`homelab vault` was effectively admin-only: two bugs blocked every non-admin (e.g. emo) from using it for their own Vaultwarden vault. 1. Token: the CLI relied purely on ambient `vault` auth (~/.vault-token / $VAULT_TOKEN), which only admins have. Non-admins carry a scoped token at ~/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token (policy workstation-claude-<user>). Add ensureVaultToken(): explicit env > ~/.vault-token > scoped fallback, wired into every vault verb. Admins are unaffected (their ambient token wins). 2. Write capability: `homelab vault setup` used plain `vault kv patch`, which needs the `patch` capability the scoped policy does not grant (only create/read/update) — so setup 403'd for non-admins. Switch to `kv patch -method=rw` (read-modify-write; same approach claude-auth-sync already uses), with `kv put` only when the path doesn't exist yet. Preserves co-located keys (claude_ai_oauth_json). Enables onboarding emo onto the per-user Vaultwarden access tool. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
536 lines
18 KiB
Go
536 lines
18 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"reflect"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestVaultCommandsRegistered(t *testing.T) {
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want := map[string]Tier{
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"vault setup": TierWrite,
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"vault status": TierRead,
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"vault list": TierRead,
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"vault get": TierRead,
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"vault search": TierRead,
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"vault code": TierRead,
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"vault lock": TierWrite,
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}
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got := map[string]Tier{}
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for _, c := range vaultCommands() {
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got[c.name()] = c.Tier
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}
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for name, tier := range want {
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if got[name] != tier {
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t.Errorf("command %q: tier=%q, want %q (registered=%v)", name, got[name], tier, got[name] != "")
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}
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}
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}
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func TestVaultGroupInRegistry(t *testing.T) {
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if !isCommandGroup(buildRegistry(), "vault") {
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t.Fatal("`vault` group not wired into buildRegistry()")
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}
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}
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func TestVaultCredsPath(t *testing.T) {
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if got := vwCredsPath("emo"); got != "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo" {
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t.Fatalf("vwCredsPath = %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestBwAppDataDir(t *testing.T) {
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if got := bwAppDataDir("1001"); got != "/run/user/1001/homelab-bw" {
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t.Fatalf("bwAppDataDir = %q", got)
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}
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}
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// fakeRunner records calls and returns canned stdout/err keyed by argv[0]+first arg.
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type fakeRunner struct {
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calls [][]string
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out map[string]string // key: name+" "+strings.Join(argv," ") prefix-matched
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err map[string]error
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lastEnv []string
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}
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func (f *fakeRunner) run(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
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f.calls = append(f.calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
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f.lastEnv = envv
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key := name + " " + strings.Join(argv, " ")
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for k, v := range f.out {
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if strings.HasPrefix(key, k) {
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return v, f.err[k]
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}
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}
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return "", f.err[key]
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}
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func TestLoadCredsReadsFourFields(t *testing.T) {
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f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
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"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_email secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "emo@x.me",
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"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "hunter2",
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"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.abc",
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"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "sek",
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}}
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c, err := loadCreds(f.run, "emo")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("loadCreds: %v", err)
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}
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want := vwCreds{Email: "emo@x.me", MasterPassword: "hunter2", ClientID: "user.abc", ClientSecret: "sek"}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(c, want) {
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t.Fatalf("loadCreds = %+v want %+v", c, want)
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}
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}
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func TestLoadCredsUnconfigured(t *testing.T) {
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f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{}} // every field empty
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if _, err := loadCreds(f.run, "emo"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not configured") {
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t.Fatalf("want 'not configured' error, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestBwEnvCarriesSecretsNotArgv(t *testing.T) {
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c := vwCreds{ClientID: "user.abc", ClientSecret: "sek", MasterPassword: "hunter2"}
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env := bwSecretEnv("/run/user/1001/homelab-bw", c, "SESSIONKEY")
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joined := strings.Join(env, "\n")
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for _, want := range []string{
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"BW_CLIENTID=user.abc", "BW_CLIENTSECRET=sek", "BW_PASSWORD=hunter2",
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"BW_SESSION=SESSIONKEY", "BITWARDENCLI_APPDATA_DIR=/run/user/1001/homelab-bw",
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} {
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if !strings.Contains(joined, want) {
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t.Errorf("bwSecretEnv missing %q", want)
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}
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}
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if strings.Contains(joined, "PATH=") == false {
