Pull the per-unit backup->restart->verify->recover routine (and the small
helpers it needs) out of t3-autoupdate.sh into a sourced library, so a second
job (the upcoming idle migrator) can reuse the exact same audited recovery path
instead of forking safety-critical code. safe_restart_unit returns non-zero on
failure (after recovery+freeze) rather than exiting, so callers control flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Viktor was worried about stale prices silently distorting net worth.
Confirmed it's real: META's quote has been frozen at 2026-04-17 (65 days
old) while the dashboard keeps valuing the ~55-share position at that
stale close; the Vanguard ETFs are current. Nothing flagged it.
Adds one compact stat to the Overview row showing the most out-of-date
HELD position's quote age (symbol + humanised age), colour-coded: green
<=4d (weekend/bank-holiday tolerant), amber 5-9d, red >=10d. Pure read of
the quote_latest mirror via the wealth-pg datasource, held positions
only, LEFT JOIN so a held symbol with no quote at all sorts as max-stale.
The six collapsed rows below shift down 4 grid units to make room; no
other panel touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Viktor hit the t3 'Client and server versions differ' warning. Root cause: the daily gated autoupdate defers a user's t3-serve restart whenever that user has an active agent at the 04:00 window, so anyone busy every night (long-lived/AFK sessions) never migrates and the client/server version skew persists for days.
This design adds a small idle-gated overnight job that drains those deferrals -- restarting a deferred instance onto the current binary only when no turn is in flight (state.sqlite active_turn_id) and it's been quiet for a buffer, so the migration lands in a real quiet gap instead of killing in-flight agent turns. Reuses the autoupdate's proven backup->restart->verify->recover path via a shared helper (approach C from the brainstorm). Design doc only; no behavior change yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ha token` originally read openclaw/openclaw-secrets -> skill_secrets, which only
cluster admins can read — so it hung/failed for the non-admin operator it was
built for (emo = emil.barzin@gmail.com, OIDC group "Home Server Admins", whose
identity is deliberately barred from secrets in the openclaw namespace).
Split the HA tokens into a dedicated secret openclaw/ha-tokens (keys sofia/london)
with a Role + RoleBinding granting `get` on JUST that secret to the Home Server
Admins group (k8s RBAC can't scope to a JSON sub-key, hence a separate object).
emo now resolves the HA token with their own identity, WITHOUT gaining the rest
of skill_secrets (slack_webhook, uptime_kuma_password). openclaw's own deployment
keeps reading openclaw-secrets — purely additive.
- stacks/openclaw/ha_tokens.tf: new secret + least-privilege Role/RoleBinding
- cli/cmd_ha.go: read openclaw/ha-tokens (raw base64 per-instance key); drop JSON parse
- README + ADR-0012 updated; VERSION -> v0.7.1
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first PR1 commit only dropped the ingress_factory reference + the 8
exclude_crowdsec call sites. But the crowdsec middleware is ALSO hard-coded
(not via the variable) in 6 more ingresses that build their middleware chain by
hand: owntracks, the monitoring Helm values (grafana + prometheus +
alertmanager), and the reverse-proxy module + its own separate ingress factory.
Remove all 6 so that after the full-cluster apply NO live ingress references
traefik-crowdsec@kubernetescrd — the precondition for PR2 deleting the CRD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The infra CI pipeline was failing often — ~38% of the last 50 runs didn't
succeed. The single biggest cause (8 of 19 non-successes) was Tier-1 stack
applies dying instantly with "Error acquiring the state lock".
Tier-0 stacks already degrade gracefully (Vault advisory lock → the pipeline
skips a locked stack). Tier-1 stacks have no such fallback: they rely on
terraform's pg-backend pg_advisory_lock, and scripts/tg ran terragrunt with
no -lock-timeout, so any concurrent lock holder was fatal — a Woodpecker-killed
run whose PG lock wasn't reaped yet (PL266 killed → PL267 failed the same
second), a human/agent applying locally, or the daily drift `plan`.
