infra/stacks/f1-stream/main.tf
Viktor Barzin ff5538a667 ingress_factory: replace protected bool with auth enum + audit pass across 100 stacks
Phase 3+4 of default-deny ingress plan. Replaces the `protected = bool` (default
false → unprotected) variable in `modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory` with
`auth = string` enum (default "required" → fail-closed). Touches every
ingress_factory caller so the audit decision is recorded explicitly in code.

ingress_factory (Phase 3):
- `auth = "required"`: standard Authentik forward-auth (the legacy
  `protected = true` semantic).
- `auth = "public"`: forward-auth via the new `authentik-forward-auth-public`
  middleware → dedicated public outpost → guest auto-bind. Logged-in users
  keep their real identity.
- `auth = "none"`: no Authentik middleware. For Anubis-fronted content, native
  client APIs (Git, /v2/, WebDAV), webhook receivers, the Authentik outpost
  itself.
- `effective_anti_ai` default flips ON only when `auth = "none"` (auth-gated
  ingresses don't need anti-AI noise; the auth flow already discourages bots).

Audit pass (Phase 4) across 96 ingress_factory call sites:
- 49 explicit `protected = true`     → `auth = "required"`
- 8 explicit `protected = false`     → `auth = "none"` (5) or `auth = "public"` (3)
- 64 previously-default (no protected line) → `auth = "required"` ADDED, then
  reviewed individually:
  * 9 Anubis-fronted (blog, www, kms, travel, f1, cyberchef, jsoncrack,
    homepage, wrongmove UI, privatebin) → `auth = "none"`
  * 22 native-client / programmatic surfaces (Forgejo Git+/v2/, webhook
    handler, claude-memory MCP, Nextcloud WebDAV, Matrix, Vault CLI/OIDC,
    xray VPN, ntfy, woodpecker webhooks, n8n triggers, ntfy push, dawarich
    location ingestion, immich frame kiosk, headscale CP, send anonymous
    drops, rybbit beacon, vaultwarden API, Authentik UI itself + outposts) →
    `auth = "none"`
  * Remaining ~33 → `auth = "required"` confirmed (admin tools, internal
    UIs, services without app-level auth)
- Smoke-test promotions to `auth = "public"`: fire-planner public UI,
  k8s-portal API, insta2spotify callback.

Three call sites in wrapper modules (`stacks/freedify/factory/`,
`stacks/reverse-proxy/modules/reverse_proxy/`) keep their internal `protected`
bool — they translate to `auth` internally, out of scope for this rename.

Behavior change: previously-default ingresses now fail closed (require
Authentik login) unless explicitly flipped to `auth = "none"` or
`auth = "public"`. This is the audit goal — no more accidentally-unprotected
surfaces. Sites that were intentionally public (Anubis content, native APIs,
webhooks) are now explicitly recorded as `auth = "none"`.

Drive-by: `modules/create-vm/main.tf` picked up cosmetic alignment via
`terraform fmt -recursive` during the audit. Behavior-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 14:16:42 +00:00

