ff5538a667
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.
ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
`protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).
Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true` → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false` → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
reviewed individually:
* 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
* 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
`auth = "none"`
* Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.
Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.
Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.
Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
115 lines
2.9 KiB
HCL
115 lines
2.9 KiB
HCL
variable "tls_secret_name" {
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type = string
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sensitive = true
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}
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resource "kubernetes_namespace" "networking-toolbox" {
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metadata {
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name = "networking-toolbox"
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labels = {
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"istio-injection" : "disabled"
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tier = local.tiers.aux
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}
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}
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lifecycle {
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# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
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ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
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}
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}
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module "tls_secret" {
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source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
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namespace = kubernetes_namespace.networking-toolbox.metadata[0].name
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tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
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}
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resource "kubernetes_deployment" "networking-toolbox" {
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metadata {
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name = "networking-toolbox"
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namespace = kubernetes_namespace.networking-toolbox.metadata[0].name
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labels = {
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app = "networking-toolbox"
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tier = local.tiers.aux
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}
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}
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spec {
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replicas = 1
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selector {
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match_labels = {
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app = "networking-toolbox"
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}
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}
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template {
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metadata {
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labels = {
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app = "networking-toolbox"
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}
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annotations = {
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"diun.enable" = "true"
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"diun.include_tags" = "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$"
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}
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}
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spec {
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container {
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image = "lissy93/networking-toolbox:1.6.0"
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name = "networking-toolbox"
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port {
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container_port = 3000
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}
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resources {
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requests = {
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cpu = "10m"
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memory = "128Mi"
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}
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limits = {
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memory = "128Mi"
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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lifecycle {
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# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
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ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
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}
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}
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resource "kubernetes_service" "networking-toolbox" {
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metadata {
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name = "networking-toolbox"
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namespace = kubernetes_namespace.networking-toolbox.metadata[0].name
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labels = {
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"app" = "networking-toolbox"
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}
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}
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spec {
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selector = {
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app = "networking-toolbox"
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}
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port {
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name = "http"
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port = "80"
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target_port = "3000"
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}
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}
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}
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module "ingress" {
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source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
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dns_type = "proxied"
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namespace = kubernetes_namespace.networking-toolbox.metadata[0].name
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name = "networking-toolbox"
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tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
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auth = "required"
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extra_annotations = {
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"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
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"gethomepage.dev/name" = "Networking Toolbox"
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"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Network diagnostic tools"
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"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "mdi-lan"
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"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Development & CI"
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"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
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}
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}
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