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infra/.claude/reference/authentik-state.md
Viktor Barzin 8e44ccaa65 docs: dashboard access is forward-auth + token-paste (OIDC SSO blocked) 
Correct the docs I'd written for the (reverted) oauth2-proxy SSO. Reality:
apiserver OIDC rejects all Authentik tokens (design §12), so the dashboard
uses forward-auth (admits kubernetes-* groups) + per-namespace SA token-paste.
Updates authentication.md, multi-tenancy.md, service-catalog, authentik-state,
and add-user skill (onboarding now documents the dashboard token). oauth2-proxy
+ k8s-dashboard OIDC app noted as idle. [ci skip]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 09:19:10 +00:00

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# Authentik Current State
> Snapshot of applications, groups, users, and flows. Use `authentik` skill for management tasks.
## Applications (11)
| Application | Provider Type | Auth Flow |
|-------------|--------------|-----------|
| Cloudflare Access | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Domain wide catch all | Proxy (forward auth) | implicit consent |
| Forgejo | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Grafana | OAuth2/OIDC | implicit consent |
| Headscale | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Immich | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Kubernetes | OAuth2/OIDC (public) | implicit consent |
| Kubernetes Dashboard | OAuth2/OIDC (confidential) | implicit consent |
| linkwarden | OAuth2/OIDC | explicit consent |
| Matrix | OAuth2/OIDC | implicit consent |
| wrongmove | OAuth2/OIDC | implicit consent |
> **Kubernetes Dashboard** (TF-managed in `stacks/k8s-dashboard/authentik.tf`):
> confidential client `k8s-dashboard`, built for seamless dashboard SSO via
> oauth2-proxy. **Currently IDLE** — the apiserver rejects all OIDC tokens (see
> `docs/plans/2026-06-04-k8s-dashboard-sso-design.md` §12), so the dashboard runs
> on forward-auth + token-paste instead and oauth2-proxy is unwired. Kept for a
> future SSO retry once apiserver OIDC is fixed.
>
> **admin-services-restriction** policy (TF-managed in
> `stacks/authentik/admin-services-restriction.tf`, adopted 2026-06-04): gates the
> 15 admin-only hostnames to `Home Server Admins`, with a carve-out admitting the
> `kubernetes-*` RBAC groups to `k8s.viktorbarzin.me` (dashboard login page).
## Groups (9)
| Group | Parent | Superuser | Purpose |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Allow Login Users | -- | No | Parent group for login-permitted users |
| authentik Admins | -- | Yes | Full admin access |
| Headscale Users | Allow Login Users | No | VPN access |
| Home Server Admins | Allow Login Users | No | Server admin access |
| Wrongmove Users | Allow Login Users | No | Real-estate app access |
| kubernetes-admins | -- | No | K8s cluster-admin RBAC |
| kubernetes-power-users | -- | No | K8s power-user RBAC |
| kubernetes-namespace-owners | -- | No | K8s namespace-owner RBAC |
| Task Submitters | -- | No | Task submission access |
## Users (8 real)
| Username | Name | Type | Groups |
|----------|------|------|--------|
| akadmin | authentik Default Admin | internal | authentik Admins, Home Server Admins, Headscale Users |
| vbarzin@gmail.com | Viktor Barzin | internal | authentik Admins, Home Server Admins, Wrongmove Users, Headscale Users |
| emil.barzin@gmail.com | Emil Barzin | internal | Home Server Admins, Headscale Users |
| ancaelena98@gmail.com | Anca Milea | external | Wrongmove Users, Headscale Users |
| vabbit81@gmail.com | GHEORGHE Milea | external | Headscale Users, kubernetes-namespace-owners, sops-vabbit81 |
| valentinakolevabarzina@gmail.com | Valentina | internal | Headscale Users |
| anca.r.cristian10@gmail.com | -- | internal | Wrongmove Users |
| kadir.tugan@gmail.com | Kadir | internal | Wrongmove Users |
## Login Sources
- **Google** (OAuth) -- user matching by identifier
- **GitHub** (OAuth) -- user matching by email_link
- **Facebook** (OAuth) -- user matching by email_link
- All sources use `invitation-enrollment` as enrollment flow (new users require invitation)
## Authorization Flows
- **Explicit consent** (`default-provider-authorization-explicit-consent`): Shows consent screen
- **Implicit consent** (`default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent`): Auto-redirects
## Invitation Enrollment Flow
Slug: `invitation-enrollment` | PK: `7d667321-2b02-4e16-8161-148078a8dac1`
New users can only sign up via invitation link. Admins generate single-use invite links.
