CrowdSec real enforcement: edge WAF (proxied) + firewall-bouncer (direct) #2

Merged
viktor merged 6 commits from wizard/crowdsec-enforcement into master 2026-06-20 09:42:41 +00:00

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Viktor Barzin
ca8d617e72 rybbit: use 'Account Rule Lists' permission group for the CF sync token (v4)
tg plan verified the agent's guess 'Account Filter Lists Edit/Read' is not a key in the v4.52.7 permission-group map; the live CF API lists the correct account-scoped groups as 'Account Rule Lists Read'/'Write'.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 09:41:41 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
cc4bfb593b rybbit: proxied CrowdSec enforcement via Cloudflare IP Lists + WAF rule
Replaces the Worker+KV approach (which only covered the ~27 routed hosts) with a
zone-wide mechanism that covers ALL proxied hosts: two CF account IP Lists
(crowdsec_ban, crowdsec_captcha) + one zone WAF custom rule that blocks
`(ip.src in $crowdsec_ban)` and managed-challenges `(ip.src in $crowdsec_captcha)`.
No per-request Worker, no cookie machinery — the rybbit Worker stays
analytics-only. lapi_kv_sync.py now full-reconciles the two lists from LAPI
(fail-safe: a LAPI blip skips the run and freezes the last-known-good block set;
serializes CF bulk ops since CF allows one pending op per account). A
least-privilege CF API token (Account Filter Lists Edit) is minted in TF.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 09:18:33 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
7e646e1c7c crowdsec: add cs-firewall-bouncer DaemonSet (direct-host nftables enforcement)
Drops banned source IPs in-kernel via nftables (hooks input+forward, so DNAT'd
LoadBalancer traffic is caught before reaching Traefik) for DIRECT hosts — the
direct-side replacement for the dead Traefik plugin, zero per-request hop.

No published image exists, so an initContainer fetches the pinned official
static binary (v0.0.34) onto a stock debian-slim base (nftables backend uses
netlink directly, no nft CLI needed). hostNetwork + NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW (not
privileged). Config (with api_key) in a Secret, Reloader-annotated. crowdsec ns
is already in the Kyverno wave-1 exclude list, so the privileged/hostNetwork pod
is admitted. Pinned to k8s-node2 (runs a Traefik pod) for one-node validation
before the nodeSelector is removed to roll cluster-wide. Fail-open by element
timeout if the bouncer stops.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 09:11:08 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
38675b7922 crowdsec: register kvsync + firewall bouncer keys in LAPI
Seeds two new bouncers at LAPI startup (BOUNCER_KEY_kvsync, BOUNCER_KEY_firewall)
from Vault secret/platform, mirroring the existing BOUNCER_KEY_traefik wiring.
These are the two halves of the real enforcement that replaces the dead Yaegi
plugin: kvsync authenticates the LAPI->Cloudflare-KV sync (proxied edge Worker),
firewall authenticates the cs-firewall-bouncer DaemonSet (direct-host nftables).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 08:12:38 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
4d9fdbc7f7 rybbit: add CrowdSec LAPI -> Cloudflare KV sync script (proxied edge control plane)
Pure-stdlib script (alert_digest pattern, runs on stock python:3.12-alpine) that
projects CrowdSec Ip-scope ban/captcha decisions into the Workers KV namespace
the edge Worker reads on each proxied request. Full-reconcile per run so an
un-ban clears from the edge within one interval; fail-safe (a LAPI read error
skips the run and leaves existing bans to expire by TTL = fail-open, never a
stale all-block). TF wiring (KV namespace + CronJob + key registration) follows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 08:05:11 +00:00
Viktor Barzin
0ac176da01 crowdsec: whitelist internal/LAN/tailnet CIDRs at the decision layer
Preparing for real CrowdSec enforcement (edge Cloudflare Worker for proxied
hosts + cs-firewall-bouncer for direct hosts). Both enforce by dropping the
real source IP, so if an internal/RFC1918 address ever ended up in a ban
decision it could blackhole legitimate internal traffic. Whitelisting the
cluster/LAN/tailnet ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 100.64/10) at the
CrowdSec parser layer makes that structurally impossible — a trusted source
can never produce a decision in the first place. Public IP already whitelisted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 08:03:46 +00:00