infra/stacks/privatebin/main.tf
Viktor Barzin f10784ddb6 infra: document auth = "app|none" tier on every legacy ingress
Sweep through the 30+ stacks that predated the auth = "app" tier
and were tagged auth = "none" without a comment explaining why
they weren't behind Authentik. Each is now self-documenting at the
call site, so the tg-level anti-exposure guard passes and future
readers don't have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Flipped 6 stacks from "none" to "app" — their backends have their
own user auth and the new tier records that more accurately:
  - navidrome   (Subsonic user/password)
  - ntfy        (deny-all default + user.db tokens)
  - nextcloud   (WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV app passwords)
  - vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible token auth)
  - headscale   (OIDC + preauth keys for Tailscale nodes)
  - paperless-ngx (app-layer login + API tokens)

Kept "none" with a comment on the rest — they're genuinely public,
webhook receivers, native-protocol endpoints, OAuth callbacks, or
Anubis-fronted: authentik (×2 + guest outpost), beads-server (dolt),
claude-memory (bearer-token MCP), dawarich, ebooks/book-search-api,
fire-planner /api, forgejo (git/OCI native clients), frigate (HA
integration), immich/frame, insta2spotify /api, instagram-poster
(meta fetcher), k8s-portal, matrix (native bearer), monitoring×2
(HA REST scrapes), n8n (webhooks), nvidia, onlyoffice (JWT),
owntracks (HTTP Basic), postiz, privatebin (client-side enc),
rybbit (analytics tracker), send (E2E file drop), tuya-bridge
(API key), vault (own auth + CLI), webhook_handler, woodpecker
(forgejo webhooks + OAuth), xray (×3 VPN transports).

real-estate-crawler/main.tf:400 already had its comment from a
prior edit — not touched here.

No live state changes — auth = "app" produces the same middleware
chain as auth = "none" (verified earlier this session). This commit
is purely documentation + intent-tagging.
2026-05-22 14:16:44 +00:00

169 lines
4.9 KiB
HCL

variable "tls_secret_name" {
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "nfs_server" { type = string }
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "privatebin" {
metadata {
name = "privatebin"
labels = {
"istio-injection" : "disabled"
tier = local.tiers.edge
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
module "tls_secret" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.privatebin.metadata[0].name
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
resource "kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim" "data_proxmox" {
wait_until_bound = false
metadata {
name = "privatebin-data-proxmox"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.privatebin.metadata[0].name
annotations = {
"resize.topolvm.io/threshold" = "10%"
"resize.topolvm.io/increase" = "100%"
"resize.topolvm.io/storage_limit" = "5Gi"
}
}
spec {
access_modes = ["ReadWriteOnce"]
storage_class_name = "proxmox-lvm"
resources {
requests = {
storage = "1Gi"
}
}
}
lifecycle {
# The autoresizer expands requests.storage up to storage_limit and
# PVCs can't shrink. Without this, every TF apply tries to revert
# to the spec value, K8s rejects the shrink, and the PVC ends up
# in Terminating-but-in-use limbo.
ignore_changes = [spec[0].resources[0].requests]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "privatebin" {
metadata {
name = "privatebin"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.privatebin.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "privatebin"
tier = local.tiers.edge
}
}
spec {
replicas = 1
strategy {
type = "Recreate"
}
selector {
match_labels = {
app = "privatebin"
}
}
template {
metadata {
labels = {
app = "privatebin"
}
}
spec {
container {
image = "privatebin/nginx-fpm-alpine"
name = "privatebin"
image_pull_policy = "IfNotPresent"
port {
container_port = 8080
}
volume_mount {
name = "data"
mount_path = "/srv/data"
sub_path = "data"
}
resources {
requests = {
cpu = "10m"
memory = "128Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "128Mi"
}
}
}
volume {
name = "data"
persistent_volume_claim {
claim_name = kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.data_proxmox.metadata[0].name
}
}
}
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_service" "privatebin" {
metadata {
name = "privatebin"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.privatebin.metadata[0].name
labels = {
"app" = "privatebin"
}
}
spec {
selector = {
app = "privatebin"
}
port {
port = "80"
target_port = "8080"
}
}
}
# Anubis intentionally NOT used here — PrivateBin creates pastes via XHR
# `POST /`, which Anubis's catch-all CHALLENGE rule intercepts and serves
# an HTML challenge page where the JS expects JSON. PrivateBin pastes are
# client-side encrypted, so AI scrapers gain nothing from indexing them;
# the default `anti_ai_scraping` middleware is sufficient protection.
module "ingress" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
# Public pastebin — anyone can create/read pastes. Pastes are client-side
# encrypted; AI scrapers gain nothing from indexing them. anti_ai_scraping
# defaults on for auth=none, which is the existing protection.
# auth = "none": Client-side encrypted pastes — AI scrapers gain nothing from indexing; anti-AI middleware fronts the ingress. No backend user auth by design.
auth = "none"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.privatebin.metadata[0].name
name = "privatebin"
host = "pb"
dns_type = "proxied"
extra_middlewares = ["traefik-x402@kubernetescrd"]
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
custom_content_security_policy = "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'"
extra_annotations = {
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "PrivateBin"
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Encrypted pastebin"
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "privatebin.png"
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Development & CI"
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
}
}