### Stages (in order)
| Order | Stage | Type | Purpose |
|-------|-------|------|---------|
| 10 | invitation-validation | Invitation | Validates `?itoken=` parameter, blocks without valid token |
| 20 | enrollment-identification | Identification | Shows social login (Google/GitHub/Facebook) + passkey |
| 30 | enrollment-prompt | Prompt | Collects name and email (pre-filled from social login) |
| 40 | enrollment-user-write | User Write | Creates user in `Allow Login Users` group |
| 50 | enrollment-login | User Login | Auto-login after signup (policy: `invitation-group-assignment` adds user to target group from invitation `fixed_data.group`) |
### Invitation Management
Script: `.claude/scripts/authentik-invite.sh`
```bash
# Create invitation (single-use, no expiry)
./authentik-invite.sh create "Headscale Users"
# Create invitation with expiry
./authentik-invite.sh create "Wrongmove Users" --days 7
# Add user to group after enrollment
./authentik-invite.sh assign <username> "Headscale Users"
# List pending invitations
./authentik-invite.sh list
```
Invited users sign up via social login (Google/GitHub/Facebook) or passkey. No username/password enrollment.
The target group (e.g. "Headscale Users") is auto-assigned on enrollment via the `invitation-group-assignment` expression policy. The `assign` command is available for manual post-enrollment group changes.
## Cleanup Log (2026-03-13)
### Deleted Flows
- `enrollment-inviation` (typo) -- previous invitation attempt
- `headscale-authentication` -- not used by any provider
- `headscale-authorization` -- not used by any provider
- `default-enrollment-flow` -- password-based, unused
- `oauth-enrollment` -- replaced by invitation-enrollment
### Deleted Stages
- `enrollment-invitation`, `enrollment-invitation-write` (from old invitation flow)
- `invitation` (unbound)
- `default-enrollment-prompt-first`, `default-enrollment-prompt-second` (from default enrollment)
- `default-enrollment-user-write`, `default-enrollment-email-verification`, `default-enrollment-user-login`
### Deleted Groups
- `authentik Read-only` -- 0 users, unused role
### Deleted Policies
- `map github username to email` -- unbound
- `Map Google Attributes` -- unbound
### Deleted Roles
- `authentik Read-only` -- no group assignment
## Policy Fix (2026-04-06)
### Unbound brute-force-protection Policy
The `brute-force-protection` ReputationPolicy (PK: `ac98cb11-31d3-46ab-8883-bf51e6b09a60`, `check_username=True`, `check_ip=True`, `threshold=-5`) was bound to 3 authentication flows, causing "Flow does not apply to current user" for all unauthenticated users (no username to evaluate → failure_result=false → flow denied).
Removed bindings from:
- `default-authentication-flow` (PK: `34618cf3`) — username/password login
- `webauthn` (PK: `0b60c2a5`) — passkey login
- `default-source-authentication` (PK: via policybindingmodel `1a779f24`) — Google/GitHub/Facebook OAuth
Policy still exists with 0 bindings. If brute-force protection is needed, bind to the **password stage** (not the flow level).
## Session Duration (2026-05-01)
Pinned via Terraform in `stacks/authentik/`:
| Knob | Value | Surface | Effect |
|------|-------|---------|--------|
| `UserLoginStage.session_duration` on `default-authentication-login` | `weeks=4` | `authentik_stage_user_login.default_login` in `authentik_provider.tf` | Authenticated users stay logged in 4 weeks across browser restarts. No sliding refresh — resets on each login. |
| `ProxyProvider.access_token_validity` on `Provider for Domain wide catch all` | `weeks=4` | `authentik_provider_proxy.catchall.access_token_validity` in `authentik_provider.tf` | Cookie `Max-Age` on `authentik_proxy_*` and `expires` on rows in `authentik_providers_proxy_proxysession`. Bumped 2026-05-10 from `hours=168`. **Bumping requires `kubectl rollout restart deploy/ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost`** — the gorilla session store binds the value once at outpost startup; the 5-min provider refresh logs `"reusing existing session store"` and skips rebuild. |
| `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE` (server + worker) | `hours=2` | `server.env` + `worker.env` in `modules/authentik/values.yaml` | Anonymous Django sessions (bots, healthcheckers, partial flows) are reaped within 2h instead of the 1d default. |
Notes:
- There is **no** `Brand.session_duration`; `UserLoginStage` is the only correct lever for authenticated session lifetime.
- Embedded outpost session storage: PostgreSQL table `authentik_providers_proxy_proxysession` in authentik 2025.10+ (PR #16628), but **only when `IsEmbedded()` returns true** (i.e. `Outpost.managed == "goauthentik.io/outposts/embedded"`). Our outpost record had `managed=null` until 2026-05-10, which silently kept it on the gorilla `FilesystemStore` at `/dev/shm` (TMPDIR) and re-exposed the 2026-04-18 mismatched-session-ID class on every pod restart. Fix landed 2026-05-10: see `authentik_outpost.embedded` in `authentik_provider.tf` and post-mortem `2026-04-18-authentik-outpost-shm-full.md`.
- The proxy outpost service has a known goauthentik 2026.2.2 bug (`internal/outpost/controllers/k8s/service.py:52`): for embedded outposts the controller sets the Service selector to `app.kubernetes.io/name=authentik` (the server pods), not `authentik-outpost-proxy`. We work around it via a `kubernetes_json_patches.service` patch on the outpost record (replaces `/spec/selector` with the outpost's own labels). Without this, endpoints are empty and Traefik forward-auth fails over to the Basic Auth realm `Emergency Access`.