Fix: scripts/tg now passes -lock-timeout (default 5m, override TG_LOCK_TIMEOUT)
on every state-locking verb (plan/apply/destroy/refresh), so a contended lock
WAITS for the holder to finish instead of failing. -auto-approve behaviour for
non-interactive applies is unchanged. Central wrapper change → covers CI, plus
local human/agent applies; no CI image rebuild (tg is read from the repo).
Adds a hermetic pytest (stub terragrunt + preset PG_CONN_STR) pinning the
arg-injection. Docs updated in AGENTS.md + .claude/CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Traefik CrowdSec (Yaegi) bouncer plugin enforces nothing on Traefik 3.7.5
(handler never invoked) and is fully superseded by the cs-firewall-bouncer
(in-kernel nftables drop on direct hosts) + the Cloudflare IP-List/WAF rule
(proxied hosts). Drop the `traefik-crowdsec@kubernetescrd` middleware from the
ingress_factory chain and the 8 explicit `exclude_crowdsec = true` call sites,
and delete the now-unused `exclude_crowdsec` variable.
This is PR1 of a 2-phase removal: the reference is removed FIRST (a shared-module
change → full-cluster apply re-renders every ingress without the middleware) so
that PR2 can delete the `crowdsec` Middleware CRD + the plugin itself WITHOUT
leaving any ingress pointing at a missing middleware (which would error those
routers). PR2 MUST NOT land until this has fully applied and zero live ingresses
reference traefik-crowdsec@kubernetescrd.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One-node validation on k8s-node2 passed: kernel nftables sets created in both
input and forward chains (policy accept), ~31k decisions loaded, a known banned
scanner confirmed in the drop set, pod stable 4h+ with no collateral. Remove the
nodeSelector so the DaemonSet runs on every node — direct-host enforcement now
survives a MetalLB VIP failover to any worker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The edge CF IP List can't hold the ~31k CAPI community blocklist (already
enforced in-kernel by the firewall-bouncer), so the sync now skips origin=CAPI
and carries only high-signal local/curated decisions (+ a 9000 safety cap).
Also fixes the list-items GET: per_page=1000 returned a misleading CF 400
'invalid or expired cursor' (10027); the endpoint max is 500. Verified live:
crowdsec_ban populates (4 IPs) and the sync exits 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mined another devvm user's Claude sessions for repeated, hand-rolled command
patterns worth absorbing into the shared CLI. The dominant signal was Home
Assistant "Sofia" work: a `kubectl | base64 | jq` token-extraction pipeline
re-derived ~420x, and a bespoke non-interactive `ssh -o …` invocation reinvented
~30x — every session. The existing `home-assistant-sofia.py` already covers the
API but goes unused from an arbitrary cwd (needs an env var set + a cwd-relative
path), so agents bypassed it and hand-rolled everything.
Add two verbs covering exactly the gaps the `ha` MCP can't (entity state/control
stays with the MCP):
- `ha token [--instance sofia|london]` (read): resolves the long-lived API token
live from k8s secret openclaw/openclaw-secrets via the ambient kubeconfig — no
pre-set env var. Composes as `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $(homelab ha token)"`.
- `ha ssh [--instance sofia|london] -- <cmd>` (write): deterministic
non-interactive ssh to the HA host using the invoking user's key.
Also fix the root cause: `home-assistant-sofia.py` now falls back to
`homelab ha token` when its env var is unset (works from any directory), and the
home-assistant skill points agents at these verbs + `homelab metrics query`
instead of hand-rolled curls. README + ADR-0012 + AGENTS.md updated per the
per-verb-group convention.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Viktor's passkeys all vanished and he was suddenly being asked to log in
multiple times a day instead of ~monthly. Root cause: on 2026-06-18 an ad-hoc
tripit passkey E2E test (run from the devvm as akadmin via python-httpx) cleaned
up "the demo user's" passkeys with GET /core/users/?search={demo} then DELETE
each device of users[0] — but the fuzzy search returned the REAL account, so it
wiped all 6 real passkeys. Losing passkeys forced fallback to Google login, and
the social-login stage (default-source-authentication-login) had the provider
default session_duration=seconds=0, which falls back to UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=2h —
hence the constant re-logins. (Password + passkey logins were already weeks=4.)
