infra/stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf
Viktor Barzin 467eb7d7ee claude-agent: grant shared pod executor powers (Forgejo PR, terragrunt apply, kubectl write, MCP)
Elevates the shared claude-agent-service pod (SA claude-agent, ns
claude-agent) so the nextcloud-todos-exec agent can run autonomously.
Viktor explicitly chose to elevate the SHARED service knowing every
agent on the pod inherits these creds — each grant is security-sensitive
and flagged inline for review.

Vault (stacks/vault/main.tf):
- terraform-state k8s-auth role: add `claude-agent` to
  bound_service_account_names (was only `default` — the pod's own SA
  token could not log in, so scripts/tg apply died fetching the PG
  backend password). `default` kept.
- terraform-state policy broadened from `database/static-creds/pg-terraform-state`
  read only to read on database/static-creds/*, database/creds/*,
  secret/data/* and secret/metadata/* — what stacks read at plan/apply
  time. FLAG: grants the shared pod broad Vault READ (effectively all app
  secrets + rotating DB creds); not denied: secret/data/vault.

claude-agent-service stack (stacks/claude-agent-service/main.tf):
- ExternalSecret: add FORGEJO_TOKEN (secret/ci/global -> forgejo_push_token,
  viktor-scoped admin PAT) and HA_MCP_URL (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
- git-init: add url.insteadOf rewrite to authenticate git pushes to
  forgejo.viktorbarzin.me with $FORGEJO_TOKEN (PRs opened via Forgejo API).
- New claude-agent-exec ClusterRole+Binding: cluster-wide
  get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete on core (incl. secrets),
  apps, batch, networking.k8s.io, rbac roles/rolebindings. Additive to the
  existing read-only claude-agent role; does NOT bind cluster-admin. FLAG:
  very broad — close to cluster-admin in blast radius.
- Vault login: VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_K8S_ROLE env + vault-token-refresher
  sidecar (k8s-auth login role=terraform-state every 30m -> shared
  emptyDir); main container symlinks ~/.vault-token so scripts/tg auto-auths.
- MCP: project-scoped .mcp.json at infra repo root wires `ha` (HTTP,
  ${HA_MCP_URL}) and `paperless` (in-cluster Service, no token in-cluster).

Not applied, not pushed — code only, for human review of the privilege grants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 09:19:10 +00:00

870 lines
29 KiB
HCL

data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "secrets" {
mount = "secret"
name = "claude-agent-service"
}
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "viktor_secrets" {
mount = "secret"
name = "viktor"
}
locals {
namespace = "claude-agent"
# Phase 3 cutover 2026-05-07 — see infra/docs/plans/2026-05-07-forgejo-registry-consolidation-plan.md.
image = "forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/viktor/claude-agent-service"
image_tag = "latest"
labels = {
app = "claude-agent-service"
}
}
# --- Namespace ---
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = local.namespace
labels = {
tier = local.tiers.aux
"resource-governance/custom-limitrange" = "true"
"resource-governance/custom-quota" = "true"
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
# --- Secrets ---
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "external_secret" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
kind = "ExternalSecret"
metadata = {
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
namespace = local.namespace
}
spec = {
refreshInterval = "15m"
secretStoreRef = {
name = "vault-kv"
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
}
target = {
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
}
data = [
{
secretKey = "GITHUB_TOKEN"
remoteRef = {
key = "viktor"
property = "github_pat"
}
},
{
# Forgejo push token for opening PRs on forgejo.viktorbarzin.me
# (exec agent uses the Forgejo API via curl + $FORGEJO_TOKEN, and
# git push over HTTPS via the url.insteadOf rewrite in git-init).
# SECURITY: this is the viktor-scoped admin PAT (write:package +
# repo) shared by Woodpecker — see secret/ci/global/forgejo_push_token.
# The shared claude-agent pod (all agents on it) can now push to
# and open PRs against any repo this token can reach.
secretKey = "FORGEJO_TOKEN"
remoteRef = {
key = "ci/global"
property = "forgejo_push_token"
}
},
{
secretKey = "API_BEARER_TOKEN"
remoteRef = {
key = "claude-agent-service"
property = "api_bearer_token"
