infra/docs/plans/2026-04-25-nfs-hostile-migration-plan.md

NFS-Hostile Workload Migration — Plan

Date: 2026-04-25 Design: 2026-04-25-nfs-hostile-migration-design.md Beads: code-gy7h (Vault, epic), code-ahr7 (Immich PG)

Phase 1 — Immich PG (DONE 2026-04-25)

Step	Done
Snapshot extensions + row counts to /tmp/immich-pre-migration-*	✓
Quiesce immich-server + immich-machine-learning + immich-frame	✓
pg_dumpall → /tmp/immich-pre-migration-<ts>.sql (1.9 GB)	✓
Add kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.immich_postgresql_encrypted (10Gi, autoresize 20Gi cap)	✓
Swap claim_name at infra/stacks/immich/main.tf deployment	✓
Patch init container to gate on PG_VERSION (chicken-and-egg fix)	✓
Force pod restart so override.conf gets written	✓
Restore dump	✓
REINDEX clip_index, REINDEX face_index	✓
Scale apps back up	✓
Verify: \dx, row counts (~111k assets), HTTP 200 internal/external	✓
LV present on PVE host (vm-9999-pvc-...)	✓

Phase 1 follow-ups (not blocking)

• Old NFS PVC immich-postgresql-data-host retained 7 days for rollback. After 2026-05-02: remove module.nfs_postgresql_host from infra/stacks/immich/main.tf and the CronJob's reference.
• Backup CronJob (postgresql-backup) still writes to the NFS module. After cleanup, point it at a dedicated backup PVC or to the existing immich-backups NFS share.

Phase 2 — Vault Raft (IN PROGRESS)

Pre-flight (T-0) — DONE 2026-04-25 15:50 UTC

• Verify all 3 vault pods sealed=false, raft healthy.
• Take fresh vault operator raft snapshot save (anchor saved at /tmp/vault-pre-migration-20260425-155029.snap, 1.5 MB).
• Optional: scale ESO to 0 — skipped (auto-unseal sidecar is independent; ESO refresh churn is non-disruptive for one swap).
• Confirmed leader is vault-2 → migrate vault-0 first (non-leader), vault-1 next, vault-2 last (with step-down). Plan originally assumed vault-0 was leader; same intent (non-leader first).
• Thin pool headroom: 54.63% used, plenty for 6 × 2 GiB LVs.

Step 0 — Helm values + StatefulSet swap — DONE 2026-04-25 16:08 UTC

• Edit infra/stacks/vault/main.tf: change dataStorage.storageClass and auditStorage.storageClass from nfs-proxmox → proxmox-lvm-encrypted.
• kubectl -n vault delete sts vault --cascade=orphan (StatefulSet volumeClaimTemplates is immutable; orphan keeps pods+PVCs alive while we recreate the controller with the new template).
• tg apply -target=helm_release.vault → recreates STS with new VCT (full-stack tg plan blocks on unrelated for_each-with- apply-time-keys errors at lines 848/865/909/917; targeted apply on the helm release alone is the right scope here). Existing pods still on old NFS PVCs.

Step 1 — Roll vault-0 first (non-leader) — DONE 2026-04-25 16:18 UTC

• kubectl -n vault delete pod vault-0 --grace-period=30
• kubectl -n vault delete pvc data-vault-0 audit-vault-0
• STS controller recreated pod; new PVCs auto-provisioned on proxmox-lvm-encrypted (LVs vm-9999-pvc-fb732fd7-... data 4.12%, vm-9999-pvc-36451f42-... audit 3.99%).
• Hit and fixed: vault-0 CrashLoopBackOff'd with permission denied on /vault/data/vault.db. The helm chart's statefulSet.securityContext.pod block in main.tf only set fsGroupChangePolicy, replacing (not merging) the chart's defaults fsGroup=1000, runAsGroup=1000, runAsUser=100, runAsNonRoot=true. NFS exports made the missing fsGroup a no-op; ext4 LV needs it to chown the volume root for the vault user. Old vault-1/vault-2 pods were created before that block was added so they still had the chart-default securityContext from their original spec. Fix: provide all five fields explicitly in main.tf and re-apply. Same root cause will affect vault-1 and vault-2 swaps unless this stays in place.
• Wait Ready; auto-unseal sidecar unsealed; retry_join rejoined raft cluster.
• Verify: vault operator raft list-peers shows 3 voters, vault-0 follower, leader=vault-2. External HTTPS 200.

Step 2 — 24h soak (IN PROGRESS, ends ~2026-04-26 16:18 UTC)

Wait 24h. Confirm no Raft alarms, no Vault errors, downstream healthy. Rollback window for vault-0 closes here.

Step 3 — Roll vault-1 (T+24h)

Same shape as Step 1. The securityContext fix is now in main.tf so this should be straightforward.

Step 4 — 24h soak

Step 5 — Roll vault-2 (T+48h, leader)

• Step-down vault-2 first: kubectl -n vault exec vault-2 -- vault operator step-down.
• Then delete pod + PVCs as Step 1.

Step 6 — Cleanup

• Re-enable ESO if disabled: kubectl -n external-secrets scale deploy external-secrets --replicas=2.
• Verify kubectl get pvc -A | grep nfs-proxmox returns zero live-data results (only backup-host should remain, if any).
• If no consumers: remove inline kubernetes_storage_class.nfs_proxmox from infra/stacks/vault/main.tf (lines 29-42).

Verify (after each pod, then again at the end)

• All 3 PVC pairs on proxmox-lvm-encrypted.
• vault operator raft autopilot state healthy=true.
• External https://vault.viktorbarzin.me/v1/sys/health = 200.
• vault-raft-backup CronJob completes overnight (writes to NFS, stays NFS — correct).
• No Prometheus alerts (VaultSealed, VaultLeaderless).

Phase 3 — Released-PV cleanup (FOLLOW-UP)

After Phase 1+2 land cleanly, ~30 PVs in Released hold dead LVs. Reclaim by:

1. List Released PVs, confirm LV exists on PVE.
2. kubectl delete pv <name> (CSI removes underlying LV when PV is orphaned with Retain reclaim policy and no PVC reference).
3. If LV survives: manual lvremove pve/vm-9999-pvc-<uuid>.

Rollback

Phase	Trigger	Action
1	Immich UI broken / data loss	Revert claim_name; restore from /tmp/immich-pre-migration-*.sql to old NFS PVC
2 (mid-rolling)	Single pod broken	Delete the encrypted PVC; recreate with NFS SC explicitly; cluster keeps quorum from 2 healthy pods
2 (post-rolling, raft corrupt)	Cluster-wide failure	vault operator raft snapshot restore <pre-migration.snap>
Catastrophic	All Vault data lost	Restore from latest /srv/nfs/vault-backup/ snapshot via CronJob output