- The standalone embedded-outpost deployment needs `AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__{HOST,PORT,USER,PASSWORD,NAME}` env vars to reach the dbaas cluster — codified via `kubernetes_json_patches.deployment` envFrom the shared `goauthentik` Secret. The `app.kubernetes.io/component=server` pod label is also injected via JSON patch (matches the `component:server` half of the Service selector that the controller adds for embedded outposts).
- `ProxyProvider.remember_me_offset` stays UI-managed via `ignore_changes`.
- The Authentik provider's resource schema does **not** expose the `Outpost.managed` field. We rely on TF's "write only fields it knows about" semantic: the server-set `goauthentik.io/outposts/embedded` value is preserved across applies because Terraform never writes `managed`. Don't change the resource provider schema expectations without verifying this assumption holds.
- The `unauthenticated_age` env var is injected via `server.env` / `worker.env` (not `authentik.sessions.unauthenticated_age`) because we set `authentik.existingSecret.secretName: goauthentik`, which makes the chart skip rendering its own `AUTHENTIK_*` Secret. The `authentik.*` value block is therefore inert in this stack — anything new under `authentik.*` must use the `*.env` arrays instead. The same applies to the existing `authentik.cache.*`, `authentik.web.*`, `authentik.worker.*` blocks (currently inert; live values come from the orphaned, helm-keep-policy `goauthentik` Secret created by chart 2025.10.3 before `existingSecret` was introduced).
## Upgrade Validation Checklist
Run after **any** of these:
- Authentik chart version bump in `stacks/authentik/modules/authentik/main.tf` (the `version = "..."` line on `helm_release.authentik`).
- `goauthentik/authentik` Terraform provider version bump.
- Outpost pod recreation (kured reboot, eviction, manual `rollout restart`, scheduler move).
The fragile surfaces are the `kubernetes_json_patches` and the `Outpost.managed` field — both rely on assumptions that can silently break across upgrades. The checklist exercises the same path the alerts watch, so it doubles as a smoke test for the alerts.
```bash
# 1. Service routes to the outpost pod (NOT the server pods).
# Empty endpoints => auth-proxy fallback fires; expected: ONE pod IP, ports 9000/9300/9443.
kubectl -n authentik get endpoints ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost
# 2. Service selector still excludes the server pods. Expected: includes
# `app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik-outpost-proxy`. If it flips to
# `name: authentik`, the goauthentik upstream bug came back or our
# JSON patch was unset.
kubectl -n authentik get svc ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost -o jsonpath='{.spec.selector}'
# 3. Outpost mode + session backend. Expected log lines on startup:
# {"embedded":true,"event":"Outpost mode",...}
# {"event":"using PostgreSQL session backend",...}
# If embedded=false or `using filesystem session backend`, the postgres
# fix is broken — likely `Outpost.managed` got cleared, or the upstream
# schema started exposing `managed` and TF reset it.
kubectl -n authentik logs deploy/ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost | grep -E '"Outpost mode"|"session backend"' | head -3
# 4. /dev/shm is essentially empty (postgres backend = no filesystem use).
# A row count > a few dozen indicates filesystem fallback is firing.
kubectl -n authentik exec deploy/ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost -- sh -c 'df -h /dev/shm; ls /dev/shm | wc -l'
# 5. Postgres session table is growing with traffic. Expected: rows with
# `expires` ~28 days out (matches access_token_validity = weeks=4).
kubectl -n authentik exec deploy/goauthentik-server -- ak shell -c "
from django.db import connection; c = connection.cursor()
c.execute('SELECT COUNT(*), MAX(expires) FROM authentik_providers_proxy_proxysession')
print(c.fetchone())"
# 6. Edge auth flow: should be 302 → authentik. NOT 401 with WWW-Authenticate.
curl -sS -o /dev/null -D - 'https://terminal.viktorbarzin.me/' -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0' \
| grep -iE '^HTTP|^location|x-auth-fallback|www-authenticate'
# 7. Terraform plan-to-zero on the whole authentik stack.
( cd stacks/authentik && /home/wizard/code/infra/scripts/tg plan ) | grep -E 'No changes|Plan:'
```
Steps 1, 3, 6 cover the failure modes the Prometheus alerts trigger on (`AuthentikForwardAuthFallbackActive`, `AuthentikOutpostForwardAuth400Spike`). Steps 4 and 5 cover the silent-regression case (filesystem fallback) where the alerts don't fire but the system loses its postgres-backed session persistence on the next pod restart.
If step 2 shows the controller restored `app.kubernetes.io/name=authentik`, watch goauthentik/authentik issue tracker for fixes around `internal/outpost/controllers/k8s/service.py:52` — the upstream patch might let us drop our `kubernetes_json_patches.service` workaround.
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