}
},
{
# Long-lived OAuth token (1-year) from `claude setup-token`.
# Preferred over the short-lived .credentials.json — CLI picks this up and
# skips the refresh flow entirely. Rotate yearly; alert 30d before expiry.
secretKey = "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"
remoteRef = {
key = "claude-agent-service"
property = "claude_oauth_token"
}
},
{
# Consumed by service-upgrade agent to poll ci.viktorbarzin.me
# per-workflow status. Pod has no Vault CLI auth, so the old
# `vault kv get` path is dead — see bd code-3o3.
secretKey = "WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN"
remoteRef = {
key = "ci/global"
property = "woodpecker_api_token"
}
},
{
# Consumed by service-upgrade agent for Start/Success/Failure
# notifications. Same shared webhook as alertmanager.
secretKey = "SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
remoteRef = {
key = "viktor"
property = "alertmanager_slack_api_url"
}
},
{
# Home Assistant MCP endpoint (community ha-mcp add-on on ha-sofia).
# The URL embeds a secret path-token, so it ships as a secret, not a
# literal. Referenced as ${HA_MCP_URL} by the project-scoped .mcp.json
# in the infra repo root. Same Vault key OpenClaw uses
# (secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url).
secretKey = "HA_MCP_URL"
remoteRef = {
key = "openclaw"
property = "ha_sofia_mcp_url"
}
},
]
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent]
}
# SOPS age key for terraform state decryption
resource "kubernetes_secret" "sops_age_key" {
metadata {
name = "sops-age-key"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
data = {
"keys.txt" = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.viktor_secrets.data["sops_age_key_devvm"]
}
type = "Opaque"
}
# Claude OAuth credentials (for claude -p)
resource "kubernetes_secret" "claude_credentials" {
metadata {
name = "claude-credentials"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
data = {
".credentials.json" = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.secrets.data["claude_credentials_json"]
}
type = "Opaque"
}
# git-crypt key for repo decryption
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "git_crypt_key" {
metadata {
name = "git-crypt-key"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
binary_data = {
"key" = filebase64("${path.root}/../../.git/git-crypt/keys/default")
}
}
# --- RBAC ---
resource "kubernetes_service_account" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
}
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent"
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch"]
api_groups = ["", "apps", "batch"]
resources = ["pods", "pods/log", "nodes", "events", "deployments", "services", "namespaces", "jobs", "cronjobs", "configmaps", "replicasets", "statefulsets", "daemonsets"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["patch", "update"]
api_groups = ["apps"]
resources = ["deployments"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["create"]
api_groups = [""]
resources = ["pods/exec"]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role_binding" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent"
}
subject {
kind = "ServiceAccount"
name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
role_ref {
api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
kind = "ClusterRole"
name = kubernetes_cluster_role.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# claude-agent-exec — broad cluster WRITE for the executor agent
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Added 2026-06-04 for the nextcloud-todos-exec executor elevation. The
