Viktor got locked out of the break-glass path (forgot the port-knock setup) and deleted the edge-router forwards, then asked to review and redesign it from scratch. Root cause of the lockout: the knock added no real security (key-only SSH is already brute-force-proof) and its only benefit — hiding the port — came at the cost of a circular dependency. The knock sequence lived only in in-cluster Vault, which is unreachable in the exact away/cold scenario break-glass exists for. So the unlock secret was unavailable precisely when needed. New model (self-contained, nothing to remember): plain key-only SSH on the Proxmox host's :52222, openly reachable. The edge router forwards WAN tcp/52222 -> 192.168.1.127:52222 (external port MUST equal internal on the TP-Link AX6000 - it rejects remaps; port 22 itself is reserved). The exposed port trusts only a dedicated break-glass key via `Match LocalPort` (a leak of any other root key does not grant internet access), rate-limited (iptables hashlimit) + fail2ban. - Removed knockd (package + config) and the legacy Synology SSH forward (ext 3333 -> .13:22, a needless WAN exposure the original plan wanted gone). - Fixed the fail2ban jail for Debian 13 (auth logs under sshd-session, not sshd - the stock journalmatch silently never banned). - Versioned the host config in scripts/ (it was applied ad-hoc, never committed) and recorded the deliberate Wave-1 "no public-IP" exception in security.md + .claude/CLAUDE.md. Superseded the 2026-05-30 port-knock design docs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
6.7 KiB
Runbook: Break-glass SSH
Cold-survivable, brute-force-proof SSH onto the home LAN for when the Kubernetes cluster and its remote-access tunnels (Headscale, cloudflared) are down but the Proxmox host + edge router are up. Redesigned 2026-06-11 — the previous port-knock design is decommissioned (see "History" below).
Model (as built)
your laptop (anywhere) ── ssh -p 52222 ──▶ edge router 192.168.1.1
│ WAN tcp/52222 ─▶ 192.168.1.127:52222
▼
Proxmox host 192.168.1.127
sshd :52222 (key-only, break-glass key ONLY)
→ full LAN via ssh -J / ssh -D
- No port-knock. Plain
ssh -p 52222. The SSH key is the only gate. - Key-only, brute-force-proof. The exposed
:52222trusts only the dedicated break-glass key (/root/.ssh/authorized_keys.breakglass), separate from root's normal LAN-admin keys, so it is independently revocable and a leak of any other root key does not grant internet access. - Rate-limited per source IP (iptables hashlimit) + fail2ban. These trim scanner noise only; key-only auth is the real protection.
- Exposed, not hidden.
:52222answers on the WAN (Shodan-visible). This is a deliberate, documented exception to the Wave-1 "no public-IP access" policy (seedocs/architecture/security.md), chosen for self-containment: it has no dependency on the cluster (unlike Headscale/cloudflared) and nothing to remember (unlike the old knock, whose sequence lived only in in-cluster Vault).
Secrets (Vault secret/viktor)
| Key | Use |
|---|---|
breakglass_ssh_pubkey |
authorized on the host (authorized_keys.breakglass) |
breakglass_ssh_privkey |
the private key (also on your laptop at ~/.ssh/breakglass_ed25519) |
The key has no passphrase (so it works in a true cold event without anything to recall). Treat the private key as the sole credential — guard the laptop copy.
Leftover:
breakglass_knock_sequenceis dead (knock decommissioned). It is inert; remove it when you have a Vault token with thepatchcapability (vault kv patch/ merge-patch — the everyday token lacks it).
Connect
Client ~/.ssh/config:
Host breakglass
HostName viktorbarzin.ddns.net # follows the dynamic WAN IP
Port 52222
User root
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/breakglass_ed25519
IdentitiesOnly yes
Then:
ssh breakglass # shell on the Proxmox host
ssh -J breakglass root@10.0.20.1 # jump to pfSense (or any LAN host)
ssh -D 1080 breakglass # SOCKS5 → reach any internal IP
There is no bg() knock function anymore — delete it from your shell rc if
you added it under the old design.
