Two remaining gaps to let non-admins (emo) use `homelab vault`: - setup-devvm.sh installed `@bitwarden/cli` only when `command -v bw` failed, which an admin's own ~/.local/bin/bw satisfied — so the system-wide copy was never installed and non-admins had no `bw` backend. Install to the npm /usr prefix and guard on the system path (/usr/bin/bw) instead. - Add docs/runbooks/homelab-vault-onboarding.md (per-user setup, the shared Organization/Collection flow for sharing passwords, admin deploy + verification, security model) and repoint the two code comments that cited a design-spec path which never existed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.4 KiB
homelab vault onboarding (per-user Vaultwarden access)
Scope
homelab vault gives each devvm roster user no-HITL access to their own
Vaultwarden vault (and any Organization Collection shared with their account)
from the command line. It shells out to the official bw CLI; the user's
Vaultwarden credentials live only in their isolated Vault path
secret/workstation/claude-users/<os-user> and are decrypted as that OS user —
the admin never sees them.
homelab vault setup one-time: store VW email + master password + API key
homelab vault status configured / unlocked / reachable (no secrets)
homelab vault list [--search Q] item names (no secrets)
homelab vault get <name> [--field password|username|uri|notes|totp] [--json]
homelab vault code <name> current TOTP code
homelab vault lock lock / log out the local bw session
How auth works (why a non-admin can use it)
homelab vault runs vault as the calling user. It resolves a Vault token in
this order (ensureVaultToken, cli/cmd_vault.go):
- an explicit
$VAULT_TOKEN, then - a native
~/.vault-token(what admins carry), then - the per-user scoped token that
claude-auth-syncmaintains at~/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token(policyworkstation-claude-<user>).
That scoped policy grants exactly create/read/update on the user's own
secret/workstation/claude-users/<user> path — no patch capability — so the
tool writes with vault kv patch -method=rw (read-modify-write), falling back to
kv put only when the path does not exist yet. This preserves the
claude_ai_oauth_json key that claude-auth-sync
co-locates there. (Both bugs that previously made this admin-only were fixed
2026-06-27.)
Prerequisites (per user)
- The user is in
scripts/workstation/roster.yamland the vault stack has been applied → theirworkstation-claude-<user>policy exists. - The user's workstation was provisioned (
setup-devvm.sh) → their scoped Vault token exists at~/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token. bwis installed system-wide at/usr/bin/bw(see below).- The user has a Vaultwarden account at
https://vaultwarden.viktorbarzin.me(self-service signup is open; admin panel is disabled).
One-time admin steps (devvm)
bw must be system-wide so every user resolves it (it is a Node script, and
node is already system-wide at /usr/bin/node). setup-devvm.sh installs it
to the npm /usr prefix; the guard checks the system path, not
command -v bw (an admin's own ~/.local/bin/bw used to mask the system
install, leaving non-admins with no backend). To install on a running box:
sudo npm install -g --prefix /usr "@bitwarden/cli@^2024"
bw --version # confirm /usr/bin/bw resolves
After landing a cli/ change, rebuild the binary so users pick it up:
sudo bash -c 'cd /home/wizard/code/infra/cli && \
go build -ldflags "-X main.version=$(git -C /home/wizard/code/infra describe --tags --always 2>/dev/null || echo dev)" \
-o /usr/local/bin/homelab .'
(or just re-run scripts/workstation/setup-devvm.sh as root, which rebuilds it.)
User onboarding
The user runs these as themselves. The master password / API key are entered interactively (never on the command line) and stored only in the user's Vault path.
-
In the Vaultwarden web vault → Settings → Security → Keys → View API key, copy the
client_id(user.xxxx) andclient_secret. -
Configure:
homelab vault setup # prompts: VW email, API client_id/secret, master password homelab vault status # → "vault: configured, unlocked, reachable ✓" homelab vault list # item names (own vault + any shared Collections)
Shared-Collection access (sharing passwords with a user)
homelab vault surfaces Organization Collection items automatically once the
user's Vaultwarden account is a confirmed member. These steps are done by the
vault owner in the Vaultwarden web UI (they need the owner's master
password — not an infra/Terraform operation):
- Create or reuse an Organization and a Collection of shared logins.
- Invite the user's Vaultwarden account to the Organization, granting "Can view" on that Collection (least privilege).
- The user accepts the email invite and confirms membership.
- The user runs
homelab vault list— the shared items now appear alongside their own (ahomelab vault statussync picks them up).
Security model (the no-HITL trade)
Identity is the kernel UID. Anything running as the user can decrypt the user's
vault — this is the accepted trade for no-human-in-the-loop fetches. Secrets
never appear in argv (passed via env or stdin), core dumps are disabled, TOTP
fetches are logged to syslog/Loki, and on a TTY values go to the clipboard
(auto-clearing) rather than scrollback. The admin's Vault token is never used by
a non-admin: each user authenticates with their own scoped token.
Verification
# the scoped token carries the right policy
VAULT_TOKEN="$(sudo cat /home/<user>/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token)" \
vault token lookup -format=json | jq '.data.display_name, .data.policies'
# → "token-devvm-claude-auth-<user>", [..., "workstation-claude-<user>"]
sudo -u <user> -i bw --version # /usr/bin/bw resolves for the user
sudo -u <user> -i homelab vault status