# existing `claude-agent` ClusterRole above stays as-is (read + patch
# deployments + pods/exec) — this is purely ADDITIVE.
#
# SECURITY — VERY BROAD, FLAG FOR REVIEW:
# - This grants the SHARED claude-agent pod cluster-wide
# get/list/watch/create/update/patch/delete across the common API groups
# below. EVERY agent that runs on this pod inherits it.
# - It explicitly includes core `secrets` (read+write, cluster-wide) and
# rbac roles/rolebindings (create/update/delete) — i.e. the agent can
# read any Secret in any namespace and grant itself further RBAC. That is
# close to cluster-admin in blast radius, minus a few group wildcards.
# - It intentionally does NOT bind the built-in `cluster-admin` ClusterRole,
# so it lacks: arbitrary CRDs/apiextensions, clusterroles/clusterrolebindings
# bind/escalate beyond what's listed, raw `*` on `*`. Viktor can widen to
# `cluster-admin` by swapping the role_ref below if he decides the scoped
# list is too restrictive.
# Terraform-managed cluster resources must still be changed via `scripts/tg
# apply` (CLAUDE.md Terraform-only rule) — this RBAC is for ad-hoc kubectl
# writes the exec agent needs, not a license to drift Terraform state.
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role" "claude_agent_exec" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent-exec"
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
api_groups = [""]
resources = ["pods", "pods/log", "pods/exec", "services", "configmaps", "secrets", "persistentvolumeclaims", "serviceaccounts", "namespaces", "events", "endpoints"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
api_groups = ["apps"]
resources = ["deployments", "statefulsets", "daemonsets", "replicasets"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
api_groups = ["batch"]
resources = ["jobs", "cronjobs"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
api_groups = ["networking.k8s.io"]
resources = ["ingresses", "networkpolicies"]
}
rule {
verbs = ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
api_groups = ["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"]
resources = ["roles", "rolebindings"]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_cluster_role_binding" "claude_agent_exec" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent-exec"
}
subject {
kind = "ServiceAccount"
name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
role_ref {
api_group = "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
kind = "ClusterRole"
name = kubernetes_cluster_role.claude_agent_exec.metadata[0].name
}
}
# --- Storage ---
#
# The `workspace` volume in the deployment is intentionally emptyDir — agent
# jobs do fresh git clones each run, so a per-pod scratch dir on node disk
# is faster and isolated. The 10Gi `claude-agent-workspace-encrypted` PVC
# that previously sat next to this comment was created but never wired
# into the deployment (sat idle from 2026-04-15 to 2026-05-11).
#
# For cases where the agent DOES need to persist state across pod restarts
# (caches, ad-hoc outputs, anything that should survive a pod reschedule),
# `module.persistent` below provides a 5Gi NFS-backed RWX volume mounted
# at /persistent for state that should survive a pod reschedule. Since the
# service now runs jobs concurrently (bounded semaphore, no single-flight
# lock), agents sharing /persistent must use per-job paths to avoid races —
# per-job *workspaces* are isolated (own clone under /workspace/jobs/<id>),
# but /persistent is shared.
module "persistent" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/nfs_volume"
name = "claude-agent-persistent"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
nfs_server = "192.168.1.127"
nfs_path = "/srv/nfs/claude-agent-persistent"
storage = "5Gi"
}
# --- Deployment ---
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent-service"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
labels = local.labels
}
spec {
replicas = 1
strategy {
type = "Recreate"
}
selector {
match_labels = local.labels
}
template {
metadata {
labels = local.labels
}
spec {
service_account_name = kubernetes_service_account.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
image_pull_secrets {
name = "registry-credentials"
}
security_context {
run_as_user = 1000
run_as_group = 1000
fs_group = 1000
}
# Fix workspace ownership. Kubelet creates the Dockerfile WORKDIR
# (/workspace/infra) inside the emptyDir as root:gid=fsGroup with
# the setgid bit — uid 1000 can't write into it without explicit
# chown + chmod. Pre-create so the path is guaranteed, then chown
# recursively and chmod the infra subdir for safety.
init_container {
name = "fix-perms"
image = "busybox:1.37"
command = ["sh", "-c", "mkdir -p /workspace/infra /persistent && chown -R 1000:1000 /workspace /persistent && chmod 0775 /workspace/infra /persistent"]
security_context {
run_as_user = 0
}
volume_mount {
name = "workspace"
mount_path = "/workspace"
}
volume_mount {
name = "persistent"
mount_path = "/persistent"
}
resources {
requests = {
memory = "32Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "64Mi"
}
}
}
# Copy Claude credentials to writable volume (CLI needs to refresh OAuth tokens)
init_container {
name = "copy-claude-creds"
image = "busybox:1.37"
command = ["sh", "-c", "cp /secrets/claude/.credentials.json /home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json && chown 1000:1000 /home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json"]
security_context {
run_as_user = 0
}
volume_mount {
name = "claude-credentials-secret"
mount_path = "/secrets/claude"
}
volume_mount {
name = "claude-home"
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
}
resources {
requests = {
memory = "32Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "64Mi"
}
}
}
# Init: clone repo + unlock git-crypt on first run
init_container {
name = "git-init"
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
command = ["sh", "-c", <<-EOF
set -e
# Configure git with HTTPS + PAT
git config --global user.name "Claude Agent Service"
git config --global user.email "claude-agent@viktorbarzin.me"
git config --global --add safe.directory /workspace/infra
git config --global url."https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/".insteadOf "git@github.com:"
git config --global url."https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