Changes:
- authentik: adopt default-source-authentication-login into Terraform (import)
and pin session_duration=weeks=4, so Google/GitHub/Facebook logins last as long
as password/passkey. Immediate relief without re-enrolling.
- authentik: document the provider-schema gotcha — authentik_stage_identification
exposes no webauthn_stage / enable_remember_me attribute, so they must NOT be in
ignore_changes (commit 4e882989 removed them for this reason; re-adding breaks
every apply). The passkey break was purely the missing device records, not drift.
- edge (rybbit): shield auth so a CrowdSec hit can never wall a user out of login —
carve authentik.viktorbarzin.me + public-auth out of the zone WAF block rule,
make the LAPI->edge sync ban-only (stop downgrading captcha to a hard block),
and set exclude_crowdsec on the Authentik UI ingress (auth keeps rate-limiting).
- docs: record the session-duration change, the edge enforcement + auth carve-out
(previously undocumented), and the pre-existing broken crowdsec-cf-sync CronJob
(CF cursor pagination 400 + ~31k IPs vs list capacity -> edge list inert).
Passkey re-enrollment is a manual user action (devices are gone from the DB);
nothing auto-re-deletes them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first live renewal run showed systemd could not create state beneath a read-only home sandbox. Provision each user's writable state directory before enabling the timer so automatic renewal can run.
The approved Claude token renewal deployment could not run because setup-devvm passed inline package comments to apt as package names. Strip inline comments so the persisted all-user setup remains reproducible.
TripIt's native signup-verification + account-recovery mail (ADR-0028) sends From: trips@viktorbarzin.me while authenticating SMTP as spam@. With SPOOF_PROTECTION on, Postfix smtpd_sender_login_maps requires an EXPLICIT alias (the @domain catch-all doesn't satisfy it) — mirrors the existing plans@->spam@ grant. Must be applied + verified before TripIt flips SMTP_FROM to trips@, else every verification/recovery send is rejected 550.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each workstation user needs a continuously valid Claude token under their own Enterprise identity. Store only that user's OAuth state in an isolated Vault path, renew and verify it automatically, recover from Vault when possible, and alert when interactive SSO is required.
TripIt external users are now LOCAL TripIt accounts (ADR-0028 native passkey + Authentik OIDC), so the Authentik-side self-enrollment machinery is dead. Removes the tripit-enrollment + tripit-recovery flows and all their stages/prompts/policies/bindings, the tripit-email-stages blueprint (+yaml), and the 'TripIt External' group; reverts the admin-services-restriction fence branch that contained those users (its sole member, the leftover tripit-demo@ test account, was deleted first, so the revert affects zero live principals). Real external collaborators (type=external) are untouched. tg plan: 0 add, 1 change (the policy expression), 20 destroy (all tripit_*). Closes tripit#97; moots the B2 per-app OIDC fences.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CF account hard-limits to 1 Rules List, so proxied enforcement uses one crowdsec_ban
list + one WAF block rule; the sync writes both ban and captcha decisions into it
(captcha downgraded to block at the edge). Drops the second list + managed_challenge
rule. Trivial touch to firewall_bouncer.tf to make CI re-apply crowdsec and recreate
the DaemonSet (tar fix already in master; stale orphan was cleared).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
v4.52.7 import id must be zone/<zone_id>/<ruleset_id>; add depends_on so the
crowdsec_ban/captcha lists exist before the WAF rules reference them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- initContainer used GNU tar --wildcards which fails on the busybox curl image (pod Init:Error); switch to extract-all + cp via shell glob.
- cloudflare_ruleset hit the per-zone singleton conflict; import the existing 'default' http_request_firewall_custom ruleset and manage all rules — CrowdSec ban/captcha first, the pre-existing disabled skip rule preserved verbatim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
tg plan verified the agent's guess 'Account Filter Lists Edit/Read' is not a key in the v4.52.7 permission-group map; the live CF API lists the correct account-scoped groups as 'Account Rule Lists Read'/'Write'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
910d5892 landed the [git.timeout] + [git.config] env in master, but the CI apply
skipped stacks/forgejo (the changed-stack-diff race after a sync-merge), so the
Forgejo deployment never picked it up. A trivial comment touch to force a clean
apply of the stack so the durable push-mirror fix actually takes effect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the Worker+KV approach (which only covered the ~27 routed hosts) with a
zone-wide mechanism that covers ALL proxied hosts: two CF account IP Lists
(crowdsec_ban, crowdsec_captcha) + one zone WAF custom rule that blocks
`(ip.src in $crowdsec_ban)` and managed-challenges `(ip.src in $crowdsec_captcha)`.