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t.Error("bwSecretEnv must keep a PATH so node/bw resolve")
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}
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}
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func TestBwGetArgsHasNoSessionInArgv(t *testing.T) {
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argv := bwGetArgs("password", "github")
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for _, a := range argv {
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if strings.Contains(a, "SESSION") || a == "--session" {
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t.Fatalf("session must travel via env, not argv: %v", argv)
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}
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}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(argv, []string{"get", "password", "github"}) {
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t.Fatalf("bwGetArgs = %v", argv)
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}
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}
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func TestBwListArgs(t *testing.T) {
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if got := bwListArgs(""); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"list", "items"}) {
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t.Fatalf("bwListArgs('') = %v", got)
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}
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if got := bwListArgs("git"); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"list", "items", "--search", "git"}) {
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t.Fatalf("bwListArgs('git') = %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestBwUnlockReturnsSession(t *testing.T) {
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f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{"bw unlock": "THE-SESSION-KEY"}}
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env := bwSecretEnv("/run/user/1001/homelab-bw", vwCreds{MasterPassword: "pw"}, "")
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sess, err := bwUnlock(f.run, env)
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if err != nil || sess != "THE-SESSION-KEY" {
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t.Fatalf("bwUnlock = %q, %v", sess, err)
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}
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// argv must use --passwordenv + --raw, never the password literal
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last := f.calls[len(f.calls)-1]
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if strings.Join(last, " ") != "bw unlock --passwordenv BW_PASSWORD --raw" {
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t.Fatalf("unlock argv = %v", last)
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}
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}
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func TestReturnMode(t *testing.T) {
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if returnMode(true) != "clipboard" || returnMode(false) != "stdout" {
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t.Fatal("returnMode wrong")
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}
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}
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func TestOSC52Encode(t *testing.T) {
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got := osc52("secret")
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want := "\x1b]52;c;" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("secret")) + "\a"
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if got != want {
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t.Fatalf("osc52 = %q want %q", got, want)
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}
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if osc52clear() != "\x1b]52;c;\a" {
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t.Fatalf("osc52clear wrong: %q", osc52clear())
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}
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}
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func TestTerminalAllowed(t *testing.T) {
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allow := []struct{ term, prog string }{
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{"xterm-kitty", ""}, {"alacritty", ""}, {"foot", ""}, {"tmux-256color", ""},
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{"screen-256color", ""}, {"xterm-256color", "WezTerm"}, {"xterm-256color", "ghostty"},
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}
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for _, c := range allow {
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if !terminalAllowed(c.term, c.prog) {
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t.Errorf("terminalAllowed(%q,%q) = false, want true", c.term, c.prog)
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}
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}
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deny := []struct{ term, prog string }{{"dumb", ""}, {"", ""}, {"vt100", ""}}
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for _, c := range deny {
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if terminalAllowed(c.term, c.prog) {
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t.Errorf("terminalAllowed(%q,%q) = true, want false", c.term, c.prog)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestOpLogLineHasNoSecretOrItem(t *testing.T) {
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line := opLogLine(opRecord{User: "emo", Verb: "get", PID: 10, PPID: 9, ParentComm: "claude", ItemName: "Chase Bank"})
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for _, must := range []string{"user=emo", "verb=get", "ppid=9", "parent=claude"} {
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if !strings.Contains(line, must) {
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t.Errorf("op-log missing %q: %s", must, line)
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}
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}
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for _, mustNot := range []string{"Chase", "password", "secret"} {
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if strings.Contains(line, mustNot) {
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t.Fatalf("op-log LEAKS %q (privacy violation): %s", mustNot, line)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestLockPath(t *testing.T) {
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if got := vaultLockPath("1001"); got != "/run/user/1001/homelab-vault.lock" {
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t.Fatalf("vaultLockPath = %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestParseGetArgs(t *testing.T) {
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o, err := parseGetArgs([]string{"github", "--field", "username", "--json"})
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if err != nil || o.name != "github" || o.field != "username" || !o.json {
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t.Fatalf("parseGetArgs = %+v err=%v", o, err)
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}
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d, _ := parseGetArgs([]string{"github"})
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if d.field != "password" || d.json {
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t.Fatalf("defaults wrong: %+v", d)
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}
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if _, err := parseGetArgs([]string{}); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("get with no name must error")
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}
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if _, err := parseGetArgs([]string{"x", "--field", "evil"}); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("invalid --field must error")
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}
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}
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func TestListNamesParsing(t *testing.T) {
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// bw list items returns JSON; listNames extracts name + id only.