# Authenticate git pushes/clones to Forgejo so the exec agent can
# branch + push to open PRs on forgejo.viktorbarzin.me. The PR
# itself is created via the Forgejo API (curl + $FORGEJO_TOKEN);
# this rewrite only handles the git transport.
if [ -n "$${FORGEJO_TOKEN}" ]; then
git config --global url."https://$${FORGEJO_TOKEN}@forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/".insteadOf "https://forgejo.viktorbarzin.me/"
fi
# Clone or update repo
if [ ! -d /workspace/infra/.git ]; then
git clone https://$${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/ViktorBarzin/infra.git /workspace/infra
else
cd /workspace/infra
git fetch origin
git reset --hard origin/master
fi
# Unlock git-crypt
cd /workspace/infra
git-crypt unlock /secrets/git-crypt/key || true
EOF
]
env_from {
secret_ref {
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
}
}
volume_mount {
name = "workspace"
mount_path = "/workspace"
}
volume_mount {
name = "git-crypt-key"
mount_path = "/secrets/git-crypt"
}
resources {
requests = {
cpu = "100m"
memory = "256Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "512Mi"
}
}
}
# Seed beads metadata + beads-task-runner agent into runtime volumes.
# The Dockerfile stages these files at /usr/share/agent-seed/ (image
# layer, never mounted). Both /workspace (PVC) and /home/agent/.claude
# (emptyDir) are volume mounts that hide any image-layer content, so
# the files have to be copied in at pod start. Also creates the
# scratch directory the beads-task-runner rails expect.
init_container {
name = "seed-beads-agent"
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
command = ["sh", "-c", <<-EOT
set -e
mkdir -p /workspace/.beads /workspace/scratch /home/agent/.claude/agents
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-metadata.json /workspace/.beads/metadata.json
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/beads-task-runner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/beads-task-runner.md
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/recruiter-triage.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/recruiter-triage.md
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/nextcloud-todos-planner.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/nextcloud-todos-planner.md
cp /usr/share/agent-seed/nextcloud-todos-exec.md /home/agent/.claude/agents/nextcloud-todos-exec.md
EOT
]
volume_mount {
name = "workspace"
mount_path = "/workspace"
}
volume_mount {
name = "claude-home"
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
}
resources {
requests = {
memory = "32Mi"
}
limits = {
memory = "64Mi"
}
}
}
container {
name = "claude-agent-service"
image = "${local.image}:${local.image_tag}"
# Wrap the image CMD so a Vault token is in place before any agent
# runs `scripts/tg apply`. The `vault-token-refresher` sidecar
# k8s-auth-logs-in (role=terraform-state) and writes the token to the
# shared `vault-token` emptyDir at /vault/token; we symlink
# $HOME/.vault-token → that file so `vault` / `scripts/tg` (which fall
# through to ~/.vault-token when $VAULT_TOKEN is unset) pick it up.
# NOTE: this duplicates the image's CMD (uvicorn line below) — if the
# Dockerfile CMD changes, update this too. FLAG for review.
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOF
ln -sfn /vault/token "$HOME/.vault-token"
exec python3 -m uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --app-dir /srv
EOF
]
port {
container_port = 8080
}
env_from {
secret_ref {
name = "claude-agent-secrets"
}
}
env {
name = "WORKSPACE_DIR"
value = "/workspace/infra"
}
# Soft-unbounded concurrency: this caps simultaneous agent runs;
# excess calls queue FIFO rather than 409/503. Each run peaks ~0.5-1.5Gi
# (claude + terraform), so this and the memory limit are sized together.
env {
name = "MAX_CONCURRENCY"
value = "10"