No per-request Worker, no cookie machinery — the rybbit Worker stays
analytics-only. lapi_kv_sync.py now full-reconciles the two lists from LAPI
(fail-safe: a LAPI blip skips the run and freezes the last-known-good block set;
serializes CF bulk ops since CF allows one pending op per account). A
least-privilege CF API token (Account Filter Lists Edit) is minted in TF.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drops banned source IPs in-kernel via nftables (hooks input+forward, so DNAT'd
LoadBalancer traffic is caught before reaching Traefik) for DIRECT hosts — the
direct-side replacement for the dead Traefik plugin, zero per-request hop.
No published image exists, so an initContainer fetches the pinned official
static binary (v0.0.34) onto a stock debian-slim base (nftables backend uses
netlink directly, no nft CLI needed). hostNetwork + NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW (not
privileged). Config (with api_key) in a Secret, Reloader-annotated. crowdsec ns
is already in the Kyverno wave-1 exclude list, so the privileged/hostNetwork pod
is admitted. Pinned to k8s-node2 (runs a Traefik pod) for one-node validation
before the nodeSelector is removed to roll cluster-wide. Fail-open by element
timeout if the bouncer stops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New stack for the realtime voice agent — v2 of the portal-assistant brain
path. One persistent WebSocket per conversation: continuous mic audio ->
Silero VAD turn-taking -> Whisper STT (portal-stt) -> streaming Claude brain
(claude-agent-service) -> edge-tts (portal-tts) -> audio out, with barge-in.
Reuses all three upstream cluster services; nothing new is spun up.
Public Cloudflare ingress (proxied, WebSocket) at portal-realtime.viktorbarzin.me
with the app's own DEVICE_TOKEN as the edge gate (auth="app" — Authentik would
break the native Portal client). No buffering middleware: it would break the
streaming WebSocket. Image ghcr.io/viktorbarzin/portal-assistant-realtime
(private ghcr, pulled with ghcr_pull_token). Sibling to the v1 portal-assistant
gateway, which stays live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduced the first pytest file in the tree
(stacks/k8s-version-upgrade/scripts/test_compat_gate.py); running it leaves an
untracked __pycache__/ dir. Ignore the standard Python build artifacts so test
runs don't show up as working-tree noise or get committed by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two corrections to the runbook matching today's code fixes:
- The next-minor *patch* probe (GET .../Packages) also needs `-L`; it lacked it
until 2026-06-20 and silently no-op'd the 2026-06-19 nightly run. Both probes
now follow the 302.
- The compat gate's addon check is scoped to minor jumps — patches within the
running minor are never addon-blocked (target_minor <= running_minor returns
early), so a conservative ceiling like ESO 0.12 -> 1.31 no longer false-blocks
a 1.34.x patch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The compat gate compared every addon's matrix ceiling against the target
k8s minor unconditionally. That is correct for a minor JUMP, but it also
blocked patch upgrades within the minor the cluster is ALREADY running:
ESO v0.12's matrix ceiling is 1.31, the cluster runs 1.34.9, so a target of
1.34.10 (a patch) was refused with "external-secrets supports k8s <= 1.31;
target 1.34 exceeds it" — even though the running cluster is itself proof ESO
0.12 works on 1.34. That silently defeats autonomous patching (it would have
bitten the moment a 1.34.10 was published).
Fix: a target at or below the running minor crosses into no new k8s minor, so
every installed addon is already empirically proven on it — check_addons now
returns no reasons when target_minor <= running_minor. Added running_minor()
(oldest kubelet across nodes, mirroring the detector; RUNNING_K8S env override
for tests) and pass it in. Minor jumps are unchanged: 1.34->1.35 still blocks
on ESO 0.12 + kyverno 1.16. removed-API + containerd checks are naturally
inert for patches (no API removal / containerd floor inside a minor) and keep
running as defence. Added test_compat_gate.py (8 cases) covering both paths.