296 lines
8.9 KiB
HCL

variable "tls_secret_name" {
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "nfs_server" { type = string }
variable "discord_f1_guild_id" { type = string }
variable "discord_f1_channel_ids" { type = string }
resource "kubernetes_namespace" "f1-stream" {
metadata {
name = "f1-stream"
labels = {
"istio-injection" : "disabled"
tier = local.tiers.aux
"chrome-service.viktorbarzin.me/client" = "true"
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: goldilocks-vpa-auto-mode ClusterPolicy stamps this label on every namespace
ignore_changes = [metadata[0].labels["goldilocks.fairwinds.com/vpa-update-mode"]]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "external_secret" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
kind = "ExternalSecret"
metadata = {
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
namespace = "f1-stream"
}
spec = {
refreshInterval = "15m"
secretStoreRef = {
name = "vault-kv"
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
}
target = {
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
}
dataFrom = [{
extract = {
key = "f1-stream"
}
}]
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream]
}
# Pull the chrome-service bearer token into this namespace as a separate
# Secret so the verifier can reach the in-cluster Playwright pool.
resource "kubernetes_manifest" "chrome_service_client_secret" {
manifest = {
apiVersion = "external-secrets.io/v1beta1"
kind = "ExternalSecret"
metadata = {
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
namespace = "f1-stream"
}
spec = {
refreshInterval = "15m"
secretStoreRef = {
name = "vault-kv"
kind = "ClusterSecretStore"
}
target = {
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
}
dataFrom = [{
extract = {
key = "chrome-service"
}
}]
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream]
}
resource "kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim" "data_proxmox" {
wait_until_bound = false
metadata {
name = "f1-stream-data-proxmox"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
annotations = {
"resize.topolvm.io/threshold" = "80%"
"resize.topolvm.io/increase" = "100%"
"resize.topolvm.io/storage_limit" = "5Gi"
}
}
spec {
access_modes = ["ReadWriteOnce"]
storage_class_name = "proxmox-lvm"
resources {
requests = {
storage = "1Gi"
}
}
}
}
resource "kubernetes_deployment" "f1-stream" {
metadata {
name = "f1-stream"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
labels = {
app = "f1-stream"
tier = local.tiers.aux
}
annotations = {
"reloader.stakater.com/auto" = "true"
}
}
spec {
replicas = 1
strategy {
type = "Recreate"
}
selector {
match_labels = {
app = "f1-stream"
}
}
template {
metadata {
labels = {
app = "f1-stream"
}
}
spec {
container {
image = "viktorbarzin/f1-stream:latest"
image_pull_policy = "Always"
name = "f1-stream"
resources {
limits = {
memory = "1Gi"
}
requests = {
cpu = "100m"
memory = "1Gi"
}
}
port {
container_port = 8000
}
env {
name = "DISCORD_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "f1-stream-secrets"
key = "discord_user_token"
}
}
}
env {
name = "DISCORD_CHANNELS"
value = var.discord_f1_channel_ids
}
# Verifier connects to in-cluster headed Chromium pool — see
# stacks/chrome-service/. Falls back to in-process headless if unset.
env {
name = "CHROME_WS_URL"
value = "ws://chrome-service.chrome-service.svc.cluster.local:3000"
}
env {
name = "CHROME_WS_TOKEN"
value_from {
secret_key_ref {
name = "chrome-service-client-secrets"
key = "api_bearer_token"
}
}
}
# The embed proxy (this pod's /embed?url=…) must be reachable from
# the remote chrome-service pod. Default 127.0.0.1 only works for
# in-process Chromium — for the remote browser we point it at our
# own ClusterIP service.
env {
name = "PLAYBACK_VERIFY_PROXY_BASE"
value = "http://f1.f1-stream.svc.cluster.local"
}
volume_mount {
name = "data"
mount_path = "/data"
}
}
volume {
name = "data"
persistent_volume_claim {
claim_name = kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.data_proxmox.metadata[0].name
}
}
}
}
}
lifecycle {
# KYVERNO_LIFECYCLE_V1: Kyverno admission webhook mutates dns_config with ndots=2
ignore_changes = [spec[0].template[0].spec[0].dns_config]
}
}
resource "kubernetes_service" "f1-stream" {
metadata {
name = "f1"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
labels = {
"app" = "f1-stream"
}
}
spec {
selector = {
app = "f1-stream"
}
port {
port = "80"
target_port = "8000"
}
}
}
module "tls_secret" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/setup_tls_secret"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
}
# f1-stream serves its SvelteKit SPA via the FastAPI `/{path}` catch-all
# and exposes 14 JSON/proxy routes at root (/schedule, /streams, /embed,
# /embed-asset, /relay, /proxy, /extract, /extractors, /health). A flat
# Anubis catch-all CHALLENGE breaks the SPA's XHRs with "Unexpected token
# '<', '<!doctype '" because the schedule fetch lands on the challenge HTML.
# Custom policy: ALLOW the known JSON routes + SvelteKit `_app/` assets
# (which load before any user has a chance to solve PoW), CHALLENGE
# everything else — the HTML pages.
module "anubis" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/anubis_instance"
name = "f1"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
target_url = "http://${kubernetes_service.f1-stream.metadata[0].name}.${kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name}.svc.cluster.local"
policy_yaml = <<-EOT
bots:
- import: (data)/bots/_deny-pathological.yaml
- import: (data)/bots/aggressive-brazilian-scrapers.yaml
- import: (data)/meta/ai-block-aggressive.yaml
- import: (data)/crawlers/_allow-good.yaml
- import: (data)/clients/x-firefox-ai.yaml
- import: (data)/common/keep-internet-working.yaml
# SvelteKit immutable assets (CSS/JS chunks) and OpenAPI/health routes —
# served pre-cookie, must pass without challenge.
- name: f1-svelte-assets-and-meta
path_regex: ^/(_app/|openapi\.json|docs|api/)
action: ALLOW
# Application JSON routes — XHR'd by the SPA after the user has solved
# the PoW for `/`. We allow them unconditionally because the alternative
# (carve-out per route via separate Ingress objects) is brittle and
# because the data they expose (stream URLs, schedule metadata) is not
# the AI-scraping target — the HTML/SPA is.
- name: f1-data-routes
path_regex: ^/(embed|embed-asset|extract|extractors|health|proxy|relay|schedule|streams)(/|\?|$)
action: ALLOW
# Allow non-GET methods unconditionally — AI scrapers GET the body,
# they don't POST. Mutating XHRs and CORS preflight need to bypass.
- name: allow-non-get-methods
action: ALLOW
expression: method != "GET"
- name: catchall-challenge
path_regex: .*
action: CHALLENGE
EOT
}
module "ingress" {
source = "../../modules/kubernetes/ingress_factory"
auth = "none" # Anubis-fronted; PoW challenge gates bots, no Authentik
dns_type = "non-proxied"
namespace = kubernetes_namespace.f1-stream.metadata[0].name
name = "f1"
service_name = module.anubis.service_name
port = module.anubis.service_port
tls_secret_name = var.tls_secret_name
exclude_crowdsec = true
anti_ai_scraping = false
extra_middlewares = ["traefik-x402@kubernetescrd"]
extra_annotations = {
"gethomepage.dev/enabled" = "true"
"gethomepage.dev/name" = "F1 Stream"
"gethomepage.dev/description" = "Formula 1 live streams"
"gethomepage.dev/icon" = "si-f1"
"gethomepage.dev/group" = "Media & Entertainment"
"gethomepage.dev/pod-selector" = ""
}
}