}
# Vault — so `scripts/tg apply` can fetch the Tier-1 PG backend
# password + the broadened app-secret reads. The CLI + scripts/tg
# fall through to $HOME/.vault-token (symlinked above) when
# $VAULT_TOKEN is unset; VAULT_K8S_ROLE tells the refresher which
# role to log in as.
env {
name = "VAULT_ADDR"
value = "http://vault-active.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200"
}
env {
name = "VAULT_K8S_ROLE"
value = "terraform-state"
}
# NOTE on MCP: the HA MCP URL (secret — its path segment is the auth
# token) arrives as env `HA_MCP_URL` via the claude-agent-secrets
# ExternalSecret (env_from above), sourced from Vault
# secret/openclaw -> ha_sofia_mcp_url. The project-scoped .mcp.json
# in the infra repo root references it as ${HA_MCP_URL}. Paperless
# MCP needs no token in-cluster (bearer is enforced only at the
# Traefik ingress), so its in-cluster Service URL is a plain literal
# in .mcp.json.
liveness_probe {
http_get {
path = "/health"
port = 8080
}
initial_delay_seconds = 10
period_seconds = 30
}
readiness_probe {
http_get {
path = "/health"
port = 8080
}
initial_delay_seconds = 5
period_seconds = 10
}
volume_mount {
name = "workspace"
mount_path = "/workspace"
}
volume_mount {
name = "persistent"
mount_path = "/persistent"
}
volume_mount {
name = "sops-age-key"
mount_path = "/home/agent/.config/sops/age"
}
volume_mount {
name = "claude-home"
mount_path = "/home/agent/.claude"
}
# git-crypt key — each job re-unlocks its own clone, so the runtime
# container (not just the git-init init container) needs the key.
volume_mount {
name = "git-crypt-key"
mount_path = "/secrets/git-crypt"
}
# Shared Vault token written by the vault-token-refresher sidecar.
# Symlinked to $HOME/.vault-token by the container command above.
volume_mount {
name = "vault-token"
mount_path = "/vault"
}
# Burstable (tier-aux). Sized for ~10 concurrent agent runs at
# ~0.5-1.5Gi each (see MAX_CONCURRENCY). No CPU limit per cluster
# policy (CFS throttling); request only.
resources {
requests = {
cpu = "1"
memory = "2Gi"
}
limits = {
memory = "12Gi"
}
}
}
# Sidecar: keep a fresh Vault token on disk for `scripts/tg apply`.
# k8s-auth login (role=terraform-state) every 30 min — well inside the
# 6-day token TTL — and write it to the shared `vault-token` emptyDir.
# The main container symlinks $HOME/.vault-token at it. Mirrors the
# estate k8s-auth-login pattern (infra/.woodpecker/default.yml "Vault
# auth" step, woodpecker vault-sync sidecar).
container {
name = "vault-token-refresher"
image = "docker.io/curlimages/curl:8.11.0"
# No `set -e`: a transient Vault blip must NOT kill the refresh loop
# (the stale token keeps working until its 6d TTL). curlimages/curl
# is Alpine/busybox — has `sed`, no `jq`, so parse client_token with
# sed. umask 077 so the token file is 0600.
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOF
umask 077
while true; do
SA_TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$VAULT_ADDR/v1/auth/kubernetes/login" \
-d "{\"role\":\"$VAULT_K8S_ROLE\",\"jwt\":\"$SA_TOKEN\"}" \
| sed -n 's/.*"client_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
printf '%s' "$TOKEN" > /vault/token
echo "$(date -u +%FT%TZ) refreshed vault token (role=$VAULT_K8S_ROLE)"
else
echo "$(date -u +%FT%TZ) ERROR: vault k8s login failed (role=$VAULT_K8S_ROLE)" >&2
fi
sleep 1800
done
EOF
]
env {
name = "VAULT_ADDR"
value = "http://vault-active.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200"
}
env {
name = "VAULT_K8S_ROLE"
value = "terraform-state"
}
volume_mount {
name = "vault-token"
mount_path = "/vault"
}
resources {
requests = { cpu = "5m", memory = "16Mi" }
limits = { memory = "32Mi" }
}
}
volume {
name = "workspace"