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js := `[{"id":"1","name":"GitHub","login":{"username":"u"}},{"id":"2","name":"AWS"}]`
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names := listNames(js)
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if len(names) != 2 || names[0] != "GitHub (1)" || names[1] != "AWS (2)" {
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t.Fatalf("listNames = %v", names)
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}
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}
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func TestStatusSummaryUnconfigured(t *testing.T) {
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f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{}} // no creds
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s := statusSummary(f.run, "emo", "1001")
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if !strings.Contains(s, "not configured") {
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t.Fatalf("status = %q", s)
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}
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}
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func TestEnsureVaultTokenSetsScopedFallback(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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cfg := dir + "/.config/claude-auth-sync"
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if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg, 0o700); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(cfg+"/vault-token", []byte("SCOPED-TOK\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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t.Setenv("HOME", dir)
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t.Setenv("VAULT_TOKEN", "") // no ambient token
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ensureVaultToken()
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if got := os.Getenv("VAULT_TOKEN"); got != "SCOPED-TOK" {
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t.Fatalf("VAULT_TOKEN = %q, want scoped fallback to be exported", got)
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}
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}
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func TestEnsureVaultTokenKeepsExplicitEnv(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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cfg := dir + "/.config/claude-auth-sync"
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if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg, 0o700); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(cfg+"/vault-token", []byte("SCOPED-TOK"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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t.Setenv("HOME", dir)
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t.Setenv("VAULT_TOKEN", "ADMIN-TOK")
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ensureVaultToken()
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if got := os.Getenv("VAULT_TOKEN"); got != "ADMIN-TOK" {
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t.Fatalf("VAULT_TOKEN = %q, must not override an explicit token", got)
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}
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}
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func TestScopedTokenPath(t *testing.T) {
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if got := scopedTokenPath("/home/emo"); got != "/home/emo/.config/claude-auth-sync/vault-token" {
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t.Fatalf("scopedTokenPath = %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestVaultTokenSource(t *testing.T) {
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// Precedence: explicit $VAULT_TOKEN > ~/.vault-token (vault CLI native) >
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// the claude-auth-sync per-user scoped token. This is what lets a non-admin
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// workstation user (no ambient token) reach their own Vault path.
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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env string
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haveVaultToken bool
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scoped string
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wantTok, wantSrc string
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}{
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{"explicit env wins", "abc", true, "S", "", "env"},
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{"vault-token file used natively", "", true, "S", "", "file"},
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{"scoped fallback for non-admin", "", false, "S-TOK", "S-TOK", "scoped"},
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{"scoped value is trimmed", "", false, " S-TOK\n", "S-TOK", "scoped"},
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{"whitespace-only scoped is no token", "", false, " \n", "", "none"},
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{"nothing configured", "", false, "", "", "none"},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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tok, src := vaultTokenSource(c.env, c.haveVaultToken, c.scoped)
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if tok != c.wantTok || src != c.wantSrc {
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t.Errorf("%s: vaultTokenSource(%q,%v,%q) = (%q,%q), want (%q,%q)",
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c.name, c.env, c.haveVaultToken, c.scoped, tok, src, c.wantTok, c.wantSrc)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestKvWriteVerb(t *testing.T) {
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// merge=true → read-modify-write patch (needs only read+update, NOT the
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// `patch` capability the scoped workstation policy lacks).