Cold-event IP cheat sheet (cluster DNS is down)
| Host | IP |
|---|---|
| Proxmox host | 192.168.1.127 |
| pfSense | 10.0.20.1 (WAN 192.168.1.2) |
| k8s API | 10.0.20.100 |
| Synology NAS | 192.168.1.13 (reach via ssh -J breakglass) |
| edge router | 192.168.1.1 |
Deploy / re-provision the host config
Source of truth lives in infra/scripts/. To (re)deploy:
# 1. break-glass key authorized for the exposed port
PUB="$(vault kv get -field=breakglass_ssh_pubkey secret/viktor)"
ssh root@192.168.1.127 "printf '%s\n' '$PUB' > /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.breakglass && chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.breakglass"
# 2. sshd drop-in (dual-port, Match-isolated) — validate before reload (anti-lockout)
scp scripts/sshd-10-breakglass.conf root@192.168.1.127:/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-breakglass.conf
ssh root@192.168.1.127 'sshd -t && systemctl reload ssh'
# 3. firewall (rate-limit) + boot unit
scp scripts/breakglass-firewall.sh root@192.168.1.127:/usr/local/sbin/breakglass-firewall.sh
ssh root@192.168.1.127 'chmod 0755 /usr/local/sbin/breakglass-firewall.sh && systemctl enable --now breakglass-firewall.service'
# 4. fail2ban jail
scp scripts/fail2ban-breakglass-sshd.local root@192.168.1.127:/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/breakglass-sshd.local
ssh root@192.168.1.127 'systemctl restart fail2ban && fail2ban-client status sshd'
The breakglass-firewall.service unit (oneshot, RemainAfterExit=yes,
Before=network-online-ish ordering) is a manual host unit — recreate it if the
host is rebuilt:
[Unit]
Description=Break-glass base firewall (key-only SSH on :52222)
After=network-pre.target
Wants=network-pre.target
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/breakglass-firewall.sh
RemainAfterExit=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
Edge-router forward (manual — live device, not Terraform)
TP-Link Archer AX6000 (192.168.1.1) → Advanced → NAT Forwarding → Port
Forwarding. The break-glass rule:
| Service Name | Device IP | External Port | Internal Port | Protocol |
|---|---|---|---|---|
breakglass-ssh |
192.168.1.127 |
52222 |
52222 |
TCP |
AX6000 quirks (learned 2026-06-11 — do not relearn the hard way):
- External port must equal internal port. The firmware rejects any remap
(e.g.
22 → 52222) with "External Port: This item conflicts with existed ones." Hence ext==int 52222. - Port 22 is reserved — even
22 → 22is refused. Break-glass cannot use 22. - Row delete is immediate (no confirm dialog) — clicking the trash icon removes the rule and toasts "Operation succeeded".
- Automation:
~/wizard/tools/insecure-browse/add-forward.{sh,js}(dockerized Playwright; double-gated saveDRY_RUN=0 CONFIRM_SAVE=1; supportsRULES_JSONadd,EDIT_RULES_JSONprotocol-edit,DELETE_RULES_JSONidentity-guarded delete). Router password: Vaultsecret/viktor/edge_router_192_168_1_1_password.
Rotate / revoke
- Revoke instantly: remove the line from
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys.breakglass. - Rotate the key:
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -a 100 -f ~/.ssh/breakglass_ed25519,vault kv patch secret/viktor breakglass_ssh_privkey=@... breakglass_ssh_pubkey=..., redeploy step 1 above. - Router reset wipes forwards: re-add the
breakglass-sshrule above.
History
- 2026-05-30: original design — key-only SSH on
:52222gated behind a UDP port-knock (knockd). Decommissioned 2026-06-11: the knock added no real security (the SSH key already makes the port brute-force-proof) and its only benefit — hiding the port — came at the cost of a circular dependency: the knock sequence lived only in in-cluster Vault, unreachable in the exact cold/away scenario break-glass exists for. That caused a real lockout. The knockd package + config + the legacy Synology SSH forward (ext 3333 → .13:22) were removed.