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TripIt external users are now LOCAL TripIt accounts (ADR-0028 native passkey + Authentik OIDC), so the Authentik-side self-enrollment machinery is dead. Removes the tripit-enrollment + tripit-recovery flows and all their stages/prompts/policies/bindings, the tripit-email-stages blueprint (+yaml), and the 'TripIt External' group; reverts the admin-services-restriction fence branch that contained those users (its sole member, the leftover tripit-demo@ test account, was deleted first, so the revert affects zero live principals). Real external collaborators (type=external) are untouched. tg plan: 0 add, 1 change (the policy expression), 20 destroy (all tripit_*). Closes tripit#97; moots the B2 per-app OIDC fences. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
70 lines
2.8 KiB
HCL
70 lines
2.8 KiB
HCL
# Catch-all forward-auth restriction: gate the admin-only hostnames to the
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# "Home Server Admins" group. Bound to the "Domain wide catch all" application
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# (binding stays UI-managed; only the expression is adopted here).
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#
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# Adopted into Terraform 2026-06-04 to add a carve-out: the Kubernetes Dashboard
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# (k8s.viktorbarzin.me) ALSO admits the kubernetes-* RBAC groups, so
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# namespace-owners (e.g. gheorghe) can reach the dashboard login page. The
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# dashboard itself enforces per-namespace access via the pasted ServiceAccount
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# token (stacks/rbac/modules/rbac/dashboard-sa.tf) — this policy only controls
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# who reaches the page. All other admin-only hosts remain Home-Server-Admins-only.
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import {
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to = authentik_policy_expression.admin_services_restriction
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id = "07a11b85-8f37-4844-aebb-ac9c112ec87c"
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}
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resource "authentik_policy_expression" "admin_services_restriction" {
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name = "admin-services-restriction"
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expression = trimspace(<<-EOT
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ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS = {
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"terminal.viktorbarzin.me",
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"frigate.viktorbarzin.me",
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"netbox.viktorbarzin.me",
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"trading.viktorbarzin.me",
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"speedtest.viktorbarzin.me",
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"meshcentral.viktorbarzin.me",
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"k8s.viktorbarzin.me",
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"dashy.viktorbarzin.me",
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"prowlarr.viktorbarzin.me",
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"qbittorrent.viktorbarzin.me",
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"listenarr.viktorbarzin.me",
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"shlink.viktorbarzin.me",
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"openclaw.viktorbarzin.me",
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"openlobster.viktorbarzin.me",
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"wealthfolio.viktorbarzin.me",
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}
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ADMIN_GROUP = "Home Server Admins"
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# The K8s Dashboard additionally admits the Kubernetes RBAC groups. Access
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# to the page is not the security boundary — the pasted ServiceAccount token
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# is (per-namespace admin + cluster read-only). See dashboard-sa.tf.
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K8S_DASHBOARD_HOST = "k8s.viktorbarzin.me"
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K8S_DASHBOARD_GROUPS = [
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"Home Server Admins",
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"kubernetes-admins",
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"kubernetes-power-users",
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"kubernetes-namespace-owners",
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]
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host = request.context.get("host", "")
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# t3 Workstation edge gate: only members of "T3 Users" may reach t3.
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# Placed BEFORE the ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS early-return (t3 is intentionally not in
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# that set — it must not require Home-Server-Admins, just T3 Users membership).
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if host == "t3.viktorbarzin.me":
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return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="T3 Users")
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# Not an admin-only host: allow any authenticated user.
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if host not in ADMIN_ONLY_HOSTS:
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return True
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# K8s Dashboard: allow admins OR any Kubernetes RBAC group.
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if host == K8S_DASHBOARD_HOST:
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return any(ak_is_group_member(request.user, name=g) for g in K8S_DASHBOARD_GROUPS)
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# Every other admin-only host: Home Server Admins only.
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return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name=ADMIN_GROUP)
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EOT
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)
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}
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