Viktor Barzin fd0f4a0365 fix: restore tree dropped by 6d224861; land stem95su gdrive-sync (10m) [ci skip]

6d224861 came from a --no-checkout worktree whose empty index made the
commit drop every file except two. This restores 05b50d2b's full tree and
correctly adds stacks/stem95su/gdrive-sync.tf + the service-catalog stem95su
entry. Forward-only (parent=6d224861, no force-push); [ci skip] since the
live infra was never applied from the broken commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-09 08:45:33 +00:00

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Runbook: Offboard a User

Removing a user can span two surfaces — the in-cluster namespace-owner model (Vault k8s_users / RBAC / namespace) and the devvm Workstation (roster / OS account / t3 instance). Both are staged: a reversible cut (revoke access, delete nothing) first, then an explicit, gated destructive removal. Do the reversible cut immediately; only do the destructive step once you're sure.

Architecture: ../architecture/multi-tenancy.md. Workstation design: ../plans/2026-06-07-multi-user-workstation-design.md.

Part A — DevVM Workstation offboarding

Driven by removing the user's entry from infra/scripts/workstation/roster.yaml. roster_engine.py offboard_plan computes the staged actions (reversible cut vs the gated userdel_archive, which is never auto-applied).

A1. Reversible cut (revoke access; delete nothing)

Delete the user's entry from roster.yaml; commit + push.
Reconcile (sudo /usr/local/bin/t3-provision-users, or wait for the hourly timer). This regenerates /etc/ttyd-user-map + dispatch.json without the user → t3-dispatch now returns 403 for them. (Automated.)
Disable their instance + lock login (manual today; Phase 7 will fold this into the reconcile):
```
sudo systemctl disable --now t3-serve@<os_user>.service
sudo passwd -l <os_user>
```
Verify: they can no longer reach t3.viktorbarzin.me (302 → Authentik, then denied once removed from the T3 Users group — Part C) and cannot log in. Nothing is deleted; re-adding the roster entry + reconcile fully restores them.

A2. Destructive removal (explicit, gated — NEVER automatic)

Only after the reversible cut and a deliberate decision:

sudo tar czf /mnt/backup/offboard/<os_user>-$(date +%Y%m%d).tar.gz /home/<os_user>
sudo userdel -r <os_user>          # removes home + mail spool — IRREVERSIBLE

Rollback before this step: re-add the roster entry + reconcile. After it: restore from the archive.

Part B — In-cluster (namespace-owner) offboarding

Reversible cut: remove the user's Authentik group membership (edge/RBAC blocked) and their entry from the Vault k8s_users map (secret/platform).
Apply: scripts/tg apply the vault → platform → woodpecker stacks (drops the RBAC binding, Vault identity/policy, and per-user CI). Their OIDC kubeconfig stops authorizing immediately.
Destructive (gated): deleting their namespace(s) removes all their workloads + data — back up first (PVCs, DBs), then delete only on explicit decision.

Part C — Authentik (both surfaces)

Remove the user from the relevant Authentik group(s) — kubernetes-namespace-owners (cluster) and/or T3 Users (workstation edge gate). This is the edge revocation; do it as part of the reversible cut so they're locked out at the front door.

Order of operations

Reversible cut on all relevant surfaces first (Authentik group → roster removal + reconcile → k8s_users removal + apply) → verify access is gone → only then the gated destructive steps (userdel -r, namespace deletion), each after its own archive.

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