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if got := kvWriteVerb(true); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw"}) {
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t.Fatalf("kvWriteVerb(true) = %v", got)
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}
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// merge=false → put (creates the path on first use)
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if got := kvWriteVerb(false); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"kv", "put"}) {
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t.Fatalf("kvWriteVerb(false) = %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestVaultWritePublicArgs(t *testing.T) {
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got := vaultWritePublicArgs(true, "emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci")
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want := []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo",
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"vaultwarden_email=e@x.me", "vaultwarden_client_id=user.ci"}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("vaultWritePublicArgs(merge) = %v", got)
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}
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if got := vaultWritePublicArgs(false, "emo", "e@x.me", "user.ci"); got[0] != "kv" || got[1] != "put" {
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t.Fatalf("vaultWritePublicArgs(create) must use `kv put`, got %v", got)
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}
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for _, a := range got {
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if strings.Contains(a, "master_password") || strings.Contains(a, "client_secret") {
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t.Fatalf("secret key leaked into public argv: %v", got)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestVaultWriteSecretArgsNoValueInArgv(t *testing.T) {
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for _, key := range []string{"vaultwarden_master_password", "vaultwarden_client_secret"} {
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got := vaultWriteSecretArgs(true, "emo", key)
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want := []string{"kv", "patch", "-method=rw", "secret/workstation/claude-users/emo", key + "=-"}
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if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("vaultWriteSecretArgs(%q) = %v", key, got)
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}
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if got[len(got)-1] != key+"=-" {
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t.Fatalf("secret value must be read from stdin (`%s=-`), got %v", key, got)
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}
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}
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}
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// recStdin records a stdin-bearing call for assertions.
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type recStdin struct {
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argv []string
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stdin string
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}
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// TestWriteCredsCreatesThenMerges: when the path is ABSENT the first (public)
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// write must `kv put` (create), and the two secrets must merge via patch -rw
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// with values on stdin only — never the buggy plain `kv patch` (needs `patch`).
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func TestWriteCredsCreatesThenMerges(t *testing.T) {
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var calls [][]string
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var stdinCalls []recStdin
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run := func(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
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calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
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if len(argv) >= 2 && argv[0] == "kv" && argv[1] == "get" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("no value found") // path absent
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}
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return "", nil
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}
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runStdin := func(name string, argv, envv []string, stdin string) (string, error) {
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stdinCalls = append(stdinCalls, recStdin{append([]string{name}, argv...), stdin})
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return "", nil
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}
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c := vwCreds{Email: "e@x.me", MasterPassword: "PW", ClientID: "user.ci", ClientSecret: "CS"}
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if err := writeCreds(run, runStdin, "emo", c); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("writeCreds: %v", err)
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}
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var sawPut, sawPlainPatch bool
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for _, cl := range calls {
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j := strings.Join(cl, " ")
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if strings.Contains(j, "kv put") {
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sawPut = true
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}
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if strings.Contains(j, "kv patch") && !strings.Contains(j, "-method=rw") {
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sawPlainPatch = true
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}
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}
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if !sawPut {
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t.Fatalf("path absent → public write must be `kv put`; calls=%v", calls)
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}
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if sawPlainPatch {
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t.Fatalf("must never use plain `kv patch` (needs `patch` capability); calls=%v", calls)
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}
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if len(stdinCalls) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("want 2 stdin secret writes, got %d", len(stdinCalls))
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}
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for _, sc := range stdinCalls {
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if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(sc.argv, " "), "kv patch -method=rw") {
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t.Errorf("secret write must use patch -method=rw: %v", sc.argv)
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}
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for _, a := range sc.argv {
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if strings.Contains(a, "PW") || strings.Contains(a, "CS") {
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t.Errorf("secret leaked into argv: %v", sc.argv)
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}
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}
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}
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if stdinCalls[0].stdin != "PW" || stdinCalls[1].stdin != "CS" {
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t.Errorf("stdin values wrong: %q,%q", stdinCalls[0].stdin, stdinCalls[1].stdin)
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}
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}
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// TestWriteCredsMergesWhenPresent: when the path EXISTS, every write must merge
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// (patch -rw) — a `kv put` would wipe sibling keys (e.g. claude_ai_oauth_json).
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|
func TestWriteCredsMergesWhenPresent(t *testing.T) {
|
|
var calls [][]string
|
|
run := func(name string, argv, envv []string) (string, error) {
|
|
calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
|
|
return "{}", nil // get succeeds → path exists
|
|
}
|
|
runStdin := func(name string, argv, envv []string, stdin string) (string, error) {
|
|
calls = append(calls, append([]string{name}, argv...))
