a set of IPs).
Returns (added, removed). Serializes add->wait->delete so we respect the
one-pending-bulk-op-per-account limit. Raises CFError on hard failure.
"""
existing = cf_list_items(list_id) # {ip: item_id}
existing_ips = set(existing)
to_add = sorted(desired - existing_ips)
to_remove_ids = [existing[ip] for ip in (existing_ips - desired)]
added = removed = 0
if to_add:
op = cf_add_items(list_id, to_add)
if _wait_for_op(op):
added = len(to_add)
else:
# add op didn't finish; skip the delete this run to avoid stacking a
# second pending op, and report what we attempted.
print(f"[warn] {label}: add op not confirmed; deferring deletes", file=sys.stderr)
return added, removed
if to_remove_ids:
op = cf_delete_items(list_id, to_remove_ids)
if _wait_for_op(op):
removed = len(to_remove_ids)
print(f"[ok] {label}: +{added} / -{removed} (desired={len(desired)}, was={len(existing_ips)})")
return added, removed
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Metrics (best-effort)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def push_metrics(block_n, ok):
if not PUSHGATEWAY:
return
payload = (
"# TYPE crowdsec_cf_list_ban_count gauge\n"
f"crowdsec_cf_list_ban_count {block_n}\n"
"# TYPE crowdsec_cf_list_sync_success gauge\n"
f"crowdsec_cf_list_sync_success {1 if ok else 0}\n"
"# TYPE crowdsec_cf_list_sync_last_run_seconds gauge\n"
f"crowdsec_cf_list_sync_last_run_seconds {int(time.time())}\n"
)
try:
_req(
f"{PUSHGATEWAY}/metrics/job/crowdsec-cf-list-sync",
method="PUT",
headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"},
data=payload.encode(),
timeout=10,
)
except Exception as e: # metrics are best-effort, never fail the job
print(f"[warn] pushgateway: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def main():
# 1. Desired state from LAPI. Any failure here = SKIP (fail-safe).
try:
block = fetch_decisions()
except Exception as e:
print(
f"[skip] LAPI unreadable ({e}); leaving the CF list untouched "
f"(fail-safe: freeze last-known edge state).",
file=sys.stderr,
)
push_metrics(0, ok=False)
return 0
print(f"[info] LAPI desired: {len(block)} block (ban-only, ip-scope)")
# 2. Reconcile the single block list. CF errors fail loud (non-zero exit).
try:
reconcile("block", CF_BAN_LIST_ID, block)
except CFError as e:
print(f"[error] Cloudflare API failure: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
push_metrics(len(block), ok=False)
return 1
push_metrics(len(block), ok=True)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())