# Per-pod ephemeral scratch — agent does fresh git clones each
# job, so node-disk emptyDir is faster than a network-backed PVC
# and avoids RWO contention across the 3 replicas.
empty_dir {}
}
volume {
name = "persistent"
persistent_volume_claim {
claim_name = module.persistent.claim_name
}
}
volume {
name = "sops-age-key"
secret {
secret_name = kubernetes_secret.sops_age_key.metadata[0].name
default_mode = "0600"
}
}
volume {
name = "git-crypt-key"
config_map {
name = kubernetes_config_map.git_crypt_key.metadata[0].name
}
}
volume {
name = "claude-credentials-secret"
secret {
secret_name = kubernetes_secret.claude_credentials.metadata[0].name
default_mode = "0600"
}
}
volume {
name = "claude-home"
empty_dir {}
}
# Holds the Vault token the refresher sidecar mints; main container
# symlinks $HOME/.vault-token at /vault/token. emptyDir (memory-backed
# not required) — token is re-minted every 30 min and on pod restart.
volume {
name = "vault-token"
empty_dir {}
}
}
}
}
lifecycle {
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config] # KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1
}
}
# --- Service ---
resource "kubernetes_service" "claude_agent" {
metadata {
name = "claude-agent-service"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
labels = local.labels
}
spec {
selector = local.labels
port {
port = 8080
target_port = 8080
}
type = "ClusterIP"
}
}
# =============================================================================
# Token expiry monitor
# Long-lived CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN values expire 1y after mint. We track
# mint timestamps here — on rotation, update the map below. A CronJob pushes
# the computed expiry_timestamp to Pushgateway, Prometheus alerts 30d out.
# =============================================================================
locals {
claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs = {
# unix seconds (UTC) — when `claude setup-token` finished minting
"primary" = 1776528429 # 2026-04-18T12:07:09Z (TOKEN2)
"spare-1" = 1776528280 # 2026-04-18T12:04:40Z (TOKEN1)
"spare-2" = 1776528429 # 2026-04-18T12:07:09Z (TOKEN2 — redundant w/ primary)
}
claude_oauth_token_ttl_seconds = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
}
resource "kubernetes_config_map" "claude_oauth_expiry" {
metadata {
name = "claude-oauth-expiry"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
data = {
for path, mint in local.claude_oauth_token_mint_epochs :
path => tostring(mint + local.claude_oauth_token_ttl_seconds)
}
}
resource "kubernetes_cron_job_v1" "claude_oauth_expiry_monitor" {
metadata {
name = "claude-oauth-expiry-monitor"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.claude_agent.metadata[0].name
}
spec {
concurrency_policy = "Replace"
failed_jobs_history_limit = 3
successful_jobs_history_limit = 1
schedule = "17 */6 * * *" # every 6h at :17 past
job_template {
metadata {}
spec {
backoff_limit = 1
ttl_seconds_after_finished = 300
template {
metadata {}
spec {
restart_policy = "OnFailure"
container {
name = "push-expiry"
image = "docker.io/curlimages/curl:8.11.0"
command = ["/bin/sh", "-c", <<-EOT
set -e
PG='http://prometheus-prometheus-pushgateway.monitoring:9091/metrics/job/claude-oauth-expiry-monitor'
NOW=$(date +%s)
PAYLOAD=''
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# HELP claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp Unix epoch when the CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN for this path expires
"
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# TYPE claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp gauge
"
for path in /mnt/expiry/*; do
name=$(basename "$path")
exp=$(cat "$path")
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}claude_oauth_token_expiry_timestamp{path=\"$name\"} $exp
"
done
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# HELP claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp Last time the expiry monitor pushed metrics
"
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}# TYPE claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp gauge
"
PAYLOAD="$${PAYLOAD}claude_oauth_expiry_monitor_last_push_timestamp $NOW
"
echo "$PAYLOAD"
echo "$PAYLOAD" | curl -sS --data-binary @- "$PG"
echo "pushed at $NOW"
EOT
]
volume_mount {
name = "expiry"
mount_path = "/mnt/expiry"
}
resources {
requests = { cpu = "10m", memory = "32Mi" }
limits = { memory = "64Mi" }
}
}
volume {
name = "expiry"
config_map {
name = kubernetes_config_map.claude_oauth_expiry.metadata[0].name
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
ignore_changes = [spec[0].job_template[0].spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
}
}