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
c := vwCreds{Email: "e@x.me", MasterPassword: "PW", ClientID: "user.ci", ClientSecret: "CS"}
|
|
if err := writeCreds(run, runStdin, "emo", c); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("writeCreds: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, cl := range calls {
|
|
if strings.Contains(strings.Join(cl, " "), "kv put") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("path exists → must NOT `kv put` (wipes siblings): %v", cl)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow is the load-bearing security test: across the
|
|
// whole get flow (vault reads, bw config/status/login/unlock/get) NO secret
|
|
// value may appear in any command's argv — secrets travel via env/stdin only.
|
|
func TestNoSecretInArgvAcrossFlow(t *testing.T) {
|
|
uid := fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
|
|
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "SUPERSECRETPW",
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "CLIENTSEKRET",
|
|
"bw status": `{"status":"locked"}`,
|
|
"bw unlock": "SESSIONXYZ",
|
|
"bw get password github": "p@ss",
|
|
}}
|
|
if _, err := getValue(f.run, "emo", uid, getOpts{name: "github", field: "password"}); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("getValue: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, call := range f.calls {
|
|
for _, arg := range call {
|
|
for _, s := range []string{"SUPERSECRETPW", "CLIENTSEKRET", "SESSIONXYZ"} {
|
|
if strings.Contains(arg, s) {
|
|
t.Errorf("secret %q leaked into argv: %v", s, call)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(f.lastEnv, "\n"), "BW_SESSION=SESSIONXYZ") {
|
|
t.Error("expected BW_SESSION in the bw get env (test would be vacuous otherwise)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestClipboardDecision(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
stdoutTTY, stderrTTY bool
|
|
term, prog, want string
|
|
}{
|
|
{false, true, "xterm-kitty", "", "stdout"},
|
|
{true, true, "xterm-kitty", "", "clipboard"},
|
|
{true, true, "dumb", "", "refuse"},
|
|
{true, false, "xterm-kitty", "", "refuse"},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, c := range cases {
|
|
if got := clipboardDecision(c.stdoutTTY, c.stderrTTY, c.term, c.prog); got != c.want {
|
|
t.Errorf("clipboardDecision(%v,%v,%q) = %q, want %q", c.stdoutTTY, c.stderrTTY, c.term, got, c.want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestJSONToStdoutOK(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if jsonToStdoutOK(true) {
|
|
t.Error("must refuse JSON secret on a terminal")
|
|
}
|
|
if !jsonToStdoutOK(false) {
|
|
t.Error("must allow JSON when piped")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBwNeedsLogin(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if !bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"unauthenticated"}`) {
|
|
t.Error("unauthenticated → needs login")
|
|
}
|
|
if bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"locked"}`) {
|
|
t.Error("locked → no login (just unlock)")
|
|
}
|
|
if bwNeedsLogin(`{"status":"unlocked"}`) {
|
|
t.Error("unlocked → no login")
|
|
}
|
|
if !bwNeedsLogin(`not json`) {
|
|
t.Error("unparseable → attempt login")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestVaultHelpMentionsSecurity(t *testing.T) {
|
|
h := vaultHelp()
|
|
for _, want := range []string{"homelab vault get", "no-HITL", "your own", "setup"} {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(h, want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("vault help missing %q", want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestVaultBareGroupRegistered(t *testing.T) {
|
|
for _, c := range vaultCommands() {
|
|
if len(c.Path) == 1 && c.Path[0] == "vault" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatal("bare `vault` help command not registered")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getValue is the testable core: given a runner + opts, returns the secret value.
|
|
func TestGetValueFlow(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &fakeRunner{out: map[string]string{
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_master_password secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "pw",
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_id secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "user.x",
|
|
"vault kv get -field=vaultwarden_client_secret secret/workstation/claude-users/emo": "cs",
|
|
"bw status": `{"status":"locked"}`,
|
|
"bw unlock": "SESS",
|
|
"bw get password github": "p@ss",
|
|
}}
|
|
// Use real UID so os.MkdirAll(/run/user/<uid>/homelab-bw) succeeds.
|
|
uid := fmt.Sprintf("%d", os.Getuid())
|
|
val, err := getValue(f.run, "emo", uid, getOpts{name: "github", field: "password"})
|
|
if err != nil || val != "p@ss" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("getValue = %q, %v", val, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|