Verified end-to-end against live Prometheus: target 1.34.10 -> EXIT 0 (safe),
target 1.35.6 -> EXIT 2 (blocked on ESO+kyverno).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seeds two new bouncers at LAPI startup (BOUNCER_KEY_kvsync, BOUNCER_KEY_firewall)
from Vault secret/platform, mirroring the existing BOUNCER_KEY_traefik wiring.
These are the two halves of the real enforcement that replaces the dead Yaegi
plugin: kvsync authenticates the LAPI->Cloudflare-KV sync (proxied edge Worker),
firewall authenticates the cs-firewall-bouncer DaemonSet (direct-host nftables).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The next-minor Packages query used `curl -sf` without -L. pkgs.k8s.io
302-redirects every request to a backing host, so without -L curl returned
an empty body, NEXT_MINOR_PATCH came back empty, and the detector fell
through to "No upgrade needed". That is exactly why last night's 23:00 chain
no-op'd instead of resolving the 1.35 next-minor target (1.35.6) and handing
it to the compat gate. `curl -sfL` follows the redirect and returns the
Packages file (verified: -sf -> empty, -sfL -> 1.35.6). Mirrors the same
-L fix already applied to the Release availability probe (-sILo) above.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tripit Forgejo->GitHub push-mirror silently stalled: `git cat-file
--batch-all-objects` over the NFS-backed repo exceeded the default git deadline
once ~4500 loose objects accumulated (gc.auto's 6700 threshold hadn't fired), so
pushes stopped reaching GitHub and prod deploys stalled. Raise [git.timeout]
(DEFAULT/MIRROR/GC) so a slow object enumeration can't abort the mirror, and set
[git.config] gc.auto=1000 so post-push autogc + the git_gc_repos cron keep repos
packed (the real fix). A one-off forced gc already unblocked tripit; this prevents
recurrence across all repos.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pure-stdlib script (alert_digest pattern, runs on stock python:3.12-alpine) that
projects CrowdSec Ip-scope ban/captcha decisions into the Workers KV namespace
the edge Worker reads on each proxied request. Full-reconcile per run so an
un-ban clears from the edge within one interval; fail-safe (a LAPI read error
skips the run and leaves existing bans to expire by TTL = fail-open, never a
stale all-block). TF wiring (KV namespace + CronJob + key registration) follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Preparing for real CrowdSec enforcement (edge Cloudflare Worker for proxied
hosts + cs-firewall-bouncer for direct hosts). Both enforce by dropping the
real source IP, so if an internal/RFC1918 address ever ended up in a ban
decision it could blackhole legitimate internal traffic. Whitelisting the
cluster/LAN/tailnet ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 100.64/10) at the
CrowdSec parser layer makes that structurally impossible — a trusted source
can never produce a decision in the first place. Public IP already whitelisted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Answers the question that drove the whole CLI — which verbs to add next — with
data instead of one maintainer's habits, and resolves the cross-user-usage ask
in-bounds (no reading anyone's home).
- emit on dispatch: every verb fire-and-forgets one Loki line {job,user,verb} +
"exit=N ver=X". ONLY the verb path + exit code — never args, paths, flags, or
secrets (the emit never sees arguments). Best-effort: 800ms timeout, errors
swallowed, never affects the command; opt-out HOMELAB_TELEMETRY=0. Discovery
verbs (manifest/version/help) and usage itself don't self-record.
- usage top [--since 30d] [--user U] [--json]: ranks verbs via
sum by (verb)(count_over_time({job="homelab-usage"}[…])) against the shared
Loki. Cross-user analytics WITHOUT touching ~/.claude — the privacy-preserving
answer to "what does the team use".
- Loki sink (zero new infra, dogfoods v0.5 logs path); push verified HTTP 204 no
auth. ADR docs/adr/0011.
Live-verified: ran 4 verbs, usage top ranked them correctly (metrics query=2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
